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ABSTRACT:
This dissertation investigates one of the ways countries can deal with the policy dilemmas and
political conflicts stemming from greater economic openness -- by providing side payment
compensation along-side liberalization. Such compensation includes any policy or good designed
to assist victims of liberalization initiatives without compromising the liberalization itself.
Examples include trade adjustment assistance for workers dislocated by US trade liberalization,
and the "structural funds" assistance for dislocations associated with European Community internal
market liberalization. The hope behind such compensation is that it will off-set the social costs of
and defuse opposition to freer trade. Whether it does so in practice is a matter of unresolved
debate, as are understanding of the incidence of compensation and the conditions that might explain
that incidence.
My research addresses these debates by describing, explaining, and evaluating the incidence of
compensation in US trade liberalization since 1934, and in European internal-market liberalization
through the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Community (EC)
since 1950. To explain the incidence of compensation, the dissertation develops, illustrates, and
tests a theory of compensation focused on egoistic bargaining between protectionist and liberalizer
coalitions, and in particular on two sets of conditions that influence such bargaining: the power and
trade policy platforms of protectionist groups; and the jurisdictional breadth and preexisting welfare
policies of the institutional settings through which bargaining takes place.
The main findings are three-fold. First, the incidence of side payment compensation varies
substantially across liberalization episodes, across groups within episodes, and across regional
settings (e.g. US vs. EC). Second, the case studies support a qualified defense of the policy of
compensation: Although compensation fell short of its promise, it usually provided modest short-
term benefits for the victims of liberalization, while significantly reducing protectionist opposition
in the short- and medium-term. Third, the US and European cases suggest that varying
protectionist power resources and platforms can explain the bulk of the US variation across
episodes and groups, and that the institutional conditions can explain the broad contrasts between
the US and the EC patterns of compensation.
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Introduction
Introduction
The globalization of economic life, marked by freer and growing trade and financial flows,
fuels some of our most contentious politics. Recent struggles over trade liberalization, such as the
NAFTA and the liberalization of European Union Common Agricultural Policy, suggest why. On
the one hand, increased openness expands the orbit of competition and exchange, promising more
efficiency and wealth for societies in the aggregate, and especially strong gains for some
internationally-oriented firms and the most skilled workers. On the other hand, greater openness
poses a variety of human and environmental costs. It unleashes foreign competition and outward
investment that promise heightened insecurity, dislocation and income losses for less
internationally competitive workers and firms. And some groups fear that greater openness may
give competitive advantage to producers in foreign countries with lax regulations, thereby fueling
"competition in laxity" that undermines hard-won labor and environmental standa&ds at home.
These real or anticipated consequences spark conflict between those seeking the benefits of freer
markets and those defending against its social and environmental costs. Every time government or
other groups promote some kind of trade liberalization, competing groups rise up in opposition.
Such distributional conflict creates a policy dilemma for governments and polities trying to
navigate a stable course through the international economy. Countries may embrace openness and
push through trade liberalization without providing any new or promised redress for the groups
who stand to lose from that liberalization -- a path that can be termed "uncompensated"
liberalization. This outcome leaves victims of the liberalization to rely on whatever existing
welfare, industrial policy or other general assistance the state provides. Although such assistance
has traditionally been greater in more open economies, the deepening of openness has made it
increasingly difficult for governments to sustain generous safety nets in the face of competitive
pressures wrought by openness (Rodrik 1997). In any event, liberalization often proceeds in
settings where broad sociJ assistance is lacking or minimal, leaving market victims more
vulnerable. And preexisting safety nets do little to protect social and environmental regulations
from "competition in laxity." Such uncompensated liberalization, then, may bring benefits of
economic openness, but at potentially high social and environmental cost -- a cost that some groups
in society may simply not accept.
In the face of such costs and opposition, then, polities may make the opposite choice:
retreat from openness, and in particular back away from or down-grade liberalization initiatives, a
path that can be termed "compromised liberalization." Such a retreat could involve either
exempting some groups from the reach of liberalization, or watering-down the initiative's
Burgoon
Introduction
ambition. And such protectionism ranges from across-the-board closure to piecemeal
protectionism, such as pursuit of protectionist safeguards to protect certain worker and
environmental standards. Whatever the form and extent of such retreat, any preserved welfare or
standards made possible by this compromised liberalization path comes at the expense of aggregate
efficiency and wealth. The distributional costs of openness, in short, appear to force polities and
their governments to make a difficult choice between equity and efficiency.
This dissertation is about a way governments can avoid such a choice -- by providing side
payment compensation along-side the liberalization of trade or other flows. Political economists
have long recognized that polities can smooth the distributional costs and conflict of trade
liberalization by providing hypothetical systems of compensation to the losers of openness,
generally seeing "compensation" as some cash pay-out designed to off-ret losses. My concern is
with "side payment compensation" more broadly, including any policy assistance targeted to help
the anticipated losers of liberalization and that doesn't compromise that liberalization.' Real-life
examples of such compensation include US adjustment assistance for workers and firms dislocated
by various post-War episodes of trade liberalization, ?:id the European Community's "structural
funds" created partly to off-set the risks of internal market liberalization. The promise of
compensation is that it can simultaneously off-set the social costs of and defuse political opposition
to freer trade. This allows countries to reap globalization's benefits without having to bear all its
costs. I call the provision of compensation along-side liberalization "compensated liberalization."
Compensated Liberalization's Unresolved Controversies
The impetus for a study of compensated liberalization is that existing literature on the
politics of economic openness, and of distributional conflict generally, harbors unresolved
disagreement or silence over the most basic questions about the use of side payments during
liberalization struggles. First, has compensation humanized and facilitated freer trade? Research
from a variety of political stripes -- from economistic research on how to reconcile particularistic
and general interests, to more sociological research on what nations do to protect themselves from
the vagaries of open markets -- suggest that compensation holds promise to simultaneously off-set
social costs of and defuse opposition to freer trade (Coase 1960; Polanyi 1944; Aho and Bayard
1984). Yet others claim that in practice compensation may fall short of this promise, because it
will tend to provide little help to the real victims of liberalization, encourages rent-seeking abuses
from unscrupulous groups, and does little to actually lower existing opposition while possibly
sparking new opposition (Trebilcock et.al. 1990; Banks and Tumlir 1986).
Throughout this study I use the term "side payment compensation" interchangeably with "compensation" and "side
payments."
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Second, in which liberalization episodes and to which groups has side payment
compensation been provided? Some scholarship implies that compensation should be a common
part of political life, including liberalization (Coase 1960; Tullock 1967). Others observe or assert
that such compensation tends to be relatively rare or at least "under-provided," in the sense of
being provided less than rational pursuit of efficiency and equity would predict (Oye 1992). And
political economy scholarship is, in any event, ambiguous on the extent to which side payments are
the mechanisms that link the tendencies of more open economies to have more generous public
spending (Cameron 1978; Rodrik 1996).
Third and finally, why has compensation been provided during some episodes and to some
groups and not others? About this explanatory issue, political economists have little to say about
compensation per s6, and in any event the insights we can derive don't disagree so much as speak
in different tongues. But an important division is between what can be loosely labeled an "altruist"
and an "egoist" approach. The altruist perspective suggests that compensation reflects social
contract or ideational norms that call for providing some policy redress to cushion members of
society from the adjustment costs and risks of free trade and openness (Katzenstein 1985,
Goldstein 1989). The egoist perspective, on the other hand, suggests that compensation reflects
the dynamics of self-interested bargaining between protectionists and liberalizers (Tollison and
Willett 1979; Friman 1993). Within the egoist perspective, the literature divides over what shapes
the dynamics of such bargaining: (1) characteristics of the groups engaged in bargaining, such as
the economic positioning and beliefs that underlie tastes for protection, or the sinews of political
power that translate such tastes into policy demands; (2) or characteristics of the institutional setting
within which groups bargain, such as information-gathering capacities of institutions that can
mediate the "transaction costs" of identifying and negotiating side payments (Keohane 1984).
Unfortunately, this descriptive, normative and analytical attention to. compensation lacks
both empirical grounding and theoretical development, with the result that we don't know which if
any of the views on the basic questions about compensated liberalization is correct. First, none of
the literature has developed on empirical grounds. The literature addressing whether compensation
humanizes and facilitates freer trade is the most empirical, but even it only offers anecdotal
illustrations of when compensation does or does not work. Without more systematic review of the
use of compensation over a more significant swath of time and space of liberalization we don't
even know when compensation emerged from liberalization struggles, let alone why it has been
provided at some times and places and not others, or when if at all it off-sets social costs and
facilitates openness.
Second, the insights into what explains the incidence of compensation suffer from being
theoretically under-identified, under-developed, and under-specified. Most of the insights are
under-identified in the sense that they offer predictions of outcomes that cannot distinguish side
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payment compensation from its alternatives -- protectionist redress (compromised liberalization)
and nothing at all (uncompensated liberalization). Some insights focused on the power of groups,
for instance, might anticipate when groups should win redress, but say nothing about when that
redress will take the form of compensation as opposed to protectionism. The insights, moreover,
are under-developed in the sense that alone or in combination they offer predictions about very
narrow ranges of the incidence of side payments. For instance, the institutional factors on which
some focus cannot predict variations in incidence that exist across groups and time -- within stable
institutional settings. Finally, insights often lack specificity in that they highlight immeasurable or
difficult-to-measure explanatory conditions. For instance, the focus on transaction cost conditions
often says too little about what observable features in political life might mediate such conditions.
Most of these empirical and theoretical problems reflect the lack of any direct study of
compensation, not poor theoretical insight or sloppy empirics. Still, without more empirical
attention and some synthetic theoretical innovation focused on compensation, the most basic
questions about compensated liberalization remain unanswered. When has compensation been
provided during trade liberalization? Why has compensation been provided at some times and not
others? And how successful has compensation been at off-setting the social costs of and
facilitating freer trade?
Description, Explanation, and Evaluation of Compensated Liberalization
To better answer these questions, this study (1) describes when, where and to whom
compensation has been provided in recent trade liberalization history; (2) develops and illustrates a
more identified, developed and specified theory that can explain why compensation is provided at
some times and not others; and (3) assesses whether compensation, when provided, actually
humanizes and facilitates freer trade. The dissertation pursues these tasks through comparison of
almost all the major episodes of US trade liberalization since 1934 with four episodes of European
internal market liberalization under the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the
European Community (EC) since 1950 -- each episode encompassing the legislative proposal,
international negotiation, and legislative/referendum ratification of some trade liberalization.
Describing Compensated Liberalization. To describe the incidence of compensation over
time and space, this study investigates the history of discrete liberalization episodes, to find
examples of side payment compensation. This entails focusing on primary and secondary accounts
of bargaining among state and societal groups arrayed in liberalizer and protectionist coalitions, to
find out whether the bargainers discussed, promised, or provided some policy or benefit for the
anticipated or alleged victims of the liberalization episode. Such accounts reveal whether and when
side payments provide the mechanism by which countries cushion their societies from the blows
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wrought by economic openness. And they reveal variation in the incidence of compensation over
time and space -- across episodes, across groups within episodes, across countries, and across
national and supra-national levels of governance through which countries pursue liberalization.
Explaining Compensated Liberalization. To explain the incidence of compensation
unearthed by this description, the study develops a theory based on the premise that side payments
emerge only when the liberalization initiative is under threat of defeat or costly retaliation by
protectionists, and when the bargaining groups recognize compensation to be a feasible alternative
to protectionism. Such a theory sides with those who see compensation reflecting egoistic
bargaining rather than altruistic pursuit of societal fairness. But it also seeks to improve upon the
egoistic bargaining perspective by synthesizing and moving beyond the under-identified, -
developed, and -specified focus on groups and institutions. It does so by developing an egoist
bargaining framework and focusing on political features of groups and their institutional setting
that predict variations over time and space in the incidence of compensation rather than
protectionism or nothing at all.
First, I argue that the power and platforms of protectionist groups strongly influence
whether liberalization struggles will yield side payments. The more political resources protectionist
groups have to threaten or retaliate against a liberalization initiative, the more likely they are to elicit
some redress from the liberalizers. And the more issues other than protectionist demands that
protectionist groups have on their trade policy platforms, the easier and more tempting it will be to
link the liberalization to new issues. The interests and stated platforms of liberalizers and others in
society set limits on whether, what kind, and how much compensation will be provided, but multi-
issue protectionist platforms will increase the likelihood that redress will take the form of side
payments rather than protectionist exemption from or revision of the liberalization. Thus, I
hypothesize that compensation will be provided where protectionist coalitions not only have the
political resources to threaten liberalization, but also approach bargaining with multiple demands
rather than single-minded protectionism.
Second, I argue that the institutional setting through which groups bargain -- both the
domestic ratification institutions such as legislatures, and the supra-national negotiating arenas --
affect the power to threaten liberalization and the desirability of side payments vis , vis other
redress. Trade policy-making institutions with broader jurisdictional reach -- with authority over
more issues than trade policy -- will make it easier to identify and negotiate linkable issues and to
hold liberalization hostage to action on other issues, thereby encouraging compensation.
Meanwhile, the generosity of preexisting welfare state benefits shapes whether side payments are
redundant to or conflict with existing mechanisms for redressing pain. I hypothesize that more
generous preexisting welfare will discourage provision of side payments during liberalization
struggles. Together, these two institutional conditions suggest the following hypothesis: domestic
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or international institutions that not only have jurisdiction over issues -ther than trade policy but
also provide modest social welfare assistance will encourage side payment compensation during
bargaining, whereas settings with narrow jurisdictions and/or generous welfare will tend to
discourage compensation.
Evaluating Compensated Liberalization. To assess the usefulness of compensation, the
study investigates several measures of compensation's effectiveness at facilitating liberalization and
of actually humanizing the real and anticipated pain of liberalization. First, for each of the
liberalization episodes, the research gauges opposition before and after provision of compensation
-- relaying on testimony, press statements, and lobbying expenditures and other measures of
opposition -- to see if that provision made a difference for the targeted opposition. The research
also considers whether compensation provides incentives or assistance to exit the trade-impacted
sector and adjust to more promising areas, and looks for evidence of rent-seeking or extortionate
abuses of compensation, such that compensation offers might yield more rather than less
opposition. Together, these offer some measure of effectiveness in facilitating liberalization.
Second, the research considers the scale and distribution of financial and in-kind costs and
benefits, and summarizes implementation studies of the compensation packages that actually
emerge from bargaining. Together with the information on abuses, these provide some measure of
whether and how much compensation off-set social costs of freer trade, and of the equity of
providing compensation.
Comparing US Trade Liberalization and EC Intemal-market Liberalization
The US and European Community cases provide good grounds for describing and
evaluating the variation in the incidence of compensation, and for illustrating and testing the above
theory of compensated liberalization. The US and EC experience encompasses dozens of
liberalization episodes, including both bilateral and multilateral initiatives, with the episodes
divided into both domestic and international phases -- domestic authorization and ratification, as
well as international negotiation. The episodes also include liberalization initiatives of varying
ambition and focused on a variety of sectors and trade impediments to be liberalized. And the
episodes span two different regions with distinct political-economic histories. This is a wide
landscape to identify and assess the actual pattern of variation in the incidence of compensated
liberalization. Given the difficulty of unearthing some of the deals that may constitute side
payment compensation, the US cases have the added value of having been subject to as much
empirical scrutiny as any issue of public policy, with journalists and historians shining much light
upon even the darkest corridors of political exchange.
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More importantly, the US and EC cases are good grounds for illustrating and testing my
egoist theory of compensation, because they capture substantial but controlled variation in the
theory's group and institutional conditions. The US history captures differences over time and
sector in the power resources and platforms of protectionist groups. It only exhibits modest
variation, however, in the institutional setting through which trade policy is bargained, particularly
in jurisdiction and welfare that I hypothesize predict the incidence of side payments.
Meanwhile, comparing the US trade history with EC internal-market liberalization captures
significant institutional variation. The inter-governmental conferences and Council of Ministers
through which EC internal-market liberalization have been negotiated have broader jurisdiction than
the supra-national institutions through which US trade liberalization has gotten negotiated, such as
the inter-governmental arenas for GATT and the NAFTA. And at the national-level, most
European institutions have substantially more developed and generous welfare states than their US
counterparts. But the broad US-EC trends do not vary systematically in the power and platforms
of protectionist groups. As a result, the US history illustrates and tests the power and platform
conditions while controlling for the theory's institutional conditions, and the US-EC comparison
illustrates the institutional conditions while controlling for power-platform differences.
The Findings
The research into these cases generates three sets of findings, corresponding with the
respective goals of describing, explaining, and evaluating the incidence of compensation in
liberalization history.
What is the Incidence of Compensation? First and most generally, the US and EC
liberalization histories revealed that compensation was provided in plenty of liberalization episodes,
to plenty of groups expected to suffer from liberalization. But the most groups in many episodes
settled for a mix of uncompensated and compromised liberalization. And compensation only rarely
involved promises or decisions to expand broad, untargeted social welfare provision, implying that
side payments were rarely the mechanism linking openness with broader government spending.
Within these general patterns lurks important variation, however, in when and to whom it
compensation has been provided. In some eleven US liberalization episodes between 1934 and
1962, for instance, compensation was unheard of -- with the struggles instead ending in a mix of
uncompensated liberalization with the losers receiving no redress or compromised liberalization
where the redress was protectionist exemption or revision. Through bargaining over the 1962
Trade Expansion Act, however, explicit compensation was provided for the first time, principally
in the form of trade adjustment assistance (TAA) to workers and firms. In all subsequent
legislative episodes of US liberalization, negotiations yielded at least some talk of compensation,
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always including reform or expansion of the TAA but also sometimes including other
compensation subjects, such as tax deferrals and proposals to reform social welfare provisions.
Most of this US compensation has been modest in the scale of benefits provided and the
number of groups helped. And the adjustment assistance program, in particular, has been the
object of ridicule and retrenchment when trade liberalization initiatives are not under review. The
NAFTA liberalization, however, represents a partial exception to this pattern in that it yielded more
generous and diverse compensation, in the form of adjustment assistance, environmental cleanup,
tri-country commissions for monitoring labor and environmental standards, and a flurry of last-
minute benefits targeted more narrowly at ambivalent legislators.
Finally, most of this US compensation was negotiated during domestic phases of the
episode and provided by national governments, with very little compensation negotiated during
international phases of negotiations or provided by supra-national institutions. The NAFTA
trilateral commissions again represent notable exceptions to this rule. In short, the US
liberalization history reveals a pattern of side payment compensation that is inconsistent in its
incidence, modest in its scale and scope, and national in the institutions through which it has been
provided and negotiated.
Compared to this US pattern, EC internal market liberalization exhibits a pattern of side
payment compensation that is nearly opposite: more consistent in incidence, more generous in
scale and scope, and more supra-national in the institutions through which it has been provided and
negotiated. All five of the major episodes of EC internal-market liberalization yielded substantial
side payments to buy the support of national delegations explicitly conditioning their support for
liberalization upon provision of compensation packages. Negotiations over the ECSC, for
instance, yielded the ECSC Re-adaptation program to fund job retraining and relocation for
workers, and restructuring for firms, as part of the other transitional arrangements that included
temporary subsidization. The European Economic Community (EEC) negotiations elicited not only
a European Social Fund (ESF), a broader version of this Re-adaptation program, but also explicit
commitments to upwardly-harmonize equal-wage laws, length of the standard work week, and
standard vacation benefits -- all to off-set the costs of EEC tariff liberalization. And the Single
European Act yielded the commitment to expand and reform all Structural Funds programs to off-
set the risks of SEA liberalization, ultimately doubling the Funds budget to nearly $170 billion over
a five year period between 1994-99. This amounts to a yearly fund more than an order of
magnitude larger than the US TAA ever was.
Almost all of the EC side payments were provided by supra-national institutions under EC
Council of Ministers and EC Commission decisions and policies, and negotiated during the
international, inter-governmental stages of the episodes. Surprisingly, during the domestic stages
of negotiating these integration and liberalization landmarks, very little side payment compensation
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was ever seriously discussed, let alone enacted. And national governments appear to have
provided very little side payment compensation at any stage of the negotiations. Thus, whereas
US compensated liberalization has been primarily national and domestic, EC compensated
liberalization has been primarily a supra-national sport.
What Explains This US and EC Variation? The group-institutional theory of compensated
liberalization predicts much of the variation in the incidence of compensation. In particular, the
power and platforms of protectionist groups broadly predict the incidence of compensation in the
US episodes, while the institutional conditions predict the broad differences between US and
European compensation experience. In the US, the 1962 Trade Expansion Act marked the first
liberalization episode when the protectionist coalition encompassed groups, such as organized
labor, that not only had resources to threaten liberalization but also approached the episode with
multi-issue platforms embracing related policies like adjustment assistance. This predicts what the
history reveals: the advent of compensated liberalization in 1962. Growing disenchantment with
side payment redress and a shift to unconditional protectionism among many groups -- borne of
increasing trade competition and failures of previous adjustment assistance compensation -- predict
the subsequent modesty of adjustment assistance or any other compensation.
The NAFTA episode, however, inspired a protectionist coalition of unprecedented diversity
and determination, strongly threatening the liberalization at every point in its evolution, and
comprising diverse groups with multi-issue platforms, including a Labor movement softening its
unconditional protectionism. This extraordinary power and platform of the anti-NAFTA coalition
predicts the exceptional diversity, reach, and supranationality of the NAFTA compensation.
The very different institutional settings within which US and EC liberalization unfolded,
moreover, account for how Europe's EC liberalization yielded more generous and supra-nationally
provided compensation than did US liberalization. EC internal market liberalization has been part
of a broader political and economic integration project where internal market liberalization got
pursued simultaneously with other policy reforms, implying a broader jurisdiction and more
opportunities and demands for subjects of side payments. This made compensation at the
international level easier and more necessary than in the US. The greater generosity of most
European welfare states compared to the US, meanwhile, complicated and diminished interest in
changing domestic welfare assistance to compensate for the costs of particular liberalization --
hence fewer domestic compensatory side payments.
Thus, in the EC the combination of broad jurisdiction and modest welfare at the
supranational level with broad jurisdiction and generous welfare at the national level predicts what
the history reveals: consistent and generous compensation at the supranational level. In the US,
we see nearly the opposite: the combination of narrow jurisdiction and modest welfare provision at
the supranational level, and broad jurisdiction and modest welfare at the national level. And such
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an institutional configuration again broadly predicts what the history reveals: more frequent and
substantial compensation negotiated and provided by national institutions, smaller scale and less
frequent compensation negotiated during international phases or provided by supra-national
institutions.
Have Side Payments Humanized and Facilitated Freer Trade? Finally, the study provides
qualified support for the policy of compensated liberalization. In the cases studied, compensation
varied a lot over time and space in the amount and effectiveness of the redress provided, and in
how much it lowered existing or sparked new opposition to freer trade. In the US, for instance,
compensation was very effective in buying labor support for the 1962 TEA liberalization, even
though it ended up providing few benefits for workers and did little to promote adjustment out of
non-competitive sectors. And in 1993, NAFTA compensation to environmental groups was much
more successful than that to labor, both in the redress offered and the opposition defused. The EC
Structural Funds, meanwhile, were more generous, provided more redress and bought off more
political opposition during the Single European Act than had compensation provided in previous
internal-market liberalization episodes.
The cases show some evidence of modest abuses and of the occasional extortionate demand
sparked by offers of compensation. For instance, some free-trade Democrats and Republicans
exaggerated demands and alleged pain to get some pork in the final days of the NAFTA fight. And
during the inter-governmental negotiations over the SEA liberalization, the Irish delegation may
have exaggerated how much pain their polity would endure due to SEA, designed to get more
regional assistance and other side payments. These abuses, however, appear to be relatively rare
exceptions to the rule of the groups making compensation demands and getting compensation
redress roughly in line with anticipated pain.
The cases suggest that compensation's biggest down-side may well be an unintended
consequence not foreseen by either compensation's supporters or detractors: compensating the
losers of trade liberalization has done little to institutionalize or build support for, and may even
have undermined, broader policy arrangements for remedying the pain of open markets. For
instance, US labor's waning interest in and Congress' jealous support for a minimal TAA as a
symbolic gesture of compassion has insured weak but persistent use of trade adjustment assistance
as a cornerstone of US compensated liberalization. This pattern of support and weak assistance,
however, has discredited the efficacy of public training policies and thwarted efforts to develop
more generalized and more generous active labor market policies. In Europe, providing targeted
compensation during internal market liberalization tended to draw attention away from the more
capable and promising national solutions for mitigating liberalization's risks.
Smoothing over this variation and considering the unexpected, compensation provided less
redress and defused less opposition than hoped for. But it did provide redress that was better for
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its beneficiaries than the alternative of uncompensated liberalization, and in many cases did make
liberalization more possible or sustainable. Especially if compensation packages can be designed
to avoid abuses and to reinforce or at least steer clear of broader safety net arrangements, the
judicious use of compensation can off-set the social costs of and facilitate economic openness.
The Chapter Plan
The rest of this dissertation develops all the above theoretical and empirical claims in eight
chapters. Chapter One reviews the political economy literature to glean what existing scholarship
has to say about the nature, propriety and origins of side payment compensation during
liberalization, and then lays out my attempt to improve upon this literature. The focus is on the
terms on which real-world compensation can be better described and evaluated, on a theory of
compensated liberalization that can better explain variation in the incidence of compensation, and
on a research design for carrying out these goals. The bulk of the thesis, Chapters Two through
Eight, chronicles, evaluates and explains the inconsistent, modest, and national compensated
liberalization in the United States since 1934, and more consistent, generous, and supra-national
compensated liberalization within the EC.
Chapters Two through Six cover the history of side payment politics in US trade
liberalization, with the chapters divided chronologically, according to the important periods in that
history. Chapter Two details and explains the transition from the period of uncompensated and
compromised liberalization between 1934 and 1962, to the 1962 advent of compensated
liberalization with the provision of trade adjustment assistance and of a few industry-specific side
payments during the 1962 Trade Expansion Act.
Chapter Three details the maturation and subsequent decline of compensated liberalization
between 1963 and 1973. It begins with the provision of improved adjustment assistance for auto
workers in the struggle for the 1965 Auto Pact. And it then details the subsequent disappointment
and apparent decline in compensated liberalization with the AFL-CIO's rejection of adjustment
assistance and turn to unconditional protectionism, and with the aborted liberalization initiatives of
the Johnson and early Nixon Administrations.
Chapter Four chronicles the tenacity of compensated liberalization in the subsequent
decade, 1974 to 1984. It first seeks to describe, explain, and evaluate the baroque side payment
politics of the 1974 Trade Reform Act (TRA). It then analyzes the unusual provision of industry-
specific side payments during the international phase of Tokyo Round liberalization that the TRA
authorized. And the chapter concludes by studying the cycling fortunes of trade adjustment
assistance in the aftermath of that Round through the 1980s -- upward ratcheting of TAA
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compensation during every subsequent legislated liberalization initiative, but always resulting in
modest and politically-vulnerable compensation.
Chapter Five concludes the US history with a detailed account of the unprecedented
compensated liberalization of the NAFTA. The focus is on describing, explaining and evaluating
the exceptionalism of this episode -- the greater scale, diversity and supranationality of the NAFTA
side paym, oackages relative to any previous US compensated liberalization.
Chapters Six and Seven contrast this US trade liberalization history with that of internal
market liberalization within the European Community between 1950 and 1990. That EC history is
subdivided chronologically into its most dramatic moves towards greater liberalization. The focus
of both chapters is on how and why the pattern of compensation to emerge from these episodes is
more consistent, generous, and supra-national than the US pattern. Chapter Six provides the side
payment history of the initiation of Community activity in the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) and the founding of the European Economic Community (EEC) via the Treaty of Rome.
Chapter Seven covers the remaining major EC liberalization episodes: the Greek and
Iberian enlargements, and the extended negotiation and implementation of the Single European Act.
The discussion in Chapter Seven not only continues the explanation of the US-EC differences, but
also chronicles some important changes over time in the development of EC compensated
liberalization: the increasing generosity of the benefits provided; greater willingness to offer and
accept promises of compensation that get detailed after ratification of liberalization; and the
narrowing focus of compensatory side payments on structural-fund reforms and expansion, rather
than regulatory harmonization, technology policies, or other side payment subjects.
Chapter Eight concludes the dissertation by reviewing and extending the argument and
findings. It recaps the argument and case evidence, and then offers recommendations for both
liberalizers and protectionists to better use side payments to humanize and facilitate freer trade.
Finally, the chapter situates the findings in the broader context of trade liberalization cases outside
the US and EC settings, and of other issue areas like privatization and waste facility siting. This
context suggests several directions for further study into when and how side payment
compensation can be used to humanize and facilitate economic openness, and more broadly, to
better reconcile general and particularistic interests.
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Chapter One
If there's a universal truth in a political economy literature rife with historiographic and
theoretical divisions, it is that transitions to economic openness are painful and politically
contentious. Even free trade's most unflappable cheerleaders recognize that pursuit of aggregate
prosperity through liberalization temporarily dislocates and imposes concentrated income losses
upon some, less competitive workers and firms. More circumspect free traders expect the costs to
be more permanent and serious for such groups, and potentially for broader systems of labor and
environmental regulation. And to free trade's critics, the human and environmental pain of
openness may well outweigh in the aggregate its efficiency benefits. Whatever the mix of costs
and benefits these perspectives anticipate, all agree that moves to liberalize commercial trade or
other flows will likely spark acute conflict between the winners and losers of openness.
Political economists have also found common cause in looking for ways societies can
assuage this distributional conflict so as to promote social peace and prosperity. But here there are
no universal truths. The candidates political economists offer and that societies have actually
pursued are many. They range from doing nothing and letting preexisting safety nets or the sheer
job-creating power of free trade run their course, to stanching the pace of or withdrawing
completely from economic openness.
In between these polar solutions is the provision of side payment compensation along-side
liberalization, a way to deal with conflict over openness that has also received ample, if diffused
attention from political economists. Although most of the attention to compensated liberalization
has come from scholars focusing less on compensation directly than on generic issues of
bargaining or on issue areas other than trade liberalization, a wide range of scholarship implicitly or
explicitly considers such compensation one way societies have and/or should off-set the social
costs of and facilitate freer trade.
This scholarship harbors disagreement over three of the most basic questions about
compensated liberalization. First, can providing side payment compensation during trade or other
liberalization off-set the social costs of and facilitate freer trade? A range of otherwise conflicting
political economists suggest that compensation holds promise to provide such double-edged
benefits, while a number of more skeptical researchers find reasons why compensation may fall
short of its promise. Second, when and to which groups has compensation emerged from
struggles over liberalization? Some writings suggest compensation should be a common part of
political and liberalization life, while others anticipate or observe that compensation uncommon or
under-provided. Finally, what explains when side payment compensation emerges from
bargaining over liberalization? Political economists suggest a number of characteristics of groups
and their institutional setting that may explain this incidence of compensation.
The present chapter reviews the literature addressing these three questions and finds that
empirical and theoretical shortcomings make it impossible to know which if any of the answers is
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correct, and leaves the questions largely unanswered. All the writings about compensation, we
shall see, suffer from very little empirical research, with claims backed by anecdotal evidence at
best and purely theoretical at worst, rather than grounded in the actual use of compensation during
liberalization across time and space. Without such empirical grounding, we know little about when
compensation has or has not emerged from liberalization struggles, let alone about what can
explain the incidence of compensation, or about whether compensation off-sets social costs and
facilitates openness.
Not surprising given the modest analytical attention compensation has received, the
explanatory insights not only suffer from empirical silence, but also from the theoretical
shortcomings: They tend to be under-identified, to lack the explanatory reach to explain variation
over any significant range of time and space, and to generate few measurable and testable
propositions. The most important of these problems is the first, that existing insights are too
under-identified to predict or understand the incidence of compensation as distinct from its
alternatives -- protectionist redress or nothing at all. In particular, the insights we can de'ive from
existing scholarship can suggest some broad tendencies in compensation, but either fail to explain
why bargaining yields compensation rather than nothing at all (uncompensated liberalization), or
fail to explain why compensation rather than more protectionist redress (compromised
liberalization). The literature's blind spots, we shall see, point to the need for more identified,
developed and specified attention to the causal role of group interests and endowments, and of their
institutional setting.
In light of these empirical and theoretical shortcomings, the bulk of the chapter develops
my attempt to better understand compensated liberalization. I begin by laying out a strategy and
theory to describe, evaluate, and explain the incidence of compensation as it actually emerges from
struggles over openness. Here the explanatory task receives the most attention. I develop a theory
of compensation based on the premise that compensation emerges from egoistic bargaining rather
than altruistic fairness standards. And I focus on a set of group and of institutional conditions
which affect that bargaining: the power and policy platforms of groups; and the jurisdiction and
welfare assistance that characterizes the national and supranational institutional settings within
which these groups bargain. With the aid of some informal applications of non-cooperative game
theory, these group and institutional conditions can predict the incidence of compensation as
distinct from protectionist or no redress, can predict variations over significant swaths of time and
space, and can be empirically tested.
The final section of the chapter designs the empincal research into what describes the
incidence of compensation, what explains that incidence, and what compensation has done or
failed to do to humanize and facilitate freer trade. Here the focus is on case selection and
measurement. First, I lay out the usefulness and limits of comparing US trade liberalization with
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EC internal market liberalization as a vehicle for describing and evaluating compensation, and
especially for illustrating and testing my group-institutional theory of compensation. Second, the
research design discusses and defends my qualitative and historicist methodology to measure the
incidence and usefulness of compensation, and the various explanatory variables of the theory to
be illustrated and tested.
1. Political Economy and the Unanswered Questions About Compensated Liberalization
The very substantial literature on the politics of liberalization and of national responses to
economic openness offers a mixture of controversy and scattered insight about compensated
liberalization. The clearest controversy surrounds the "propriety" of compensation, whether
compensation can off-set social costs of and facilitate openness. Less understood is the basic
descriptive issue of when compensation has actually emerged from struggles over liberalization.
And the extensive writings about liberalization and openness suggest a smattering of insights into
what might explain or predict the incidence of compensation. What does this literature tell us about
the nature, propriety, and origins of compensation?
1.1. Does Compensation Humanize and Facilitate Freer Trade?
1.1.1. Compensation's Supporters. Three different strands of scholarship suggest that
side payment compensation promises to off-set the human and other costs of economic
liberalization, and thereby also defuse political opposition to such liberalization. First, at least
since Karl Polanyi's Great Transformation, many political economists have argued that
industrialized societies respond to the expansion of self-regulating markets with counter-
movements that stem the reach of such markets or that establish other policies and programs to
mitigate the human and environmental costs those markets create (Polanyi 1944; Ruggie 1983).
Subsequent work in this vein has used increasingly careful statistics to show that industrialized
countries whose economies are most open to the vagaries of international markets tend also to have
the most generous social expenditures (Cameron 1978, Katzenstein 1985, Blais 1988, Garrett
1996, Rodrik 1996). This work supports the claim that more open economies face higher social
risks that, in turn, fuel demands for more expansive welfare provision, and that increases in such
provision legitimates more and continued openness.' The mechanisms and politics underlying this
harmonious relationship between openness and welfare are left unexamined. But the work implies
This claim was originally cross-sectional only, focused on differences in the openness and welfare provision across
countries in comparative statics. More recent contributions have also considered longitudinal studies, showing that
changes in the level of openness, with more caveats, tend to be associated with increased public spending.
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that side payment compensation to the losers of liberalization, accompanying discrete moves
towards such liberalization, promises to off-set the risks of and thereby legitimates freer trade.
A second strand of political economy research, concerned less with macro-historical links
between openness and welfare than in the micro-politics of bargaining, gives more focused
attention to the promise of compensation. Economists have long claimed that when there is some
policy change that advances the general interest of society but imposes costs on some individuals,
the beneficiaries of the change should provide some material compensation to those bearing the
costs. Ronald Coase's seminal study of property rights went a step beyond this hope for Pareto
efficiency by highlighting how the beneficiaries and victims of pollution and other "negative
externalities" will tend to bargain with one another to lower levels of the externality in exchange for
material compensation or various side payments, yielding outcomes that are as or more efficient
than what government might legislate by fiat (Coase 1960). Explicitly drawing on this Coasian
view, some scholars of international politics have argued that unregulated bargaining among states,
involving the use of compensation, will yield outcomes that improve matters for all bargainers,
again better than what governance structures -- in this case international organizations -- might
mandate. The outcomes of interest explicitly include trade liberalization (Conybeare 1980).
Similar arguments about the promise of side payment compensation appear in several
related literatures. The political economy literature on issue-linkage in international bargaining, for
instance, includes a number of works claiming that two or more groups with an interest in more
than one issue can promote mutually beneficial equilibria by linking issues through compensatory
exchange in situations where cooperation on one or another of the issues would not be rational if
those issues were considered in isolation (Sebenius 1983; Tollison and Willett 1979). Applying
the same claims from this broadly theoretical literature to a particular setting is a corpus of
scholarship on the use of issue linkage and side payments in the international politics of European
Union integration (Weber and Weismuth 1989; MacAleavey 1993; Marks 1992; Wilcox 1983).
Scholars of the domestic politics of international cooperation -- seeing cooperation as a
two-level games (among groups at home and between national representatives internationally) --
show how international agreements in a country's general interest can be made politically more
acceptable by giving side-payments to domestic opposition (Putnam 1988, Mayer 1992).
And in a more American-focused literature, scholars of congressional voting have pointed
out that vote-trading and log-rolling -- often involving an exchange of some support on one issue
in exchange for support on another issue as compensation -- can make legislation possible that
would otherwise fall prey to regional, constituency particularism (Tullock 1967; Wilson 1969).
Although applied to address a variety of empirical phenomena other than trade liberalization, all of
these works suggest reasons to believe that providing some compensation -- assistance or policy
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goods to the losers of trade liberalization, assistance separate from the protections being liberalized
-- can off-set social costs and buy off opposition to liberalization.
Finally, in addition to the broad literatures influenced by the economic sociology of Polanyi
and the micro-economics of Coase, more policy-specific literature on trade liberalization has seen
promise in providing compensation to the losers of international trade. In the trade literature, such
a claim has been particularly influential among those seeking to reconcile society's general interest
in free trade with the concentrated and particularistic interest in protectionism. One strategy, they
recognize, is to devise adjustment assistance and other kinds of policy and material compensation
to humanize and, especially, buy off opposition to liberalization (Bauer et.al. 1966, Frank 1977,
Bhagwati 1988, Lawrence and Litan 1984, Aho and Bayard 1984, Richardson 1982). 2
1.1.2. Compensation's Critics. Side payment compensation doesn't enjoy universal
appeal, however. A number of scholars contend or suggest that the promise of compensation to
humanize and facilitate liberalization is rarely fulfilled. Against the promise that side payments
humanize liberalization, some political economists and policy pundits have leveled several
criticisms or doubts. One criticism that has been prominently aired in policy circles is that giving
special treatment to the losers of liberalization is not fair to other citizens hurt or dislocated for
reasons other than trade (Mathematica; Corson 1988, 1995). Others have looked at particular
programs that were artifacts of side payment compensation -- such as some versions of the US
trade adjustment assistance program -- and emphasized that the recipients of this special treatment
do not get much redress from compensation anyway (GAO 1980; Trebilcock 1985). Related to
this, some looking at these and other programs suggest that providing compensation tends to go to
groups that do not lose as much as to groups with enough political voice, even if those groups
exaggerate their losses. And some have pointed out that the provision of side payments may or
actually does impose costs on third parties without a clear stake in trade liberalization, costs
ranging from higher taxes to inflexible labor markets (Banks & Tumlir 1986; Oye 1992).
Against the promise that side payments can facilitate economic liberalization, the skepticism
is stronger still. Some critics suggest that policies provided in real-life compensation -- such as
adjustment assistance in the US and Europe -- has not promoted adjustment out of non-competitive
activity. And they assert that the modesty of redress has meant that such assistance does little to
defuse opposition while actually provoking new opposition from groups otherwise supportive of
openness (Trebilcock et.al. 1993; Banks and Tumlir 1986). Some also point out that compensation
2 The trade policy literature's interest in compensation often focuses on both equity and efficiency benefits of
providing compensation to the losers of trade liberalization. But the writing often reveals that efficiency benefits --
the promise to buy off opposition and thereby facilitating efficiency-enhancing liberalization -- are what appeal most
strongly. For instance, the contributors don't express concern over Pareto losses when compensation isn't provided
and when liberalization goes through -- uncompensated liberalization. Instead, it is the potential for liberalization's
real and alleged losers blocking liberalization in the absence of systems of compensation that inspires concern.
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invites abuse and extortionate demands from groups exaggerating or inventing their suffering,
obstructing liberalization as a way to get more side payment pork. Finally, even if groups don't
exaggerate their opposition as such, the offer or provision of compensation may incite new
opposition from groups supportive of or ambivalent over liberalization, particularly those who are
"third parties" bearing costs of the compensation. And this new opposition may off-set any
political gains that the compensation buys among targeted beneficiaries.
Does Compensation Work? Neither the promoters nor detractors of side payment
compensation, however, have grounded their claims in any systematic look at the use of
compensation in liberalization history. Much of the attention to compensation provides useful but
anecdotal empirical examples from both political economy and security studies experience.
Supporters of the promise identify as scnporting illustration a successful example of side payment
compensation -- such as the creation of trade adjustment assistance in 1962 to appease organized
labor, a qualified success (Richardson 1984; Frank 1979). Meanwhile, skeptics rely on plenty of
counter-examples -- such as the problems with that same trade adjustment assistance program in
providing mediocre redress, no adjustment incentives, and questionable success in buying off
opposition in subsequent liberalization initiatives (Trebilcock et.al.1990). Neither the supporters
nor skeptics, however, have gone beyond such isolated examples to survey the range of actual
experience with the incidence of side payment compensation over time and space.
The reasons for such spotty empirical attention may be the difficulty of measuring side
payment compensation and its effectiveness. Simply identifying the existence of compensation is
difficult since many political deals take place behind closed doors and since compensation might
involve any kind of policy, but only if it is intended to help the victims of some trade liberalization
and is separate from the protections being reduced in that liberalization. More difficult is
measuring the usefulness of compensation, particularly its effectiveness in lowering political
opposition. Judging such effectiveness involves causal inferences difficult to make in the midst of
so many political and economic forces that affect both compensation levels and opposition.
Without fuller empirical investigation, in any event, we don't know whether compensation
humanizes or facilitates freer trade. Not all the issues involved in judging the propriety of
compensated liberalization are empirical -- for instance, gauging the fairness of singling-out the
losers of trade for help is mainly a conceptual judgment -- but most are. They involve such
questions as what benefits compensation provides, how much money is spent, who puts up that
money, how much change there was in opposition levels following compensation, etc. And even a
blush of empirical knowledge reveals a lot of variation in these characteristics. We need to know
the details of such variation over a significant period of time and different regional settings. Only
then can we venture general conclusions about whether compensation mitigates social costs and
buys political support for freer trade.
Burgoon
Chapter One
1.2. When and To Whom Has Compensation Been Provided During Liberalization?
Most of the political economy literature to focus explicitly on compensation directs its gaze
at normative questions -- at whether side payment compensation can improve equity or efficiency
for groups or nations. Less attention has been devoted explicitly to empirical or analytical
questions about the incidence of compensation. But out of that normative literature one can
identify a few empirical claims and controversy.
Many contributions, particularly those developing theories of optimal bargaining, deduce
the expected from the ideal. For instance, Coase and many others focused on the micro-politics of
bargaining suggest that compensation should be a common part of such bargaining precisely
because and to the extent it is desirable. Yet, others focused on more explanatory questions expect
or observe otherwise. Some expect that transaction costs associated with providing side payment
compensation will tend to be high enough that compensation will be relatively rare (Tollison and
Willet 1979). Similarly, Kenneth Oye's work on the economic discrimination observes that
compensation in international economic life tends to be "under-provided" relative to what game
theory and neo-classical economics might suggest (Oye 1988). And H.Richard Friman's work on
the use of side payments and other bargaining tactics in the politics of international cooperation
suggests that the incidence of side payments varies over time and space (Friman 1991).
As already mentioned above, moreover, the larger literature on the link between openness
and the public economy developed strong evidence that more open economies tend to have more
generous public expenditures (Rodrik 1996, Cameron 1978), welfare provision (Rodrik 1996),
and industrial subsidies (Blais 1986).3 The link between greater openness and public spending is
left unexamined, however. It could take a variety forms. It could entail side payment
compensation, with protectionist and/or liberalizer groups calling for,and providing policy
promises and commitments to expand and reform various elements of the public economy. Or it
could entail less direct and explicit linkage: For instance, liberalization might shift trade patterns
and competition, in turn changing economic incentives for societal groups, in turn shifting
perceived policy interests, and in turn inspiring new and stronger demands for industrial
subsidization, welfare spending or public expenditures generally.
In all the political economy literature, then, there's a combination of controversy and
ambiguity on how common or rare side payment compensation is in real life, and on whether such
3 Openness, in this literature, is generally understood to be trade (imports plus exports) as a percentage of GDP,
though a few studies consider actual liberalization of barriers to trade. Blais 1986 focuses on tariff reductions and
their relationship to industrial subsidization, though his study is cross-national and not longitudinal. Bates et.al.
1992 focus on the relationship between several measures of NTBs and tariffs on the one hand, and public spending
on the other. Again, the evidence is cross-sectional rather than longitudinal. Most longitudinal studies focus on
trade openness (trade as % of GDP), not on liberalization. But this is a reasonable approximation for trade-opening.
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compensation is the mechanism by which more open economies generally provide more generous
public expenditures. Yet, in all the literature we only have a few anecdotal observations of
variation in side payment compensation -- understood broadly as assistance directed at the victims
of some liberalization and separate from the protections being reduced in that liberalization.
Beyond these examples, we know very little. So we don't know whether compensation is rare or
common during struggles over liberalization, or whether it is commonly the link that connects
openness to welfare. And we certainly don't know whether and in what ways the incidence of
compensation varies across countries, over time and across episodes of liberalization, across
sectors or groups, across different national or international institutional settings.
1.3. Why is Compensation Provided Sometimes and Not Others?
As for why compensation might vary over time and space, political economy offers more
insight. Only a few scholars have focused explicitly on explaining "side payments" and
"compensation" during fights over liberalization. But plenty have offered explanations for related
phenomena like issue linkage in international and domestic bargaining more generally. And from
the broader literatures on political struggle over trade liberalization and on how societies deal with
the vagaries of open markets, we can derive a number of insights into why compensation might be
provided to some groups and in some liberalization episodes and not others. Together, this yields
a number of insights that don't so much disagree as highlight different aspects of groups and their
institutional environment that affect the incidence of compensation. Two broad distinctions
dividing these insights characterize the state of our knowledge about the origins of compensation.
1.3.1. "Altruism" vs. "Egoism"
The first involves whether the provision of compensation reflects "altruistic" or enlightened
concern for the victims of liberalization, or whether instead it reflects "egoistic" bargaining and the
search for a way to expedite openness. Obviously, both of these motivations may coexist, but
political economists are divided over which motivation might best explain or underlie variation in
the provision of compensation.
1.3.1.1. 'Altruism" Via Norms of Fairness and Social Contracts: The "altruistic"
perspective implies that polities will sometimes provide compensation to the victims of
liberalization for the sake of those victims and for the stability and equality of the society. The
crudest claim we might deduce from this approach would be to expect compensation for those
bearing the greatest costs and risks from openness, each time and to the degree that a country
liberalizes trade. Much more usefully, however, several altruist-centered contributions suggest
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conditions under which liberalization will yield any compensation, and to whom it will yield
compensation. These conditions include fairness ideas held by liberalizers, and nationally-
differentiated social compromises premised upon particular ideas, institutions, and enlightened
interests.
A good example of this perspective focused on ideational conditions is Judith Goldstein's
work on the role of ideas in US trade policy-making. Her work focuses on the impact of
institutionalized ideas of government leaders on US trade policies since the inter-war period
(Goldstein 1989, 1993). Goldstein wants to explain why the US continues to pursue essentially
open trade policies despite increased protectionist demands by vulnerable interest groups and a
decline in the US's hegemonic position in the international economy. She claims that this
recalcitrant openness can best be explained by a few ideological norms, or "decision rules," held
by government policy-makers who "supply" trade policies to meet interest group "demands": (1)
the US should maintain an open economy to achieve prosperity and harmony; (2) foreign countries
which do not pursue such openness are acting unfairly and should not be given fill access to the
US market; and (3) the imperatives of democracy and fairness require government to relieve the
suffering of vulnerable members of the American economy with some form of policy assistance.
These decision rules, Goldstein claims, explain why US trade policy is generally liberal; why
demands for protectionism that rest on claims of unfair trade usually receive a more protectionist
response by the state; and, most importantly for the present study, why interest group demands for
protectionism where unfair trade is not the issue still are likely to be met by compensatory
measures, albeit less protectionist ones -- measures such as compensation.
Such an argument supports the hypothesis that countries whose trade policies are
dominated by leaders following compensatory liberal decision rules will offer compensation when
"unfair trade" is not at issue and where substantial societal suffering underlies interest group
opposition. In countries with a different political culture, adjustment compensation may mark
liberalization bargaining, but not due to such norms of fairness. Such a focus on fairness ideas,
thus, works within the assumption that compensation might well reflect "altruistic" norms, and
predicts significant variation across groups within the US, and by implication across countries with
varying normative standards.
Much of the more sociological political economy focused on the relationship between
economic openness and the public economy suggest a similar view that compensation emerges
from social justice concern for the victims of markets. For instance, some scholars suggest that
countries with strong unions and left governments ("left-labor power"), or those with corporatist
intermediation, provide more and more frequent compensation to victims of greater openness --
again, in "compensation" broadly-defined to include all state provisions that might help the victims
of and be linked to liberalization (Garrett and Mitchell 1995, Garrett 1995; Katzenstein 1985).
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A related insight comes out of the attempt to explain why there is an apparent correlation
between trade openness and welfare generosity as compensation for the risks of openness in
developed countries in Europe and North America, compared to the lack of such a correlation
among developing countries (where we see openness with minimalist welfare provision; closure
with generous state intervention) (Bates et.al. 1991). The researchers hypothesize that this
difference is due to the lack of welfare policy-making and fiscal competencies in the latter, making
it difficult for the state to provide compensation and, in turn, altering the expectations of groups
fighting over openness. Such a claim would suggest that pre-conditions for compensation are
sufficient wealth, and fiscal and welfare policy competency. This perspective, again, doesn't
distinguish compensation from more diffuse ways in which greater economic openness might
inspire the creation or improvement of welfare or other assistance measures.
The common insight we can derive from this "altruism" perspective, however, is that
particular ideational, socio-political and institutional conditions underlie different kinds of politics
and social compromises that, in turn, underlie provision of compensation for liberalization's
losers. Liberalization in a setting with preexisting welfare capacities, strong Labor influence in
government and industrial relations, and with corporatist intermediation, will entail social concern
for humanizing openness that will in turn encourage provision of side payment compensation.
1.3.1.2. "Egoism" Via Group Bargaining: Many of the insights into when compensation
might be provided, however, conform to the bias of the "grim science" and assume that egoistic
self interest in individualistic bargaining trumps any broad norms of fairness or compromise. They
suggest that bargaining between protectionist and liberalizers over economic openness will under
some conditions spill-over into discussion of side issues, issue linkage, compensation, all as a
simple artifact of coalitions seeking to maximize their piece of the pie -- liberalizers seeking
compensation only as an expedient to buy liberalization, protectionists seeking as much redress as
possible. Such a perspective emerges from work that either focuses explicitly on bargaining over
trade, or on related and more general issues of domestic and international negotiations in political
economy -- work such as that of Coase and others discussed above. This bargaining perspective,
however, is divided over what conditions affect bargaining such that redress or other compensation
might emerge. And this division represents the second important set of distinctions characterizing
what political economists have to say about the origins of compensated liberalization.
1.3.2. The Elements of Egoistic Bargaining: Groups and Institutions
Political economists identify a number of conditions that influence egoistic bargaining such
that struggles over liberalization yield compensation. Some of these concern the political
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characteristics of the groups involved in the bargaining, and others involve the institutional setting
within which they negotiate.
1.3.2.1. Group Characteristics: Perhaps the explanatory perspective with the longest
pedigree within political economy is that focused on the economic interests and political power of
groups agitating over public policies. The very ramified literature on the politics of international
trade policy making, for instance, has identified a hundreds of conditions that influence when
groups will pursue or oppose liberalization initiatives -- such as the international economic position
of groups and/or nation states (e.g. Rogowski; Baldwin; Lake; Milner; Brock et.al., Nelson). And
that same literature has also identified an equally dizzying array of group characteristics that
influence the capacity to translate such interests into policy demands -- characteristics such as the
concentration of a sector, the number of people employed, the centralization of their organizational
representation, the money they have, the elite contacts they wield, etc. (e.g. Lavergne).
These various insights suggest power and interest conditions that can explain when and
which groups in a polity are likely to influence trade policy and to receive redress -- and, by
implication, side payment compensation. None of this literature distinguishes such compensation
from other forms of redress, in particular protectionist exemptions from or revisions of
liberalization initiatives. Not even the relatively more ramified scholarship interested in explaining
the "complexity" of trade policy-making tools in addition to protectionism consider this distinction,
since such complexity encompasses different kinds of exemptions or protectionist revisions of
trade policy (Verdier 1994; Hiscox 1996). Although this means that the insights we can derive are
pretty blunt instruments, the trade policy literature still suggests usefully that compensation
emerges when and to groups that have the determination and political resources to threaten
liberalization. And they identify a diverse tool-box of group conditions that shape such interest and
power.
A few contributions more focused on side payment compensation also identify particular
aspects of group power and interest that influence whether egoistic bargaining over liberalization
will elicit compensation per se. H.Richard Friman has tried to explain the varied provision of side-
payments that can fashion domestic support for international negotiations (Friman 1993, Friman
1994). He argues, simply, that side-payments are likely to be used in negotiations involving
intractable domestic opposition to international cooperation, only when other domestic opposition
to the use of such payments is sufficiently low. This insight usefully reminds us that the provision
of compensation is likely to be as politicized as the policy change for which losing groups are
compensated.
Moravcsik's "liberal inter-governmentalist" approach to the politics EC integration and
policy-making also submits a variety of group-specific expectations about when and what kind of
side payments issue linkage should result from intra- and inter-state bargaining over EC issues.
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Claiming that issue linkage and side payments will tend to be over marginal issues and marginal
powers, this perspective also suggests: (1) that side payments in inter-state bargaining is most
likely when governments or other groups have "highly asymmetrical interests in various issues,
which permit each to make concessions valuable to the other at relatively low cost"; (2) that
linkages are most likely in areas where the preferences of domestic groups are not intense,
preferences that might, a la Friman, scuttle offers of compensation; and (3) that linkages imposing
real costs on domestic actors may require further domestic side payments to be politically
acceptable (Moravcsik 1993, pp.505-6). 4
Finally, Kenneth Oye's study of political exchange among and within nations suggests zhat
the degree to which bargaining groups or nations are fragmented, as opposed to unified, will
importantly affect the likelihood of compensation during bargaining. Fragmentation implies many
actors involved on either side of a bargain, and Oye maintains that Olsonian "logic of collective
action" will lead the more numerous sub-groups to free-ride and under-invest in the provision of
public goods. One public good important to the possibilities of compensation is the reputation of a
bargaining group or nation to keep its promises -- something that affects the willingness of
bargainers to risk offering something on one issue for promised action on another. Fragmentation
of coalitions, thus, degrades concern for reputation at the coalition level, and this has the effect of
tempting groups to renege on exchanges -- including those relevant to issue linkage and side
payment compensation. For instance, a fragmented bargainer might agree to support some
liberalization upon the provision of a side payment and then, upon receiving payment, renege on
their side of the deal and undermine the liberalization anyway. This possibility suggests that
egoistic bargaining among relatively unified groups or coalitions will tend to yield more
compensation than will bargaining among relatively fragmented ones.
1.3.2.2. Institutional Setting Political economists focused on how egoistic bargaining may
underlie compensation focus as much on the institutional setting within which groups bargain as
they do on the groups themselves. Most of this attention to institutions grows out the role that
"transaction costs" play in the constraining bargaining and political exchange. In his seminal
discussion of the propensity of groups to engage in secondary bargaining to off-set the costs of
policy externalities, Ronald Coase pointed out that the extent of such bargaining depended upon the
various costs of organizing representatives, of identifying forms of compensation, of costing-out
pain, and of the give-and-take of bargaining -- costs that have become known as "transaction
costs." If these transaction costs were sufficiently high, as when many groups in a community try
4 Other insights Moravcsik offers are less focused on group or institutional characteristics, but are more general:
that linkages in package deals are most likely at the final stage of bargaining to balance marginal gains and losses;
and that government proposing linkage will likely begin in more closely related issues before resorting to more
distantly related issue linkages.
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to cost out the distribution of damage wrought by a polluting factory, compensatory exchange will
be constrained or might not take place at all -- and compensation will be under-provided.
Subsequent research on vote-trading, issue linkage and side payments has been heavily
influenced by this basic observation. Several researchers have suggested a variety of ways in
which "transaction costs," such as the costs of gathering information about the preferences of
negotiating partners and about worthwhile bargains, are particularly high or particularly
problematic when issues are linked or side payments provided (Tollison and Willet 1979, Sebenius
1983, Oye 1992, Marshall and Weingast 1988). These and other researchers also point out or
imply that such transaction costs vary and are negatively related to the incidence and political
efficacy of issue linkage and side payments.
Some of these contributions also specify some conditions that affect transaction costs,
focusing particularly on the institutional setting within which groups bargain. Keohane and others,
for instance, suggest that institutions with strong information-gathering and monitoring capacities
make it easier for groups to know what political exchanges are possible and desirable, and to
enforce compliance with resulting agreements -- including exchanges of side payment
compensation for trade liberalization (Keohane 1984). And Oye's work on the under-provision of
compensation argues that imperfect information in the bargaining environment -- an institutional
characteristic that can be expected to vary across settings -- creates ambiguity over the preferences
and actions of bargaining actors. This encourages reneging and distrust, he argues, by making
retaliation against reneging less certain, and by making extortionate demands more difficult to
distinguish from win-win exchange demands (Oye 1992).
1.3.3. The Theoretical and Empirical Limits of Explanatory Alternatives
All of these insights -- those focused on the altruism of fairness norms as well as those
focused on various group and institutional elements of egoistic bargaining -- provide leverage to
understand why liberalization episodes might yield side payments at some times and not others.
Alone or in any obvious combination, however, they don't provide enough leverage, in that they
leave a great deal of variation to be explained. This limited explanatory power, it seems, reflects
the literature's important theoretical and empirical shortcomings -- shortcomings that mainly reflect
a lack of developed attention to the incidence of compensation rather than poor insight. The
theoretical shortcomings are three-fold: The literature is under-identified, under-developed, and
under-specified.
1.3.3.1. Under-identified: First and most importantly, virtually of the explanatory insights
are under-identified in the phenomena they are equipped to explain. In particular, all explain or
predict outcomes that do not distinguish the provision of side payment compensation from both of
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its two alternatives -- provision of protectionist redress or of nothing at all. This is most obvious
with the extensive literature focused on the sinews of group interests and power that affect
bargaining over trade policy-making. As we have already seen, this literature might broadly
suggest the importance of a group's particular economic positioning and its various power
resources in agitating for government redress from the vagaries of openness, but not even the most
ramified entries can distinguish when that redress will take the form of protectionist redress and
when it will take the form of side payment compensation. In other words, these contributions
might explain when we get something other than uncompensated liberalization, but they don't
explain when we will get compensated rather than compromised liberalization. Why, for instance,
did textile groups opposing trade liberalization in the US get only protectionist redress in US
liberalization episodes in the 1950s, but in 1962 get side payment compensation in addition to new
protectionist exemptions as part of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act?
Most of the other contributions focused on the characteristics of groups and their
institutional setting, however, are under-identified in the opposite respect -- unable to distinguish
compensated from uncompensated liberalization. Friman's focus on the opposition among societal
groups to the provision of compensation, for instance, might explain why compensation might get
chosen over or in addition to protectionist redress as groups bargain over trade or other
international economic initiatives. But it cannot explain when and why compensation even gets on
the negotiating agenda among bargaining groups -- why, in other words, groups discuss
compensation for opponents rather than simply ignoring those opponents. Moravcsik's emphasis
on off-setting asymmetries in the preferences of groups, and especially on the dynamics of
opposition from "third parties" who might pay for or oppose compensation, is especially useful for
suggesting the kinds of compensation that might be more or less politically viable, but it too
doesn't offer insight into when and why compensation gets chosen over uncompensated
liberalization. And Oye's focus on fragmentation of groups has a similar limitation. Why would
some relatively unified groups and trade associations get nothing, say the shoe/leather industry in
the US, while similarly unified groups, say the winter-fruit and vegetable industry, get
compensation?
The various insights into the importance of institutional setting are similarly under-
identified. The institutional characteristics thought to mediate transaction costs to issue linkage can
only explain why compensation might be provided along-side protectionist redress; it can't explain
why uncompensated liberalization sometimes reigns supreme. We don't have any explanation for
why the US distilled spirits industry rec, --ý side payment compensation to buy its support for
liberalization crucial to the final stages of the 1970 Tokyo Round, never any protectionism
afterwards, even though transaction cost institutional conditions didn't vary.
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And the welfare capacity and Left-labor orientation of the institutional arena suggest that
some kind of redress will follow moves towards greater openness, but that redress might take the
form more diffuse and historically separate changes in the demands on welfare or other
government provision, rather than side payment compensation. That some moves towards
openness, such as US liberalization initiatives between 1934 and the late 1950s yielded little
compensation or any other targeted redress for many vulnerable groups, might be roughly
consistent with the focus on Left-labor orientation, welfare capacity, etc. -- in that welfare
provision over the period tended to grow, albeit politically and temporally separated from trade
legislation and struggles. But counter-factually, the provision of side payment compensation to
those groups during the same period would be just as consistent.
1.3.3.2. Under-developed: In so far as the existing insights can explain broad outcomes,
albeit under-identified, many also suffer from being under-developed in the sense of having only
very limited empirical reach in the range of variation they can explain. The various insights
focused on the ways institutional settings mediate the transaction costs to side payment bargaining
only have explanatory value in accounting for rarity, under-provision or variations in compensation
that might coincide with shifts or differences in institutional setting -- say, across countries, or
across very substantial periods of time. This obviously leaves to a number of other conditions,
presumably those more connected to group characteristics, to explain differences across episodes
or groups in a given institutional setting. And yet the group conditions highlighted in the literature
-- such as those related to the economic position underlying tastes for protection, or to the
fragmentation of groups that under-value reputation -- cannot explain much of the remaining
variation. For instance, these particular group conditions don't vary if we compare the shoe
industry and the lumber industry, and yet the first received no redress to off-set its dislocation
while the second received a package of side payments.
1.3.3.3. Under-specified: Finally, some of the most broadly useful insights into the
origins of compensation -- useful despite under-identification and limited explanatory reach -- tend
to be under-specified in the sense of not identifying measurable explanatory conditions that can be
subject to empirical testing. The transaction cost approach, largely expressed in the focus on
institutional setting, is perhaps the most important example of this shortcoming. Not only does
much of this literature say nothing about any empirical referents to transaction cost conditions --
institutional or otherwise -- the role institutions might play in mediating such conditions are not
clearly measurable. For instance, how are we to measure those institutional settings that are more
or less conducive to the flow of information? Some such conditions might be obvious, such as the
existence of monitoring capacities, but others are less so, and not specified, leaving it to the
empirical-minded student to come with such specification for him or herself. Some of the group
conditions also have this weakness, such as the observation that groups with sharply off-setting,
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or asynmmetrical, preferences across several issues will engage in issue linkage or package deal-
making. For very general groupings some empirical measures of varying "asymmetries" might
suggest themselves -- such as liberals and conservatives in a party system, or country
representatives with very different ideas about economic integration. But for different sectors
engaged in coalitional fights over trade liberalization the task is much harder.
1.3.3.4. Empirical Vacuum: Finally, however limiting these three theoretical shortcomings
might be to the explanatory power of existing insights, perhaps the most important problem is the
empirical vacuum. None of the insights discussed are subjected to any significant empirical
illustration, let alone testing. A few offer anecdotal evidence to illustrate the logic and potential of
the claims. Friman's focus on domestic group opposition to side payments is an example.
Slightly more empirically-grounded is Goldstein's discussion of principled ideas in the US that
might underlie the provision of some side payment compensation -- she illustrates with reference to
the US trade adjustment assistance provisions. But the evidence offered is also anecdotal, rather
than drawn from any sustained look at the liberalization history in the US or elsewhere. Her
account, for instance, doesn't consider the many other instances of side payment compensation that
emerge from trade policy-making in the US, such as that provided to the lumber, distilled spirits,
and textile industries mentioned above, or to the lack of such compensation to many other groups.
This matters because the variation doesn't co-vary well with the normative standard on which her
"altruism" perspective focuses -- a standard that suggests groups unable to claim "unfair" trade
may well get some assistance if their suffering is palpable. s
None of these theoretical and empirical shortcomings, of course, reflect shoddy scholarship
or disinterest in empirical research. Instead they reflect the paucity of direct scholarly attention to
explaining side payment compensation, as opposed to indirect attention to compensation as a side
bar to other aspects of political economic life. The insights we can derive from such side bar
attention, alas, understandably lacks theoretical or empirical focus.
We are left, in any event, with the most important explanatory questions about the
compensation unanswered. When and to what extent does compensation reflect "altruistic"
concerns, such as the norms of fairness, and to what extent does it instead reflect the dynamics of
egoistic bargaining? Why might compensation be rare or underprovided? Which characteristics of
groups and of their institutional setting matter most to the incidence of side payment compensation?
What, in general, explains variations over time and space in the incidence of compensation?
5 In the examples just cited, textiles, lumber, and distilled-spirits were far from the biggest victims of their
respective liberalization episodes, and yet they got substantially more side payment compensation than many of the
most vulnerable, most dislocated sectors and groups, such as watches, shoes, clay pottery, etc.
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The challenge is to provide better answers to theýz- explanatory questions by doing what
existing literature has not: subject side payment compensation to sustained, theoretically informed
and empirically grounded attention. This means developing a theory of incidence that is better
identified to explain the incidence of compensation as distinct from its uncompensated and
compromised liberalization alternatives. It means developing theory that can explain a range of
variation in the incidence of compensation -- variation across episodes, groups, institutional level,
and countries. It means developing theory that is better specified so as to be empirically testable
and historically .- iIful. And, finally, it means illustrating and testing that theory across a
significant chunk of the liberalization history.
2. The Argument: Describing, Explaining, and Evaluating Compensated Liberalization
To better understand compensated liberalization -- to understand the incidence and propriety
as well as the origins of compensation -- this dissertation describes, explains, and evaluates side
payment compensation in a more theoretically self-conscious and empirically focused way than has
past scholarship. The theoretical contribution comes in part from a strategy for describing when
compensation has emerged from struggles over openness and for assessing when compensation
has actually off-set social costs of and facilitated such openness. But it mainly comes from a
theory of the incidence of compensation that is identified enough to distinguish compensated
liberalization from its compromised and uncompensated liberalization alternatives, and developed
to explain variation over time and space, and specified enough to be empirically testable. The
empirical contribution comes from applying this strategy and theory to the use of compensation
over a significant swath of US and European experience with trade liberalization. The present
section lays out the theoretical strategy, and the next (Section 3) lays out the empirical focus.
2.1. Describing and Evaluating Compensated Liberalization
Describing the incidence of side payment compensation in episodes of liberalization is
conceptually straight-forward. This dissertation considers the bargaining during political struggles
over trade liberalization initiatives, and looks for promises and provision of policies, moneys, or
any other kind of assistance that is (1) intended to off-set the political, economic, or environmental
costs of the proposed liberalization, and that is (2) separate from the core protections to be reduced
in that liberalization. Both of these conditions turn out to pose measurement challenges, as will be
discussed below, but they pose few conceptual challenges.
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Evaluating side payment compensation when it actually emerges from episodes of
liberalization is a little bit less straight-forward. The strategy here is to assess the real experience of
compensation on the various terms existing scholarship has judged compensation to have
succeeded or failed to off-set the social costs of and facilitate freer trade. To assess whether
compensation actually off-set social costs, this means looking at the following: (1) the scale and
the scope of the redress compensation provides to actual and expected victims of liberalization; (2)
the degree to which the groups get redress in accordance with the costs they bear; (3) instances and
the proportion of compensation provisions that go beyond the scale of actual suffering (i.e.
instances of rent-seeking or receiving); (4) the scale, source, and distribution of the burden of
revenues underlying and costs of the compensation, particularly the burden borne by beneficiaries
of liberalization vs. "third parties," those not directly benefiting from the fruits of the liberalization;
and finally, (5) the actual implementation of the programs created through compensatory exchange.
To assess whether compensation has actually facilitated freer trade, the literature's
standards require measuring the following: (1) how much the provision of compensation lowered
the level of existing protectionist opposition; (2) how much the compensation inspired new
opposition from groups opposed to the compensation; (3) how much the compensation sparked
new opposition from groups seeking to extort more generous compensation; and (4) how much the
compensation encouraged (or discouraged) vulnerable groups to exit the aggrieved sector for more
competitive sectors of the economy. As we shall see below, both sets of measures for evaluating
compensation raise significant measurement problems -- more so than the task of describing the
incidence of compensation. But, again, the conceptual issues are relatively simple.
2.2. Explaining Compensati on: A Theory of Compensated Liberalization
To explain the incidence of side payment compensation, however, requires substantially
more theoretical development. It requires, in particular, a theory of incidence that goes beyond the
diffuse explanatory insights drawn from existing political economy scholarship. Such a theory of
compensation, remember, needs to: (1) be more identified, better able to explain when struggles
over liberalization will elicit compensation as distinct from its alternatives, protectionism or nothing
at; (2) be more developed in order to account for variation across episodes, groups, countries and
institutions through which bargaining takes place; and (3) be more specified and testable by
identifying measurable, observable explanatory conditions.
Developing such a theory requires theoretical synthesis of and innovation beyond existing
explanatory insights. The theory I propose takes as pre-given the existence of a trade liberalization
initiative and of state and societal groups arrayed into competing coalitions: a liberalizer coalition
championing that initiative and a protectionist coalition opposing it. I argue that compensation
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emerges mainly from egoistic bargaining between these liberalizers and protectionists, and in
particular when compensation is expedient to the passage of the liberalization. In the existing
political economy divide between those highlighting the altruistic vs. the egoistic conditions, of
course, this approach sides with the latter.
But to better understand when egoistic bargaining elicits compensation rather than some
mix of uncompensated or compromised liberalization, the theory I propose focuses on particular
features of the bargaining groups and their institutional setting that shape when compensation is
expedient to liberalization. First, compensation is most likely when protectionist groups not only
have the political resources to threaten initiatives but also approach the bargaining with broad,
multi-issue trade policy platforms that set an agenda for secondary bargaining over comperfsation
rather than protectionism alone. Second, compensation is most likely to emerge from institutional
settings characterized by modest welfare provision that heightens the expected pain of
uncompensated liberalization, and by broad jurisdiction over issues beyond trade policy that
suggest subjects of side payment linkage and create opportunities to retaliate against liberalization.
Developing the elements of this theory requires three steps. The first lays out the premise
and the framework of egoistic bargaining that I argue underlies the provision of compensation.
The second step lays out the group conditions, and the third the institutional characteristics, that I
argue shape the bargaining as modeled in that framework.
2.2.1. The Premise and Framework: Egoistic Bargaining Underlies Compensation
The premise on which the theory builds is that side payment compensation will emerge
from egoistic bargaining when such compensation is expedient to the passage of the liberalization.
This means compensation will provided under two conditions: (1) when liberalizers fear political
threats to the liberalization and recognize compensation as a reasonable alternative to protectionist
redress for lowering those threats; and (2) when protectionists see compensation as a more or less
imperfect substitute for protectionism. This is not to say that compensation cannot emerge or has
not emerged from more "altruistic" conditions such as fairness norms or the practice of broader
social contracts, only that this more egoistic dynamic can explain and predict more incidence of
compensation.
2.2.1.1. Edgeworth Box Illustration: This premise supports a bargaining framework to
explain the incidence of compensation, a framework focused on liberalizers and protectionists
bargaining simultaneously over trade protection and side payment compensation. This bargaining
can be informally captured using a game theory heuristic that represents non-cooperative
bargaining between two actors over two issues, called an Edgeworth box (Shubik 1984, Raiffa
Burgoon
Chapter One
1982).6 Such bargaining, of course, encompasses that between liberalizers and protectionists over
protectionism and compensation during a liberalization episode, where liberalizers might see
compensation as an expedient to buy protectionist acceptance of lower protection, and where
protectionists might see compensation as a substitute for protection. Figure 1.1 shows an
Edgeworth Box representation of such secondary bargaining, and reveals the logic by which the
bargaining might yield compensation along-side liberalization -- compensated liberalization.
The Figure maps the preferences of protectionist and free trade coalitions for different
levels of protectionism and compensation, and the likely bargaining outcomes given those
preferences. The preferences of both coalitions for a mix of compensation and protectionism can
be expressed as indifference curves on the same two-dimensional plane, with the y-axis being the
level of protectionism ("Trade Protection") and the x-axis the level of side payment compensation
("Compensation"). This trade protection might be a particular protectionist provision to be
liberalized in an episode, say some tariff barrier on a particular sector, or it might be a clustering,
or averaging, of all the protectionist barriers under review. Likewise, the compensation might be a
particular side payment provision, say an adjustment assistance program for dislocated workers, or
it might be a clustering or averaging of all compensation considered or recognized.
The P curves (P(a), P(b), P(c), and P(d)) capture the willingness of a given protectionist
group to exchange compensation for lower protection at a given point in time. All protectionist
indifference curves are likely to be a negatively-sloped curve, because protectionists are likely to
see protectionism and compensation as substitutes, however imperfect.7 The indifference curve is
likely to be convex to the origin (bowed inward) reflecting the law of diminishing returns at the
margin: As more of either compensation or trade protection is provided, the protectionists will be
willing to trade marginal increases in the "abundant" policy for smaller increases in the more
"scarce" one. The average slope of the indifference curve P will vary across groups and time,
depending on the preferences and environment of the protectionists. Protectionists with a very
favorable view of some compensation could be represented by an indifference curve with a
relatively steeper slope (see P (a)) than those who have a less favorable view (see P(b)). The
reasoning is simply that protectionists tending to be disinterested in compensation will only accept
very large offers of compensation to off-set the pain of a given decrease in trade protection. If the
average slope on a protectionist's curve should tend to be flat -- say, less than a 45 degree angle --
6 This tool has been applied to domestic bargaining among supplier-consumers (Edgeworth 1881), and more recently
to international bargaining between states (Mayer 1992), but has not, to the best of my knowledge, been applied to
domestic political bargaining among coalitions.
7 Only if protectionists saw less protectionism as acceptable in exchange for less compensation would we expect a
positive sloping indifference curve.
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that would express a situation where protectionists see a given package of compensation as an
imperfect and less preferable substitute for, a second-best alternative to, protectionism.
The L curves (L(a), L(b), L(c) and L(d)) capture the willingness or preference of liberalizer
groups to accept or offer levels of compensation in exchange for lower levels of protectionism.
Their indifference curve is also likely to be negatively sloped, reflecting how they are likely to see
lower levels of protectionism (for protectionists) as substitutable for lower levels of compensation
(for the protectionists) -- ideally wanting zero protection and compensation, but willing to accept
compensation if they can get less protection for the protectionists. But their curves are likely to be
concave to the origin (bowed out) because the law of diminishing marginal returns suggests that
liberalizers will trade off marginally smaller levels of compensation as protectionism approaches
zero, and vice versa (marginally higher levels of compensation as protectionism gets very high).
Variations in the willingness of liberalizers to accept or offer compensation to secure lower levels
of protectionism are also captured by variations in the slope of their indifference curves.
Liberalizers marginally more willing to offer compensation in exchange for liberalization will tend
to have aflatter indifference curve (see L (a)) than those less willing to exchange compensation for
reductions in trade protection (L (b)). Where liberalizers see compensation as an imperfect and
preferable substitute for trade protection, they would have a relatively flat (<45 degrees)
indifference curve, while those seeing compensation as marginally less preferable to protection
would have a relatively steep curve (> 45 degrees). 9
Since I am interested in bargaining over liberalization of a status-quo trade policy, the
indifference curves of the liberalizers and protectionists must intersect, marking the status-quo
from which the new policy outcome will depart -- the point t' in Figure 1.1. When the
protectionists are willing to give up protectionism for some compensation, and the liberalizers
know this, there may be some room for a consensual agreement that improves for both coalitions
the mix of protectionism and adjustment assistance over the status-quo: a Pareto improvement.
This possibility is illustrated by the space enclosed by the liberalizer and protectionist indifference
curves (between the curves L and P that obtain at a given time) -- a space that captures the
possibility for pareto-improving bargaining. Raiffa and others call this space the "zone of joint
improvement" or "zone of possible agreement."'  Imagine, for instance, the small space enclosed
8 Protectionists who so covet some compensation package that they see it as marginally preferable to trade
protection -- who see compensation as an imperfect and superior substitute for protection -- would have a steeper
indifference curve (greater than 45 degrees relative to the x-axis). On the other hand, protectionists wholly unwilling
to give up some protectionism for compensation would be characterized by a horizontal curve, such as curve P(d),
reflecting that no amount of compensation would convince the protectionists to accept lower levels of protectionism.
9 Liberalizers who are completely averse to giving out compensation to buy liberalization will tend to have a
vertical indifference curve, such as L(d), while those who will see compensation as neutral will offer so much
compensation to buy a marginal increase in protection that their indifference curve will be horizontal.
10 The absence of such a possibility is captured by the intersecting curves having no overlap, meaning that whatever
changes in trade and compensation policies flow from the bargaining between the coalitions, there will be some
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Figure 1.1.
Indifference Curves of Protectionist and Liberalizer
Groups Bargaining Over Trade Protection and Compensation
Trade
Protection
I, I - - 60.
Compensation
by L(b) and P(b), compared to the relatively larger spaces enclosed by L(b) and P(a), L(a) and
P(b), and, of course, L(a) and P(a). Of course, if either the liberalizers or the protectionists are so
averse to exchanging compensation for liberalization that there is no room for pareto-improvement
-- captured by the lack of any zone of possible agreement with either curve L(d) or P(d) -- we have
a zero-sum rather than positive-sum game.
The exact point within that space to be established through bargaining will vary depending
on a number of conditions such as the relative power, skill and determination of the bargainers.
And the particular point of agreement or compromise that the bargainers reach within the zone will
have implications for the relative payoffs for the protectionist and liberalizer coalitions, and for the
incidence and generosity of compensation. Pure rationality predicts that the bargainers will settle
on some point along more vertically-arced "contract curve," such as that connecting L(b) and P(b).
That curve captures the range of points at which the negotiators have negotiated all room for
pareto-improvement (they have reached the Pareto frontier), and the different points along this
curve represents a zero-sum game (gains for one group at the expense of the other). This zero-sum
situation is captured by the way curves L(c) and P(c) are asymptotic to one another, and the point
pareto loss. P(c) and L(c) capture such an intersection, where they have but on point of intersection and no overlap.
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t" of their intersection roughly captures an equitable splitting of the pareto gains." But, again, the
exact point within the zone of possible agreement, and certainly along the contract curve, I take to
be indeterminate.
The simple conclusions I want to emphasize here are two-fold. First, the existence of the
zone of possible agreement implies that the egoistic bargaining is likely to yield some mix of trade
liberalization accompanied by compensation -- compensated liberalization.12 The arrow between t'
and t" captures this outcome. Second, the larger that zone of possible agreement and, hence, the
longer the contract curve, the more likely it is that egoistic bargaining will yield discussion or
provision of side payment compensation. The reasoning here is that the larger zone captures
simply more and more obvious possibilities for mixing liberalization with compensation to achieve
some mutually acceptable outcome, and this implies, ceteris paribus, more possibilities for
providing compensation. At the other extreme, where the zone is very narrow by virtue of either
liberalizers and/or protectionists taking little interest in compensation as an imperfect substitute for
trade protection, the range of compensation options discussed and agreeable is smaller.'3
Given the simple and general premise that egoistic bargaining between protectionists and
liberalizers will elicit compensation to the degree that liberalizers see it as a necessary and desirable
expedient to liberalization, and that protectionists see compensation as a substitute for protection,
the question is why that bargaining should yield varying incidence and levels of side payment
compensation. Why will egoistic bargaining yield compensation at some times and places and not
others, to some groups and not others, generous sometimes and not others?
As we saw in the previous section, the political economy literature suggests a number of
factors that can influence such egoistic bargaining over trade liberalization -- factors that might
predict incidence of side payment compensation. These included the power and economic interests
of groups, and several characteristics of the institutional setting within which they bargain. But as
we saw above, these insights are under-identified and lack explanatory reach. They either cannot
explain or predict why compensation might emerge from the bargaining rather than protectionist
redress, or they fail to predict why compensation might emerge rather than nothing at all. And
these insights also tended to have very limited explanatory reach in any event, focused on group or
institutional characteristics that can only explain variation over very limited swaths of time and
"1 And, of course, the smaller the pareto space, the sooner that exhaustion of pareto-gains will come about. And
with the situations where liberalizers (L(d) or protectionists (P(d) are very hostile to the idea of giving up any change
in protectionism for even very large amounts of compensation, we may have no pareto space.
12 Expressed in terms of the premise that compensation is provided when both protectionists and liberalizers see
compensation and trade protection as imperfect substitutes, the point is that compensation is most likely and to the
degree that the P indifference curve is relatively steep and to the degree that the L curve is relatively flat -- thereby
creating a zone of possible agreement.
" This second claim comes into play with many of the hypotheses of the group-institutional theory I develop and
empirically test below. The Edgeworth box approach also suggests other predictions not developed here. See
Chapter Eight: Conclusion, for a plan to pursue these hypotheses empirically through further research.
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space. Finally, many of the explanatory conditions identified lacked empirical specificity that
allows testing and empirically useful prediction.
The theory I propose synthesizes but moves beyond the bargaining literature's insights by
identifying group and institutional characteristics that shape whether bargaining between
protectionists and liberalizers elicits compensation rather than protectionist redress or nothing at all.
I focus on group and institutional characteristics, moreover, that can be expected to vary across
episodes, groups, countries, and different institutions through bargaining takes place, and that thus
predict differences over a range of time and space. And finally, the characteristics on which the
theory focuses are measurable enough to be empirically useful and testable.14
2.2.2. The Groups: Power-resources and Platforms of Protectionists
The group characteristics on which I focus are the power resources and trade policy
platforms of the bargaining groups, especially protectionist groups. I argue that compensation will
tend to be provided to those protectionist groups that not only have enough power resources to
threaten or retaliate against the liberalization, but also approach the bargaining table with multi-
iL, ae trade policy platforms that signal both the willingness to consider and ease identification of
possibilities for side payment linkage. Although the platforms and power of liberalizers and other
groups constrain whether this coincidence of protectionist power and platforms will actually yield
compensation -- for instance, by liberalizers refusing to offer or fund some kinds of side payments
-- I argue that this coincidence is a strong predictor of the incidence of compensation.
2.2.2.1. Power resources: Protectionist groups endowed with and mobilizing more power
resources to threaten or retaliate against a given trade liberalization initiative are more likely to
receive some redress through bargaining over that initiative. Some power resources are structural,
such as the proportion of the voting and interested population that a group encompasses, or the
amount of money a group devotes to political campaigns. Other resources are more "incidental,"
or specific to a situation, such as social contacts and connections to powerful politicians of key
importance to trade policy-making. The scale of the power resources a group brings to bear on the
bargaining over liberalization depends, importantly, on the group's determination to defeat or
revise the liberalization. This determination, in turn, is a function of a group's position in the
international economy and on the ambition of the liberalization proposed, both of which the theory
14 These group and institutional conditions span the "demand" and "supply" sides of compensated liberalization. The
group conditions, for instance, focus mainly on protectionist groups doing much of the demanding, but we shall see
that the positioning of those protectionists reflects anticipation of supply side constraints. The institutional
conditions, meanwhile, pose supply-side constraints but also strong constraints on what and whether compensation
is demanded. Since "supply" and "demand" sides of the politics are, in any event, difficult to distinguish in an
empirically meaningful and measurable way, the more concrete "groups" and "institutions" become the building
blocks of the theory.
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takes as pre-given. Comparing one group to another at a given time, or the positions of one group
in different time periods, one can assess whether a group is more or less well endowed with such
resources. The more structural and incidental power resources a group has, the more likely
liberalizers will have to find some form of redress to buy off opposition. The question, of course,
is when and why redress will take the form of side payment compensation rather than protectionist
benefits that compromise the liberalization.
This argument can be expressed in terms of the Edgeworth box framework by simply
observing that groups with substantial political resources to threaten or retaliate against the
liberalization episode will win a place at the bargaining table, and will bargain with liberalizers
along lines suggested by the respective indifference curves of protectionists and liberalizers in
Figure 1.1 above. Those groups with little such power resources, on the other hand, will not get a
place at the bargaining table -- and, thus, will simply not, as it were, get onto the Edgeworth space.
Figure 1.2
Bargaining in Face of Low Protectionist Resources
Trade
Protection
r1
t"I
L (a)
Compensation
Figure 1.2 above captures this latter possibility. As the episode proceeds, a particular
protection group's lack of resources will allow liberalizers to legislate and negotiate their favored
reduction in trade protections without having to provide compensation -- at least for the particular
group lacking such power. Strictly speaking, the liberalizers might prefer and could pursue
reductions in the levels of ex ante compensation policies along-side the liberalization -- captured by
the lightly-shaded and positively sloping arrow in Figure 1.2. But if no such compensation is in
place or in mind, the reduction should simply take place without any new or rolled back
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compensation, again in keeping with the law of diminishing returns.15 This possibility is denoted
by the vertically-downward arrow (t' to t") in Figure 1.2. Even with substantial power such that
protectionist groups don't make onto the playing field, liberalizers might still provide compensation
-- captured by the negatively sloping arrow in Figure 1.2. They might do so, first, because they
see compensation as an insurance policy against relatively weak protectionists from influencing the
outcome, and second, because they might seek compensation to fulfill standards of fairness.' 6
2.2.2.2. Trade Policy Platforms: I argue that an important determinant of the form redress
will take is the trade policy platform that a groups brings to the bargaining table. The number of
issues on those platforms affects the expected gain of providing any redress other than
protectionism, and also the difficulty of identifying linkable issues as subjects of side payment
linkage. When the bargaining groups, especially protectionists, approach the bargaining table with
a single-minded focus on the protectionist policy under review -- staking claims or demands only
on protectionist policies in their in their public statements about trade policy -- it will be futile
and/or more difficult to identify linkable issues that can mollify opposition. For such groups, only
protectionist exemption or revision will do. If these groups are powerful enough to threaten
liberalization, then, single-minded protectionists are likely to extract protectionist concessions from
their liberalizer bargaining opponents, but not necessarily any compensation.
If, on the other hand, protectionist groups approach the bargaining table with more
conciliatory platforms that explicitly identify policy demands and issues other than protectionist
redress, then the primary bargaining over the liberalization episode will likely spill over into
secondary bargaining over other issues, involving linkage between liberalization and the provision
of some other good. Such secondary bargaining and linkage is more likely than more narrow
bargaining to elicit side payment compensation. For example, a textile association explicitly
lobbying against some liberalization initiative may approach the initiative with press statements and
congressional hearings explicitly discussing its desire for tax relief or government research funds
in addition to its desire for tariff and quota relief. Such a group, I argue, is more likely to elicit
compensation than if that same association mentions only the tariff and quota relief.
The breadth of platforms vary across groups and time, and is a function of the public policy
agenda set by any or all groups in the polity and, especially, of the strategy and tactics of a
particular protectionist group adopt to advance its public policy beliefs and interests. These tactics
15 If no compensation is in place, for instance, the substitutibility of compensation for protection implies a
willingness to offer a lot of compensation to buy even a little liberalization. Graphically and more generally,
liberalizers without constraint will prefer to move to a mix of protection and compensation along a line
perpendicular to the slope of their indifference curve as it intersects the status quo point, t'.
16 Of course, this latter reason is an expression of the "altruism perspective," and any compensation provided to very
weak groups, and where insurance was not part of the calculation, can be construed as potentially supporting that
perspective over the egoistic bargaining one developed here. See the Research Design section below.
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include a calculation on the part of protectionist groups of what their political power can extract and
of what liberalizers will accept and pay for.
Either by dint of tactics or core preference, however, having a broader trade policy
platform, has two consequences.' 7 First, having several policies explicitly signaled as potential
subjects of side payment linkage helps set the agenda for secondary bargaining; it lowers the
transaction costs associated with figuring out what kinds of policies or in-kind compensation will
provide relief and buy-off opposition. Second, having several issues expresses a preference to
accept some compensation in lieu of protectionist redress --a preference for side payment linkage in
general and, in particular, for any specific kind of linkage identified in the platform. Signaling
such a preference will help shape the bargaining agenda generally, especially in so far as
liberalizers are looking for buy-offs to secure liberalization. In short, the broader the protectionist
platform -- even if this partly presupposes what liberalizers will accept -- the easier it is and the
greater the inclination to identify and consider potential subjects of side payment linkage.
Figure 1.3
Broader Protectionist Trade Policy Platforms Implies
Greater Willingness to Trade-off Compensation for Protection
Trade
Protection
I
P(c)
Compensation
The role of protectionist platforms in shaping the incidence of compensation can be roughly
captured on the Edgeworth Space in Figure 1.3 above by variations in the slope of the protectionist
" The breadth of platforms, as I mean it here, encompasses the sheer number of policy positions taken when a
group discusses trade policy, but it also encompasses the conciliation or willingness to link such positions to more
traditional trade protection. For instance, some groups take positions on more than one issue in their trade stances,
but explicitly decry any possible issue linkage between those issues. Such a platform is less inviting of side
payment linkage than is a more neutral expression of multi-policy positions, and much less inviting that a platform
that explicitly calls for a linkage between the issues.
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indifference curve P. Single-minded protectionists will likely not accept any amount of
compensation, and certainly will not suggest any amount of compensation, in exchange for even
very modest liberalization. This platform, thus, yields a virtually horizontal indifference curve
P(a). A protectionist group approaching the bargaining table with a more conciliatory and multi-
issue stance, on the other hand, will accept at least some reductions in protection in exchange for
compensation, such as captured by P(b). And the protectionists with still broader platforms,
suggesting more and more clearly linkable issues to trade in their explicit platform, will encourage
still more linkage and allow still greater liberalization, denoted by the steeper-sloped P(c). 8
Of course, what protectionists want and say they want, is not necessarily what they will get
-- for liberalizers who largely supply compensation have preferences over such compensation as an
imperfect substitute for trade protection. Liberalizers approaching liberalization with broader
platforms will also signal a preference to exchange compensation for liberalization and will lower
the transaction costs associated with identifying subjects of linkage. And in any event, faced with
the side payment agenda that is partly shaped by the narrow or broad protectionist platforms,
liberalizers will be more or less willing to supply side payment compensation depending on their
calculation of whether and to what degree compensation is an imperfect substitute for protection.
For example, protectionists might demand some protection of closed shop labor standards as their
price for some liberalization, and yet liberalizers might be reluctant or unwilling to provide such
compensation. In contrast, protectionists might demand some adjustment assistance policy that
liberalizers look significantly more kindly upon. This difference in the stance of liberalizers will
have significant consequences for the likelihood and degree of secondary bargaining and the
provision of compensation: Compensation is more likely and likely to be more generous in the
second instance than the first.
Figure 1.4 below captures this point. For a given protectionist platform captured by curve
P, liberalizers might vary in their willingness to exchange more compensation for openness.
Where liberalizers look favorably upon a particular kind of compensation -- say adjustment
assistance -- the slope of their indifference curve will be relatively flat, as with L(a). But where
liberalizers look less favorably upon a particular kind of compensation -- say some change in
broader welfare provision or unemployment insurance -- their curve will be relatively steeper, as
with L(b). And where liberalizers are strongly hostile to a particular kind of compensation -- say
closed shop laws -- the curve will be virtually vertical. Averaging out these various possibilities
might capture the general willingness of liberalizers to engage in secondary bargaining for a given
liberalization episode. The flatter the liberalizer curve, the more likely and the more generous the
compensation is likely to be.
18 But it should have marginally less compensation for a given reduction in protection compared to the narrower
platform group.
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Figure 1.4
Liberalizer Willingness to Exchange Compensation for Protection
Trade
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Compensation
To explain and predict the incidence of compensation, however, the positioning of
liberalizers is less useful than the positioning of protectionists. Although liberalizer positioning
helps set the side payment agenda and puts constraints upon protectionist demands, that
positioning is arguably more difficult to measure and can explain less than protectionist platforms.
It is more difficult to measure because liberalizers generally do not identify linkable issues until or
unless protectionist opposition forces them to make statements about their stance on issues other
than the liberalization being pursued. Thus, the varying willingness of liberalizers to exchange
some particular compensation for openness cannot be measured ex ante or separately from the
actual discussion of side payments in the bargaining. The willingness of protectionists, on the
other hand, get signaled in statements before and early-on in struggles over liberalization
initiatives. Moreover, liberalizer constraints can be expected to explain less than protectionist
platforms because liberalizers as egoistic pursuers of liberalization will tend to prefer liberalization
without the price of compensation, and will thus not likely introduce the possibilities of
compensation and will look to protectionists to see what will buy-off their opposition. Especially
in so far as protectionist platforms anticipate liberalizer constraints, such platforms become good
composite measures of the possibilities to substitute compensation for protectionism. For these
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reasons, protectionist platforms are the group platforms on which I focus to explain the group
platforms on which I focus to explain compensation.' 9
2.2.2.3. Combining Power and Platforms: Like the power resources of protectionist
groups, however, the platforms with which such groups approach the liberalization bargaining are
under-determining of compensation: For groups with multi-issue platforms to inspire any
secondary bargaining presupposes that the groups have the political resources to get a privileged
seat at the bargaining table. Those without such power may well get nothing, regardless of their
conciliation.
Figure 1.5
Predicted Incidence Under Varying
Power and Platform Conditions
Platforms
Single-issue Multi-issue
High
Power
Resources
Low
In summary, then, it is the coincidence of high power resources and of multi-issue
platforms that may yield side payment compensation, as Figure 1.5 illustrates. Protectionist
groups that approach the liberalization initiative with low protectionist power, I argue, are likely to
get ignored in the bargaining over the initiative regardless of the trade policy platform they bring --
yielding no redress, or uncompensated liberalization. Those protectionists that have mobilized
significant power resources, however, are likely to elicit some redress from the liberalizers.
Powerful groups with single-issue platforms, I hypothesize, are likely to get protectionist redress,
19 Of course, whether such protectionist platforms explains enough and more than the liberalizer positioning is a
largely empirical question.
Compromised Compensated
Liberalization Liberalization
Protectionist Side Payment
Redress Compensation
No Redress No Redress
Uncompensated Uncompensated
Liberalization Liberalization
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while those with multi-issue platforms are likely to get some side payment compensation instead of
or in addition to such protectionism.
The matrix in Figure 1.5 simplifies the variation in the power and platforms of protectionist
groups, suggesting that the group conditions are binary -- low or high resources, single or multi-
issue platforms. The reality, of course, is much more complex, with resources and platforms
varying more continuously, or at least ordinally. Power resources are more ramified and can be
broken down more finely -- suggesting a continuous explanatory variable. But the breadth of
platforms is less ramified and inherently varies less continuously, more ordinally. I focus on the
value of the explanatory conditions in relative terms -- that is, the scale of resources and the breadth
of platforms in one episode and one group relative to another episode or another group. Thus, I
hypothesize that the episodes and the groups characterized by higher protectionist power resources
and broader platforms will yield more and more frequent side payment compensation than will
those episodes and groups characterized by less power and narrower platforms.
2.2.3. The Institutions: Jurisdiction and Preexisting Welfare
The national and supra-national institutions through which protectionists and liberalizers
bargain over liberalization initiatives can also be expected to affect side payment politics.
Institutions matter because they affect both the power to threaten liberalization initiatives, and the
costs and desirability of side payment redress compared to protectionist redress. I focus on two
institutional conditions: (1) the narrowness or breadth of the institution's jurisdictional authority,
and (2) the generosity of preexisting welfare assistance. And I argue that an institutional setting
combining broad jurisdiction authority and modest pre-existing welfare will tend to inspire the
more frequent and generous side payment compensation than settings that combine narrow
jurisdiction and/or generous welfare.
2.2.3.1. Jurisdictional breadth: Decision-making institutions through which trade
liberalization gets devised vary in the number of policy issues over which they have jurisdictional
oversight. Both the supra-national and national institutions through which trade gets negotiated
vary in the breadth of such jurisdiction. For instance, US Congress' pluralist and issue-segregated
committees tend to be narrower in jurisdiction than corporatist institutions in which labor and
employer peak associations regularly meet and negotiate with government representatives over a
range of issues. And the wide jurisdiction of the EC inter-governmental conferences through
which internal-market liberalization got negotiated contrast with the GATIT in which most post-War
multilateral negotiations have been negotiated.
I hypothesize that, ceteris paribus, the institutions with broader jurisdiction should yield
more frequent and generous compensation than the narrower arenas -- for two reasons. First, the
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Figure 1.6
Broader Jurisdiction of Institutional Setting
Encourages Greater To Exchange Compensation for Protection
Trade
Protection
I
Compensation
broader the arena's jurisdiction, the more it mitigates the logistical barriers to side payment linkage,
by formally encouraging the flow of information about the nature and distributional consequences
of possible subjects of side payment linkage. Second, if broader jurisdiction implies more linkable
issues, it also implies more issues that protectionist groups can retaliate against should they not get
their way on liberalization, as well as more issues to which they can hold liberalization hostage. In
other words, by lowering transaction costs to linkage and by creating "veto points" within the
bargaining arena, broader jurisdictional breadth may encourage side payment compensation. 20
Jurisdictional breadth might vary within a given liberalization episode but across different
institutional arenas within which bargaining over that liberalization take place. For instance,
domestic ratification stages of the liberalization might take place in a legislative arena explicitly
tasked with addressing a variety of issues other than trade policy, whereas the international
negotiating arena might focus exclusively on trade. In such a situation, the domestic institutional
setting encourages side payment compensation, while the latter discourages it -- suggesting that
compensation will be more frequent and generous at the national level and by national institutions,
and less so at the international level or supranational institutions.
This argument can once again be roughly expressed in the Edgeworth Box framework by
variations in the indifference curves of protectionists and liberalization (see Figure 1.6 above).
20 Of course, taken to an extreme of openness to linkable issues, broad jurisdictional arenas could cause transaction
cost overload, or could encourage so much issue hostage-taking as to paralyze any decision-making, compensatory or
otherwise (e.g. Scharpf's "joint decision traps"). I assume that the institutions relevant to trade liberalization will
tend to err on the side of narrowness, and hence to steer clear of this excess.
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Institutional settings that strictly forbid negotiations outside the trade liberalization under review
might so choke off discussion of side issues as to make liberalizers completely unwilling to
entertain any compensation offers, regardless of how much protectionism it might buy --
graphically captured by L(a). And protectionists in such a situation might not accept any
reductions in liberalization regardless of how much compensation it might buy -- graphically
captured by P(a). In either case, the resulting zone of possible agreement would be non-existent --
making any liberalization a matter of power or change in tastes for protection. More likely,
relatively narrow jurisdiction in the institutional arena will complicate negotiation over separate
issues, but simply imply fewer subjects of linkage and complicate such linkage -- captured by the
protectionist curve P(b) and liberalizer curve L(b), and yielding a modest zone of possible
agreement. Relatively broad jurisdiction in the institutional arena, in turn, will encourage and ease
the identification and necessity of compensation along-side liberalization, implying a greater
willingness on the part of the liberalizers and protectionists to exchange compensation for
liberalization. This is captured by the steeper P(c) and the flatter L(c), and the relatively bigger
zone of possible agreement.
2.2.3.2. Welfare Policy Generosity: The national and supra-national institutional setting
within which trade liberalization gets negotiated can also be characterized by the generosity of pre-
existing welfare provision provided, with important implications for side payment politics. I argue
that, ceteris paribus, generous welfare provisions existing at the time of a liberalization initiative
will not only lower the opposition to liberalization, but will also obviate the demand and perceived
need for the institution providing such generous welfare to provide any new compensatory
assistance to whomever remains opposed or is expected to suffer from that liberalization. This is
not an intuitive hypothesis, since one might expect that more generous welfare states should go
hand-in-hand with more generous side payment compensation. In fact, Bates et.al. 1993 on how
institutional settings with greater welfare capacities make it easier and more likely for industrialized
countries to respond to openness with expanded welfare is consistent with this intuition.
Two-considerations lead me to expect the opposite. First, side payment assistance will be
seen as redundant and unnecessary to the extent that possible subjects of side payment linkage
overlap the methods and purposes of preexisting arrangements and to the extent that citizens and
bargainers perceive those arrangements to be satisfactory and generous.21 Second, policy-makers
and members of the polity may see welfare-related compensation as conflicting with or threatening
the integrity of those preexisting arrangements by requiring supplemental shifts in those programs
to take into account the interests of a sub-segment of the general population.
2' This claim echoes that by Andre Blais in his studies of industrial subsidization across industrialized countries,
where he finds that higher social spending is correlated with lower levels of state aid. To make sense of this
correlation, he suggests that social welfare provisions and subsidies are imperfect substitutes for one another: "the
existence of a well-developed social security system would reduce the need for aid to industry" (Blais 1989, p.86).
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For both of these reasons, generous preexistent welfare assistance will tend to obviate the
perceived need and demand for a large and important category of side payment compensation. It
might still be seen as necessary and appropriate to provide compensation separate from welfare
provision -- say by providing technical assistance for firms. But in so far as preexisting welfare
provides assistance to workers, bargaining will not as likely seize upon over-lapping assistance as
subjects of side payment linkage. Thus, even if a broader welfare program is revised as the subject
of a side payment, higher levels of preexisting welfare will co-vary with less frequent and
generous side payments to groups opposing a given liberalization initiative.
This inverse relation between welfare and side payment compensation applies at both or
either the national and the international levels of policy provision. Since very few supra-national
institutions have much welfare provision, it mainly constrains side payment provision by national
governments and during the domestic stages of liberalization, such as ratification. But I argue that
generous welfare provided at one level of governance, say by national governments, will not pose
as many constraints on the propensity to provide compensation at a different level of governance,
say by supra-national institutions. 22 Thus, I argue that generous preexistent compensation at the
national level might still accommodate compensation at the supra-national level, and vice versa.
The final Edgeworth diagram in Figure 1.7 below roughly captures this argument by once
again showing how varying welfare can underlie variations in the indifference curves of both
protectionists and liberalizers. In institutional settings with generous welfare policy assistance
already in place, both liberalizer and protectionist groups engaged in bargaining over a
liberalization initiative will be less inclined to offer or demand compensation of a form that overlaps
with, and is thus obviated by, such welfare provision. Since there will always be other subjects of
side payment compensation that the groups may seize upon in their secondary bargaining, there
may well be room for compensatory exchange -- hence never fully vertical L or horizontal P
curves, and almost always some zone of possible agreement -- but there will be less room for such
'xchange with a large swath of potential subjects of side payments left out of mix. The curves L(a)
and P(a), and the pareto space they delimit, capture this possibility. If, on the other hand, the
institutional setting lacks any or much preexistent welfare provision, then protectionists will more
fervently mobilize power resources, bringing more protectionist groups to the bargaining table,
implying more protectionists occupying the Edgeworth space. And both liberalizers and
protectionists will more likely accept the need for welfare-related compensation -- implying a
steeper slope for the protectionist indifference curve P(b) and a flatter liberalizer curve L(b). The
22 This is particularly true when it comes to the possibility of liberalizer representatives from a generous welfare-
state country engaged in bargaining in low welfar,:. supra-national setting, with the representatives of a country
influenced by its protectionists. In this setting the liberalizer representative, whose domestic setting is characterized
by generous welfare, might still be willing to offer welfare-related compensation to the representatives of the other
country, especially if the latter has modest national welfare.
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result is a larger zone of possible agreement, and more opportunities for compensated
liberalization.
F;gure 1.7
More Modest Existing Welfare Policy Assistance
Encourages Perceived Need and Demand for Compensation
Trade
Protection
a
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2.2.3.3. Combining Institutional Jurisdiction and Welfare: Since this institutional part of
the theory focuses on two characteristics of the supra-national and national institutional setting, we
need to consider what the theory predicts in light of the combined effects of a given institution's
jurisdiction and welfare. I argue that domestic or international institutions that not only have
jurisdiction over issues other than trade policy but also provide modest social welfare assistance
will encourage compensation during bargaining, whereas settings with narrow jurisdictions and/or
generous welfare will tend to discourage compensation.
The degree to which settings with the latter characteristics discourage compensation,
however, varies depending on the mix of narrow jurisdiction or generous welfare. Broad
jurisdiction combined with generous welfare might still accommodate compensation, but not
subjects of compensation that overlap preexisting welfare, thereby narrowing the possible subjects
of compensation. Narrow jurisdiction combined with modest welfare, meanwhile, will focus the
attention of the bargainers upon intra-issue linkages, such as trading market access for market
access (e.g. in one sector for that in another sector, in one country for that in another), or trading
protectionist exemptions (e.g. Schattsneider 1933's "reciprocal non-interference"). Finally,
narrow jurisdictional breadth and generous welfare provision -- a combination that in current
liberalization experience has no empirical example -- should discourage any welfare-related
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compensation and discourage other linkage, hence promoting uncompensated liberalization.
Figure 1.8 summarizes these expectations.
Figure 1.8
Predicting Compensation Under Varying Combinations of
Jurisdictional Breadth and Existing Welfare Provision
Jurisdiction
Narrow Broad
Generous
Welfare
Provision
Modest
Like the power-platform matrix, the above matrix simplifies reality by suggesting that
institutional settings can be distinguished as having either generous or modest welfare, either
narrow or broad jurisdiction. Also like my treatment of the power and platform conditions, the
hypotheses I propose for the implications of an institution's jurisdictional breadth and welfare
generosity are relative. Institutions vary over time, across episodes, across countries, and across
level of bargaining (international/supra-national vs. domestic/national). Those settings with less
generous welfare and more broad jurisdiction should yields more compensation than the converse.
In sum, the theory of compensated liberalization I propose focuses on the combined effects
of the power and platforms of protectionist groups, and of the welfare generosity and jurisdictional
breadth of the institutional setting within which groups bargain. Each of the two sets of conditions
implies a distinct set of predictions for when egoistic bargaining over trade liberalization initiatives
should elicit side payment compensation rather than protectionist redress or nothing at all. Within a
given set of institutions, in short, variations in power and platforms of protectionists predict
variations in compensated vs. uncompensated vs. compromised liberalization. Likewise, within a
No Less
Compensation Compensation
(Bias towards Uncompensated (Particularly less
liberalization) welfare-related Compensation)
Little More
Compensation Side Payment
(Bias towards Compromised Compensation
Liberalization)
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given array of group power and platforms, variations in the jurisdiction breadth and welfare
generosity characterizing the institutional setting predict less specified variations in compensated
liberalization and its alternatives.
What this group-institutional theory of compensation does not provide, however, is a
developed set of expectations of the incidence of compensation when we combine the group and
the institutional characteristics. Of course, the extremes suggest clear predictions. When
protectionist groups with high power and multi-issue platforms bargain within an institutional
setting that combines broad jurisdiction and modest welfare, the theory anticipates frequent and
sizable side payment compensation. And when protectionist groups lack power and are single-
minded protectionist, bargaining in an institutional setting with narrow jurisdiction and generous
welfare, the theory expects no or little compensation. But all the mixed possibilities are uncertain.
I maintain that the group-institutional theory is still identified enough (distinguishes
compensation from its alternatives), developed enough (predicts variation over large swaths of time
and space), and is specified enough (focuses on measurable conditions) to explain important
variation over time and space in real liberalization experience -- and can do so better than existing
insights, including the explanatory approach that highlights the role of altruistic provision
motivated my norms of fairness. To prove as much, however, requires a selection of cases that
can generally exhibit variation in the institutional conditions while holding the power-platform
conditions relatively constant, as well as cases that exhibit power-platform variation within stable
institutional settings. And this requirement is partly what drives the design of the empirical
research, to which I now turn.
3. Research Design: Comparing US Trade Liberalization with EC Internal-market Liberalization
We now have a strategy for describing the incidence of compensation and for evaluating its
promise to off-set social costs and facilitate openness, and we also have a group-institutional
theory to explain variation in the incidence of compensation. But existing understanding of
compensated liberalization is limited in large part by the lack of empirical attention to the use of
compensation in actual liberalization experience. Without it, for instance, we don't know whether
the group-institutional theory of compensation is any better at explaining variation in the incidence
of compensation than are the scattered insights in existing political economy scholarship. Thus,
we need to put the strategy and theory to work.
The bulk of the dissertation research does so precisely that by comparing the history of
United States trade liberalization since 1934 with the history of European Community internal-
market liberalization since 1950. In the case comparisons, I seek to describe the incidence of
compensation across time and space, to evaluate the degree to which compensation off-set social
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costs of facilitated liberalization, and to explain the incidence of compensation by illustrating and
testing the group-institutional theory of compensation. What are these cases, and why are they
appropriate empirical grounds for pursuing these three tasks?
3.1. The Cases
The US and EC liberalization experience encompass dozens of episodes of trade
liberalization -- instances when some proposal to lower tariff and non-tariff barriers to commercial
exchange gets formally proposed as executive or legislative policy. In particular, the US
experience encompasses nearly two-dozen such episodes, and the EC internal-market history
includes five episodes. These various episodes include both bilateral initiatives, such as the US-
Canada Auto Pact and the NAFTA, as well as multilateral initiatives, such as the GATT or all the
EC internal-market cases. And each of the episodes span both domestic and international stages of
n:gotiation: the domestic stages involve negotiations over national authorization to pursue
international agreements, and/or ratification or referenda approval of such agreements; and the
international stages involving negotiations between representatives of more than one country in
either an ad hoc or standing forum of negotiations. 23
3.1.1. Why the Cases are Good for Description and Evaluation:
These cases provide good grounds for describing and evaluating actual compensation
experience in industrialized countries. The US and EC cases are exhaustive of a significant period
of liberalization history, with all cases of trade liberalization included rather than a sub-set of such
liberalization. These cases also cover liberalization episodes that vary in the manufacturing and
service sectors to be liberalized (e.g. autos vs. agriculture), in the kind of commercial barriers to be
liberalized (e.g. tariffs vs. VERs), and in the ambition of the liberalization (e.g. percentage vs.
complete reduction). Moreover, the episodes span both domestic and international institutional
arenas through which commercial policy liberalization takes place. And finally, they span two
continents and more than a dozen countries with very different commercial policy and political
economic traditions and institutions.
This provides a broad sweep of liberalization to get a reasonable overview of the incidence
of side payment compensation over time and space. It also provides a broad range of experience
23 Some episodes have only a domestic stage, such as those where authorization to negotiate is proposed but denied -
- examples of compromised liberalization. An example of this include the 1968 Trade Expansion Act in the US.
Other episodes have domestic authorization and international negotiation stages, but no domestic ratification stage,
because initial authorization allowed for automatic ratification. Examples of this are all revisions of the Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act that did not require post-international negotiation ratification.
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with the actual use of side payment compensation to address whether compensation fulfills its
promise to off-set social costs of and facilitate freer trade -- a far broader landscape than the ad hoc
snap-shots animating existing scholarship. Given the difficulties of measuring when compensation
actually emerges from struggle -- exchanges potentially shrouded from public view by back-room
dealings -- the US cases have the added value of being perhaps the most studied cases in political
economy.
3.1.2. Why the Cases are Good for Explanation
More significantly, perhaps, the US and EC cases also provide good grounds for
illustrating and testing the group-institutional theory of compensation. The first question for that
theory is whether such a "bargaining perspective" can better account for the incidence of
compensation than can the "altruism perspective" focused on norms of fairness. The second
question is to what extent the group-institutional theory can explain the full incidence of side
payment compensation found in liberalization experience -- regardless of how much better it can do
so than its explanatory alternatives.
The US and EC cases are good grounds for answering both these questions because they
capture significant variation in the explanatory variables of the group-institutional theory and of its
main alternative. Over the dozens of liberalization episodes and across the hundreds of groups
bargaining in those episodes, the cases capture significant variation in the degree of suffering and
risk of various groups. The fairness perspective offers a series of predictions about how the
incidence of side payment assistance ought to correlate directly with that variation.
More importantly, the US and EC comparison captures significant but controlled variation
in the group and institutional conditions highlighted by my theory of compensated liberalization.
The US liberalization history captures differences over time and sector in the power resources and
platforms of protectionist and liberalizer groups. For instance, a given liberalization episode
includes groups with diverging resources and platforms, and different episodes capture changes in
the resources and platforms of groups active in trade bargaining. The US history only exhibits
modest variation, however, in the institutions through which trade policy is bargained, in particular
in jurisdictional breadth and preexisting welfare that I hypothesize strongly influence side payment
compensation. This implies that the US cases will provide plenty of illustrations and some test of
the power-platform conditions in the theory, while providing some control on the institutional
conditions.
Comparing the US trade history with EC internal-market liberalization captures significant
institutional variation. The EC liberalization has taken place within supra-national and national
institutions that are very different than the institutions governing US trade liberalization. The three
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international institutions through which EC internal-market liberalization has been negotiated -- the
EC Corunission, the Council of Ministers, and Intergovernmental Conferences -- have broader
jurisdiction than the supra-national institutions through which US trade liberalization has gotten
negotiated, such as the GATT and the NAFTA inter-governmental arenas. At the national-level,
meanwhile, most European national institutions have substantially more developed and generous
welfare states than their US counterparts. At the same time, the broad US-EC trends do not vary
systematically in the power and platforms of protectionist groups.24 This means that the US
comparison to the EC will tend to provide some illustration of the institutional differences while
providing some control over the power-platform conditions. Over time, however, the European
cases vary in these institutional and in the other explanatory conditions, including the power
resources and platforms of the bargaining groups.
In short, the US and EC cases capture variation over space and time in all the explanatory
variables in the theory, but in a way that should isolate the importance of the group vs. the
institutional variables. In some of the cases, the predictions emerging from this variation in the
explanatory variables will likely differ from those anticipated by the altruism perspective focused
on fairness norms. The result is that the cases illustrates and tests the theory to figure the extent to
which it can explain the sweep of variation and the extent to which it can do so better than the
"altruism perspective."
3.2. The Methods: Measuring Incidence, Propriety, and Origins of Compensation
Describing, evaluating and explaining compensation in the US and EC cases requires
observable measures of side payment compensation, of the indexes of compensation's usefulness,
and of the explanatory conditions offered to explain incidence. Each of these tasks pose
measurement challenges. I use measures that cannot fully meet these challenges, that pose some
biases in the descriptive and causal inferences they support, but that I maintain are better than their
alternatives. In particular, in light of the measurement challenges posed by the descriptive,
explanatory, and evaluation tasks, I argue that the qualitative and historical measures I use are
superior to large-n and quantitative methods.
24 Except, of course, differences that can be reduced to -- are epiphenomenal of -- institutional differences: the
broader jurisdiction of the EC trade policy-making institutions will encourage EC delegations, and protectionist
groups agitating to influence those delegations, to approach liberalization episodes with more multi-issue platforms,
and will afford those groups some more power to retaliate against liberalization through other integration issues.
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3.2. 1. Measuring Incidence
Describing the incidence of compensation in the cases requires observable measures of
whether goods or policies discussed or provided during bargaining were (1) intended to off-set the
costs of the proposed liberalization, and (2) separate from the core protections to be reduced. This
is not always easy to identify. First of all, such side payments could take place behind closed
doors between two individuals (say, two legislators) and sealed with a silent hand-shake, never to
be revealed in the press, the congressional record, or even personal letters and candid memoirs.
Second, it may be difficult to distinguish side payments from policies that might happen to redress
the pain of protectionist groups but that are not intended to off-set the pain of a particular
liberalization proposal, and are instead created mainly for reasons distinct from the social costs of
and political obstacles to liberalization. Finally, there can even be ambiguity in which policies or
goods are separate from the core provisions being liberalized, since a liberalization initiative can be
very general in its scope. This can make it difficult to code actions or policies as side payments
rather than as exemption or revision of the liberalization.
The methodology used here is simply to gather evidence of the various transactions and
bargains that take place during political struggle before during and after a liberalization initiative.
Apart from secondary source accounts of the proceedings in books and journals, I also include the
distilled accounts in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, CQ Weekly, the National Journal, and a
variety of newspapers that might have covered the politics. For the US cases, I supplement these
descriptions with reviews of legislative chronicles in published Hearings and the Congressional
Record, with letters from participants, and with some interviews (especially for the more recent
cases). Luckily, the existing writings and documents chronicling the US cases are generally very
detailed and extensive, since the US trade history has been so studied by all the social sciences.
For the EC cases, alas, the documentation is not as detailed. I rely on the developed secondary
source histories of the EC policies and policy-making, and supplement these with more primary
documentation of EC inter-governmental and Council of Ministers proceedings (EC Bulletin,
Officia! Journal, Agence Europe, etc.), and with a selected number of interviews with EC
academics and practitioners expert in the details of the cases.
Using all of these sources, I look for real or proposed changes in policies or other goods
that affect the protectionists and that are separate from the provisions explicitly under review in the
proposed liberalization. And I look for evidence of intentionality in the timing of the assistance
promised or provided, in the nature of the assistance provided, the beneficiaries of the assistance,
and the statements of protectionist and liberalizer representatives. This reveals whether the desire
to off-set a liberalization's harm was the main or at least a necessary condition for the creation of
some policy. Although I always gauge the scale and scope of any compensation provided, I
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generally treat the incidence of compensation as dichotomous, because some forms of side
payments are different enough that it is impossible to gauge their relative generosity in ordinal or
continuous terms. 25 I believe this method reveals adequate measures of whether or not a fight over
liberalization is marked by one or more compensatory side payment. There are only a few cases
where there is enough ambiguity that I am unsure, such as some of national subsidies that are
loosely linked to the EC internal-market liberalization project. And in these cases I explicitly
discuss the ambiguity. 26
3.2.2. Measuring "Propriety"
3.2.2.1. Measuring Whether Compensation Off-sets Social Costs: Evaluating how much
compensation fulfills its promise to off-set social costs of and facilitate freer trade poses more
serious measurement challenges. Recall, first, that to assess how much compensation off-sets
social costs and thereby enhances equity, my strategy is to gauge (1) the scale and scope of
compensation provided, (2) the distribution of the compensation's benefits in comparison to the
alleged pain of liberalization's "victims," (3) provision that goes beyond actual pain, (4) the scale
and distribution of financial and other costs of the compensation, and (5) the effectiveness of the
compensation programs' implementation.
The scale and scope of actual costs and benefits of programs are relatively straight-forward
to measure, since the money and in-kind benefit packages, the group eligibility, and the revenue
sources are usually published information. The distribution of benefits and costs, however,
requires information about who benefits from and who pays for compensation, and about who
suffers from and who benefits from liberalization. This information is sometimes available, in the
form of studies of anticipated and real benefits and losses different industrial and other groups face
as a result of liberalization, and of the revenue source. But it is not always detailed or accurate.
This sometimes requires more speculative judgments, often extrapolating from more detailed
information about a particular group or program to the whole set of groups and programs involved
in a liberalization episode. Finally, the effectiveness of a program's implementation requires
substantial study that goes beyond the resources and time of this project. So for such program
effectiveness I simply rely on existing secondary implementation studies -- where they exist -- of
the programs created in the corpus of side payment exchange.
3.2.2.2. Measuring Whether Compensation Facilitates Openness: Recall that my strategy
to assess whether compensation actually facilitates freer trade entails gauging (1) how much
25 For instance, an employment program and the promise to build roads for the lumber industry -- two actual
compensation provisions -- might both be side payments, but differences in their generosity are difficult to measure.
26 In addition to such ambiguity, I simply have to assume that there will be plenty of private side payments for
which my methods of measurement can never uncover a smoking gun.
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compensation lowered existing protectionist opposition; (2) how much it inspired new opposition
from groups opposed to compensation; (3) how much compensation sparked new opposition from
groups seeking to extort more generous compensation; and (4) how much the compensation
encouraged (or discouraged) vulnerable groups to exit the aggrieved sector of the economy.
The first and second of these issues -- how much compensation lowered existing or
inspired new opposition -- pose some of the most difficult measurement challenges of this study.
The problem is that both entail causal rather than descriptive inferences, and raise a host of
inferential problems as a result. Two problems are most important. The first involves selection
bias, in that my case selection focuses on liberalization initiatives, which likely emerge from a
political climate in which existing protectionists will respond favorably to compensation offers, and
in that any compensation offered or provided when and to the extent that the liberalizers anticipate
some lowering in opposition to result. Both these criteria introduce selection bias that may
exaggerate the effects of side payments on opposition. The second is the difficulty of separating
the independent causal effect of compensatory side payments on opposition from the other factors
that shape both the provision of compensation and opposition. For instance, compensation might
co-vary with lower opposition, but the lowerirg and compensation might also reflect the polity's
broader normative commitment to helping market victims, possibly making the link between
compensation and opposition spurious.
One strategy to measure the political effectiveness of compensation is large-n quantitative
analysis that compares the various levels of compensation provided to various groups in the polity.
One could generate correlations between the scale of compensation provided on the one hand, and
the level of opposition to the liberalization under review on the other. Such a strategy is possible,
especially for many of the US cases, with compensation scale gauged as financial expenditures
embodied in the piece of a compensation program to be provided, and with opposition gauged by
voting statistics by district. Such a strategy would see whether the groups getting the most
compensation were the ones most supportive, or least opposed, to the proposed liberalization.
This approach, however, suffers from omitted variable bias. The bias emerges from the
likelihood that compensation will be provided only to those groups and in those instances where
opposition is already high enough to threaten liberalization, and on a scale commensurate with the
level of anticipated opposition. Even if in reality the compensation has the effect of lowering the
opposition, the measured correlations with single observations of compensation and post-
compensation opposition will likely reveal high levels of compensation co-varying with high levels
of opposition. This would suggest that compensation might raise rather than lower opposition, but
would be a spurious inference -- like correlating the number fire engines with the severity of fires
and concluding that more fire trucks cause worse fires. In short, such large-n designs would tend
to underestimate how much compensation lowers existing opposition and overestimate how much
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it raises new opposition -- thereby underestimating the degree to which compensation facilitates
freer trade.
I estimate the political efficacy of compensatory side payments by measuring at several
points during the bargaining between protectionists and liberalizers the level of opposition among
the protectionists. Most importantly, I measure opposition before and after the provision of the
side payment or payments to the group. Opposition can be measured by the statements and threats
made publicly or privately (but later made public) by representatives of the protectionist groups,
lobbying by those groups, money spent on lobbying, polls of members in society, "straw-polls" in
legislatures, and patterns of roll-call voting in legislatures. In all cases, the question is whether the
side payment made a difference in the level of opposition, and what role that change had in the
overall facilitation of the liberalization. 27
This method gets around the omitted variable bias of its large-n alternative because it can
capture changes in opposition levels regardless of the opposition existing before or during
provision of compensation. Nonetheless, my method of correlating changes in compensation
levels with changes in opposition of a group within a liberalization case still suffers from some
selection and omitted variable bias. The selection bias is that compensation will tend to be
provided not only when liberalizers anticipate opposition but also when they expect compensation
to lower opposition. And the omitted variable bias is more general, that other conditions that might
vary case-to-case can be expected to correlate with compensation and level of opposition. Both
these selection and omitted variable bias may lead to the opposite bias of the large-n method by
overestimating the political effectiveness of compensation.
Thus, I supplement these correlations with as much detail into the links between the side
payments and the statements and decisions to continue or lower opposition as the data will bear.
This includes looking for statements by protectionists and liberalizers, especially protectionists, of
how much compensation made a difference to their opposition. And in all cases I also rely on
counter-factual reasoning to judge what the opposition would have been in the absence of
compensation." As with measuring the incidence, I believe this method does a reasonable job of
estimating the political effectiveness of side payments in most cases. But I try to informally
estimate how much uncertainty there is in each case.
The remaining indices of whether compensation facilitates freer trade -- whether it inspires
extortionate demands and whether it promotes exit -- are easier to explain. To measure extortion, I
27 For instance, some of the US liberalization cases rely on roll-call data on a series of liberalization ;1ls (e.g.
renewals of US Presidential negotiating authority) leading up to a bill where a side payment was provided, targeted at
some protectionist group. In this case, the data can be analyzed to see if there was a change in the voting pattern of
legislators whose constituency included a particularly high concentration of a the protectionist group at whom the
side payments were targeted.
28 For a good discussion of the status and a partial defense of such evidentiary reasoning, see James Fearon 1991.
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engage in the difficult interpretive task of looking for situations where groups changed their
position during liberalization initiatives away from support of liberalization to opposition, did so
for no clear reason connected to the nature of the liberalization, and actually asked for more
compensation for themselves.
Finally, to measure the degree to which compensation packages actually promoted or
discouraged exit from aggrieved sectors of economic activity, I consider two measures. First I
consider the content of the compensation provided, to see if any programmatic incentives or
disincentives to exit exist in the design of the side payment provided. Second, I again rely on
secondary sources analyzing the implementation of programs to see if the programs promoted
adjustment. Such studies exist for some of the most important compensation programs in the
history, such as the US Trade Adjustment Assistance program, and a variety of EC Commission
"compensation" programs like the European Social Funds and the Guidance Section of the
European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF).
3.2.3. Measuring Elusive Explanatory Conditions
The explanatory task of illustrating and testing the group-institutional theory of
compensation requires getting clear measures of protectionist power resources and trade policy
platforms, and of the institutional setting's jurisdictional breadth and welfare policy generosity. It
also requires some measures of the conditions highlighted by the "altruism" approach against
which I compete my bargaining perspective. For any of the explanatory factors to have meaning,
they still need measures that are independent of the outcome to be explained. Yet, some of the
factors are multi-dimensional and others have dimensions that are difficult to get clear quantitative
or qualitative information about -- in either case, difficult to separate from the outcomes to be
explained. This is particularly true for power and fairness ideas, but the other factors raise similar
problems. All these difficulties are mitigated, though not solved, by the kinds of hypotheses I
deduce from the theory -- hypotheses that anticipate a higher incidence and greater political efficacy
of side payments in one setting or to one group relative to another.
3.2.3.1. Measuring Political Power: I focus on both structural and incidental measures of
political resources actually mobilized during liberalization. This means that the resources measured
will reflect the level of determination of the protectionist group. Still, the structural measures are
those that affect the influence of a group, regardless of the particular policy and year in which that
group is agitating for some outcome. And the incidental measures refer to characteristics more
specific to the liberalization episode.
The structural conditions I focus on are the number of people encompassed by a particular
coalition, the distribution of those people across legislative or other politically-relevant districts,
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and the inclusiveness and centralization of the organizations representing the groups. For the first
two measures, I rely on a variety of secondary and, for the US cases especially, primary sources,
such as "Census of Manufacturers" and "County Business Patterns" data, internal annual reports
by representative industry associations, lobbies, and unions.29
The other structural index of power on which I focus is the inclusiveness and centralization
of the lobbying organization representing a protectionist group. Here I simply assess the number
of people in the bargaining association, as both an absolute number and as a percentage or fraction
of the total in the general group the association claims to represent. Secondary sources and
association reports usually provide this kind of information. Sometimes figures are not available to
distinguish the association membership from the total number of people covered by their activity.
For instance, some industry associations claim a larger membership than they actually have by
including not only participating or dues-paying members but also people who don't see the
association as speaking for them. For concentration, I measure the number of associations
representing a particular aggrieved group, asking for a particular kind of protectionism or side
payment. The fewer such representative associations, the more centralized the group. If there is
an umbrella organization that coordinates the activities of member associations, such as the AFL-
CIO does for organized labor in the US, then I assess from secondary and primary sources the
strength of the umbrella body to coordinate disparate aims of member groups.
The power of groups, however, can depend as much on conditions specific or incidental to
the bargaining situation as on these more general conditions. Principal among these is the
importance of groups and their legislative agents to the particular policy or electoral goals of the
liberalizer coalition. The position of the groups and legislative agents in the party system, for
instance, can significantly affect their power independent of structural power. In a US context, for
instance, an industry group may have its employment spread across a variety of states whose
legislative representatives are very important to the electoral or policy goals of an executive bent on
some liberalization initiative but also concerned about election and other policies. More incidental
29 The number of people included in a coalition, and their distribution across politically-relevant districts, can be
illustrated by considering a hypothetical industry in the US. One can measure the concentration and distribution of a
particular industry's employment across legislative districts in the US, and this works for assessing the power of
both industry and worker groups that might oppose a liberalization initiative. Getting information on the regional
break-down of an industry's employment turns out to be easy at the national and state level, and very difficult at the
district level, because census data on industry employment and firm concentration is not always collected at the
county level and because representative districts do not coincide with county lines in any event.
At both the state and national level, I use this information to rank the importance of a particular
protectionist group or industry as a percentage of total manufacturing employment. One can infer from this the
importance of a particular group to the electoral position of legislators at the level of those districts; for instance, if a
textile industry is the number one employer in a state, it stands to reason that a Senator representing that state will
care about appeasing the representatives of that industry. With this information, I can infer that industry and labor
groups that command a higher percentage of manufacturing employment at the state and national level will have
more power than groups commanding a lower percentage.
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still, some protectionist group might be represented by a legislator in a particularly powerful
committee or with strong personal ties to liberalizers.
Estimated according to both these incidental and structural measures, it is possible to assess
the relative power of one group compared to another, at a particular time or across liberalization
episodes. Sometimes the relative power position can be summarized in quantitative statistics
capturing one or another of these dimensions, but in all cases the power position is judged by an
amalgam of structural and incidental measures.
3.2.2.2. Measuring Platforms: The remaining explanatory variables on which I focus are
easier to measure, though also have limitations. The breadth of protectionist trade policy platforms
-- the conciliation of a group as expressed by the number of policy issues over which protectionists
express a preference along-side demands for protection -- is, perhaps, the trickiest. My measures
of platforms are all information sources that carry public policy statements by the protectionist
group. The most important of these include published policy platforms of representative
organizations expressed before and during bargaining -- but before any explicit discussion by
liberalizers of compensation. In the US setting, the relevant sources are Congressional Hearings
testimony, press statements, and more on-the-fly statements documented in the Congressional
Record, Congressional Quarterly and Quarterly Almanac, and newspaper/magazine analysis like
the CQ Weekly, National Journal and the New York Times. In the EC context, my emphasis is on
the counterpart sources, such as the EC Official Journal and Agence Europe. In all cases, I put
particular emphasis on the platform points that get raised in connection with the issue of economic
liberalization (e.g. mentioning training in the same forum that an organizational committee
mentions trade liberalization). I consider these as more "linkable" to protection than policy
positions that never get mentioned in connection with the stance of protection.
3.2.2.3. Jurisdiction and Welfare Generosity: The institutional characteristics on which my
theory focuses are simpler to measure. Jurisdictional breadth can be measured simply by
newspaper, secondary source, and other official organization accounts (e.g. EC Bulletin and
GATT reports) of the range of issues to be discussed in the institution through which bargaining
takes place. National and international institutional breadth tends to be easily defined as such, and
relatively stable. General welfare state compensation, meanwhile, is measured by the budget
expenditures on social programs that assist market dislocations. This includes both passive and
active labor market interventions, such as unemployment insurance and job retraining, social
security, health care, and welfare (e.g. the erstwhile Aid to Families with Dependent Children).
3.2.3.2. Measuring Fairness Ideas: Finally, to consider how the group-institutional theory
fares in its explanatory usefulness relative to the "altruism perspective" requires some measure of
the fairness ideas and norms that might vary across countries or time. The difficulty here lies in the
haziness of the variable -- a commitment to helping the victims of economic liberalization as a
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fairness value -- as well as in the inherent difficulties of measuring an ideational value as distinct
from the outcome to be explained and from related power and interest conditions. My strategy is to
focus on three related characteristics. First, I focus on the statements and actions of the liberalizers
before and during the liberalization initiative under review. The policy statements made by
liberalizers seeking to marshal support for their liberalization provide some information on the
importance the liberalizers attach to explicitly taking account of the welfare of those hurt by the
liberalization. To be sure, all liberalizers can be counted on to couch the provision of side
payments in terms of such concern, since it is politically risky to proclaim bribery as a goal. But
some policy defenses are more laced with statements about the welfare of victims than others. And
I interpret the frequency of such statements as indicative of the prevalence of fairness ideas.
Precisely because such statements may represent rhetoric designed to shroud egoistic
bribery, a second characteristic is the timing of the statements relative to the liberalization and the
provision of side payments. The earlier liberalizers discuss concern for the welfare of the victims
of liberalization, relative to the provision of side payments and to the passage of a liberalization
initiative, the more likely they are to actually hold "fairness ideas" about the propriety of redressing
liberalization's costs. Most importantly, the more such ideas get expression before a protectionist
group is expected to block some liberalization initiative, the stronger the case that fairness ideas are
strongly held. Conversely, if such ideas only get expression at the time of, or after, the provision
of some side payment, or at a time when protectionist groups are most vocally threatening the
initiative championed by liberalizers, then there is less reason to believe such ideas matter.
Finally, the nature of a side payment, itself, can reveal the prevalence of fairness ideas
among liberalizers. Side payments may be more or less focused on the demands and interests of
the most "deserving" groups in society -- those most likely to be hurt by the liberalization -- as
opposed to the most powerful groups. Sometimes, of course, the most vulnerable are also the
more vocally opposed and powerful. But when this is not the case, it is easier to marshal evidence
that fairness ideas are held and matter to the provision of the side payment.30
4. Conclusion: Case Studies as Historical Narratives
This chapter reviewed what existing political economy scholarship tells about compensated
liberalization, and laid out my attempt to improve upon that scholarship. I tried to show that
political economists focused on the politics of trade liberalization and economic openness offer a
variety of, sometimes competing, insights into (1) whether compensation off-sets social costs and
30 Like the worst "revealed preference" claims, this measure of fairness ideas is, by definition, a measure that
provides no predictive leverage, at least not for the side payment that "reveals" the ideas. But it is still useful in
sorting out the existence of fairness ideas of a given liberalization, ex post, and of the importance of fairness ideas as
a motivation distinct from political expediency.
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facilitates liberalization, (2) when compensation has emerged from struggles over liberalization,
and (3) what can explain the incidence of compensation. Review of this literature shows, I
believe, that existing theoretical and empirical shortcomings prevent existing insights from
providing satisfactory answers to these questions.
My attempt to improve upon this literature consists of more theoretically-informed and
empirically focused study of compensation. It includes a strategy to describe the incidence of
compensation and to evaluate when side payments actually off-set social costs of and facilitate
openness. It also includes a more identified, developed, and specified theory of compensation.
This theory focuses on egoistic bargaining between liberalizers and protectionists, and in particular
on group platforms and power, as well as institutional jurisdiction and welfare, that together shape
such bargaining. Finally, my attempt to improve upon the literature includes a research design to
carry out all these various tasks.
Before turning to the case studies outlined in that design, one more task remains: to lay out
how each of the case studies in the following six empirical chapters will develop the descriptive,
explanatory, and evaluation aims of the study. My plan is to pursue these aims through an
historical narrative across and within the cases. This means that the descriptive, explanatory and
assessment story will unfold in roughly chronological order and through historical detail, with each
of the chapters encompassing at least one episode of liberalization (most encompass two).
Such historical narrative involves roughly six steps for each episode.3 First, I summarize
the origins, ambition and anticipated distributional consequences of the liberalization initiative that
underlies the episode. Second, I lay out the conditions that my theory anticipates will affect the
political struggle over that episode, particularly the group and/or institutional conditions at the
center of my theory of compensation. For the US cases, the focus is on the power resources and
platforms of the protectionist groups, more than on the institutional setting, and for the EC cases
the focus is on both group and institutional conditions. 32 Third, I detail how bargaining between
groups evolved in light of these conditions, focusing on the origins and bargaining over the
options for dealing with opposition -- do nothing, provide protectionist redress, and provide side
payments. Fourth, I summarize the mixture of these options to emerge from the bargaining, with
emphasis on any side payments -- including the scale, scope, and distribution of the financial and
in-kind benefits and costs of the compensation. Fifth, I evaluate the short-term political
effectiveness of the compensation by assessing the degree to which it lowered (or raised)
3 The narrative of each episode may repeat one or more of these steps depending on the complexity and number of
side payment packages to emerge from the bargaining. Each case and/or each series of cases in a chapter also is
introduced by an overview and followed by a theoretical recap that summarizes the descriptive, explanatory, and
evaluation findings.
32 The reason is that for the EC cases I'm simultaneously comparing the continents and telling of the historical
development of internal-market compensated liberalization
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opposition of existing protectionists, raised new opposition from those hitherto supportive or
disengaged from the liberalization, and/or inspired rent-seeking or extortion among any groups.
Sixth and finally, I consider the longer-term measures of whether the compensation off-set social
costs and facilitated freer trade by surveying existing implementation studies, to capture how much
the compensation provided meaningful redress in line with the actual losses and dislocation, and
how much it facilitated adjustment out of the non-competitive economic activity.
Through these six steps, the narrative of each case develops the rudiments of the incidence,
propriety and origins of compensation in that case. And with the accumulation of information
about all of three of these issues in all of the US and EC cases, we can revisit in Chapter Eight the
extent to which my contribution actually improves upon what political economy currently tells us
about compensated liberalization.
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From Uncompensated and Compromised Liberalization,
to Compensated Liberalization, 1934-62
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Chapter Two
Throughout its trade policymaking history, the US Congress and the Executive have
overseen alternating periods of protectionism and liberalization, with each of these periods masking
major shifts in the degree of protection afforded to particular segments of agriculture and industry.
Since 1934, the broad trend has been towards freer markets. Beginning with the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act (RTAA) of that year, US policymakers reversed the precedent of the infamous
Smoot-Hawley tariff with a series of institutional and policy shifts favoring increased commercial
openness. Although the trend toward openness smooths over some protectionist set-backs and
more sustained exemptions for particular segments of the economy, the 1934 RTAA ushered-in
US history's most sustained and unprecedented lowering of tariff and other protectionist barriers, a
trend that has continued through the recent NAFTA and the Uruguay Round episodes.
For the first thirty years of this period, however, the progressive lowering of tariff barriers
in successive legislative initiatives, and in the bilateral and multinational agreements they authorize,
took place without any side-payment compensation to groups hurt by freer markets. Between
1934 and 1962, liberalizers successfully brokered eleven legislated renewals of the Reciprocal
Trade Act of 1934, and negotiated scores of bilateral and, after the creation of the GATT in 1946,
multilateral trade agreements. With each of these renewals and agreements, liberalizers faced
various kinds and degrees of political opposition from those vulnerable to increased import
competition. To deal with that opposition liberalizers either offered no redress or doled out
protectionist redress. In 1934, liberalizers strategically timed introduction of the liberalization so as
to maximize legislative power, invoked rhetoric to down-play the depth of the liberalization, and
accepted important revisions in the extent of the liberalization. Between 1934 and 1945, in
contrast, the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations didn't even invoke these kinds of bargaining
measures; they simply ignored the opposition. Between 1946 and 1958, finally, liberalizers
exempted opposition from the reach of and watered-down the liberalization initiative. In other
words, struggle over the first thirty years of US trade liberalization elicited some combination of
uncompensated and compromised liberalization -- but no payment compensation.
With President Kennedy's Trade Expansion Act of 1962, designed to authorize tariff-
cutting authority for the impending GATT Round, this all changed. In the corpus of legislative
struggle over that TEA liberalization, Kennedy provided compensation packages to three groups
vocal in their opposition to or ambivalence over liberalization. The textile industry won from the
Administration a "seven-point" program of assistance that included protectionist exemption in the
form of voluntary quotas and several compensation provisions -- including research and
development funds, loans from the Small Business Administration, and tax relief. The softwood
lumber industry, similarly, received a "six-point" assistance package that included tax relief, SBA
loans, along-side a protectionist commitment to negotiate a bilateral voluntary export agreement
with Canada. Finally, organized labor was the principal target of ambitious adjustment assistance
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provisions written into the TEA -- provisions promising tax relief, loans, and subsidies for firms,
and unemployment-insurance supplements, and relocation and re-training assistance for workers.
The key explanatory question posed by this uneven compensated liberalization between
1934 and 1962 is two-fold: why was compensation provided in 1962 and not before?; and why
did textiles, lumber, and labor receive side-payments, whereas other groups opposing economic
liberalization either receive nothing, such as was the plight of the shoe industry, or got protectionist
exemption or revision alone, such as agriculture, glass and carpets?
The history supports answers to the explanatory questions that are broadly consistent with
the theoretical expectations developed in Chapter One. In 1934, protectionist groups lacked both
the power resources to threaten the RTAA as well as approached the initiative with narrow
platforms, making the use of compensatory side payments both unnecessary and difficult.
Between 1934 and 1945, the modesty of protectionist opposition obviated the need to use side
payments or other tactics for reducing opposition. And increased protectionist opposition
following post-war economic recovery abroad, and increased power of that opposition in
Congress, began to threaten the passage of the proposed liberalization initiatives between 1946 and
1958, but the groups at the core of this opposition approached the episodes with single-minded
protectionism, making the selection and negotiation of side payments a costly alternative to
protectionist revision and exemption. Thus, power conspired with single-minded protectionism on
the part of the protector groups to produce exemption and revision, rather than side payments.
By the beginning of the 1960s, a number of sectors and groups became increasingly hostile
to or ambivalent about freer trade, AND these groups increasingly expressed interest in policy
goods separate from the protectionism. Most important among the groups to gain power and to
broaden their platforms were textiles and the AFL-CIO. The former had long been in the
protectionist coalition, but became more resolutely and powerfully protectionist as the 1950s
wound to a close. And the AFL-CIO, which had previously expressed unconditional support for
free trade internationalism, encompassed unions that were increasingly vulnerable to foreign
competition as post-War recovery matured. But rank-and-file sentiment was mixed, consistent
with the international economic positions of the various member unions, and some union officials
had taken an interest in other policies that might smooth relations between these wings of Labor:
conditional support for liberalization, conditioned upon provisions like protection of labor rights
and, especially, creation of trade adjustment assistance for those dislocated by liberalization.
In short, the TEA story suggests that compensation was provided in 1962 and not before,
and to some groups and not others, because of increased power resources to threaten the
liberalization episode combined with moves on the part of some groups from single-minded
protectionism to conciliatory and multi-issue platforms. There is some modest evidence, however,
for the "altruism" perspective focused on fairness norms. The Kennedy Administration, prior to
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the TEA episode, expressed greater interest in fair trade ideas than had liberalizer Presidents.
Kennedy promoted compensation before labor had called for linkage between adjustment
assistance and trade liberalization, and adjustment assistance was championed by a variety of free-
trade employer groups and economists as well labor. It is difficult, therefore, to attribute the
creation of the adjustment assistance compensation as solely a reflection of egoistic bargaining.
Explanatory questions aside, the advent of compensated liberalization in 1962 raises more
generic normative questions: did the array of side payments in 1962 offer significant redress for
the expected victims of the TEA and its GATT consequences? And did they facilitate the
liberalization to follow? Here, the long-run history suggests that all three compensation packages
fell short of their promise, particularly with respect to the hope of off-setting liberalization's social
costs. The compensation programs provided limited relief for the targeted groups, particularly the
TAA program which was implemented with such tight eligibility criteria that no groups gained
access to relief for the first seven years of the program. On the other hand, the history also
supports the conclusion that the compensation, particularly that provided to organized labor, was
crucial to the short-term acquiescence of Labor to the passage of the TEA liberalization. Even here,
however, the poor implementation of TAA left the longer-term promise of compensation to buy-off
opposition to freer trade very much in doubt.
This Chapter develops these explanatory and normative conclusions in three broad
sections. The first section considers the history and origins of the mix of uncompensated and
compromised liberalization between 1934 and 1961. This involves laying out in some detail the
1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, the landmark legislative initiative that ushered-in a period
of liberalization initiatives. The section then reviews the continuation of economic liberalization
between 1934 and 1958, which can be divided into two sub-periods -- a honeymoon period of
liberalizer predominance between 1934 and 1946, and a more fractious prelude to compensated
liberalization between 1946 and 1960. The second section of the chapter overviews the advent of
compensated liberalization in Kennedy's 1962 Trade Expansion Act, with the discussion divided
between histories of compensation to textiles, lumber, and labor, respectively. The third and final
section of the chapter provides an explanation for the advent of compensated liberalization in light
of the group-institutional theory of compensation, and pulls together the short-term history relevant
to evaluating whether that advent off-set social costs and facilitated openness.
1. The Period of Uncompensated and Compromised Liberalization, 1934-61
1.1. 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
Less than four years after it passed the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff, which today remains
the icon of excessive protectionism, Congress approved the trade provision that marks the turning
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point toward greater openness. The 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) gave the
President limited authority to negotiate reciprocal agreements with other countries to significantly
lower tariff levels and to extend the results to all countries granted Most Favored Nation trading
status, all without having to subject the results to Congressional approval.' The medium-term
tariff reductions turned out to be modest, by 1946 leading to bilateral negotiations that yielded only
marginally lower tariffs than pre-Smoot-Hawley days. But tariffs and other protections began their
secular lowering at that time. At a minimum, the RTAA marked a major turning point in the
ideological, power-interest, and international conditions that conspire to explain the broad trend
toward liberalization since that time. As many scholars have pointed out, moreover, RTAA may
have partially caused as well as marked that shift, due to the institutional legacy of delegating
authority to the President (Lowi 1964, Pastor 1980, Destler 1986, Haggard 1988).2 Either way,
the RTAA was a major liberalization initiative.
Yet, this "watershed" moment in US trade policymaking history was devised and approved
without the provision of compensatory side payments. The history of the episode demonstrates
that the Roosevelt Administration introduced the measure as a modest liberalization initiative,
inspiring substantial opposition from industry groups defending their market position and from
congressional leaders defending their authority over trade policy. To deal with this opposition, the
Administration may have delayed his introduction of the legislation until monetary policy changes
and other developments improved the RTAA's legislative position. The Administration also
accepted limits on the proposed tariff-cutting authority, and ultimately pledged to keep the trade
initiative in line with the major industrial policy measures already enacted to promote industrial and
agricultural recovery. What they did not do was either explicitly exempt any groups from the reach
of the liberalization, or offer compensatory side payments.
1.1.1. The Origins and Controversy Over RTAA Delegation and Liberalization
In the years leading up to the introduction and fight over RTAA, the Roosevelt
Administration was deeply ambivalent toward free trade. Before his election to the presidency,
I As David Lake 1988 points out, the RTAA contained little that had not already been enacted into previous tariff
acts, but was unprecedented in delegating these powers in a single Act.2 The literature doesn't do a good job explaining why delegating authority to the President ought to make a
difference, but several reasons apply. By moving important tariff-setting authority into the Executive, the policy
was to be designed by politicians accountable to one large constituency rather than by more than 430 in the House
and 100 in the Senate, each with their own regional constituency. This increased the power of policymakers
concerned more with aggregate national interest than with sectional, special-interests (Alt and Gilligan 1994).
Second, since the Executive authority was centered in the State Department, RTAA empowered officials with an
internationalist, free trade bias. Finally, delegating authority meant that interest groups could influence the limits of
authority only before actual tariff-cutting was to take place via international negotiations, making it hard for groups
to judge winners and losers of the negotiations, and in turn complicating vote-trading and protectionist contagion.
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several protectionist industry and agricultural groups important to the Democrat's electoral coalition
forced Roosevelt and his party to move away from their professed commitment to free trade. 3 By
the election, Roosevelt had pronounced his support for "continuous protection for American
agriculture as well as American industry" (Moley 1971, p.51). Upon taking office, moreover,
Roosevelt's chief concern was with economic recovery from the Great Depression. Roosevelt and
his "brains trust" advisors like Raymond Moley, Rexford Tugwell, and George Peek preferred an
open, cooperative international economic system in the long run, but "proceeded on the assumption
that the causes of our ills were domestic, internal, and that the remedies would have to be internal
too" (Moley 1971, p.23, quoted in Haggard 1988, p.105). This economic nationalist view fueled
early New Deal policies for agricultural and industrial recovery, including price-supports under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), which necessitated that inflated domestic prices be shielded
from low-cost foreign competition. This all militated against any major liberalization.
A variety of forces, however, conspired to get the President to pursue some liberalization
and some delegation of authority away from Congress. Most immediately, the President, many
Congressmen, and political pundits saw the recent Smoot-Hawley episode as revealing that
Congress was institutionally condemned to excessive protectionism. The recent trend towards
reciprocal and bilateral bargaining internationally, moreover, suggested to many the need to give
the President the power to effectively negotiate agreements. And while the economic nationalists in
the brains trust had the President's ear, so too did his Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who over the
preceding twenty years had been an inveterate proponent of free trade multinationalism.4
The outlines of Roosevelt's RTAA legislation were clearly in place early in his presidency,
but was watered-down and awaited many delays before the bill was finally introduced. Hull was
probably the most responsible for the legislation draft, along with his State Department colleagues,
including Assistant Secretary Francis B. Sayre. But economic nationalists were also appointed to
the Executive Committee on Commercial Policy, including AAA chief George Peek. The
legislation was always to mandate liberalization and delegation of negotiating authority to the
President. The Administration decided on complete delegation of authority to the President, rather
than authority subject to some Congressional veto or scrutiny. But Hull had to back away from his
preference for unilateral cuts, for "horizontal" or linear cuts in tariffs (on the basis of a broad
economic sector), and for explicit mandates for multi-national cuts. Conscious of limits to what
3 In particular, they moved away from an initial campaign commitment to some combination of the 10% across-
the-board tariff reduction and the reciprocal reductions compromise proposed by Secretary of State-elect Cordell Hull.
4 Each of these pressures expressed deeper political forces that explain the country's turn to liberalization and new
tariff setting institutions in 1934. Some scholars have highlighted how changes in the international system towards
a pattern of reciprocity mandated major tariff-setting reform (Haggard 1988, Lake 1988, Pastor 1980); others
emphasize the increasing power of free trade ideas (Goldstein 1993); still others, the shift in the political power and
the socio-economic position of industry, labor, finance, and agriculture (Freiden 1988; Ferguson 1984); or the
maturation of the US's hegemonic position in the international economy (Lake 1983). It's fair to say that
Roosevelt's support for an RTAA was overdetermined.
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Congress would bear, they decided to settle for reciprocal, item-by-item cuts in bilateral
negotiations (Hawkins and Norwoed 1963, p.77, Pastor 1980, p.87). Similar considerations
motivated the Administration to propose these changes through revision of the Smoot-Hawley law,
rather than through entirely new trade legislation. And although they considered tabling such
legislation more than a year earlier, the Administration unveiled the RTAA package in March 1934.
From the beginning, societal and congressional opposition to the RTAA was strong.
Throughout the deliberation process, even before the legislation was actually sent to Congress,
criticism was fierce, if not as well-publicized as the Smoot-Hawley episode. In extra-legislative
statements, in the House and Senate Committee deliberations, and in the extensive floor debate,
controversy focused mostly on the propriety and constitutionality of delegating trade policymaking
to the Executive. After the House Ways and Means Committee sent the legislation to the floor, the
minority report listed a series objections to the legislation, the first five of which focused on the
issue of delegation. Although Committee voting for the legislation followed strict party lines, with
the Democrats supporting their President, many Democrats on the House and Senate floors
expressed worry over how much power they were delegating to the President.5
There was also plenty of protectionist opposition to the liberal slant of the policy. The
House Ways and Means hearings lacked the protectionist industry attention that marked Smoot-
Hawley, with the RTAA hearings drawing only seventeen witnesses, seven of whom were front
the Administration. But those witnesses who did show up, such as the Rep from the National
Association of Manufacturers, opposed the RTAA on grounds that it threatened necessary
protections from foreign competition. The minority report to the House Hearings, moreover,
voiced the general protectionist argument in explaining their opposition:
[RTAA] places in the hands of the President and those to whom he may delegate his authority the
absolute power of life and death over every domestic industry dependent upon tariff protection,
and permits the sacrifice of such industries in what will undoubtedly be a futile attempt to expand
the export trade of other industries....(Congressional Record 1934, pp.5532-3)
What this report said in general terms, many individual industries said for themselves in the Senate
Foreign Relations hearings, which were dominated various industry and agricultural groups
clamoring for continued or expanded protectionism. Of the 54 witnesses giving testimony to the
Foreign Relations Committee, 39 were representatives of protectionist industry and agriculture
(Congressional Hearings 1934 S448-3, passim).6
5 For instance, the report's list of objections began: "1. [RTAA] ... provides for an unconstitutional delegation of
the supreme taxing power of Congress, contrary to what a prominent Democrat has called 'the plainest and most
fundamental provisions of the Constitution.' (Congressional Record 1934, p.5532)
6 These included the National Association of Wool Manufacturers, the National Grange, the Window Glass
Manufacturing Association, the Saw Manufacturers Association, the US Potters Association, the Wool Hat
Manufacturing Association, the National Dairy Union, etc. Organized labor at this stage had little organizational
representation, and had no official representatives to give testimony. The list reflected traditionally protected and
protectionist groups who would continue to mount attacks on free trade for many decades to come. See Senate
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1. 1.2. Roosevelt's Political Strategy: Timing, Rhetoric, and Revision
With the Democratic party enjoying strong majorities in both houses of Congress and with
Roosevelt a strong party leader, the President was in a strong legislative position throughout the
RTAA fight. However, with a proposal to delegate strong tariff-cutting authority to the president,
the Administration anticipated the opposition and used several maneuvers to safeguard RTAA's
passage. Three were most important: timing introduction of the legislation until passage of
policies that would strengthen legislative support; using rhetoric to down-play the liberalization and
permanence of the authority being delegated; and revising the ambition of the liberalization by
limiting the time and autonomy of the requested authority. The first two of these were elements of
uncompensated liberalization, the third compromised liberalization.
1.1.2.1. Timing and Rhetoric
The first thing the Administration did to safeguard passage of the RTAA was to delay its
submission to Congress until other legislation and non-legislative actions affecting sentiment for
liberalization had already been adopted. In April 1933, Roosevelt announced his intention to
pursue trade legislation, and he had the State Department draft a bill for submission to Congress
authorizing the president to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements on an MFN basis (Haggard 1988,
p. 107). Hull led the drafting of this legislation, and carried a copy of the bill in his pocket when he
set sail for the London Economic Conference in early June, expecting the President to introduce the
legislation soon enough that the bill could leverage discussion over multi-lateral cooperation. But
Roosevelt chose to delay his introduction of the trade bill. In a press conference on May 31st, the
President stated that his bill was too complex and that he feared congressional resistance:
"Congress would never give me complete authority to write schedules" (Roosevelt Press
Conferences 1933, p.3 6 8 ).7 In his dispatch to a chagrined Cordell Hull, Roosevelt explained
the situation in the closing days of the session of Congress is so full of dynamite that
immediate adjournment is necessary. Otherwise bonus legislation, paper money inflation,
etc., may be forced....Therefore, tariff legislation seems not only highly inadvisable, but
impossible of achievement [sic] (quoted in Feis 1966, p. 175).
The delay, in short, was motivated partly by the priority of other legislation and partly by his fear
that Congress wouldn't give it to him at that time.
Having chosen this delay, the President waited until some of his highest priority New Deal
legislation and actions had already been established and had improved the reception Congress was
Foreign Relations Hearings on Reciprocal Trade Agreements 1934, pp.1-415, and CIS Index 1934, p.9 5 9 .
7 Since the President gave this press conference soon after passage of his AAA and NIRA packages, one of the press
corps replied: "Why shouldn't they; they've given you everything else." Roosevelt Press Conferences 1933, p. 17 5 .
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to give his RTAA. First, there was the core of the early New Deal, the National Industrial
Recovery Act (NIRA) and the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA). Both of these initiatives sought
to raise domestic prices through substantial government intervention. Their passage and early
implementation began to secure support of some industrial and agricultural groups, but their
dependence on protection from import competition also meant that the groups could be more hurt
by tariff reductions under the RTAA than they would have been otherwise.
However, a second part of Roosevelt's economic nationalism, monetary policy, clearly
improved the economic position of agricultural and industry groups in a way that made trade
liberalization under the RTAA less painful and more attractive (Haggard 1988). In late April, the
Administration decided on a policy of inflation, removing the dollar off of the Gold Standard, and
allowing it to steadily depreciate. This depreciation was accelerated by Roosevelt's decision to
forego a multilateral arrangement to stabilize competitive devaluations discussed at the London
Economic Conference. And on September 8, 1934, Roosevelt sharply raised the price of gold.
The end result was that by January, Roosevelt was not only in a position to support currency
stabilization, but had so devalued the dollar that foreign imports faced a price disadvantages
constituting major defacto tariff relief for US producers.
The Administration introduced its liberal trade legislation with the knowledge that their
previous policies had substantially under-cut some of the arguments of those concerned about the
threat of imports. There is not evidence that the Administration delayed submission of the RTAA
until after the depreciation out of a belief that the monetary policy lowered opposition. But at least
some members of the Administration, including Assistance Secretary of State Herbert Feis and
Secretary of Commerce Daniel C. Roper, were aware that the timing made a difference (Haggard
1988).8
The Roosevelt Administration's second tactic for safeguarding RTAA's passage was more
clearly conscious: the strategic use of rhetoric, particularly the use of language and concepts that
down-played the significance of the RTAA and signaled the compensatory effect of previous
policies. First, the Administration down-played the extent to which the proposal was a
liberalization initiative by pointing out how the RTAA authorized trade increases as much as
decreases. Representative Fred M. Vinson (D.- Ky.) supported the legislation by denying its
liberalization slant, claiming that he knew "of no one in the Democratic side of the House who does
8 None of the secondary accounts by the practitioners, including Moley, Hull Vls I and II, Gardner, Feiss, Rosen,
demonstrate that the Administration consciously waited until the devaluation lowered opposition to economic
liberalization. Statements by Roper in the House Ways and Means Hearings, p.65-66, cited below, demonstrate
Roper's knowledge of the link. Feis expresses his own awareness in his history/memoir, Feis 1966. There he states:
"the prospect [of receiving tariff-making powers] was improving, because by then the value of the dollar in terms of
gold and other foreign currencies had so markedly declined that the competitive position of the American producers
was much improved. Thereby, Roosevelt's monetary policy...was clearing the way for the step he would take in
1934 which initiated...reductions of restrictions on international trade..." (p.264).
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not believe that American industry, labor, and agriculture should be protected against a flood of
foreign-made goods" (quoted in Lake 1988, p.206). Second, the Administration down-played the
legislation's extraordinary request for blanket authority over a policy hitherto dominated by
Congress by painting the Act as an emergency measure necessary in a time of deep economic
crisis. Hull told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for instance, that "there should, I repeat,
be no misunderstanding as to the nature or the purpose of this measure...Its support is only urged
as an emergency measure to deal with a dangerous and threatening emergency situation" (Foreign
Relations Hearings 1934, p.5, quoted in Haggard 1988, p.111).
Third, at least one member of the Administration drew the Congress' attention to efforts the
Administration had made to help vulnerable industry and agriculture. During his testimony to the
House Ways and Means Committee, Dan C. Roper explicitly "signaled" 9 the causal links
connecting dollar devaluation to both increased exports and ability to weather tariff decreases:
the pick-up in exports...reflects the new advantage which American exporters now
have...because of the depreciated exchange value of the dollar....[Moreover] this dollar
devaluation has put the American tariff on such a heightened level that the United States is
now in a better position than it has been for a long time to make partial reductions in
duties...without inducing destructive competition through enlarged imports. (Hearings,
pp.65-66, partly quoted in Haggard 1988)10
1.1.2.2. Protectionist Revision
By far the most important action the Roosevelt Administration took to secure passage of the
RTAA was to accept a couple of major revisions to the proposed legislation during House and
Senate deliberations. The House Ways and Means reported the President's bill intact to the floor
of the House with an open rule, out of confidence in the Democratic Party's comfortable majority
in both houses and out of respect for the Constitutional issues many legislators believed were at
stake. But the bill received bipartisan scrutiny on the floor. Although the Democratic majority
defeated a slew of amendments, the majority adopted three compromise amendments. Two of
these were modest," but a third struck at the core of the RTAA's reach: the president's authority
to enter into trade agreements was limited to three years.12 To this major amendment, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee added another: prior to trade negotiations the President must issue a
public notice of intention to open such negotiations, and he must provide a forum for outsiders to
9 Oye 1992 discusses such signaling as one of the forms of political exchange, under the label "explanation." The
others are "exchange" and "extortion." See, Oye 1992, p.4 3 .
10 Roper did not repeat this signaling in his Senate Foreign Relations appearance, nor did any other witnesses.
I One prohibited the President from negotiating-away a country's indebtedness as part of commercial policy
bargains, and the other proclaimed that all agreements could be terminated after three years upon giving six months
notice (Pastor 1980, p.89).
12 After the bill's passage, "Speaker Rainey and Majority Leader Byrnes met with the President who told them that
he would be able to accept the House's amendments" (Pastor 1980, p.90; NYT March 31, p.2).
Burgoon
Chapter Two
present their views on the proposed agreement before it is concluded. This forum was to elicit
non-binding recommendations from industry and other groups, but it still created access for groups
to organize and express trade demands. 3
1.1.3. No Exemption in Word, No Compensation in Deed
If Roosevelt accepted revision and used rhetoric and timing to push his RTAA, there were
limits to what he would pursue or accept. The Administration did not accept or offer any sectoral
group explicit exemption from the reach of the RTAA's tariff-cutting provisions, and it did not
provide any compensatory side payments.
1.1.3.1. No Explicit Exemption: Many sectoral groups lobbied individual legislators in the
House and (especially) Senate Committee hearings to have their products given special
protectionism or to be exempted from tariff-cutting. The most vocal and numerous of these were
the various textile groups, mainly wool, and agricultural associations. 14 The representatives of
these groups wanted expanded protections written into the RTAA bill, or more commonly, explicit
promises that the bill's tariff-cutting authority would not extend to them. In both the Committee
and floor stages of deliberations in both houses, legislators (mainly Republican) proposed dozens
of amendments calling for such protection or exemption. The President's solid Democratic
majority in both houses defeated all of these.15
But the RTAA was implemented in such a way that tariff reductions were minimized on the
products of the most vulnerable and vocal industry groups. At several times during the legislative
bargaining over RTAA, Administration representatives pointed out, perhaps a bit disengenuously,
that they wanted the negotiating authority to give the President freedom to trade-off access to
foreign markets in which the US was competitive for access to US markets in goods in whose
production the US was less competitive.' 6 In implementing RTAA Roosevelt did, indeed, limit
US concessions mostly to products that did not compete with domestic manufacturers and farmers
-- particularly the most politically powerful ones (Lake 1988, p.206; Hathaway 1984, p.287).
Agriculture was the most glaring and important example of this de facto exemption. The
1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act was the root of this exemption -- with its Section 22 reserving
the right to set import quotas and Section 32 the right to set export prices to protect the AAA price
13 This revision in the RTAA became a foot-hold for later development of the "escape clause" relief, which
mandated that industries found to be threatened by a liberalization initiative could petition for import relief from that
initiative. See below for more on this development.
14 See footnote 6 above, for a partial list of protectionists testifying to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
15 There was exemption of the Buffalo milling products suffering from Canadian competition (Pastor 1980, p.8 9).
But this exemption never made it past the final committee vote.
16 In introducing his RTAA to Congress, for instance, Roosevelt said he wanted power to grant tariff concessions
"in the American market for foreign products supplementary to our own" (from speech in Ratner 1972, p. 146).
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intervention (Benedict 1953, p.302; Rau 1957, p.66; Goldstein 1993, pp.154-5). 17 When the
President sought his RTAA in 1934, farmer groups were adamantly opposed to extending
liberalization to agricultural products. Their pleas to exempt agriculture, however, was defeated by
a narrow margin of 54 to 33 in the Senate (Goldstein 1993, p. 156). But Roosevelt came through
for agriculture in the implementation of the AAA and the RTAA. Consistent with Sections 22 and
with the trade authority under RTAA, Roosevelt accepted quota protection for sugar and authorized
quotas, import licenses or fees on wheat products, butter, milk products, cheese, oats, peanut oil,
and other products. Consistent with Section 32, he also accepted subsidization, though later
sought to have the provisions repealed (C,,!dstein 1993, p. 156). Finally, implementation of the
RTAA also tended to leave the basic agricultural products out of tariff cutting.' 8
1.1.3.2. No Side Payment Compensation: Finally, the Roosevelt Administration and its
liberalizer allies in the Congress and among industry and labor offered no side payments to any of
the various groups opposed to or ambivalent about the RTAA. Some policies provided and actions
taken by the President had the effect of lowering the pain felt by, and the opposition of, groups
expecting to be hurt by RTAA liberalization. The NIRA and AAA provided government assistance
that may have made some groups or their legislative representatives more receptive to free trade by
showing the Administration was doing something to help industry and agriculture. More clearly,
Roosevelt's monetary policy that devalued the dollar significantly mitigated any dislocating effects
tariff reductions might cause. After the passage of the early New Deal policies and the dollar
devaluation, some Administration officials recognized and signaled the compensating effect to
those who would listen, and may have timed the introduction of the RTAA bill with this effect in
mind. But the main motivation for these policies had nothing to do with helping or buying off
those hurt by impending trade liberalization, and everything to do with promoting recovery.
In the end, the Roosevelt Administration won its liberalization without the help of explicit
exemption or side payments. The House approved the final bill by a wide partisan margin of 280
to 101, with 269 Democrats voting for and 11 against, and with 2 Republicans voting for and 99
against. The Senate, likewise, voted for the liberalization by a vote of 56 to 33, with 51 Democrats
supporting (5 opposing) and 28 Republicans opposing (5 supporting).
17 That AAA mandated substantial price-supports to a variety of agricultural products -- including wheat, cotton,
corn, hobs, rice, milk, etc. -- to be implemented by the US government paying domestic farmers to slow or stop
their production so as to reduce supply until the domestic price reached the desired level. For a good summary of the
rogram, including Sections 22 and 23, see Benedict 1953, pp.302-15.
In bilateral negotiations, the US successfully won exemption for Agriculture from the general rule that tariff cuts
cannot be vitiated by quota protection. And as Evans 1971 points out, "as the United States did not grant tariff
reductions in prewar agreements on any of the 'basic products' on which import quotas were likely to be imposed, the
exception had little practical effect" (Evans 1971, p.69; US Tariff Commission 1949, pp.88-115).
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Table 2.1.
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and Extensions, 1934-58
Duration
Year (years) Authority Special provisions
1934 3 50% of 1934 tariff rates Uncond. MFN; principal supplier rule
1937 3 50% of 1934 tariff rates No change
1940 3 50% of 1934 tariff rates No change
1943 2 50% of 1934 tariff rates No change
1945 3 50% of 1945 tariff rates No change
1948 1 50% of 1945 tariff rates Peril point clause introduced
1949 2 50% of 1945 tariff rates Peril point clause eliminated
1951 2 50% of 1945 tariff rates Escape clause intro./perilpoint reintro.
1953 1 50% of 1945 tariff rates No change
1954 1 50% of 1945 tariff rates Limited defense clause introduced
1955 3 15% of 1955 tariff rates, 5%/year National security clause
1958 4 20% of 1958 tariff rates Reduce to 50% rates in excess of 50%
1.2. Renewing RTAA: A Quarter Century of Uncompensated Liberalization, 1935-1961
For twenty-five y~ars after passage of the 1934 RTA Act, three presidents and thirteen
congresses continued or accelerated the shift towards freer trade. The period saw eleven
extensions of the RTAA that authorized more than a dozen bilateral tariff agreements and five
multilateral rounds, together comprising ten liberalization episodes.' 9 The result was a substntial
lowering of US barriers to trade, principally tariffs, on the order of 40 percent. Table 2.1
summarizes the authority granted under the RTA extensions, and Table 2.2 summarizes the tariff-
cutting results of the bilateral and multilateral cuts. This liberalization road, of course, faced its
share of protectionist obstacles. Import-competing industry and agricultural groups, penetrating
Democratic and Republican parties only slowly moving away from their traditional positions on
trade, threatened to scuttle or cripple several liberal initiatives. The response from congressional
and executive-branch liberalizers ranged from doing nothing to giving-up on some initiatives
altogether, with the provision of exemptions or revision of initiatives somewhere in between. In
the late 1950s, moreover, some groups began to broaden their trade policy platforms. However,
even though this shift foreshadowed the future of politics over trade liberalization, no side
payments emerged from any of the episodes.
19 I count episodes encompassing any domestic authorization and international negotiation of reductions. Counting
the 1934 RTAA, the first five domestic RTA struggles coincided with bi-national negotiations to comprise five
libeialization episodes. 1948 extension authorized negotiation of the ill-fated ITO. 1949 authorized Annecy and the
beginning of Torquay, and I mark the episode as the Annecy episode. 1951 Extension allowed Torquay completion,
and covers the Torquay episode. The 1953,'54, and '55 Extensions covered the 4th Geneva Round. And the 1958
Extension covered the Dillon Round. Together these constitute ten episodes.
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The 1934-1958 period can be broken up into two sub-periods, according to the kinds of
trade liberalization sought, the level of opposition mobilized, and the kinds of strategies pursued to
defuse that opposition. The first covers 1934 to 1946 and can be best described as a honeymoon
period for uncompensated liberalization. The second covers 1947 until 1960, and can be described
as the increase in compromised liberalization, and prelude to compensated liberalization in 1962.
1.2.1. Extending RTA, 1935-1946: The Honeymoon for Uncompensated Liberalization
In the period between 1934 and 1947, trade policymaking was focused on setting the
bounds of the president's authority to negotiate bilateral agreements. The three-year negotiating
authority grý nted by the original RTAA was extended in 1937, 1940, and 1943 without much
fanfare or controversy. In all three extensions, Congress was simply asked to renew the
president's authority to cut 1934 tariffs by no more than 50 percent, giving no greater tariff-cutting
authority. By 1945, however, Roosevelt had exhausted almost all of this authority, having
negotiated more than a dozen bilateral agreements to achieve US tariff reductions from an average
of 59.1 percent in 1932 to 28.2 percent in 1945 -- an reduction averaging more than 50 percent
(Pastor 1980, p.94). The Truman Administration, therefore, requested authority to cut 1945 rates
by an additional 50 percent. With these extensions, the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations
concluded twenty-eight bilateral agreements. As Table 2.2 shows, between 1934 and 1947, these
agreements lowered 1934 tariff rates on dutiable imports by 33.2 percent.
Table 2.2
Tariff Reductions Under US Trade Agreements, 1934-62
Dutiable Remaining duties as a % of
imports Cuts in 1930 tariffs, ignoring
subject to reduced Cut in all inflation and structural
GATT Conference cut (%) tariffs (%) duties (%) changes in trade
Pre-GATT, 1934-1947 63.9 44 33.2 66.8
Ist Round, Geneva (1947) 53.6 35 21.1 52.7
2nd Round, Annecy, 1949 5.6 35.1 1.9 51.7
3d Round, Torquay, 1950-51 11.7 26 3 50.1
4th Round, Geneva, 1955-56 16 15.6 2.5 48.9
Dillon Round, Geneva, 1961-62 20 12 36 30.5
These "RTA renewals" had to survive continued, but muted, opposition from several
industrial and agricultural groups, and from a Republican party still committed to the protectionist
cause. The pattern of industrial and agricultural lobbying changed little from the 1934 struggle.
The core of protectionist opposition in society remained centered in a smattering of import-
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competing industries, including wool textiles, glass, petroleum, watches, zinc, etc. to form a loose
and constantly evolving protectionist coalition. Table 2.3 below captures the very broad industrial
categories of sectors that had a lot of protectionist sub-segments. 20 Agricultural groups initially
continued to oppose RTA tariff-cutting authority, despite their de facto exemption from its reach in
successive bilateral agreements. 21 But in 1940 a variety of farm groups, including the American
Farm Bureau Federation and the National Farmers' Union, supported RTA externion, even though
some farm groups, such as dairy, sugar and wheat, continued to oppose extension (House
Hearings 1940; Verdier 1994, p. 189).
Table 2.3
Aggregate Employment Across Industry Group,
* denoting groupings dominated by protectionist members
Major Industry Group
20 Food and kindred products
21 Tobacco manufacturers
*22 Textile mill products
<*23 Apparel and related products
24 Lumber and wood products
25 Furniture and fixtures
26 Paper and allied products
27 Printing and publishing
28 Chemicals and allied products
*29 Petroleum and coal products
30 Rubber and plastics products
*31 Leather and leather products
*32 Stone, clay and glass products
33 Primary metal industries
34 Fabricated metal products
35 Machinery, except electrical
36 Electrical machinery
37 Transportation equipment
38 Instruments and related products
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing
1958
1,781,469
83,841
918,612
1,188,530
591,049
357,170
573,592
871,725
783,870
247,440
356,109
358,484
574,790
1,129,512
1,090,280
1,385,781
1,218,645
1,641,860
293,787
370,920
1963
1,714,607
91,988
883,170
1,290,536
568,714
381,221
613,829
925,093
853,121
219,903
426,716
335,071
602,764
1,166,953
1,110,649
1,520,574
1,612,178
1,689,737
316,443
397,638
% of
Total ('58)
11%
i%
6%
8%
4%
2%
4%
6%
5%
2%
2%
2%
4%
7%
7%
9%
8%
10%
2%
2%
% of
Total ('63)
11%
1%
6%
8%
4%
2%
4%
6%
5%
1%
3%
2%
4%
7%
7%
10%
10%
11%
2%
3%
Source: US Department of Commerce, Census of Manufacturers, 1958 and 1963
20 Some significant sub-segments of agriculture, discussed above, were clearly in the protectionist camp.
Obviously, the two-digit SIC categories in Table 2.3 mask the existence of many more free-trade-oriented sub-
segments. Table 2.5 below on more detailed industry groupings -- at the three and four digit SIC# level, such as
silver-plating -- and the organization or association representing them in their protectionism.
21 In 1937, the Tobacco lobby stood alone among agricultural groups in favor of RTA extension.
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Organized labor, meanwhile, was only beginning to take a vocal stand on trade issues, with
the AFL representative supporting free trade only tepidly in 1940 and with the AFL and the CIO
doing so more whole-heartedly by 1943.22 Individual unions, however, tended to side with their
employers, and hence to take positions reflecting their industry's international economic position,
such the United Mine Workers supporting protections and the United Steel Workers supporting
liberalization. 23
In Congress, the parties remained fiercely partisan on the issue of foreign trade. In the
1937 and 1940 bills, the Republicans were responsible for virtually every attempt to gut the
president's negotiating authority. Only the extraordinary demands of World War Two temporarily
muted these partisan pressures in the 1943 RTA extension. In that year, many fewer members of
Congress, from either party, thought it prudent to question the president's authority to oversee
foreign trade in service of the war effort. By the war's end in 1945, however, the traditional
partisan divide reasserted itself with strong Republican opposition in both the House and Senate.
Again, the Republicans were responsible for virtually every protectionist amendment that called for
revision of or exemptions from the reach of the bill.
The modest ambition of the RTA extensions proposed, and the overwhelming majorities
held by the Democrats in both houses of Congress, meant that opposition never viably threatened
passage of the RTA extensions. As a result, the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations never had
22 In 1940, labor representative Matthew Woll testified before House Ways and Means only tepidly in behalf of the
extension. He stated that the AFL was supportive of free trade and of the extension of negotiating authority, but that
the AFL also was interested in helping member unions make specific claims, even if those were protectionist. Woll
also appeared in 1940 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on behalf of the American Wage Earners
Protective Conference, an adamantly protectionist outfit. William Green, president of the AFL, testified before the
Ways and Means committee in more unambiguous support of the proposed extension. House and Senate hearings
index demonstrates that the AFL preceded CIO engagement of the trade issue, and that the CIO representative didn't
appear until 1945. For several RTA extensions thereafter, CIO was more active and free trade oriented than the AFL.23 The protectionist wing of the AFL and the CIO member unions was represented by the American Wage Earners'
Protective Congress (AWEPC). Its official 1940 membership included more than 550,000 workers, though many
were very passive actors in the AWEPC efforts. The member unions included the following (Vear 1955, p. 129):
Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers 37,500
International Photo-engravers' Union 10,500
Glass Bottle Blowers Association 20,000
American Flint Glass Workers' Union 30,800
United Wall Paper Craftsmen 3,100
Cigar Makers' International Union 7,000
American Wire Weavers Protective Association 300
Window Glass Cutters' League 800
National Brotherhood of Operative Potters 14,000
Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers 100,200
International Brotherhood of Bookbinders 18,700
American Federation of Musicians 100,000
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees 42,000
International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers 31,200
International Brotherhood of Operating Engineers 80,000
United Association of Plumbers and Steamfitters 40,000
TOTAL 554,700
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to do more than simply ignore the opposition, to vote them down on the strength of the Democrat
majorities. For the 1937, 1940, and 1943 extensions calling for simple perpetuation of the 1934
authority, the bills flew through Congress -- passed by joint resolution. As Table 2.4. shows, the
voting was strictly partisan except for the 1943 bill, where for the first time the Republican party
split its votes, particularly in the House.
Table 2.4
Congressional Votes on RTA
Year
1934 Democrats
Republicans
1937 Democrats
Republicans
1940 Democrats
Republicans
1943 Democrats
Republicans
1945 Democrats
Republicans
1948 Democrats
Republicans
1949 Democrats
Republicans
1951 Democrats
Republicans
1953 Democrats
Republicans
1954 Democrats
Republicans
1955 Democrats
Republicans
1958 Democrats
Republicans
Source: Congressional Record,
Senate
Yea Nay
51 5
5 28
56 9
0 14
41 15
0 20
41 8
18 14
38 5
15 16
23 17
47 1
47 1
15 18
38 0
34 2
voice vote
voice vote
34 1
37 2
37 6
38 7
36 6
36 10
various years.
Democrats
Republicans
Democrats
Republicans
Democrats
Republicans
Democrats
Republicans
Democrats
Republicans
Democrats
Republicans
Democrats
Republicans
Democrats
Republicans
Democrats
Republicans
Democrats
Republicans
Democrats
Republicans
Democrats
Republicans
bills, 1934-58
House
Yea Nay
269 11
2 99
278 11
3 81
212 20
5 146
195 11
145 52
205 12
33 140
16 142
218 5
234 6
84 63
voice vote
voice vote
63 136
179 25
154 14
126 39
186 35
109 75
184 39
133 59
The 1945 request for renewal, with authority to cut 1945 rates by 50 percent, inspired more
controversy, but also got through without trouble. Again, the voting was very partisan. It passed
without any major revisions on the House floor. On the floor, however, the legislation was
delivered with an open rule and survived a series of amendments. 24 In the Senate things were a bit
24 One of these, by Cleveland M.Bailey (D.-W.Va.) called for "an escape clause...so that Government could
withdraw from an agreement if the domestic market is injured" (p.313 CQ Almanac 1945). Another amendment
called for "ship construction costs for construction subsidy purposes shall not be considered as exceeding that
percentage of foreign construction costs which is equal to the average rate of tariff duty" (p.313) This was refused by
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more interesting. The Foreign Relations Committee referred a bill stripped of the 50 percent
negotiating authority, having narrowly passed by a 10-9 vote. The full Senate rejected this
reduction of the President's negotiating authority in a vote of 47 to 33, and then rejected several
others -- all following pleas of liberalizers that Congress must not confer hollow authority.25 The
defeat of these bills cleared the way for final passage. In all of these episodes, then, the Roosevelt
and Truman Administrations simply ignored most of the opposition -- the implicit exemptions for
some agricultural groups notwithstanding. Side payment compensation discussions show up
nowhere on the Congressional Record, Hearings, or secondary accounts.
1.2.2. Extending RTA, 1946-1958: The Prelude to Compensated Liberalization
The next ten years in the US's trade policy-making included seven legislative initiatives: an
aborted ratification debate of the International Trade Organization in 1948; extension of RTA
negotiating authority in 1948; revised and more liberal extension in 1949; minimalist extensions in
1951, 1953, 1954, and 1955; and a more substantial extension in 1958. All of these episodes
sparked considerably more political controversy than had previous decade of trade politics. Out of
the more recent controversy emerged a variety of measures designed to defuse political opposition
and mitigate pain of liberalization, but compensatory side payments was still not one of them. This
story can be divided into an overview of the continued but slowing liberalization during the period,
and then of the protectionist opposition and bargaining politics complicating that liberalization.
1.2.2.1. Accumulating but Stumbling Liberalization
After the 1945 extension of RTA, the next leg in US trade liberalizations began in the
Spring of 1947, when the Truman Administration convened the leaders of twenty-two nations in
Geneva for multilateral trade negotiations under the authority of that extension. The negotiations
led to the founding of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAT'), which has governed
much of the world's international trade policymaking ever since. The first GATT agreement
mandated member countries to adhere to a series of trade policy practices, including the principle of
non-discrimination via the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause, and oversaw tariff reductions on
many thousands of products that accounted for more than one-half of world trade (Pastor 1980,
p.96). As Table 2.2 shows, the resulting cuts in tariffs on 54 percent of the US's dutiable imports
a point of order that the amendment was not germane. Another amendment introduced by Frank A.Barrett (R.-Wyo.)
called for a quota system for manufactured textiles and their raw materials (p314).
25 Other amendments rejected included Edward V. Robertson (R.-Wyo.) calling for a quota system on textiles and
their inputs, presumably the same bill that Barrett unsuccessfully proposed in the House.
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amounted to a weighted average reduction of some 35 percent, and a 21 percent cut in all duties
(Evans 1971, pp.11-12).
Subsequent extensions of RTA negotiating authority and the multilateral agreements they
allowed paled in comparison to this first GATT action. The freer trade cause was off to a shaky
start, in fact, with a couple of protectionist developments that took place independent of the RTA
extensions and soon after the conclusion of the first GATT. Only a few months after the
Republicans regained control of the Congress in the 1946 elections, a group of legislators opposed
to tariff-cutting threatened major protectionist action. This was narrowly averted by a compromise
between the Administration and key Senators that required the creation of a formal "escape clause"
procedure by which threatened industry could petition the Tariff Commission for relief from the
President's tariff reductions, pending the Commission's findings and the President's approval
(Leddy and Norwood 1963, pp. 126-7). Soon thereafter, the Administration backed-off from
introducing its recently negotiated the International Trade Organization (ITO), set up to oversee
international trade relations as the IMF was to oversee currency relations, because it anticipated so
much opposition in Congress.
The four RTAA renewals following conclusion of the first GATT ranged from minimum
extension with increasing constraint on executive negotiating authority to modest expansion of that
authority. In 1948, the new Republican Congress extended negotiating authority without granting
extra tariff-cutting power beyond the 50 percent of 1945 rates granted in 1945, and imposed new
constraints on the President's authority by requiring that the Tariff Commission research and
identify "peril points" of tariff levels below which industries would suffer. Subject to the
President's approval, Commission recommendations would block cutting below these levels. The
Truman Administration roundly criticized this renewal, but accepted it as the cost of keeping RTA
alive. When the Democrats regained both houses in the 1948 elections, however, the Truman
Administration and liberalizing Democrats pushed through a repeal of the 1948 renewal and
replaced it with a three-year renewal (retroactive to 1948) without peril point constraints. Come
1951, however, the protectionist tide had turned to the point that a number of Democrats supported
the Republican initiative to reinstate the peril point provisions and demand that the escape clause
machinery, previously left to the President's devices, be a formal, legislated limit on the
president's negotiating authority. Like the renewals in 1948 and 1949, moreover, the president
was to stay within the existing tariff cutting limits set in 1945.
Under the new Eisenhower Administration, this pattern of minimalist extension continued.
Claiming no intention to enter any trade agreements within the year, the Administration pushed
though one-year renewal in 1953 that was virtually identical to the 1951 legislation. One modest
difference was that the 1953 renewal called for convening a 17-member Commission to conduct a
major review of trade policy and to offer reform recommendations to Congress and the President.
Burgoon
Chapter Two
In 1954 the Administration repeated this holding pattern, choosing to wait until the next year to act
on the basically free-trade recommendations of the Commission, called the Randall Commission.
In 1955, the Administration finally proposed only a slightly more ambitious three-year RTA
renewal, authorizing the President to negotiate up to 15 percent reductions in 1955 rates (5 percent
a year), but also containing, by amendment, a "national security" clause. Accepted primarily to
appease the oil and coal industries, this clause gave the president authority to raise tariffs or other
barriers to prevent injury to industries vital to national security. The last renewal of RTA in 1958
was also Eisenhower's last and most ambitious piece of trade legislation. It gave the president
four-year authority to cut rates by up to 20 percent (2 percentage points of existing duties), and to
reduce by 50 percent those rates that were still in excess of 50 percent. This authority set the stage
for the Dillon round of GATT talks that took place in the autumn of Eisenhower's presidency.
In all, these extensions of RTA negotiating authority yielded significant tariff cuts, but
much less substantial than the cuts made under the bilateral agreements under the RTAA or under
the first GATT agreement. With the authority delegated under the 1949 renewal, the Truman
Administration was able to conclude the Annecy Round of GATT talks in 1949 and the Torquay
round in 1951, both substantially less ambitious than the first Geneva round. The modest
expansion of authority granted in 1955 allowed the Administration to negotiate the Fourth Round
of GATT talks in Geneva during 1955 and 1956. In contrast to the 33.2 percent cut in duties
achieved under the bilateral agreements between 1934 and 1947, and the 21.1 percent cut brought
about under the first GATT round, Table 2.2. shows that the Annecy, Torquay, Fourth (Geneva),
and Dillon Rounds cut US duties by 1.9, 3.0, 2.5, and 2.4 percent, respectively. As many trade
policy observers have pointed out, this increasing modesty in the reach of GATT reductions was
due as much to international constraints, such as the inability of recovering countries in Europe and
elsewhere to accept more significant reductions, as to domestic opposition.
1.2.2.2. Surrender, Revise, and Exempt, but Don't Compensate
These seven episodes saw a strong up-swing in the level of opposition to liberalization
from internationally vulnerable industry groups and their legislative champions. The cast of
industry characters remained essentially the same, with textiles, petroleum, some agricultural
producers, leather, and a smattering of smaller groups lobbying primarily for exemption from the
reach of the RTA liberalization (CQ Almanac 1951, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1958).
Organized labor remained split, with the AFL and CIO taking free trade stances clearer than
before 1945, but with their member unions divided according to international economic position.
In the 1950s, however, the number of member unions taking an explicitly protectionist stand in
RTA Hearings and elsewhere consistently increased in successive RTA Extensions. The
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protectionist minority continued to be represented by the American Wage Earners Protective
Conference (AWEPC), but in addition to official AWEPC actions a number of AWEPC member
unions appeared on their own, and they were joined by several non-AWEPC unions, including the
United Mine Workers of America (600,000 members) and local units of the United Steelworkers. 26
By 1955, the groups also included the 90,000 member Textile Workers' Union of America and
others. 2 7
The protectionist demands of all these groups increased along with competition from
European and Japanese imports following post-War recovery. Not only was competition
increasing, but the substantial tariff-reduction brought about under previous RTA negotiating
authority was also beginning to take its toll. The perception among a variety of vulnerable groups
was that liberal trade policies were partly to blame, and Republican legislators continued to be the
core suppliers of protectionism, though the Cold War and other factors were rapidly dampening
this traditional partisan role.
The increased determination of protectionist demands find expression in the number and
content of opposition statements released in the press, and partly in the increasing number of
appearances in Congressional hearings over RTA Extensions. Extensions in the 1940s usually
inspired a couple of hearings, often only one in House Ways and Means and one in Senate
Finance. And in those Hearings, only a smattering of industry representatives would usually
appear, and then only once (Hearings Indexes 1945, 1948, pp.). As the 1950s RTA Extension
Hearings evolved, on the other hand, the number of witnesses representing industry segments
consistently increased -- from eighteen witnesses in 1953, consuming 300 pages of testimony; to
50 witnesses consuming nearly a thousand in 1955; and to more than a hundred witnesses in 1958
consuming nearly a thousand pages of testimony (Hearings Indexes 1953, 1955, 1958).
Along with the increasing discontent of several protectionist groups came an increase in
structural political power, as more segments within a given product category became increasingly
and more vocally protectionist. This is true, for instance, with textiles, as wool and cotton
segments of the industry joined forces to call for the same cluster of protections -- mainly VERs.
And increasingly, these textile segments were joined by synthetic fibers and, tentatively, apparel
producers. 28 Second, the industry associations representing these protectionist or ambivalent
groups became more inclusive in their representation, and more centralized. Although this was
26 The unions to give RTA testimony against renewal and not affiliated with the AWEPC, included the American
Watch Workers' Union, with a 1950 membership of 8,000; the Gloucester Seafood Workers' Union, the American
Fishermen's Union, National Matchworkers' Council (6,000 members), Int'l Handbag, Luggage, Belt and Novelty
Workers Union (25,000), Cannery Workers Union of the Pacific, and the United Mine Workers of America
(600,000). (Vear 1955, p.226, p.308, House Ways and Means Hearings 1948, '51, '53).
27 In 1955 and 1958, these "others" included the Electrical Workers' Independent Union, National Brotherhood of
Packinghouse Workers, Pittsburgh Optical Workers Union, International Chemical Workers Union, and
Amalgamated Clothing Workers (House Ways and Means Hearings 1955, 1958; Vear pp.353-4).
28 See discussion in Section Two for detail on textile industry protectionism.
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true for petroleum, some segments of agriculture, and shoes, the best example involved cotton and
wool textiles (Benedict 1953, Aggarwal and Haggard 1983). A number of the industry
associations representing these groups grew substantially in their membership, growing from some
40 percent of the industry in the late 1940s to cover more than 60 percent of the industry by the
mid-1950s (Hunsberger 1964, p.). And toward the middle of the 1950s, several of these groups,
including the American Cotton Manufacturer's Institute (ACMI), the Southern Garment
Manufacturers Association and the National Association of Shirt, Pajama, and Sportswear
Manufacturers all merged to form an emergency consortium to fight liberal RTA extensions
(Brandis 1982, Friman 1992).29
As the strength and loudness of the protectionists increased through the 1950s, most
protectionist groups (watches, shoes, petroleum, steel) continued to approach the Hearings and
approach their congressional representatives with single-minded protectionism -- stating support
for tariff, quota or escape clause relief, and saying little or nothing about related forms of
assistance that wouldn't interfere with cross-border flows.
Only a few ambivalent or protectionist groups began to diversify their legislative agendas to
include separate policies that could be subjects of side payments. For instance, some of the more
protectionist members of organized labor began to lobby within the CIO and, somewhat less,
within the AFL for the provision of some kind of government-subsidized adjustment assistance.
In 1953, David MacDonald of the US Steelworkers proposed the creation of such a system during
the Randall Commission hearings. In the second half of the decade, the AFL and, later, the AFL-
CIO asked that adjustment assistance accompany continued tariff reductions. However, never did
the AFL-CIO ever threaten to oppose the RTA revisions in the absence of such supplemental policy
provisions. Thus, the bulk of organized labor still was not part of the projectionist camp.30 Textile
industries -- groups with more protectionist pedigrees -- began in the late 1950s to call for a variety
of trade-related but non-protectionist policy changes in their trade statements, though different
industry segments had their own pet policies and even though quotas were becoming a common
cause in the industry. 31
With this pattern of opposition, successive Administrations seeking varying degrees of
liberalization under RTA authority could no longer ignore all opposition. Truman and, after him,
Eisenhower, and their liberalizer colleagues in industry and Congress, increasingly considered
29 This wave of centralization foreshadowed an even more extensive shift towards inclusiveness and centralization
that was to take place between 1958 and 1962. This wave of increased inclusiveness and centralization gets discussed
in Section Two's overview of the textile industry protectionism.
30 The next section on the Trade Expansion Act discusses trade adjustment assistance and Labor in detail.31 Textile manufacturers and unions also began, somewhat later, to take an interest in a variety of other government
relief measures, including tax relief, subsidization of capital investments, and (for textile labor unions) the
establishment of a government program to regulate production and provide training and assistance for textile workers
(Hunsberger 1974). Section Two below discusses these new demands.
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protectionist redress to deal with this opposition. The liberalizer strategy for defusing opposition
also included increased lobbying and use of rhetoric by a coalition of new industry associations
devoted to the free trade cause (e.g. the Committee for a National Trade Policy). But most of the
strategy consisted varying degrees of protectionist redress -- compromised liberalization. Most
extreme was the total surrender to protectionists by aborting a liberalization initiative (e.g. Truman
never submitting the 1948 agreement creating International Trade Organization for ratification).
Most of the other episodes, however, involved compromise and some liberalization: liberalization
accompanied by protectionist exemptions and downward revision of that liberalization.
In every liberalization episode surrounding RTA renewal, industry and labor groups would
line up for explicit exemption from the reach of the liberalization proposed, usually in the form of
tariff relief. In most of the episodes in throughout the period, these appeals would get rejected.
But the appeals of agricultural groups, petroleum, textiles, and zinc yielded results, usually in the
form of amendments by Congress to the RTA bills but sometimes in the form of extra-legislative
Presidential orders. After years of pressure from the more vulnerable segments of agriculture and
the complicity of the agricultural associations more comfortable with Presidential autonomy in trade
policymaking, agriculture finally won the de jure exemption it had long received de facto: In the
1951 renewal of RTA negotiating authority, John J. Dempsey's (D.-N.M.) proposed the
amendment prohibiting the president from reducing tariffs on agricultural products in a way that
interferes with federal price support programs (CQ Quarterly 1951).
The more common and significant redress offered to the most intractable opposition was to
revise and water-down the ambition of liberalization initiatives -- through creation of the escape
clause, of peril points, and of the national security clause. Beginning with its bilateral agreement
with Mexico in 1942, US negotiators had consistently negotiated explicit escape clauses defending
"damaged industries and groups" in all subsequent bilateral agreements. Protectionist industries
called for a legislated escape clause, submitting amendments to incorporate such a clause into the
RTA as early as 1945. In 1947, the Truman defused a Republican push for protectionist
legislation by promising that escape clauses would be aggressively sought and implemented in all
agreements. This diminished pressure for the clause for a few years, but the promise for relief
went unfulfilled, and industry groups pressured for and won institutionalization of the clause in
1951 RTA legislation (Leddy and Norwood 1963 passim).
The peril points were established by the Republican Congress in 1948 as a limit on their
granting of RTA negotiating authority, only to be revoked the next year when the Democrats
regained the House, and to be reestablished along with the escape clause in 1951 (CQ Almanac
selected years). The national security clause, finally, was more narrowly championed by iron ore
and petroleum protectionists, who had called for but been unable to receive quota protection under
more industry-specific pretenses. Each of these measures served to water-down the president's
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authority to lower tariffs, and provided a foot-hold for protectionist groups to gain de facto
exemption from the reach of any such lowering. Conspicuously absent, of course, were any side
payment compensation provisions. Thus, the 1950s renewals of RTA liberalization generally
constituted a mix of uncompensated and compromised liberalization.
1.3. Explaining the Absence of Side Payments Between 1934 and 1960
What explains the period of uncompensated and compromised liberalization? Why, in
particular, did establishment of the 1934 RTAA give rise to an mix of uncompensated and
compromised liberalization, the early revision of RTA between 1935 and 1950 largely
uncompensated liberalization, and later revisions between 1953 and 1958 largely compromised
liberalization?
For the RTAA episode, the particular question is why the President was willing to accept
revision when he wasn't willing to accept explicit exemption or any compensation. A significant
part of the answer can be found in the power and platforms of the protectionist groups actively
opposed to the legislation's liberalization and delegation. With the very comfortable Democratic
majorities in both the House and Senate, with the President's strong position within that Party, and
with his legislative influence on the rise as he won his first wave of the New Deal, Roosevelt
enjoyed a strong legislative position. Moreover, partially because of the President's economic
nationalism and his rhetoric down-playing the severity of the legislation, both the liberalizers and
the protectionist groups underestimated the degree to which the RTAA was or could be free trade
legislation. So opposition was less strident.
The industry and agricultural groups opposed to the RTAA liberalization, moreover, had no
other issues on their platforms that could be made the subject of compensatory side payments.
During the same year that the RTAA was pursued, the only other activity on which they were
active was the NIRA and AAA, both of which were not up for renegotiation by the time of RTAA.
And at the hearings for the RTAA, groups mentioned no other issue that they considered more or
less germane to their trade policy position. The legislators most concerned about the RTAA,
moreover, were focused on the constitutional issues involved in delegating power hitherto held by
the Congress. Such delegation doesn't lend itself to linkage. Thus, the President comfortably
accepted the three-year time limit and the necessity of non-binding hearings prior to negotiating.
With this yielding the votes to get his legislation through, he didn't need to use other major tactics,
like explicit exemption or some kind of side payment.
In the remaining liberalization episodes, the story is similar, except that the power-
platforms predict an emphasis on uncompensated liberalization in the 1940s followed by the
increasingly compromised liberalization in the 1950s. During the later 1930s and early 1940s, the
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pattern of uncompensated liberalization also fits the power-platform expectations. Only a
smattering of industrial groups, without any coordination, and commanding only a very small
percentage of the manufacturing population actively opposed the RTA extensions. And much of
the political struggle, in any event, was shaped by less targetable partisan fights between
Republican and Democratic traditions. Finally, as the 1950s progressed and the size and
determination of the protectionist coalition grew, struggle over successive liberalization episodes
became hotter. But the largely single-minded protectionism of the most powerful protectionists --
especially wool textiles, petroleum, and AAA-beneficiary agriculture -- meant that any redress
would take the form of protectionist exemptions and downward revisions of the liberalization.
In terms of the Edgeworth representations from chapter one, the nature of bargaining varied
across groups and time depending on power and platform changes. Most of the industrial
protectionists simply lacked the political capacity to threaten or retaliate against the successive
liberalization initiatives. This means they didn't get a seat at the bargaining table, or a place on the
Edgeworth space, and it meant liberalizers could pursue their strategy of liberalization without any
new or additional side assistance -- as Figure 2.1 suggests. And those few with sufficient
resources and determination to threaten the liberalization initiatives -- such as agriculture, textiles,
and possibly petroleum -- were forces to be reckoned with, earning a place at the bargaining table.
But their single-minded, or virtually single-minded, protectionism left little room for identifying
and negotiating side payment compensation. Figure 2.2 captures these contingencies.
Figure 2.1 Figure 2.2
Protectionists Lack Power Resources, Protectionists with Significant Resources
Leaving Liberalizers With Option for But Narrow Platforms Leave Few Alterna-
Uncompensated Liberalization tives to Protectionist Redress
Trade
Protection
Compensation
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Finally, the broader argument can be expressed by the positioning of the various
protectionist groups on the power-platform matrix in Figure 2.3. Each of the major industry and
labor segments fall on the matrix according to a rough approximation of their overall power and
platforms as those evolved since 1934. "Agriculture" includes representatives from the dairy,
sugar, seed oils, wheat, and a number of other internationally-vulnerable, AAA-dependent,
segments of the farm. "Textiles" includes a variety of sub-segments active in the trade arena,
especially wool and cotton organizations. The protectionist segments of organized labor are
clustered under the name of the American Wage Earners Protective Congress (AWEPC), though as
we have seen some unions acted on their own.
Figure 2.3
Power and Platforms of Various
Protectionist Industry Groups (by industry) and Labor (AWEPC, etc.)
Platforms
Single-issue Multi-issue
Compromised Compensated
Liberalization Agriculture Liberalization
0
High 
* Textiles
(late '50s)
Textiles .
(1940s)
Power ( Petroleum
tesources Shoes/Leather.
.Watches/Clocks ('51-'55)
• Flat Glass * AWEPC etc
Low .Luggage ('40-'48)
* Silverware/plated ware
SClay pottery
Uncompensated Uncompensated
Liberalization Liberalization
In all cases, a differences or changes in the power resources of industry or labor segments
is captured by their order and position along the y-axis -- with the stronger groups higher up than
the weaker ones. And the groups with broader trade policy platforms are more right-ward on the
x-axis than are those groups with narrower platforms. Thus, the matrix captures the way the
strongest groups, gauged mainly in terms of employment, organizational representation, and
financial resources are agriculture, followed by textiles and petroleum. The weaker groups include
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clay pottery producers, and the somewhat stronger leather shoes prod-'cers. 32 The matrix captures
how there is less variation among the groups in the breadth of their platforms, as revealed in
testimony to Congressional Hearings: most groups were consistently single-issue oriented.
Protectionist segments of agricu!ture were slightly broader in their testimony, occasion -,lly calling
for a variety of government support programs along-side their clear emphasis on protectionist
exemption. And some of the major labor protectionists occasionally talked about the importance of
other government programs, better welfare provision and labor collective bargaining rights.
Most of the groups stayed roughly constant through the period, but a couple either gained
significant resources by virtue of the number of groups joining the protectionist umbrella, or by
virtue of resources mobilized, again measured mainly by the number of groups and concentration-
coordination of their representative associations. This was most clearly true for protectionist
segments of organized labor, which gradually increased in successive RTA extensions to include
new AWEPC members and independents like United Mine Workers and other large-membership
unions -- an increase captured by the upward shift in the position of "AWEPC, etc." in Figure 2.3.
The textiles sector underwent a more dramatic upward shift, and they were the only group that
experienced a significant broadening in the trade policy platform, as several textile representatives
(certainly not most or all) began highlighting the importance of government subsidies, research and
development funding, and other programs.
The most important point is that none of the groups combined significant power resources
with multi-issue platforms. Even though there was some broadening, none of the groups explicitly
took a position that conditioned support on the provision of some action on a separate issue -- an
explicit embrace of compensated liberalization. And only a couple of groups tentatively mentioned
side issues in their statements. Never were the side issues consistently stated in testimony to
Congress or in other public statements. In very general terms, then, the power and platforms
predict what the history reveals: the combination of compromised and uncompensated
liberalization -- but no compensated liberalization -- throughout the period between 1934 and 1958.
The Figure does not capture the basic historical trend: the increase in the aggregate
number, determination and mobilization of various protectionist groups increased the vulnerability
of liberalization initiatives as the 1950s evolved, and increasingly forced liberalizers to resort to
general protectionist revisions that compromised the ambition of the liberalization. It better
captures, however, the general lack of compensated liberalization through the period, and the mix
among protectionist groups of uncompensated and compromised liberalization. Both this historical
and cross-group argument cannot be fully developed as supporting evidence for my group-
institutional theory, however, because that theory only supports hypotheses about the likelihood
and generosity in one setting and one group relative to another. Thus, the argument isn't complete
32 See employment figures in Tables 2.3. and 2.4 for one of the main measures underlying this positioning.
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until we compare the power-platform conditions of this 1934-62 period with those in a period
where compensation was provided -- which brings us to the 1962 Trade Expansion Act.
2. The Advent of Compensated Liberalization With Kennedy's TEA
Kennedy came into office in January 1961 knowing he would pursue legislation
authorizing continued trade liberalization, because he supported expansion of exports under GATT
and knew his negotiating authority granted under the 1958 RTA extension was to expire in August
1962. 3 3 The question was whether to pursue a limited extension of that authority or to pursue
more ambitious free-trade legislation. Pressures for more ambitious tariff-cutting authority were
strong. Foremost among these was the balance of payments deficit and worry that European trade
partners might pursue their commercial opening at the US's expense, both concerns addressed by
tariff-cutting authority that would allowed reciprocal expansion of export markets (Zeiler 1993;
Pastor 1980; Evans 1971). And in the on-going Dillon round of negotiations, Kennedy learned
that existing RTA authority complicated his ability to approve tariff cuts that would win major
concessions from GATT members. 34 On the other hand, Kennedy was an ambivalent free trader,
being a political leader from a state rife with internationally vulnerable industries like textiles and
shoes. Kennedy and his advisors also supported the British government's bid to join the European
Economic Community, and were concerned that large-scale tariff cutting would fuel claims in
Britain that the EEC was unnecessary for trade expansion. Finally, 1962 was an election year in
which many legislators would be heavily pressured to vote protectionist to keep their own
vulnerable industry groups satisfied.
These conflicting considerations were played out in the Kennedy Administration's internal
deliberations well before 1962. He had appointed his new Undersecretary of State George Ball, a
well-established and less ambivalent free-trader, to draw up a trade policy strategy in his pre-
inaugural Task Force on Trade Policy. The recommendations wzre for an ambitious new trade
policy that, among other things, granted authority to cut tariffs in broad, "linear," industrial
categories and eliminated peril-point provisions. Ball recommended that his Task Force
33 For the general overview of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, I rely heavily on several narratives. The single most
thorough treatment is Zeiler 1993. The Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1962 analysis is also remarkably detailed.
Sorenson 1965, Pastor 1980, Destler 1986 are also good. Curtis and Vastine 1971, Evans 1971 and Preeg 1970 are
also useful on the domestic politics, but focus mainly on the international of the negotiations.
34 In fact, by 1962 the limits of authority were laid bare in Dillon Round negotiating. The six EEC countries
proposed 20 percent cuts in the tariffs protecting broad, "linear," categories of industrial products. Yet, RTA
authority prevented the Kennedy Administration from reciprocating. Peril-point provisions prevented Kennedy from
accepting such deep cuts in some segments of industry that would be harmed. More importantly, Kennedy lacked the
authority to pursue cuts in broad industrial categories, forced instead to focus on much narrower items. By the time
the Dillon Round was concluded on March 7, 1962, the EEC six withdrew more than 100 non-agricultural product
categories from the negotiating table, and total tariff cuts averaged around 10 percent for all the negotiating parties.
Kennedy and other internationalists blamed this mediocre outcome on RTA constraints (Zeiler 1993).
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recommendations be the center of an ambitious new trade bill, but that such a bill be sent to
congress after the election year. Peterson, Kennedy's Special Assistant on Trade Policy, promoted
the more modest RTA extension but thought it should be pursued early in 1962. 35
As several historians have pointed out, Kennedy chose the most ambitious strategy all
around -- Ball's plan with Peterson's timing (Zeiler 1993, Pastor 1980, Preeg 1970). Kennedy
announced in early December 1961 his intention to send a trade bill to Congress, and did so
formally on January 25, 1962, proclaiming his bill a "wholly new approach to trade" and
distinguishing it from previous RTA bills by titling it "the Trade Expansion Act."36
Closely patterned after Ball's iask Force report, the Administration's bill (Introduced as
H.R. 9900) was a major liberalization departure from RTA. It contained several major tariff-
cutting provisions, all allowing the President to cut tariffs on broad industrial categories -- "linear
cuts" -- rather than on narrow segments only -- "item-by-item cuts" -- over a five-year period. The
first and most basic was delegation of tariff-cutting authority to the President to reduce tariffs (as of
1962) by 50 percent, staged over five years; but for those tariffs at 5 percent or less, the President
could negotiate their elimination. Second, the Kennedy bill omitted the peril-point provisions but
retained the procedural stages requiring the Tariff Commission to estimate what points of peril
might be. Third, the bill contained a "dominant supplier" provision that was to provide an
incentive for the UK to join the EEC: "the US would negotiate the elimination of tariffs on those
pioducts in which the US and the EEC supplied 80 percent of world trade. (Few products would
qu?'ify unless the UK was a member of the EEC)" (Pastor 1980, p.107). Fourth, the US would
eliminate tariffs on "tropical products" if the EEC would do the same. Fifth, the President could
grant Communist countries most-favored-nation status. Sixth, the bill proposed tightening escape
clause eligibility requirements by requiring that trade be the "primary" cause of injury, not simply
an important cause. And finally, the bill included Trade Adjustment Assistance that was to provide
financial and tax assistance to trade-impacted workers and firms.
Long before introducing his trade bill, in fact before taking office, Kennedy faced clear and
vocal opposition to any significant trade liberalization, let alone the ambitious tariff-cutting
authority TEA embodied. Table 2.5 below lists most of the most vocal protectionist groups, as
manifest in statements made prior to and during testimony to the House Ways and Means and
Senate
35 Knowing that Ball had been the target of isolationist accusations that the State Department sold out domestic
interests, Kennedy chose to center his Administration's trade policymaking in a White House office. He appointed
Howard Peterson, a Republican banker from Philadelphia, to be his Special Assistant on Trade Policy and the head
of that office. Though nominally out of Ball's and the State Department's hands, the trade strategizing was
controlled as much by Ball and State as by Peterson. Some practitioners claim that Ball actually ran rough-shod
over Peterson, and dominated the drafting process. Interview with Raymond Vernon, May 7, 1996.
36 Kennedy announced the bill only after his congressional Liaison Lawrence O'Brien received encouragement from
House Ways and Means Chairman Wilbur Mills to pursue a major departure from RTA, and after public trial
balloons in late November 1961.
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Table 2.5
Protectionist Industries: Employment and Association Representation
Major Industry Group
22 Textile mill products
227 Floor covering mills
2271 Woven carpets and rugs
2272 Tufted carpets and rugs
2279 Carpets and rugs, n.e.c.
23 Apparel and related products
2352 Hats and caps
2371 Fur goods
2381 Fabric dress & work gloves
24 Lumber and wood products
2411 Logging camps and cntrctrs
29 Petroleum and coal products
2911 Petroleum refining
299 Petroleum/coal prods, n.e.c.
3131 Footware cut stock
3141 Shoes, except rubber
3161 Luggage
3211 Flat glass
3333 Primary zinc
3423 Hand and edge tools
3751 Motor-, bi-cycles, parts
387 watches,clocks,&watchcases
3871 Watches and clocks
3872 Watchcases
3914 Silverware and plated ware
3951 Pens and mech. pencils
1958
918,612
33,668
18,151
11,528
3,989
1,188,530
17,701
9,355
88
3
1
1,29
1
13,941 1
585,372
71,738
247,440
146,025
9,824
2
1963 chng Association/Interest Group
33,170 -4% see below
35,656 6% see below
3,357 -26% see below
9,854 72% see below
2,445 -39% see below
)0,536 9% see below
6,608 -6% United Hatters, Cap&Millnry,
Workers, Int'l Union of Hatters,
Fur Cuttrs Assoc., and Hats Instit.
9,289 -1% Natl Board of Fur Farm Organizations
American Fur Merchants Assn
2,771 -8% American Knit Glove Assn.
Natl Assn of Glove Mfrs
563,135
73,130
219,903
119,297
9,928
-4%
2%
-11%
-18%
1%
See Below
18,031 14,339 -20% Tanners Council of America
215,311 201,728 -6% United Shoe Workers of America
New England Shoe Manufacturers
National Shoe Mfrs. Assn.
15,856 16,409 3% Luggage&Leathergds Lock Mfrs Assn
21,179 22,815 8% see below
8,923 8,065 -10% Rolled Zinc Mfrs Assn
American Zinc, Lead&Smelting Co
Emergency Lead-Zinc Committee
30,273 31,837 5% Shears, Sciss.&Manic. Implmt. Mfrs.
7,578 9,662 28% Bicycle Mnfrs. Assn. of Amer.
Cycle Parts&Accessories Assn.
26,157 29,753 14% American Watch Association
Bulova Watch Co.
Gen.-Gilbert Corp./Ingraham Co./Lux
Clock Mfg Co.
13,842 13,249 -4% Sterling Silversmiths Guild of America
US Silverplated Flat&Holloware Mfrs
US Stainless Steel Flatware Mfrs.
1 1,179 11,562 3% FountainPen&Mech. Pencil Mfrs Assn
Source: US Department of Commerce, Census of Manufacturers, 1958 and 1963
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Finance Committee hearings on TEA. 37 In addition to the high-profile opposition of textiles and
lumber, and the qualified support from labor, all to be discussed in detail below, a number of
vulnerable industrial and agricultural groups had made clear their concerns that continued GATT
tariff reductions were threatening the US's industrial base, its employment, its way of life, and
even its national security. Among the largest of these were the oil and coal industries, which
employed some 129,000 people in 1963 and had already received some quota protection, and
leather shoes which employed some 215,000 people dispersed nationally. Both sought tariff-
relief, quotas or other protection. Smaller segments included watches, bicycles, fur products,
silverware, and others (Congressional Committee Hearings Index). Many of these groups were
long-time protectionists, having lobbied congress for trade relief, with varying degrees of success,
in previous RTA extensions and other trade-related episodes. By the time of TEA's introduction,
however, the lobbying activity in opposition to the bill and in favor of any variety of protectionism
was intense and intensely threatening to the bill's prospects.
The threat to TEA's passage posed by these various groups manifested itself in the
alignment of congressional leaders who were skeptical or outright hostile to the bill. Leading the
protectionist charge were Congressman John H. Dent (D-Pa.) and Senator Prescott S. Bush (R-
Conn.). Less inveterate protectionists were the House and Senate leaders, those heading the
committees hearing the bill and rallying the president's party. But the positioning of these leaders
did not promise a smooth ride for the bill. Wilbur Mills (D-Ark.), Chairman of the House Ways
and Means Committee, supported Kennedy's free trade but certainly had shown himself willing to
impose import protections. And Senator Harry F. Byrd (D-W.Va.), chair of the Finance
Committee, was a more ardent protectionist who apparently "disliked the president anyway" (Zeiler
1993, p.74). Kennedy also didn't have a good relationship with the new House Speaker, John W.
McCormack (D-Mass.), and felt Johnson's absence given the new Senate majority leader Mike
Mansfield's (D-Mont.) lack of power. Finally, Kennedy had put enough stock in the TEA that
many Republicans felt strong partisan pressure to oppose the bill to undermine the president's
prestige and advance their party's position in an election year. Zeiler 1993 points out that several
months after TEA's introduction, "One senator estimated only forty votes for it in the Senate, while
support in the House was also lacking. The president's congressional liaison office reported that
even supporters of the 1958 RTA had turned luke-warm in recent years" (p.74). In short, the
legislative battle to keep his TEA intact, and to get it to pass at all, was going to be steeply uphill.
37 The Table includes industry groupings according to Standard Industry Classifications fr 1958 and 1962. Most
groups to express opposition to House and Senate Hearings fell into the four-digit SIC category, such as silverware
and plated ware (SIC 3914). A few protectionist groups, however, were either too srrmall to be represented by the
four-digit classification (such as dairy machinery, beverage machinery, textbook publishing, and pianos) or had
employment dispersed across several four-digit classifications without representing the majority of any one of those
classifications (e.g. pottery workers association) (House Ways and Means Hearings on TEA, parts 1-6, and Senate
Foreign Relations Hearings, parts 1-5; US Department of Commerce, Census of Manufacturers 1963).
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2.1. Kennedy's General Strategy: Ignore, Exempt, and Compensate
By all accounts, the President was profoundly aware of the legislative battle ahead of him
and made the battle his highest legislative priority for 1962 (CQ Almanac 1962, Sorenson 1965,
Pastor 1980). His strategy began with a series of largely symbolic organizational and rhetorical
measures. In addition to moving his trade policy operation out of the State Department, he
appointed Luther Hodges, his Secretary of Commerce and a Southern Governor with a strong
protectionist pedigree, to shepherd the legislation through Congress. The President gave a number
of speeches and other addresses explaining the importance of the bill. But these measures did little
to address the varied coalition of groups opposing the TEA who, if coordinated and able to
establish a voting bloc, could easily defeat the president.
Faced with this determined opposition, the president had four choices. He could ignore
some or all opposition groups, using rhetoric and brute power in the place of appeasement. He
could exempt some groups from the liberalization effects of the TEA by offering some kind of
tariff-relief in direct contravention of the authority he was trying to win. He could compensate
groups with side-payments without exempting them from the liberalization embodied in the TEA.
Or he could revise, compromising the ambition of the TEA -- such as restore peril-point negotiating
authority or remove the authority to make "linear" cuts. The president was least willing to do the
last, to dampen the basic and unprecedented tariff-cutting authority in his original TEA bill. He
avoided this at all costs, or at least until he had tried everything else.
Thus, Kennedy's legislative strategy entailed either ignoring (uncompensated
liberalization), exempting (compromised liberalization), or compensating (compensated
liberalization) all the protectionist groups and their legislative representatives. The smallest, least
concentrated, least wealthy, and least organized economic groupings were simply ignored by the
president. Such was the plight of leather shoes, plywood, handbags, hats, bicycles, watches,
furs, zinc, and a variety of other groups. As Table 2.5 shows, except for the shoe industry, none
of these protectionist groups employed anywhere near 100,000 workers. Only shoes, moreover,
was a top-five employer in any state, thereby commanding a strong political presence.38 For all
their vitriolic testimony in House and Senate hearings, applications for escape clause relief, threats
of industrial disaster, and general declarations of penury and woe, these groups got little more than
sympathy and verbal encouragement from the Administration. They received neither any tariff-
relief nor other protectionism involving exemptions in the president's legal authority to negotiate
trade barriers nor any assistance distinct from that authority.3 9
38 The leather shoe industry was a top-five industrial employer in Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire.
39 As a result, the president probably lost at least a few votes. For example, New Hampshire, a state where leather
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Other groups received overt and legislated protectionism in clear conflict with the tariff-cuts
Kennedy proposed. As we will see shortly, Textiles and Lumber received promises of voluntary
export restraints, which would undermine the liberalization the tariff-cutting sought. Visible
among the other protectionist redress, however, was the escape clause tariff relief for carpets and
glass.4 0 The Tariff Commission ruled positively in favor of the petitions both industries had
recently submitted, but Kennedy initially post-poned approval of the finding in the hope that he
could marshal enough TEA votes to deny tariff assistance, as Eisenhower had done several years
previously. Angry legislators stood in the way, however. Representing a major glass producing
district, Dent led the attack by trying to rally legislative opposition, including Senators Estes
Kefauver (D-Tenn.), J. William Fulbright, Robert Kerr, and the entire Oklahoma congressional
delegation, paralleling coal-oil bloc and numbering potentially 90 House and 15 Senate members
(Zeiler 1993, p.121). Acting with the support of other elements of the textile industry, who were
themselves busy on a variety of other fronts, Congressmen Samuel Stratton (R-N.Y.) and Steven
Derounian (R-N.Y.) and others threatened to vote against TEA on their carpet industry's behalf.
Faced with such opposition, Kennedy approved the Tariff Commission ruling on March
19, 1962, even though it threatened the winding-down Dillon Round negotiatior.s.4 1 The duty rise
on wilton and velvet or tapestry carpet was from 21 percent of invoice to 40 percent, and on
cylinder, crown and sheet glass the increase would range from 1.3 to 3.5 cents a pound (NYT,
April 4, 1962). Even though the two industries were smaller in employment than the shoe industry
(which received nothing), they had a greater increased interest than most protectionist groups in
protectionism, they sought relief through the RTA's escape clause mechanism (unlike most other
protectionist groups), and among those industries who did apply through that mechanism they
were the largest and best represented. 42 The carpet industry's connection to the rest of the textile
goods products, primarily shoes, is the largest industry, employing some 30 percent of the state's manufacturing
workers, had both its Senators vote against the bill. Kennedy's other two strategies for appeasing industry demands,
however, more than compensated for these lost votes.
40 The wilton and velvet carpets had petitioned the Tariff Commission for escape clause relief on the grounds that
their industry was in vital danger from an onslaught of imports. With carpet imports reaching a record high of 8.2
million square yards in 1961, nearly double the 1958 level, they had a case. The sheet glass industry, likewise,
sought escape clause tariff relief for its problems. At a Tariff Commission hearing in May 1961, several major
glass producers and unions testified, including Libbey-Owens-Ford, Pittsburgh Plate Glass, and American-St.
Gobain, and unions included United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America, the Window Glass Cutters
League, and Ohio-Pennsylvania-W.Virginia-Indiana Glass Workers Protective League (Zeiler 1993, p.1 2 1). Sales for
these groups fell by more than 25 percent between 1955 and 1960, employment by 16 percent, and the four largest
manufacturers suffered losses of over $1.1 million (Zeiler 1993, p. 121). The industry had lost one-quarter of its
market share to imports over the previous decade, with some 3 percent of the market going to imports in 1950 and
32 percent in 1959. Apparently convinced that carpets and glass deserved relief, the Commission recommended tariff
increases (CQ Almanac 1962, p.290).
41 The ensuing tariff increases sparked EC retaliation, in the form of tariff increases on polyethylene, synthetic
cloth, and other products thought to be worth some $27 million/year in lost revenue to US producers. Ironically,
Kennedy used the retaliation to garner support for TEA: "If we had had passage of the Trade Act, we could have then
offered an alternative package which I think would have prevented retaliation" (CQ Almanac 1962, p.290).
42 At the same time the President decided to overturn the Commission's recommendation for escape clause relief to
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industry is particularly important to its power in convincing Kennedy and the Tariff Commission to
grant escape clause relief. In the end, the "exemption" of carpets and glass from TEA tariff cutting
helped to split the 90-member "glass bloc" in congress in half, and along with other textile action
helped win support of Stratton, Derounian, and other "carpet" representatives (Zeiler '93, p. 123).
The strategy of ignoring and exempting potential victims of trade liberalization as a way of
consolidating political support was not new to US trade policymaking. The strategy of
compensating opposition, however, was new. Some TEA side-payments may have escaped
notice. Theodore Hesbourgh of the University of Notre Dame, for example, is said to have
believed that Kennedy deliberately soft-pedaled his desegregation plans in order to gain Southern
support for his TEA (Zeiler 1993, p.99). But there is no evidence of such an exchange, neither
statements that are "smoking guns," nor voting patterns by Southern legislators to fully support
this claim. There may well have been many other more modest promises of compensation in
exchange for support of TEA, such as those among and between individual legislators and the
President. Without some historical trace, however, we will never know exactly how many.
Three packages of side-payments, in contrast, are clearly measurable and central to the
history of the TEA: compensation for textiles and apparel, for soft-wood lumber, and for
organized labor. Compensation to them was the most focused and important part of Kennedy's
strategy to garner the votes to pass his TEA bill unscathed by amendments constraining his tariff-
cutting authority. Relating the history of these packages of compensation requires more attention.
The story of each differs. The textile compensation is a straight-forward tale of an industry's
significant and increasing interest and power in demanding protectionism, combined with a shift in
strategy and focus on the substance of relief from the pressures of international markets. The story
of lumber's compensation, on the other hand, faces the puzzle of how a relatively small industry --
smaller than a number of protectionist groups who got nothing -- yielded any compensatory side-
payments from Kennedy. The story of trade adjustment assistance to labor, finally, not only
involves primarily the power and platforms of labor, but also the altruistic commitments that
express the role of fairness ideas working hand-in-hand with egoistic bargaining to compensation.
The next three sections tells the history of compensatory side payments to each of these
groups -- beginning with textiles, then lumber, then labor. The organization of each section varies
according to differences in the chain of events leading up to and following the provision of
compensation. In all three, however, the history focuses on (1) the evolving economic and
political interests of the respective groups vis ai vis trade liberalization generally and the TEA in
particular; (2) their evolving political power in the trade policymaking arena; (3) their evolving
demands for protectionism and other policy goods that could be the subject of side payments; (4)
the government and the Kennedy Administration's supply of such payments; and (5) the
baseball gloves and ceramic mosaic tiles, groups which suffered plenty but hadn't the political leverage to matter.
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effectiveness of the side payment packages in securing political support and lowering opposition
from the societal groups and their legislative representatives.
2.2. Textiles' Seven-point Side Payment
By virtue of its size, international vulnerability, and ties to Congress, the textile and apparel
industry's vocal and intense opposition to continued tariff-cutting authority was the most important
threat to Kennedy's Trade Expansion Act. Fully aware of this threat, Kennedy entered office
knowing he would either have to scale-down his liberalization initiatives, exclude the textile and
apparel industries from tariff-cutting authority, or provide some protectionist or side payment buy-
off. Ignoring the industry and its 170+ bloc of legislators was an impossibility. After several
protectionist assaults by the industry alliance, the President offered a package of side-payments and
a commitment to negotiate voluntary quota protection as well -- all well in advance but mindful of
introducing his TEA. Why did Kennedy resort to compensation along-side protectionist
exemption, rather than revising the liberalization or simply exempting textiles from its reach?
2.2.1. The Growing Power and Broadening Platforms of Textiles and Apparel
In the decade leading up to Kennedy's presidency, the various segments of the textile
industry grew increasingly concerned with imports and focused on protectionism, and underwent
significant organizational changes that turn their regional concentration into a very potent force to
influence legislative and electoral politics. At the same time, a variety of industry organizations and
representatives had begun national-level discussions with national political leaders over a variety of
policy issues separate from trade protectionism -- discussions that fueled a clear broadening of their
trade policy platforms as the TEA approached.
2.2.1.1. More Determined But Broadening Protectionist Platforms: The textile and apparel
industries encompassed industry groupings with markedly different positions in the international
economy and different perspectives on the propriety of trade liberalization -- with the textile
industry split between cotton, wool and synthetic fibers, and with the textile industries generally
having divergent interests from their down-stream apparel producers. Toward the end of the
1950s, however, these differences diminished, and by 1961 virtually all Textile and Apparel
groups were increasingly protectionist and hostile to ambitious tariff-cutting authority.
Cotton textiles represented the largest segment of the textile industry and had an
unambiguous and cohesive preference for protectionist policies by 1962. Their economic position
tells most, but not all, of the story. In addition to several largely domestic adjustment problems,43
43 Technological innovation caused excess capacity; macro-economic recession and competition from synthetic and
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shifts in exports and imports fueled major problems in their market position. Imports increased
dramatically between 1948 to 1962, from 16 million to nearly 310 million pounds of cloth, while
exports fell by more than 100 percent, from 454 million pounds of cloth to 220 million
(Hunsberger 1964, p.325). The result was a shift from a very substantial trade surplus to a deficit
by 1960 -- a drop that was greatest in the few years just prior to Kennedy's election, from 130
million to -58 million in 1960.44 Whether their source was international or domestic, the industry
certainly suffered major adjustment problems during the same period. In cotton weaving mills, for
example, employment dropped from more than 300,000 in 1956 to 224,000 workers in 1962.
Total enterprises dropped, due to mergers and closings, from more than 700 in 1956 to 494 in
1962.45 Many of these losses were concentrated in several Southern states where the industry was
centered. In addition to these purely economic sources of Cotton's protectionism is a history of
experience with US government intervention -- especially with the system of "two-price" cotton --
that encouraged increasing protectionism.46
The wool segment of the textile industry, although smaller, had an even clearer economic
interest in protectionism. They were beset by the same economic problems as cotton, marked by a
consistently dropping level of employment. As Table 2.6 shows, imports outstripped exports
throughout the 1950s, and had done so consistently from 1920 onward, except for during World
War Two. More importantly, wool cloth producers faced steadily increasing influx of imports
between 1948 and 1962, at a rate significantly outstripping modest increases in wool cloth exports.
And in the years immediately preceding the TEA fight, the trade deficit accelerated as a result of a
surge in imports between 1958 and 1961. Long before the cotton textile industry was actively
calling for protectionism, wool producers and their representatives were showing up at RTA
hearings clamoring for tariff and other kinds of import relief.47 Making appearances at RTA
renewals during the inter-war period and consistently thereafter, the wool textile producers were
the textile industry's most inveterate protectionists (CQ Almanac 1945).
other fibers led to stagnant demand; market share dropped from 72.7 percent in 1947 to 53.5 percent by the mid-
1960s. And since the 1940s firms had been relocating to the South, mainly to take advantage of lower cost labor.
44 In dollar terms, the increase in imports from all countries was from 154.3 million dollars in 1956 to 203.3
million in 1961 (Hunsberger 1964, p.325). And the trade balance, in dollar terms, shrank from $125 million in
1958 to $19 million in 1960 (Zeiler 1993, p.75).
45 In 1960 alone, one historian remarks, 128 mills closed across the US, leaving employment at an all-time low.
46 Raw cotton producers received price supports since the 1933 AAA, making domestic cotton expensive for cotton
cloth producers. Protection for raw cotton required further restriction on cloth producers through restrictive quotas on
raw cotton imports to discourage purchases of foreign cotton. This encouraged a shift to synthetic fibers. More
important, the 1956 Agricultural Act introduced an export subsidy for raw cotton, on the order of 80 per pound, to
help compensate for declining cotton exports. This enabled foreign cotton cloth producers to buy US raw cotton at
the world price, while the captive cotton cloth producers in the US had to pay the inflated price. This "two-price
cotton" system, onerous given the low value-added in textile manufacturing, encouraged cotton textile producers to
hold government responsible for their ills. This anger translated into support for an end to the two-price system, but
also for protectionism in all its forms. By the 1953 RTA renewal, the Cotton textile industry representatives
initiated their calls for protectionism, and became increasingly vocal thereafter (CQ Almanac 1953).
47 At Senate Hearings for the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements, for instance, they were among the most vocal.
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Manmade fibers (rayon, acetate and other synthetics) represented the smallest segment of
the textile industry, and were the most internationally competitive. Although the segment showed a
decrease in employment and enterprise number between 1956 and 1962 (from 114,240 to 72,024,
a 23% drop), the synthetic fibers were also growing in share of consumption (from 16% in 1944,
to 28% in 1955, to 41% in 1963), and showed consistent trade surpluses as both imports and
exports grew (see Table 2.6). Thus, the economic position of synthetic fibers suggests that their
support for protectionism should have been small and shrinking. While they sat out of trade
debates through most of the 1950s, however, synthetic fiber manufacturers joined the natural
fibers in the fight for protection by the time Kennedy took office. The reasons are more political,
the most important of which was the risk that protection for natural fibers would inspire foreign
producer to concentrate on any other segment of the market that might be less protected (Aggarwal
and Haggard)48; better to join the protectionist band-wagon than to take that risk. Whatever the
reasons, 1957 was the first year manmade producers sided with the natural fiber producers.
Table 2.6
US Trade in Textile Manfuactures:
Fiber Equivalent, Exports, Imports, and Trade Balance, 1948-62 (x 1,000 lbs.)
Exports Imports Trade Balance
Cotton Wool Man. Total Cotton Wool Man. Total Cotton Wool Man. Total
1948 453,824 20,651 93,893 568,368 16,009 42,263 1,232 59,504 437,815 -21,612 92,661 508,864
1949 385,010 10,275 107,349 502,634 18,464 43,399 2,057 63,920 366,546 -33,124 105,292 438,714
1950 258,666 7,535 81,385 347,586 40,053 63,804 4,348 108,205 218,613 -56,269 77,037 239,381
1951 388,635 8,161 92,063 488,859 33,945 56,387 4,153 94,485 354,690 -48,226 87,910 394,374
1952 337,885 6,067 95,000 438,952 32,416 87,994 3,182 123,592 305,469 -81,927 91,818 315,360
1953 291,223 4,968 96,012 392,203 44,556 61,963 4,638 111,157 246,667 -56,995 91,374 281,046
1954 290,181 5,558 96,349 392,088 48,479 61,052 4,942 114,473 241,702 -55,494 91,407 277,615
1955 262,799 5,514 87,733 356,046 86,958 81,399 6,965 175,322 175,841 -75,885 80,768 180,724
1956 254,559 5,666 92,364 352,589 107,994 91,081 8,801 207,876 146,565 -85,415 83,563 144,713
1957 277,979 4,562 97,651 380,192 95,566 85,173 9,496 190,235 182,413 -80,611 88,155 189,957
1958 250,084 4,577 90,353 345,014 112,138 90,196 13,173 215,507 137,946 -85,619 77,180 129,507
1959 236,430 4,936 96,738 338,104 172,795 126,922 33,628 333,345 63,635 -121,986 63,110 4,759
1960 233,147 4,698 122,926 360,771 255,553 132,132 31,102 418,787 -22,406 -127,434 91,824 -58,016
1961 239,181 4,538 118,944 362,663 188,896 127,458 23,491 339,845 50,285 -122,920 95,453 22,818
1962 220,307 4,369 141,599 366,275 309,848 145,637 30,557 486,042 -89,541 -141,268 111,042 -119,767
Simpson, William Hays. 1966. Some Aspects of America's Textile Industry:
With Special Reference to Cotton. Columbia, South Carolina: The R.L. Bryan Co., pp.126-127
48 Aggarwal and Haggard argue that synthetic fibers went along with protectionism for three reasons: to restrict
tariff cutting authority to keep out European-produced man-made fiber textile products; to keep attention focused on
imports rather than the much more critical problem of inter-fiber competition (as Table 2.3 supports); and to reap
short-term gains from protectionism, even if that protectionism focused only on cotton imports, for which man-
made imports were imperfect substitutes (Aggarwal and Haggard 1980).
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The apparel industry, even larger than the textile industry through most of the period, faced
a similar situation to the synthetic fiber textiles. Apparel manufacturers' reliance on textile cloths as
inputs gave them a strong economic incentive to push for lower textile protectionism. However,
several forces pushed the industry in the opposite direction. First, quota protection of wool and
cotton fiber products in the late 1950s had inspired trade diversion, leading to import pressure on
apparel from countries such as Japan and Hong Kong. Second, the apparel industry was much
more organizationally fragmented than textiles, and at a distinct disadvantage in a fight against
textile protectionism. Third, apparel producers knew that in a fight over protectionism, textile
producers could retaliate by manipulating their market (Aggarwal and Haggard, p.270).
Anticipating the textile protectionism, Apparel producers had an incentive to support protectionism
for their own products. In short, contagion fueled protectionism among apparel as well as
synthetic fiber producers (Friman 1992, Aggarwal and Haggard 1980). As late as 1957, the men's
clothing and other apparel segments opposed efforts of wool mills to obtain tariff protection, but
by 1961 they actively supported such protection (Pastore Hearings 1961, p. 1 12).
Finally, the unionized workers in textile and apparel mills had economic interests that
differed somewhat from their employers, but they increasingly turned towards protectionism in the
mid-to-late 1950s. Workers bore the brunt of the industry adjustment -- their organizational
activity thwarted, their wages dropping, and their employment threatened or ended. Southern job
shedding was greatest. With 140 textile mill closings in the six major Southern textile states 49
between 1951 and 1961, textile jobs dropped nearly 17 percent.(CQ Weekly Report 20,'62).
Textile Labor spent a lot of the mid-1950s calling for domestic solutions to their market problems.
In various hearings and union discussions about their market distress, labor groups sought
domestic-institutional changes more than protectionism. They proposed establishment of a textile
development agency to engage in research and development, to administer a short work week, and
to finance movement of workers and retraining and retirement benefits, 50 as well as a board to
administer the Federal Labor Relations Act (Aggarwal and Haggard, p.276). When industry and
government representatives repeatedly ignored these requests, textile Labor threw their hat into the
protectionist ring. They began testifying against RTA extension in 1955, and were regular
lobbyists on behalf of various trade protections in every episode thereafter (Vear 1955, passim).
The demands made by particular textile and apparel groups varied throughout the 1950s
and early 1960s, with each group calling for different degrees and kinds of assistance from
Congress and the President. By the end of the 1950s, however, all segments converged not only
on demands for protectionism, but on a combination of side benefits and a particular kind of
49 Alabama, Georgia, North and South Carolina, Virginia and Tennessee.
50 This request foreshadowed textile labor's interest in adjustment assistance. Discussion of organized labor and the
Trade Adjustment Assistance provisions of the TEA explains this development in some detail.
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protectionist redress: unilateral quotas, strong escape clause relief and tariffs. The labor
representatives of the industry, mainly via the TWUA, were the main proponents of some side
issue benefits, such as research and development funding and training programs. But the textile
and apparel industry associations explicitly supported some of these side issues, especially
elimination of the two-price cotton system and increased patronage in International Cooperation
Administration's procurement, and some general industrial subsidies.
These demands were prominently voiced after the 1958 RTA, when Fall congressional
prompted the Senate to establish the "Pastore Subcommittee" 5' of the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, to study the industry's competitive situation. Most of the industry and labor
associations mentioned above gave testimcly, in which attention converged upon quota protection,
but also on a variety of aforementioned side issue demands. Following industry's suggestions, the
Pastore Subcommittee report endorsed multi-fiber textile quotas, tightening of Japan's VER, an
end to two-price cotton, new International Cooperation Administration procurement policy, and a
cabinet-level committee to study textile problems (Aggarwal and Haggard 1983, pp.275-76; and
Pastore Hearings 1958, passim). Between the explicit platforms of the ACMI and TWUA sector
representatives, the industry groups towed a pretty consistently multi-issue platform that
emphasized protectionist redress but included several side issue supplements.
2.2.1.2. Centralized Organization, Size and Regional Concentration: As different segments
of the textile industry became more determined protectionists, they also grew more powerful in
translating their perceived interests into policy demands. One of the major bases of that power lay
in the industry's changing organization. Following Friman 1992, industry organization can be
divided into three categories: concentration of organization; inclusiveness of total industry
employment by the organizations lobbying for protectionism; and degree of consensus in the
protectionist demands among those lobbying organizations. First, the organization of textiles was
relatively inclusive, with associations representing close to 86 percent of textile employees. 52
51 The committee was established at the behest of Rhode Island Senator and textile champion John Pastore.
52 The largest association in the textile industry throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s was the American Cotton
Manufacturers Institute (ACMI). Founded through a 1949 merger of major northern and southern cotton
associations, ACMI represented roughly 85 percent of cotton cloth producers and between 11 and 15 percent of total
textile employment. Partly overlapping ACMI's membership was the Northern Textile Association (NTA), whose
members increasingly diversified into man-made fibers and had absorbed many wool producers. By 1958 it
represented some 27 percent of cotton and synthetic cloth production and close to 30 percent of wool cloth
production. The remaining wool producers were represented by the National Association of Wool Manufacturers
(NAWM), covering some 2.5 percent of total textile employment.
The two main associations representing the man-made fiber industry were the Man-Made Fibers Producers
Association and the National Federation of Textiles, the first representing an average of 5 percent of textile
employment, the second 3 percent.
The Apparel industry was substantially more fragmented than textiles, with dozens of associations scattered
across product categories and the country, the largest accounting for less than 3.0 percent of total textile
employment, and roughly the same of apparel. Acting as a weak federation for New York-based apparel producer
associations was the Apparel Associations Inter-Association Committee.
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Second, between 1957 and 1962, a series of mergers and federations crafted among these
associations led to a significant increase in the centralization of the industry organization across
textile and apparel industries, across natural fiber segments, and across natural and man-made fiber
segments. And as we have already seen, the various lobbying associations increasingly converged
upon a particular array of protectionist provisions.53 In all three categories of organization, the
textile and apparel industries became stronger toward the end of the 1950s and early 1960s.
More important to the political clout of the textile and apparel industries was their aggregate
size and regional concentration in light of Kennedy's and the Democrats' electoral position. A
relatively unified textile and apparel industry would carry substantial weight in Congress in part
because of its aggregate size in terms of employment. At the two-digit aggregation of the Standard
Industrial Classification, the textile industry (SIC 23) was the seventh largest employer of all
manufacturing industries, with 918,612 workers in 1958 and 883,170 in 1963, and the Apparel
industry (SIC 23) was the fifth largest, with 1,188,530 in 1958 and 1,290,536 in 1963. Taken
alone or combined, the textile and apparel industries were by far the largest industry acting as a
group on the issue of trade in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Table 2.4 above provides the
comparison. Even the most conservative estimates of the sub-segments of the industries most
vocally demanding protectionism puts the textile and apparel segments far ahead of any other single
protectionist group. The number is large enough that his and his party's electoral position would
be affected by ignoring industry demands.
The industry demands have exaggerated clout when one considerL the distribution of the
textile and apparel industries across states. First, Table 2.7 shows the states in which textile
producers are among the top five industrial employers, nearly a dozen such states. If we add
apparel firms to the count, the number expands significantly. Given the inclusiveness, near-
unanimity, and centralization of textile demands for protectionism, this implies very substantial
electoral pressure on legislators representing the districts in which the employees reside. Table 2.7
53 First, as cotton textile producers moved into the synthetic fiber world through the latter half of the 1950s, ACMI
expanded into the membership of the National Federation of Textiles. In 1958 the overlap was such that ACMI
absorbed the Federation, allowing ACMI to claim that they represented some 80 to 85 percent of cotton, silk, and
man-made fiber cloth-making capacity in the U.S. In keeping with this claim, the ACMI's changed its name in
1962 to the American Textile Manufacturers Institute. Second, ties between ACMI and the National Association of
Wool Manufacturers were increasingly strong, foreshadowing a formal merger several years after the TEA. Third, the
members of Apparel Associations Inter-Association Committee formed an alliance with an "emergency" apparel peak
association called the Apparel Industry Committee on Imports to represent apparel producers on the issue of textile
imports. As Friman 1993 notes, "in total, twenty-three diverse apparel associations representing roughly 57.2
percent of the textile industry's production and employment participated in or lent support to the two apparel
committees" (p.69). Finally, the Southern Garment Manufacturers Association and the National Association of
Shirt, Pajama, and Sportswear Manufacturers merged to form the American Apparel Manufacturers Association
(AAMA) (Friman 1992). In addition to these relatively permanent mergers, some of the associations also formed
temporary alliances, or federations, to push for or against particular government policies. The industry's fight
against the Organization for Trade Cooperation, discussed below, is an example.
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Table 2.7
States in which Textile Employment Is Among Top Five Industrial Employers
ALABAMA
STATE/INDUSTRY
Total Industry
20 Food & Kindred Products
22 Textile Mill Products
23 Apparel and Related Products
24 Lumber and Wood Products
33 Primary Metal Industries
MAINE
STATE/INDUSTRY
Total Industry
20 Food & Kindred Products
21 Tobacco Manufacturers
22 Textile Mill Products
2211 Weaving Mills, cotton
2221 Weaving Mills, syntts
2231 Wvng/Fnshng.Mills,wool
24 Lumber and Wood Products
2411 Logging Camps Cntrctrs.
26 Paper and Allied Products
31 Leather and Leather Products
Emplymt
243,800
22,420
35.474
31,598
19,919
40,078
Total Rank
9%
15%
13%
8%
16%
GEORGIA
STATE/INDUSTRY
Total Industry
20 Food & KindredProds
22 Textile Mill Products
2211 Wvng Mills, cott
23 Apparel/RelatedProds
24 Lumber/Wood Prods
37 Transport. Equipment
Emplymt
354,023
41,949
93,482
42,214
57,145
22,741
30,357
Total Rank
12%
26%
12%
16%
6%
9%
MASSACHUSETTS
Em
9
iplymt Total Rank STATE/INDUSTRY
9,926 Total Industry
11,657 12% 5 22 Textile Mill Products
2211WvngMills, cott
12,295 12% 3 2221WvngMills, synth
2231Wvg/Fnshng.wool
451 0% 23 Apparel/RelatedProds
5,213 5% 31 Leather/Leather Prods
11,854 12% 4 35 Mach., except Elec.
4,120 4% 36 Electrical Machinery
16,537
24,699
Emplymt Total Rank
674,023
41,286 6%
2,494 0%
3,696 1%
7,770 1%
56,162 8%
48,572 7%
67,673 10%
96,183 14%
17%
25%
MISSISSIPPI
STATE/INDUSTRY
Total Industry
20 Food & Kindred Products
22 Textile Mill Products
23 Apparel and Related Products
24 Lumber and Wood Products
2411 Log Camps and Cntrctrs.
37 Transportation Equipment
NORTH CAROLINA
STATE/INDUSTRY
Total Industry
20 Food & Kindred Products
21 Tobacco Manufacturers
22 Textile Mill Products
2211 Weaving Mills, cotton
2221 Weaving Mills, synth.
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Emplymt
128,506
14,641
6,073
31,435
20,914
1,599
8,304
Emplymt
530,646
32,940
29,187
220,929
49,401
32,052
Total Ran
11%
5%
24%
16%
1%
6%
Total Ranl
6%
6%
42%
9%
6%
ik STATE/INDUSTRY
Total Industry
3 20 Food &Kindred Prods
5 22 Textile Mill Products
1 2221WvingMills, synth
2 2231Wvng/Fnshg. wool
26 Paper/Allied Prods
4 31 Leather/Leather Prods
35 Mach., except Elect.
36 Electrical Machinery
RHODE ISLAND
k STATE/INDUSTRY
Total Industry
22 Textile Mill Products
2211 Weaving Mills, cotton
2221WvngMills synth.
2231Wvg/Fnshng.wool
23 Apparel/RelatedProds
Emplymt
128,506
2,944
10,709
1,330
3,624
5,580
20,137
8,002
11,508
Emplymt
113,940
22,863
112
Total Rank
4%
13%
2%
4%
7%
24%
10%
14%
Total Rank
20%
1,810
2,390
3,860
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2231 Wving/Fnshg.Mills, wool
23 Apparel and Related Products
24 Lumber and Wood Products
2411 Logging Camps/Cntrctrs.
25 Furniture and Fixtures
SOUTH CAROLINA
STATE/INDUSTRY
Total Industry
20 Food & Kindred Products
22 Textile Mill Products
2211 Weaving Mills, cotton
2221 Weaving Mills, synths.
223 1Wvng/Fnshg.Mills, wool
23 Apparel and Related Products
24 Lumber and Wood Products
2411 Logging Camps Cntrctrs.
28 Chemicals and Allied Prods
VIRGINIA
STATE/INDUSTRY
Total Industry
20 Food & Kindred Products
22 Textile Mill Products
2221 Weavng Mills, synthetics
23 Apparel and Related Products
24 Lumber and Wood Products
2411 Logging Camps Cntrctrs.
28 Chemicals and Allied Prods
37 Transportation Equipment
3,762
47,243
27,403
3,153
47,994
Emplymt
261,655
11,042
130,371
67,371
23,087
3,240
34,561
14,761
2,802
16,181
Emplymt
302,084
32,048
35,961
4,317
26,588
20,914
2,024
35,106
25,432
Total Rank
4%
50%
26%
9%
1%
13%
6%
1%
6%
30 Rubber/PlasticsProds
3 33 PrimaryMetal Indust.
34 Fabric. Metal Prods
35 Mach., except Elect.
2
TENNESSEE
STATE/INDUSTRY
Total Industry
20 Food &Kindred Prods
22 Textile Mill Products
23Apparel/Related Prods
24 Lumber/Wood Prods
2411 Log Camps/Cntrcts.
25 Furniture/ Fixtures
28Chems./Allied Prods
7,926
9,096
7,606
9,106
Emplymt Total Rank
339,108
31,928 9% 3
30,451 9% 4
52,140 15% 1
16,574 5%
577 0%
17,877 5% 5
39,820 12% 2
Total Rank
11%
12%
1%
9%
7%
1%
12%
8%
Source: US Department of Commerce, Census of Manufacturers, 1963.
reveals how many Senate votes must have been influenced by textile demands. In the House, the
calculation is more difficult, because industry concentration is not published according to House
congressional districts. But one can conjecture very broadly that a large number of House
representatives were also heavily influenced by textile and apparel industry demands.54
Second, the concentration of the textile and apparel industries in Southern and New
England states had implications for the textile industry's power. Table 2.8 shows the regional
distribution of textile and apparel employment. It shows that with the exception of Mississippi, all
of the states in which textile manufacturers were among the top five industrial employers in the
54 Another reason to expect representatives to heed textile demands is that congressional leaders may be expected to
form blocs and to have a variety of shared interests in collaborating. Such is one of the points made by Tosini and
Tower 1987 in their attempt to measure the importance of industry employment on congressional voting.
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state were also among the top sixteen employers of textile workers nationally. The Table shows
how the industry had 94 percent of its workers in sixteen states, and well over 50 percent from
four deep south states: Alabama, Georgia, and North and South Carolina. With Virginia and
Tennessee also being major employers, it is clear that employment was heavily concentrated in the
South. But as Zeiler points out and Table 2.8 shows, "every New England and mid-Atlantic state,
except for Vermont, Maryland, and Delaware, were among the top sixteen states in textile
employment..." (Zeiler 1993, p.76).
Top Sixteen States in
Table 2.8
Terms of Textile Employment
State
1 North Carolina
2 South Carolina
3 Georgia
4 Pennsylvania
5 New York
6 Massachusetts
7 Virginia
8 Alabama
9 Tennessee
10 New Jersey
11 Rhode Island
12 Connecticut
13 Maine
14 New Hampshire
15 Ohio
16 California
20 Mississippi
# employees
220,900
130,400
93,500
67,500
53,600
41,300
36,000
35,500
29,900
26,000
22,900
13,100
12,100
10,700
8,500
6,800
6,100
Rank of Textiles
Among Industries
1
1
1
7
13
5
1
2
4
13
1
11
3
3
17
16
5
Source: US Department of Commerce, Census of Manufacturers, 1963.
Safeguarding any trade legislation he was to table in the coming year may have been
Kennedy's strongest motivation to address textile industry protectionism in light of this regional
distribution and concentration. And Kennedy needed to appease textile groups in order to get
much of his other New Frontier legislation accepted. He knew that the textile industry was
concentrated in South and had tremendous political power on Southern legislators. Southern
Democrats, in turn, chaired twelve of twenty House committees and ten of sixteen committees in
the Senate (Zeiler 1993, p.77). Since it was no secret that Republican legislators could not be
counted on to support his social spending, agriculture and other legislative initiatives, he knew he
had to count on Southern Democrats. And his civil-rights agenda -- even if Hesbourgh's claim that
Kennedy delayed or dampened those plans to secure his TEA is accurate -- was going to step on a
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lot of Southern toes. Thus, if Kennedy had strong incentives to give Southern legislators what
they wanted on trade, and that was some significant package of redress for textiles.55
2.2.2. Kennedy, the Textile Industry, and Congress
The changes in the industry's perceived economic position and its increasing organizational
strength made textiles the one of the most vocal and successful industry groups agitating for
protectionism. In the decade preceding Kennedy's election, they focused their energy mainly on
mod"- ag extensions of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, but left no political stone un-
turned. fhey focused also on non-RTA trade and foreign aid legislation (such as that involving
establishment of the OECD), they petitioned Congress directly for relief, they clamored for help
from the toothless Commission on Reciprocity, they petitioned the Tariff Commission for escape
clause tariffs, and even sought quota protection under Section 22 of the AAA.
In response to all these demands, political representatives in the Executive and Congress
did not always supply the goods, 56 by decade's end the textiles industry had won a number of
protectionist successes. In none of RTA Extensions were textiles formally exempted from tariff-
cutting authority, but the industry was largely responsible for the successful lobbying to legislate
escape clause relief, and to set up peril-point provisions. They also successfully opposed a House
Resolution creating the Organization for Trade Cooperation in 1956, and won the negotiation of
voluntary export restraints with Japan in 1956 and 1957.
With the 1960s they sought to continue or increase this list of protections. Throughout
1960, textile forces lobbied both the Republican and the Democratic Parties, and both Presidential
candidates, for promises of support. In addition to personal lobbying of candidates and coalition-
builders, such as South Carolina Governor Ernest Hollings, the textile industry got the Southern
Governor's Conference to adopt a resolution calling for quotas and other restrictions. Kennedy
and the Democrats responded with assurances of support. In public statements and personal
55 Kennedy had a couple of other motivations to listen to textiles. First, Kennedy is said to have actually
sympathized with the plight of the textile industry, reasonable given that he had represented Massachusetts, a state
who's very large textile industry had been taking a beating for years (Sorenson). Second, Kennedy had made a series
of campaign promises that, although ambiguous in their details, clearly fueled high expectation in the minds of
major textile sponsors who had gone to bat for Kennedy in the close 1960 election. If Kennedy wanted to preserve
the trust of these supporters, for the next election or for anything else, his Administration would have to do more
than provide some escape clause relief and set up a cabinet panel to think about industry problems.
56 Petitions for quota protection under Section 22 of AAA was denied in a Tariff Commission ruling. And
although Eisenhower announced that he would consider imposing a duty on imports of cotton textile goods produced
from subsidized US raw cotton exports, he didn't act. In all arenas, finally, the industry was denied its requests for
unilateral quota protection, though sometimes by only a hair: Separate Resolutions (e.g. HR8658 and HR9170) and
the "Green Amendment" to a Senate foreign aid bill were all defeated, but the Green Amendment lost by only two
votes (Friman 1992, Lynch, Brandis 1984, CQ Almanac 1956). Finally, petitions for escape clause relief to
velveteen producers, blouse manufacturers and pillowcase, and carpets were either denied by the Tariff Commission
or overturned by the president. This last defeat was soon headed for a turn-around.
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dispatches, Kennedy promised that finding a solution to the textile problem would be a "top
priority objective" of his presidency (Zeiler 1993). On what that "solution" would be, Kennedy
was much more ambiguous, saying he would aggressively use "Congressionally-established
procedures" while "working within the framework of our free trade policies." 57 Some
representatives, such as Hollings, responded to these pledges of support by delivering votes for
Kennedy's campaigr, including the key Southern textile states of North and South Carolina.
Even before tabling his TEA, Kennedy responded to this din of protectionist pressure with
some early attempts to appease the textile industry and to fulfill at least the spirit of his campaign
promise. His appointment of Luther Hodges to be his Secretary of Commerce on December 3,
1960 was an obvious bone. Hodges, from North Carolina, was one of the Governors signing the
Southern Governor's Conference resolution calling for quotas. At Hodges's recommendation,
Kennedy also agreed to follow one of the 1958 Pastore Report recommendations and set up a
cabinet-level panel, convened as the Interagency Textile Committee (ITC), to find a solution to the
import problem. Along with Hodges appointed as head, the ITC included Treasury Secretary
Douglas Dillon, Undersecretary of State George Ball, and the Secretaries of Agriculture and Labor.
With continued industry pressure and the knowledge that the ITC would have the
president's ear, Senator John Pastore and 10 other textile Senators convened a second set of
hearings in early 1961 (CQ Almanac 1962). The industry's showing at these hearings was
impressive. 58 In addition to the frequently active natural-fiber associations, such as the ACMI and
the NAWM, two overlapping apparel federations -- the Committee for the Apparel Industries and
the Apparel Industry Committee on Imports, representing 25 apparel associations -- also appeared.
So did three major apparel and textile unions: the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union, the
International Ladies Garment Workers Union, and the Textile Workers Union of America. More
important than the organizational alliances manifest in appearances, all the groups strongly
concurred in the thrust of their recommendations. Many of the groups mentioned the various other
policies on the platform, including ending two-price cotton and other provisions. 59 The emphasis,
however, was very clearly on product- and country-specific quotas as the mininially acceptable
solution to their problems (Friman 1992, Hunsberger 1971).
These industry demands for quota protection almost immediately won legislative
sponsorship, with legislators in both the Senate and the House linking such protection to future
approval of Kennedy's tariff-cutting authority. Senate activity took-off immediately after the
Pastore hearings. The day after meeting with industry representatives on March 20, 1961, Senator
57 Kennedy in letter to Ernest Hollings, quoted in Friman 1993. Letter was sent on August 31, 1960 and is
Published in its entirety in Part One: Kennedy Statements, 1960, pp.66-67.
This paragraph's discussion of the hearings borrows heavily from Friman 1992, p. 10 4 -5 .
59 Some groups, however, explicitly disparaged "'aid' measures such as 'handouts, subsidies, [or] favored
treatment..." (Friman 1992).
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Pastore and ten other textile-state Senators delivered speeches on the Senate floor in favor of textile
quotas (CQ Almanac 1962). In their remarks, Pastore and others claimed that if the Administration
didn't provide import quotas the Senators would oppose extension of the Reciprocal Trade Act,
slated for renewal in 1962 (Friman 1992).
In the House of Representatives, Carl Vinson (D-Ga.) and W.J.Bryan Dorn (D-N.C.) led
the formation of a 128-member Textile Conference Group with a bipartisan membership
representing 35 states (Zeiler 1993, p.78). On March 22, 1961, 60 House Members who were
part of that Group met with textile representatives to hear their concerns (CQ Almanac 1962,
p.287). The next day, on March 23, 1961, the vast majority of the Textile Conference Group
signed a group letter to the President that predicted "congressional rejection of a new trade bill
unless there were safeguards for textiles" (quoted in Zeiler 1993, p.7 9 and footnote 12). The
Group also appointed a 15-member committee that met with President Kennedy on March 27th to
support mainly the imposition of quotas. Finally, the Group organized a "mass display" in the
House on April 18th, during which 70 House Members -- 48 Democrats and 22 Republicans --
called for safeguards (CQ Almanac 1962, p.287). In his remarks during that display,
Representative Vinson, the major spokesman for the Group, clarified what was at stake in his
endorsement of import quotas:
Unless quotas are imposed that will provide the necessary protection to the textile industry
in the United States, I think I can safely predict that at least some of the Members who
voted to extend the Trade Agreements Act in 1958 will have second thoughts if a bill to
extend the Act is presented on the floor in 1962 (CQ Almanac 1962, p.287).
Given that Kennedy did, indeed, have in mind some kind of trade liberalization legislation -- very
ambitious legislation if George Ball's pre-inaugural trade recommendations were any indication --
this threat definitely was of interest to the President.
In the face of industry demands for quota protection and Congressional support for those
demands, Kennedy was very skeptical. He "warned that such action invited retaliation from other
nations, and would worsen the payments deficit" (Zeiler 1993). In appointing Hodges and taking
textile concerns seriously, the president sought textile remedies consistent with his fermenting free
trade agenda. But the mounting pressure in Congress for quotas, pressure that threatened to hold
any free trade legislation hostage, required a major response. Doing nothing would clearly have
spelled trouble for his free trade designs, whether he chose the modest RTA extension or a major
initiative like the one Ball's Task Force recommended.
Recommendations of his appointed Interagency Textile Committee in April spurred the
President to move towards a buy-off for textiles. Luther Hodges, as the Committee chair,
followed the broad outlines of the Pastore subcommittee report by recommending a variety of
forms of assistance, including import quotas. But instead of unilateral quotas, Hodges
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recommended quotas patterned after the 1957 voluntary export restraint controlling Japanese cotton
textile exports. According to Zeiler 1993, these recommendations were strongly protested in
Committee meetings by George Ball, who preferred a free-trade stand against the textile alliance.
The Ccnimittee also proposed other measures, again in keeping with the two sets of Pastore
Committee reports, including tax relief and an end to the two-price policy. The Committee's
suggestions became the template for Kennedy's response.
2.2.3. Compensation for Textiles: Kennedy's Seven-Point Plan
On May 2, 1961, Kennedy announced a seven-point plan of assistance to the textile
industry. The seven points, based on the Interagency Textile Committee report given to the
President only days earlier, were as follows:
1. The Department of Commerce, "with the cooperation of both union and management
groups" was "to launch an expanded program of research, covering new products,
processes and markets."
2. The Treasury Department was to "review existing depreciation allowances on textile
machinery... [to] assist in the modernization of industry." This implied speeding up
depreciation schedules that would provide tax relief.
3. The Small Business Administration was to "assist the cotton textile industry to obtain the
necessary financing for modernization of its equipment."
4. The Department of Agriculture was "to explore and make recommendations to eliminate or
offset the cost to United States mills of the adverse differential in raw cotton costs between
domestic and foreign textile producers."
5. The President planned "to send Congress proposals to permit industries seriously injured
or threatened with serious injury as a result of increased imports to be eligible for assistance
from the Federal Government."
6. The Department of State was "to arrange an early conference of the principal textile
exporting and importing countries. The conference will seek an international understanding
which will provide a basis for trade that will avoid undue disruption of established
industries."
7. The President pledged that "an application by the textile industry for action under existing
statutes, such as the escape clause or the national security provision of the Trade
Agreements Extension Act, will be carefully considered on its merits." (White House
Press Release 1961 in John F.Kennedy Public Papers, 1961, pp.345-46)
Most of these proposals had been subjects of discussion between textile industry groups
and government officials for many months or years. The call for an international conference
seeking some "understanding" that would "avoid undue disruption," was a euphemism for
international action towards some kind of multilateral quota arrangement, long the center of
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industry demands. The appeals for escape clause and "national security" tariff relief for injured
industry had been pursued, with little success, on several tries in the latter half of the 1950s.
Most of the side payment provisions also reflected past trade policy demands by textile
groups. The end to the two-price cotton system had been on the industry's agenda for years,
including its appeals to the Pastore Committee hearings in 1958 and 1961. The calls to set up a
Commerce research and development study, Small Business Association loans and to lower
depreciation allowances had also had their precedents in earlier industry discussions, but with
significantly less interest (Brandis 1982). The exception was the proposal to provide injured
groups "assistance from the Federal Government," which was a reference to the adjustment
assistance provisions Kennedy had long championed and apparently intended to supply either
separate or as part of his impending trade liberalization legislation. Only the textile labor unions
had made murmurings in support of such a program, though in the 1961 Pastore Committee
hearings some other groups explicitly singled out such assistance as insufficient. Six out of seven
provisions, therefore, addressed the core demands sought by industry representatives.
Kennedy took immediate action on many of the provisions. Most important to industry,
he dispatched Ball to gather domestic industry and political participants, together with policy
representatives from major textile importers and exporters, to negotiate some arrangement.
Convening a 17-nation conference scheduled to be held on June 17th under GATT auspices, Ball's
goal was to get "developed countries of Western Europe to relax their restrictions on textile imports
from such 'low-wage' areas as Japan, Hong Kong, India and Pakistan, and...to get these latter
areas to adopt voluntary export quotas" (CQ Almanac 1962, p.287). These negotiations were to
focus only on textiles and apparel made of cotton -- thus excluding wool and man-made fibers
(Hunsberger 1971, p.328; CQ Almanac, p.287).
Due to the many unfulfilled pronfises of relief that the industry had received from
Eisenhower and previous presidents, the initial industry response to Kennedy's seven-point
program ranged from skeptical indifference to disdain. On May 15th, ten organizations
representing the textile industry filed a petition with the then Office of Civil and Defense
Mobilization under Section 8 of the Trade Agreements Act, arguing that textile imports represented
a "national security threat" and that they ought to be restrictc:d as a consequence. 6°
Most other industry action was more explicitly hostile, threatening to oppose any
forthcoming free trade legislation. Industry groups and their politicians were particularly displeased
at Ball's restricted focus on cotton and apparel and his apparent unwillingness to pursue mandatory
quotas (CQ Almanac 1993, p.287; Zeiler 1993, p.83; Aggarwal and Haggard 1983, p.282). The
60 This petition was consistent with the seventh point of Kennedy's plan, but was not submitted with any reference
or thanks to Kennedy. The OCDM, later the Office of Emergency Planning, never granted the relief (CQ Almanac
1962, p.287).
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National Association of Wool Manufacturers (NAWM) and the ACMI called the program
"completely unsatisfactory and unacceptable" (Brandis 1982, pp.20-21). Around June 22nd,
Senator Pastore said of Ball's progress that the alternative to satisfactory quotas was certain defeat
of a trade bill in 1962 by concerted efforts of the textile bloc (Zeiler 1993, p.80). Led by
Rep.Vinson, moreover, 125 House Reps and 36 Senators sent a letter to the President on June 23,
1961 calling Ball's effort "piecemeal and entirely inadequate...which can succeed only in
embarrassing the Administration in its program relating to trade" (CQ Almanac 1962, p.287). The
legislators' threat to legislation, still not yet announced by Kennedy, was ominous.
The situation improved somewhat on July 26th, when the conferees at Ball's multi-lateral
conference agreed to the terms of a provisional agreement restricting textile imports. The short-
term arrangement (STA), as it was to be called, said that any nation suffering "disruption of its
domestic market" due to imports "could ask exporting countries to cut back their shipments to the
level maintained during the year that ended June 30" (CQ Almanac, p.287; Aggarwal 1984).61 In
response to the agreement, Vinson and Dorn wrote a letter on July 27th saying they were
impressed at what the agreement suggested might be possible. But they weren't impressed
enough, seeing the STA merely as merely a "first step," wanting JFK to end the two-price cotton
system, to reduce quotas, and to limit other fibers (Zeiler 1993, p.82).
The key breakthrough came several months later, with announcement of the 5-year "long-
term agreement" (LTA) on February 9, 1962. Like the short-term agreement, it allowed any
importing nation threatened with market disruption in cotton textiles to impose an import freeze for
up to two years at the level of the first 12 of 15 months of the year preceding the freeze. After that,
countries could limit expansion of imports to 5 percent per year (CQ Almanac 1962). If exporters
failed to comply with the plan, the agreement allowed the importing country to unilaterally impose
the rates until GATT-arbitrated negotiations settle differences. 62 The LTA multilateral quotas were
confined to cotton textile products, but the President wrote a letter to Congressman Vinson on
February 26, 1962, saying he had requested that the LTA program be extended to wool, man-made
fiber, and silk divisions of the industry (Aggarwal and Haggard 1983, p.283), and later (on the
day TEA passed the Senate) promised extension to representatives of those industry segments. 63
61 If exporters refused to abide by such a request, the importing country could refuse to accept more than the
specified amount of textiles (CQ Almanac, p.287). The agreement was to last a year, beginning October 1, 1961,
and established a committee to negotiate a long-term solution within that time. In the mean-time, it also encouraged
Europeans to significantly increase access to their textile markets to take up "their share" of Third World exports,
implying continued restriction for the US.
62 This clause leads some observers to call the LTA a multinational agreement allowing "unilateral" quota-setci.g,
as opposed to multilaterally-agreed quotas (or VERs). The agreement also called for European countries to more
rapidly expand their share of imports from major exporters, a provision grudgingly accepted by German, Dutch and
other major textile-producers. This expanded European access was necessary to appease Japan and Hong Kong in
order to get those exporters to agree to keep textile imports into the US at no more than about 6 percent of US
consumption by the end of the five-year life of the agreement (CQ Almanac, p.288).
63 As the Congressional Quarterly Almanac summarizes, the LTA was negotiated under Section 204 of the
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Within weeks of announcing the LTA, the Kennedy Administration could claim to have
either fulfilled or made substantial progress towards fulfilling the other six points in his May 1961
seven-point plan -- including the side payment provisions. Kennedy gave the one other
protectionist provision by approving Tariff Commission's positive ruling for escape clause tariff
increases for Wilton and Velvet tapestries and carpets in late March. And he provided virtually all
the side payment promises in the Plan. Even before announcement of the LTA, the Textile and
Clothing Division of the Commerce Department had expanded its research program (Aggarwal and
Haggard 1983, p.282). The Treasury Department, moreover, had reduced by about 40 percent the
depreciation period for machinery and equipment used by spinning and weaving mills on October
1 Ith (White House Press Release 1961, NYT January 16, 1962). This depreciation allowance
was extended to apparel producers on January 15, 1962, and to hosiery and knitwear industries on
February 15, 1962 -- meaning that all segments of apparel and textiles were given the tax relief
(NYT January 16th and February 16th 1962). Third, Kennedy approved more than $6 million in
Small Business Administration loans for textile industry modernization (Zeiler 1993, fn32, p.287).
Fourth, the Kennedy Administration had included adjustment assistance in with his Trade
Expansion Act, satisfying point five (to provide "federal assistance").
Finally, Kennedy had gotten the ball rolling on his proposal to end the two-price cotton
system. On November 1961, Kennedy's Agriculture Department asked the Tariff Commission to
study an "equalization fee" subsidy to textile cloth producers that would compensate for the 8.50
differential between the world market price for raw cotton and the US domestic price.64 This
proposal foundered between the Scylla of foreign countries angry at a new regulation that further
hurt their textile competitiveness and the Charybdis of domestic raw cotton producers clamoring
for continued subsidies. But the textile industry "deemed the fee crucial to textile votes for the
TEA" (Zeiler 1983, p.84, and fn 26). The Tariff Commission ultimately denied the
Administration's request on September 6th, after the House had passed TEA but before the Senate
vote. Immediately afterwards, Kenrnedy issued a statement expressing displeasure and promising
some solution via the Agriculture Department (CQ Almanac 1962, p2 8 8 ).65 Thus, by the time the
House Ways and Means convened its March hearings to consider Kennedy's Trade Expansion
Act, Kennedy had acted-on or enacted all seven points of his assistance plan for textiles.
Agriculture Act of 1956, which authorizes the president to negotiate agreements to regulate trade where "agricultural
commodities or products, or textiles or textile products" are involved. The Administration sought and received
Congressional approval of a 1962 bill strengthening that power (CQ Almanac 1962, p.288).
64 The request was made under the authority of Section 22 of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937.
65 This solution awaited until 1964 legislation creating a subsidy to the textile industry (Curtis and Vastine 1970).
121
Burgoon
Chapter Two
2.2.4. The Political Efficacy of Kennedy's Seven Points
There is little question that the seven-point package in the aggregate significantly defused
textile opposition to the TEA -- only of which elements of that package mattered. Soon after
announcement of the LTA, most textile industry groups and their congressmen finally came around
to not only moderate opposition, but to explicitly support the Kennedy's Trade Expansion Act.
The textile blocs in the House and Senate were the first to express their thanks. Senator Pastore
phoned the President to express his appreciation on February 9th, the same day that the LTA was
announced (Zeiler 1993, p.8 6 and fn.34). More dramatically, Representative Vinson called the
LTA "a great achievement" (NYT Feb. 16, 1962). Having sponsored two textile bloc letters urging
more action earlier in the year, Vinson organized some 75 members of the House and Senate textile
blocs to sign a letter thanking the president for the LTA and other assistance but insisting that he
extend the benefits of the measures to wool and man-made fibers (NYT Feb. 16, 1962, p. 1; CQ
Almanac 1962, p.287). 66 More than this, Vinson also went to bat on behalf of the President's
TEA, both in rallying industry support and in heeding Luther Hodges's request that he "keep the
House textile bloc 'in line' for the upcoming vote on the TEA (Zeiler 1993, p.86, fn.34.).
The most important of the textile industry associations either explicitly supported the TEA
or swallowed their misgivings and opposition. The National Cotton Council wrote a letter on April
9th to House Ways and Means chairman Wilbur Mills, announcing its support for the TEA and
citing the "exceptional treatment" Kennedy gave the industry as the reason (letter cited in Zeiler
1993, p.86). But the most remarkable industry support came from the textile industry's largest
and most powerful association, the American Cotton Manufacturers Institute (ACMI) soon before
they were to appear before the House Ways and Means hearings for the TEA. By the time of their
annual meeting held at the end of March, the ACMI leadership was split over whether to support
the President's actions and his TEA. 67 Knowing of the industry's reluctance to back TEA,
Representative Vinson wrote a letter to Robert Stevens, head of one of the largest textile concerns
in ACMI. The letter, read-aloud at the annual meeting, lauded the President's actions for "singling
out this industry for special and unique consideration by the President of the United States and his
Cabinet" (Letter from Vinson to Stevens, cited in Brandis 1982, p.25; different portions of the
letter also cited in Zeiler 1993, p.8 6 ).68
66 The New York Times announcement of the letter says that "by the time the letter is dispatched...it will have 150
signatures" (NYT Feb.16, 1962). The CQ Almanac, however, claims that 75 textile bloc members signed it.67 A subcommittee commended the president, while emphasizing that the LTA ought to be extended to other
fabrics, but a number of ACMI Board of Directors evidently believed government was giving insufficient attention to
the problems of imports.
68 Myer Feldman, deputy special counsel to the President, and Assistant Commerce Secretary Hickman Price Jr.
also addressed the convention to enlist ACMI's support, but they denied that the President's program was a ploy to
buy votes for TEA (NYT March 30, 1962, p.45).
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With this nudging, the ACMI came around. They adopted a resolution endorsing the
Administration's textile program and the TEA. After expressing gratitude for the LTA on cotton
textiles and apparel and expressing the expectation and hope that the LTA and other provisions be
extended to wool and man-made fibers, the Policy Resolution states:
We desire to assist the Administration and the Congress to obtain a trade expansion act
which will encourage and stimulate international trade....We believe that the authority to
deal with foreign nations proposed by the President will be wisely exercised and should be
granted by Congress. (NYT March 31, p.5; also quoted in Brandis 1982, p.27)
The ACMI, upon releasing this letter of support, was supposed to attend House Ways and Means
hearings to reinforce their position. They decided to opt out of appearing, however, claiming an
insufficient time to prepare their statement. With their support for TEA being such a radical
departure from their previous political activity, sitting out of the hearings was still a powerful
expression of the President's political victory.
Only a few textile groups and representatives even gave testimony to the House Ways and
Means and Senate Finance Committees. Principal among these were representatives of the Man-
made Fiber Producers Association, the American Silk Council, Soft Fiber Manufacturers Institute,
and Rayon Stable Fiber Producers Association, all of whom said less about the TEA's problems
than about how the President's administered assistance didn't help man-made fibers enough
(Eugene Stewart of MMFPA, p. 3333; Milton H. Rubin, p.3 1 52, Robert D.Larsen to Ways and
Means Hearings, p.2678; John S.Bartlett, p.2806). 69 The only union representative to appear was
George Baldanzi, president of the Textile Workers of America, who supported the TEA but urged
loosening escape clause eligibility and strengthening of peril point procedures. With the ACMI
supportive in absentia, and other groups silent, the hearings ended without much of the vitriol
characteristic of earlier encounters.
The most vocal controversy over the textile compensation, in fact, came not from industry
representatives opposing TEA but from those critical of the special treatment given to textiles.
Complaints that Kennedy was selling out his free trade ideas began as early as November when he
took action to end the two-price cotton system. After the Administration redoubled its effort to end
the system, Jerome M.Pitofsky, president of the American Association of Apparel and Textile
Importers gave testimony in support of TEA in which he asked "what sort of back-room political
deal was necessary to accomplish the miracle of the textile industry's support for President
Kennedy's trade bill" (NYT April 4, 1962, p. 14)?70 And one Democratic Senator said that the
69 James Cassidy, counsel for the Textile Aniline Co., a man-made textile producer, opposed the agreement and also
expressed regrets that the LTA was not yet extended to his segment of the industry.
70 House Representative Thomas B. Curtis (R-Mo.), a member of the Ways and Means Committee, was even more
blunt, calling the package of assistance for the industry a "raw political deal," grossly inconsistent with Kennedy's
liberal bill (CQ Almanac 1962). Curtis also made fun of the man-made and silk fiber textile groups who offered less
supportive testimony on TEA, since the President had been more generous with his pork to other groups.
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textile industry "in a very genteel fashion has held a pistol to the head of the President" to extract
some special treatment in exchange for support of TEA (Zeiler 1993, p.87 ).71
The final voting in the House and Senate further testify to the political efficacy of the seven-
point compensation. In the House, the final approval vote was 298-125 on June 27th, after
defeating, by 171-253, a motion to recommit by Noah Mason. The final vote in the Senate was
78-8, passed after the defeat of several amendments scaling back on various aspects of the
president's negotiating authority. The closest of these was an amendment by Prescott Bush (R-
Conn.) to restore the "peril point" provisions, an amendment defeated 38-40 (CQ Almanac 1962,
p.282). Most of the opposition in both houses were Republicans, motivated as much by traditional
Republican protectionism or by a desire to embarrass Kennedy as by industry concerns (Zeiler
1993). Of the 213 House Representatives from the top-sixteen textile states, measured in terms of
employment, 158 voted for the final bill and 77 against the motion to recommit (CQ Almanac
1962, pp.618-19, 645-55; and Zeiler 1993, pp.87-88). In the Senate, of the 32 Senators
representing the same sixteen states, 28 voted for final TEA approval and a majority against the
Bush amendment (CQ Almanac 1962, pp.687-88; Zeiler 1993, p.88). The southern support was
strong in these votes: 19 of 20 in the Senate and 82 of 105 in the House (Zeiler 1993, p.88). Of
these supporters, a great many were the stalwarts of the textile bloc, including Representative
Vinson and Dorn, both whom also fought to rally southern textile votes. And in the Senate,
Pastore was a major rallier of votes (CQ Almanac 1962, passim).
These statements and actions by industry groups and their legislative representatives, the
pattern of appearances at legislative hearings, and the voting patterns of textile-state legislators all
support the conclusion that the seven-point buy-off package was effective in lowering a great deal
of industry and some legislative opposition. In the absence of the compensation package, many of
those supportive of or silent about the TEA would almost certainly have actively opposed its
passage. That opposition, in turn, probably would have won the imposition of constraints on the
tariff-cutting authority the president requested, and may have scuttled the agreement altogether.
The five elements of side payment compensation in that seven-point package, however,
were clearly not the buy-offs that lowered the opposition of ACMI and other groups. Instead, the
groups all held out their support or moderated opposition until not only the proposed negotiation,
but the actual agreement, to erect voluntary quotas on several product categories. This strongly
suggests that the compensation as such did little to defuse opposition. The case raises the counter-
factual question of whether the side payment elements of the buy-off package would have been
successful had they been proposed before any promise to negotiate quotas -- rather than combining
71 In the face of this outcry against the compensation, Kennedy assured nervous Senators getting ready to vote on
TEA that he would stand by all provisions of his seven-point program. Zeiler points out that "Kennedy met with
eleven senators led by Pastore, who had the support of Senator Harry Byrd, chairman of the Finance Committee, and
reaffirmed his intention to limit textile imports" (Zeiler 1993, p.87).
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the less seductive, if functional, gifties along with the grand, coveted present. Perhaps this would
have bought some limited support or at least muted some opposition, rather than immediately
attract all attention to the protectionist promise. Without knowing the answer to this question, it's
clear that the short-term political effectiveness of the side payments were at best limited.
2.3. Lumber's Six-point Side Payment
The softwood lumber industry was the other industry group to receive a side-payment
package. The industry was substantially smaller in employment, profits, sales, and political clout
than textiles, but was somehow able to win compensatory assistance from the Kennedy
Administration. Where the textile industry got a seven-point compensation package, the lumber
industry was offered a six-point one that promised substantial assistance to workers and firms in
the industry -- most importantly a promise to pressure Canada to restrict its lumber exports to the
US. In the end, the compensation provided to lumber groups was less substantial than that offered
textiles, but other trade-impacted industries received nothing. So the main puzzle of the
compensation remains: how could such a small, seemingly unimportant industry to receive a
compensation package while other protectionist groups of equal or greater size received less? 72
2.3.1 Lumber's Well-timed Demands for Protection
The US softwood lumber industry was centered in the Pacific Northwest, including
Northern California, Washington State, Oregon, Montana, and Idaho. The producers made
common cause, however, with major lumber producing states focusing on pine and hardwood
production, mainly in the South. Altogether, logging and lumber producers employed more than
73,000 people (See Table 2.4). Table 2.9 lists the states whose lumber industry is among their top
five employers. The Southern states in that list include Alabama (5), Georgia (5), South Dakota
(5), Mississippi (2), and South Carolina (4).
Beginning in 1960, lumber producers in the Pacific Northwest faced growing and intense
competition from Canadian lumber producers in British Columbia. Over the course of ten years, a
burst of Canadian softwood exports increased Canada's share of the US's Atlantic market to 57
percent, from 15 percent a year earlier. With the US share of that same market moving from
roughly 50 to 20 percent, this increase in B.C. imports obviously came at the direct expense of the
West Coast lumber manufacturers (Zeiler 1992). This marked increase in imports reflected several
competitive advantages that British Columbia producers enjoyed over their US counterparts.73
72 The brief history that follows draws heavily from two sources: Zeiler 1992 and the CQ Almanac 1962.
73 Zeiler 1992 lists several major advantages, many of which had political foundations. First, Canada devaluated
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Table 2.8
States Where Lumber Manufacturers are Among Top Five Industrial Employers and
Voting by Senators and House Reps. on Major Trade Bills, 1951-62
Arkansas
STATE/INDUSTRY
Total Industry
20 Food & Kindred Products
22 Textile Mill Products
23 Apparel and Related Products
24 Lumber and Wood Products
25 Furniture and Fixtures
36 Electrical Machinery
Emplyt
113,658
17,878
2,248
10,610
21,198
8,348
7,619
Total Rank
16%
2%
9%
19%
7%
7%
IDAHO
STATE/INDUSTRY
Total Industry
2 20 Food & Kindred Products
24 Lumber and Wood Prods
3 2411 Log Camps/Cntrctrs.
1 242 Sawmills/planing mills
4 243 Millwork/Related Prods
5 27 Printing and Publishing
28 Chemicals/Allied Prods
33 Primary Metal Industries
Emplyt Total Rank
30,487
9,881 32% 2
10,288 34% 1
2,374 8%
7,207 24%
463 2%
1,360 4% 4
3,232 11% 3
1,179 4% 5
MAINE
STATE/INDUSTRY
Total Industry
20 Food & Kindred Products
21 Tobacco Manufacturers
22 Textile Mill Products
2221 Weaving Mills, synthetics
2231 Wving/Fnshng.Mills, wool
24 Lumber and Wood Products
2411 Log Camps and Cntrctrs.
26 Paper and Allied Products
31 Leather and Leather Products
OREGON
STATE/INDUSTRY
Total Industry
20 Food & Kindred Products
22 Textile Mill Products
2211 Weaving Mills, cotton
2221 Weaving Mills, synthetics
2231 Wving/Fnshng. Mills, wool
24Lumber/WoodProds
2411 Log Camps and Cntrctrs.
26 Paper and Allied Products
35 Machinery, except Electrical
Emplyt
99,926
11,657
12,295
451
5,213
11,854
4,120
16,537
24,699
Emplymt
145,164
19,938
2,277
69,975
12,261
6,781
5,575
Total Rank
12%
12%
0%
5%
12%
4%
17%
25%
Total Rank
14%
2%
48%
8%
5%
4%
MONTANA
STATE/INDUSTRY
Total Industry
5 20 Food & Kindred Products
24 Lumber and Wood Prods
3 2411 Log Camps/Cntrctrs.
242 Sawmills/planing mills
243 Millwork,Related Prods
4 27 Printing and Publishing
32 Stone, Clay, Glass Prods
33 Primary Metal Industries
WASHINGTON
STATE/INDUSTRY
Total Industry
2 20 Food & Kindred Products
24 Lumber/Wood Products
2411 Log Camps/Cntrctrs.
26 Paper and Allied Products
28 Chemicals/Allied Prods
1 37 Transportation Equip.
its currency to correct its payments deficit with the US, making Canadian exports more price-competitive and US
imports less so. Second, Canadian producers enjoyed lower wages and operating costs and more liberal access to
Canadian national forests. Third, nominal US tariffs on lumber were very low compared with other countries,
including Canada. Fourth, a US transportation law, the Jones Act, required goods bound for domestic US markets to
be shipped in US vessels. This was a problem for US producers, because US shipping rates were more expensive
than other fleets and because US shipping to places like Puerto Rico and Hawaii was less frequent and reliable than
other carriers. US lumbermen "paid...$36 per thousand board feet, while B.C. sent its lumber to the East Coast in
world charter bottoms at $6 to $11 below that price" (Zeiler 1992).
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20,247
4,048
8,297
1,565
5,437
1,213
1,517
858
3,261
Emplymt
224,375
26,704
42,440
9,111
17,985
10,908
72,402
Total Rank
20%
41%
8%
27%
6%
7%
16%
%
Total Rnk
12%
19%
4%
8%
5%
32%
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36 Electrical Machinery 5,759 4% 4
Source: CQ Almanac, various.
Along with more domestic problems besetting the lumber industry, such as the leveling-off
of US housing starts by 1961, this massive increase in import pressure caused substantial hardship
for the US softwood lumber industry. Production fell off by 16 percent between 1959 and 1961.
Zeiler points out that this was particularly serious for Oregon and Washington, "where the forest
industry accounted for 60 percent and 40 percent, respectively, of the manufacturing payroll.
Industry employment had dropped 44 percent between 1947 and 1961, making many counties in
lumber states eligible for federal Area Redevelopment assistance" (Zeiler 1992).
Industry representatives 'nd their legislative allies responded to this hardship by demanding
various forms of regulatory reform and protectionism in 1961 and early 1962. The National
Lumber Manufacturers Association (NLMA), lobbyists from softwood lumber areas, seven US
senators, and fourteen congressmen -- together composing fifty industry representatives --
requested that Secretary of Agriculture Freeman target timber sales at "fair stumpage prices and
permit additional access roads into, and more efficient use of the national forests" (Zeiler 1992).
Nine Senators also wrote Freeman a separate letter requesting a USDA investigation of lumber
conditions, among other things asking for a revision of the Jones Act. Parallel this request, a
congressional hearing in April considered lumber conditions and also requested Jones Act revision.
And the NLMA and the West Coast Lumberman's Association (WCLA) agreed that Section 22 of
the Agricultural Assistance Act be modified to allow forest products to be eligible for import limits.
They also agreed that tariffs on softwood lumber be removed until imports reached 10 percent of
domestic consumption, at which time the importer was to impose a 10 percent duty; since imports
were well above that proportion this was a thinly-veiled request for tariff relief. Many of these
demands inspired legislation independent of the TEA, but all were defeated. 74
Many of these groups explicitly threatened to oppose Kennedy's Trade Expansion Act, first
in the House. At the House Ways and Means Hearings, several lumber representatives, most
vocally Mortimer Doyle of the NLMA, opposed the President's bill. They focused especially on
how TEA killed the escape clause and maimed peril-points, on how it might abolish the minimal
tariff on lumber imports that remained after previous cutting, and on the inadequacy of the
74 As Zeiler notes, "In spring and early summer of 1962, Congresswoman Julia B. Hansen (D-Wash.) introduced the
Section 22 amendment, House members Walt Horan and Thomas M.Pelly (R-Wash.) the 10 percent plan, and
Hansen and Congressman Clem Miller (D-Calif.) a provision requiring a country-of-origin label on all wood product
imports." Senator Mundt (R-S.D.) also sought to protect the lumber industry by hitching a ride on textile industry's
legislation that said countries unwilling to adhere to multi-lateral accords on textile voluntary export restraints would
be subject to unilateral quotas. Mundt sought a clause in the law that would call for the same treatment for the
lumber industry. All these were ultimately defeated.
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adjustment assistance provisions (Ways and Means Hearings, p.2091-2096). Hearings testimony
from industry groups was only the beginning, however. Zeiler points out that Senator Morse of
Oregon "cringed at a handbill circulating around mills in his home state of Oregon that asked
foreign workers to apply to him for jobs lost by Americans if the TEA passed" and asked for a
"conscionable compromise" in response to the import problem. And on June 12, 1962, two weeks
before the House was scheduled to vote on TEA passage, forty-three congressmen from the west
and south wrote Kennedy a "lumber letter," calling for federal aid and import quotas -- a mixture of
protectionist redress and potential subjects of side payment linkage.
In response to this outcry, the Kennedy Administration initially did nothing, with no major
harm to the House TEA vote. The two congressmen representing Montana, five of the seven
representatives from Washington, and several reps from Southern lumber states voted against the
TEA or in favor of Mason's motion for re-committal. Most other lumber legislators, however,
supported the TEA. Entering the congressional thicket, therefore, Kennedy apparently counted his
votes and chose to ignore rather than compensate (CQ Almanac 1962).
Kennedy's approaching Senate fight, however, faced an even more threatening lumber
bloc. That bloc included some influential Democrats, such as Senate Whip Mike Mansfield of
Montana and Warren Magnuson (D-Wash.), who was the chair of the Senate lumber hearings.
The latter had criticized the President and his Trade Expansion bill for not providing import quotas
(Zeiler 1992). The most vocal, however, was Wayne Morse (D-Oreg.) who advocated
protectionism for the lumber industry and threatened to oppose TEA if that was not provided. He
couched this threat by explicitly appealing to a sense of justice given the compensation to textiles:
"I cannot vote for the President's foreign trade bill..." unless "we get comparable justice for
lumber as was given the textile industry" (quoted in Zeiler 1992, p.95). Aside from these
Northwest portions of the bloc, Kennedy could also anticipate some Southern support for the
lumber industry, despite the compensation provided to textiles (CQ Almanac 1962).
2.3.2 Kennedy's Six-point Lumber Compensation
On July 26, 1962, at the beginning of Senate Foreign Relations Hearings on the TEA,
Kennedy issued a six-point program of assistance for lumber. As the Congressional Almanac
notes, the plan called for:
1. Negotiations with Canada concerning the amount of softwood lumber imported into
the United States.
2. Requesting Congress for $10 million in additional funds for building roads and trails
in national forests, the source of much of the lumber for Northwest mills.
3. Seeking amendment of the Jones Act.... [by permitting] use of foreign vessels "when
those conditions exist which indicate severe hardships to American shippers."
4. Immediate increase of 150 million board feet on federal land ... for cutting.
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5. Establishment of "preference" for American lumber in purchases by the Defense
Department, General Services Administration and other Government agencies.
6. Increased attention to applications for loans filed with the Small Business
Administration and the Area Redevelopment Administration by lumber mills. (CQ Almanac
1962, p.290)75
All of these provisions had been requested by industry representatives in letters and hearings in
Congress. As with the textile agreement, however, the negotiations with Canada on the possibility
of protectionist redress via voluntary import restrictions was the most complicated to implement.
By the time the Senate voted on the TEA in September, nothing had been accomplished
with the projectionist quota negotiations. The Kennedy Administration opened consultations oil
August 27, 1962, and industry groups had made clear that their goal was for some kind of
voluntary restrictions (Zeiler 1992). The Canadian government, however, was adamantly
unwilling to accept such restrictions, pointing to the many reasons why Canadian lumbermen were
more competitive and to the balance of trade between US and Canada, and pointing out that they
had never adopted a VER (Zeiler 1992, p.97). Although the negotiations continued in after the
Senate vote, this element of Kennedy's six point plan was the one point never implemented.
Five of the six-points of Kennedy's plan, however, did get implemented, and they
represented side-payments to the industry. The renewed access and improved roads leading to
federal lands, the SBA and Area Redevelopment Assistance loans, the promised revision of the
Jones Act, and preference for US lumber in government purchases all were clearly distinct from
the tariffs to be cut under TEA authority. And in the corpus of struggle over the TEA, all were
mainly provided to appease protectionist opposition.
2.3.3 The Modest Political Effectiveness of Lumber Compensation
Even though the negotiations with Canada bore no fruit for IOS lumber interests, a number
of industry groups and their legislative representatives expressed gratitude for Kennedy's six-point
efforts. In the Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, the NLMA and other testifying industry
representatives made clear that they wanted more protections, such as a strengthened escape clause
and, more ambitiously, unilateral quotas, but all explicitly thanked the President when his six-point
program was brought to their attention. Representative Hansen, commenting on the program even
though it came too late to influence the House vote, "lauded the administration's tireless efforts on
behalf of the industry," declaring that "Kennedy had taken every possible action under the RTA by
urging a Tariff Commission investigation and naming a negotiating team to Ottowa" (Zeiler 1992,
p.96 and fn.58). The only group vocally hostile to the six-point program was the free-trade group
75 Zeiler also notes that the President's program called for revision of the depreciation schedule on lumber equipment
so that lumber manufacturers could modernize more frequently without being penalized at tax time.
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Committee for a National Trade Policy. Seeing the program as some free traders saw the textile
compensation, CNTP director John W.Hight called the program "wholly inconsistent with the new
trade policy initiated by the President" (CQ Almanac 1962).
The votes in the Senate also modestly support for the view that the compensation was
politically effective. The Senators whose lumber manufacturing represented a top five employer in
their states provided overwhelming support for TEA. All the most vocal Senators representing the
core of the lumber bloc -- all Democrats from Washington, Oregon, Montana, Idaho, and Thomas
Kuchel (R) of California -- unanimously supported TEA passage and all but Kuchel voted against
the Bush amendment to restore peril point provisions (Zeiler 1992, p.98). All of these votes in
support of free trade, however, were consistent with the previous liberal voting records of the
Senators. That all of this support was consistent with the Senators' free-trade voting in previous
legislation suggests that the timber Senators may have backed TEA without Kennedy's six-point
compensation, whereas the textile state votes supportive of the TEA were a departure from
previous protectionism. The informal alliance formed between the softwood lumber groups in the
Pacific Northwest and the lumber producers in the South, however, suggest that the lumber
compensation might have made a difference in the widespread support of many Southern Senators,
in contrast to their previous protectionism.
2.4. Labor and Fair Trade: Trade Adjustment Assistance Compensation
The third compensation package to be provided during the fight for TEA was in many
respects the most ambitious. The package mandated federal assistance to both workers and firms
injured by trade, regardless of the manufacturing or agricultural sector to which they belonged, and
took the form of supplements to unemployment insurance, relocation and retraining financing for
workers, and guaranteed loans, tax breaks and technical assistance for firms. This adjustment
assistance represents a side payment because the provisions were designed to assist groups
expected to suffer from TEA and were separate from the protectionism being liberalized. But it
differs from the industry side payment packages. First, the compensation for both the lumber and
textile industries assisted narrowly-targeted sectoral groups, while the adjustment provisions
promised assistance to workers and firms dislocated by trade regardless of sector. Second, the
textile and lumber compensation represented assistance that gave little or no incentive for the
groups to adjust out of non-competitive market activity. Adjustment assistance, on the other hand,
was designed to help dislocated groups adjust to more competitive market conditions without
erecting barriers to the flow of goods across borders. What explains the provision of such broad-
based, ambitious side payment compensation?
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2.4.1. Growing Labor, Industry, and Government Support for Fair Trade
As early as the mid-1940s, major policymakers were discussing the idea of the federal
government providing financial, tax, and training assistance to workers and firms hurt by trade
competition as an alternative to tariffs or other protections. 76 In 1950, Clair Wilcox, a prominent
economist, wrote an article offering qualified support for federal adjustment assistance (Wilcox
1950). And the Bell Report of 1953 suggested several devices to help groups hurt by increased
imports from lower tariffs (Frank 1977, p.3). Across the Atlantic, moreover, adjustment
assistance was being put into practice by 1952 with the passage of the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC). The ECSC created loans, cash disbursements and training assistance for
workers and firms dislocated by the Community's rationalization of steel and coal production.77
Only in late 1953 and 1954, however, did US policymakers give adjustment assistance
high-profile attention, during deliberations of the Randall Commission on US International Trade.
Mandated by Congress in 1953 as a condition for RTA renewal, the Commission was to review all
aspects and goals of US trade policy in time for the next congressional review of RTA authority in
1954.78 During the hearings, several labor and business people gave testimony in which they
proposed adjustment assistance. The supporters included John Coleman of the Committee for a
National Trade Policy (CNTP), set up in 1953 by a consortium of mainly international
corporations to lobby for expanded trade; Stanley Ruttenberg for the CIO, then still separate from
the AFL (U.S. Commission 1954; CQ 1954); and Meyer Kestnbaum of the Committee for
Economic Development.
Most prominently, David McDonald, president of the US Steelworkers and a member of
the Commission, submitted a formal proposal calling for extended unemployment compensation
and retraining and relocation benefits for workers. The proposal was worked out by Elmer Roper
of the Steelworkers and by William Batt Jr., a member of the Commission Staff and an assistant to
the secretary of labor specializing in community efforts to redress dislocation (BPD 1963, pp.42-
3). McDonald's adjustment assistance proposals provoked more controversy than any other issue
in the Commission's deliberations. Led by the protests of Sen. Prescott Bush (R- Conn.), and
Reps. Richard Simpson (R- Pa.) and Daniel Reed (R- N.Y.), the proposals were nearly
unanimously rejected, by a vote of 16-to-1. But Randall "ordered the paper published and
76 I.M. Destler mentions that the idea was originally suggested in a Council on Foreign Relations planning paper
prepared during World War II, and Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Economic Cooperation Administrator
Hoffman promoted the idea in the last few years of the decade. Destler doesn't say, however, who wrote the planning
pTaper or what other discussions took place over it within the Council. See Destler 1984, p.21.
Chapter Six discusses the politics of this assistance in detail.
78 To head the Commission President Eisenhower appointed Clarence Randall, a prominent free-trade businessman,
and then chose a Commission membership that inclded labor and business leaders, and leading protectionist and
free-trader Senators and Congressmen (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963).
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personally wrote an explanation of why he thought the 'admirably prepared' proposal merited
attention" (BPD 1963, p.43). The press attention given to the Commission, both critical and
laudatory, gave adjustment assistance proposals much wider play to the US audience.
The McDonald proposal became the template or inspiration for a stream of legislative
initiatives in both the House and the Senate for the rest of the decade. Several congressmen and
senators submitted adjustment assistance bills separate from the three RTA renewals in '54, '55,
and '58. In the 1954 session of Congress, for instance, several members of the House and Senate
-- called the Kennedy-Williams-Humphrey-Eberharter proposals -- introduced matching adjustment
assistance bills, cribbed from McDonald's Randall Commission proposal (CQ '54). Kennedy and
Eberharter, sometimes working with other legislators like Senator Paul Douglas and Congressman
Baker,79 sought similar bills almost every year thereafter (1955 (S 751), 1957, and 1958).
Legislators also tried to create or set up commissions to study adjustment assistance through
amendments to the 1955 and 1958 renewals of RTA negotiating authority.80 All these early bills or
amendments were killed: The Kennedy et.al. proposals never got out of committee, and the RTA
amendments were either killed on the floor or in House-Senate conference.
These proposals found their impetus partially in the autonomous actions of legislators
working independently from societal groups, but they also reflected and were helped-along by
support from a variety of consumer, farmer, business and labor groups. Arnold M.Soloway,
speaking for the citizen-action group Americans for Democratic Action, endorsed a trade
adjustment plan sponsored by Rep.Herman P.Eberharter (D-Pa.) in 1958 "as a substitute for the
escape clause procedure and escape clause relief' (quoted in CQ '58, p. 169). Among the various
farmer organizations, the National Farmers Union was the one that most vocally supported
adjustment assistance, supporting the 1955 Senate bill (S 751) creating such assistance for trade
victims (CQ '55, p.295). A more vocal and consistent supporter of adjustment assistance was the
internationalist business consortium lobbying for free trade, the Committee for a National Trade
Policy (CNTP). The CNTP supported the creation of federal adjustment assistance ever since it
was created in 1953. Other than promoting the idea in the Randall Commission, CNTP officials
explicitly supported adjustment assistance proposals of various kinds every time hearings were
held to consider RTA renewals in 1954, 1955, and 1958 (CQ '54 p.272; CQ '58, p.175).
79 Also in 1954, representative Howard H. Baker (R-Tenn.) also proposed adjustment assistance for trade-displaced
workers, in H.R.8585.
80 Hubert H.Humphrey (D-Minn.) proposed an amendment to the 1955 RTA extension, on the floor of the Senate,
to create an adjustment program to aid communities and businesses suffering from import competition. The RTA
extension passed by the Senate in 1958 contained amendments sought by Jacob Javits (R- N.Y.), Capehart and
others that "set up a nine-member bipartisan commission ...to consider in its study possible adjustment assistance
for small businesses which may be injured by imports, and to...explore the possibility of alternative employment for
workers involved in any injured industry under escape-clause cases." (CQ '58, p.173). And Senator Humphrey won
an amendment to have the Tariff Commission, in an escape-clause case, explore the possibility of alternative
employment for workers involved in any injured industry (CQ '58, p.174).
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Organized labor, however, was to become the strongest and most insistent supporter of
adjustment assistance as the decade progressed. They started out being no more unified or
supportive of such assistance than were the farm, citizen-action, or business communities. David
McDonald of the US Steelworkers was a major popularizer of adjustment assistance in the Randall
Commission, and he was supported by more encompassing groups such as the CIO's Stanley
Ruttenberg. But for the first half of the 1950s, labor organizations were split on the issue of
adjustment assistance. Individual unions tended to take the same position on trade policy as their
employers: unions representing workers in export-oriented sectors of the economy, such as the
United Auto Workers and the Steelworkers, supported free trade with adjustment assistance;
unions for workers in import-competing sectors, such as the Textile Workers Union and the
United Mine Workers, supported protectionism along with their employers, and expressed little or
no interest in adjustment assistance.
Moreover, encompassing union organizations supported adjustment assistance, but didn't
prioritize it above other aspects of their trade policy. Continuing the CIO's support for adjustment
assistance, the AFL-CIO (established in 1955) supported it in all of biannual national conferences,
as a major plank in its foreign policy platform. But the CIO and the AFL separately and together
supported a variety of other provisions along with their basic free trade stance. The most common
of these was the improvement of wages, working conditions and labor rights to associate and
bargain collectively -- conditions and rights to be pursued through the International Labor
Organization and other trade bodies.8 ' In the 1954 and 1955 RTA renewal debates, the AFL-CIO
supported adjustment assistance and these other provisions, but did not make any of them explicit
conditions for their support of free trade. And for the first half of the 1950s, labor's support for
adjustment assistance was no louder or forceful than that provided by business-sponsored CNTP.
By 1958, however, the AFL-CIO was more insistent. Major manufacturing industries
were facing increasing foreign competition that they saw as linked to the progressive lowering of
tariffs under the GATT. This increased competition inspired some unions representing workers in
these industries to demand a shift in the AFL-CIO's free trade position. In their 1957 Convention,
the AFL-CIO stuck with its support of free trade and gave the same endorsement of adjustment
assistance, pointing out that "it is essential that an effective adjustment program be established..."
(AFL-CIO Daily Proceedings 1957, p.4 9 1). But adjustment assistance was not given explicitly
higher priority than other demands. In the 1958 RTA renewal, however, the AFL-CIO was more
strident. During the House Ways and Means Hearings on the 1958 RTA, Andrew J. Biemiller of
the AFL-CIO warned that the RTA trade program "is in real trouble" unless Congress provided
81 In the Randall Commission hearings, labor groups were actually more successful in getting the rest of the
commission to make such conditions and rights explicit preconditions for continued tariff cutting, though nothing
came of this conditionality in subsequent RTA renewals.
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necessary safeguards for business and labor injured by foreign competition (CQ '58, p. 168). This
was the first time any union organization suggested tha' its free trade stance might hinge on the
provision of federal adjustment assistance or anything else. By the time of its 1961 Convention,
with Kennedy's liberalization bill in sight, the AFL-CIO did more than suggest such linkage.
2.4.2. Incorporating Adjustment Assistance Compensation into Kennedy's TEA
Kennedy's election meant an improved climate for organized labor (the Teamsters
notwithstanding) in all areas of public policy, including trade policy. When Kennedy's
Administration began formulating its trade policy, adjustment assistance was part of the plan. The
pre-inaugural Task Force on Foreign Trade headed by George Ball included adjustment assistance
provisions in its recommendations. These provisions were a copy of the defeated legislative bills
Kennedy had begun co-sponsoring more than eight years earlier as a junior Senator, and were
themselves patterned after the Randall Commission McDonald proposals.
Pressure from labor groups, however, encouraged Kennedy to go beyond including
adjustment assistance in his pre-inaugural ruminations, but to also write such provisions into his
legislative initiative. At the AFL-CIO's 1961 Constitutional Convention, held while Kennedy's
trade team had begun drafting the TEA bill, the AFL-CIO leadership claimed that "adequate
assistance or relief for those adversely affected by imports is essential if the American labor
movement is to continue its support for a liberal trade policy," referring to adjustment assistance
among other provisions (AFL-CIO Daily Proceedings 1961, p.259). More importantly, the
Congressional Quarterly reported that "labor leaders informed the Administration that protectionists
in some constituent unions was so strong that [the inclusion of adjustment assistance] was the only
way that labor's top leaders could throw their weight behind a liberal trade bill" (CQ Almanac
1962, p. 264). Given such explicit demands, Kennedy must have considered that including
adjustment assistance was important to buy labor's political support for his trade designs.
But the President talked about the adjustment assistance on a level "above" political
calculation, as a "revolutionary provision" in US trade policy (Sorenson 1965, p.46 1). In addition
to Kennedy's own discussions of adjustment assistance as a better way to conduct trade policy
than the "no injury" approach of the past, his Administration representatives took a moral stance in
defending adjustment assistance. Labor Secretary Arthur J.Goldberg emphasized that adjustment
assistance was necessary because "government has a special responsibility to these workers who
suffer hardships because of its own trade policy" (Almanac p.267). Commerce Secretary Luther
Hodges explicitly invoked fairness standards in defending the program: "It would be counter to
the standards of fairness and equal treatment under law, by which our Government has always
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abided, were we to make a small number of our citizens bear the full cost of a trade policy designed
for the welfare of the entire United States" (Senate Hearings S 1516-3-A, p.54). 82
2.4.2.1. Kennedy's Proposed Adjustment Assistance Provisions and Eligibility
Whether out of a concern for vote-buying or for fairness, once Kennedy decided to pursue
in 1962 the most ambitious of the trade liberalization options, he wrote trade adjustment assistance
into the bill. Patterned after the Ball Task Force recommendations, the adjustment provisions were
referred to as Trade Adjustment Assistance and provided separate relief for workers and firms.
For labor, the proposed TAA provisions provided eligible workers with training, relocation
assistance, and extra income maintenance above and beyond unemployment insurance (UI).83
Income supplements were to come in the form of Trade Readjustment Allowances (TRAs), which
combined with existing unemployment insurance could pay up to 75 percent of the unemployed
worker's former wage and could last for a full year, or 65 weeks for workers 60 years old or
older. After unemployment insurance ran out (which in most states was around 26 weeks), TRAs
could supply up to 65 percent of a worker's former wage or 65 percent of the average
manufacturing wage, whichever was lower. 84 The training assistance was to be provided to
eligible trade-impacted workers through an appropriate training program deemed suitable by the
Department of Labor and the more local-level provider. During the period of retraining, workers
could receive an additional 26 weeks of TRAs. Significantly, the proposal claimed to disqualify
workers from receiving TRAs if they refused suitable training when referred to it. Relocation
assistance, finally, was to come in the form of reimbursement of "reasonable and necessary
expenses" to defray the costs of moving for workers only able to find a suitable job outside their
commuting area. Relocation assistance also included an income supplement, equal to two and a
half times the average weekly manufacturing wage, for other related expenses. TAA benefits were
to be implemented by the coordinated activity of the US Department of Labor and State
employment security agencies (CQ Almanac 1962, pp.265-6).
For firms and industries, TAA was to provide technical assistance, tax relief, or financial
assistance. The tax relief was to come in the form of permission to "carry back or carry forward
current operating losses for 5 years, and apply for any tax refund or credit that might result."85
82 Such a stance was consistent with other elements of the Kennedy social platform, including policies supporting
the organizing and bargaining power of labor, expansions of the welfare state, regional redevelopment, and the
establishment of active labor market policies that provided training assistance in addition to income supplements.
83 The idea behind unemployment insurance supplements was that "workers who lost their jobs because of trade
were likely to go through longer than average spells of unemployment, and needed time to train in new skills"
(Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 1987, p.22).84 These income supplements were to go substantially beyond the unemployment insurance offered in most states.
85 OTA, Trade Adjustment Assistance, p.31.
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Technical assistance was to come in the form of assistance from a public agency or private
provider, the recipient of the aid and the government sharing in the cost as determined to be
appropriate by the Commerce Department. Financial assistance, finally, was to come in the form
of loans or loan guarantees under the program only if the financial assistance were not available
privately or from some other existing government program, and were to be used primarily for
investments in capital rather than labor. The benefits were to be administered by the Commerce
Department's Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
Eligibility for workers was to be determined by the President in consultation with the US
Tariff Commission, while firm and industry eligibility was to be determined by the US Tariff
Commission and subject to Presidential approval. Groups of workers, individual firms, or
industry peak associations injured by trade competition were to petition for either tariff relief, under
the Escape Clause of TEA, or trade assistance, under TAA. Upon receiving the petitions, the
president and/or the Tariff Commission would determine if the petitioners were eligible for either
tariff relief or adjustment assistance, or nothing at all. The Tariff Commission was to make a
decision no later than six months after receiving escape clause petitions, and no later than six
weeks after receiving adjustment assistance petitions.
But by implementing adjustment assistance through the existing escape clause mechanism,
the Kennedy Administration made eligibility for such assistance as difficult as for tariff relief.
Tariff or adjustment assistance relief was only to go to firms, workers, or industries whose injury
was "as a result of concessions granted under trade agreements," concessions which increased
imports that caused or threatened to cause, for workers, unemployment or underemployment from
trade-impacted firms. For industries and firms, tariff concessions had to be shown to be the
primary cause of "serious injury" as measured by "idling of facilities, prolonged inability to operate
at a profit, and unemployment or underemployment of a significant number of workers." For both
firms and workers, this was a high standard: "As a result of concessions" was understood to mean
trade concessions were most important in causing increased imports, and that increased imports, in
turn, be the most important factor in causing injury (Frank 1977, p.4 0 ).86
If eligibility were granted by the Tariff Commission and the President, eligible workers
were to individually petition the Labor Department, and firms to petition the Commerce
Department, for specific determination of assistance. The TEA also called for the creation of an
Adjustment Assistance Advisory Board, with the Commerce Secretary as chairman and the
Secretaries of Labor, Education and Welfare, Treasury, Health, Small Business Administration
and other officers the President chooses, to advise in the administration of the assistance.
86 This "primary part" clause tightened the old, looser clause, which stated that injury had to be due in "substantial
part" to tariff concessions. As we will see, this proposal was ultimately loosened to "in major part to concessions
granted..." because some legislators feared that the Administration's language would rule out petitions where the
tariff concessions were not the only factor involved in injury (CQ Almanac 1962, p. 266).
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The cost of both firm/industry and worker assistance was impossible to determine, because
it covered those injured by trade cuts under past acts, under the 1962 Act, or any future tariff
cutting authority. The Trade Expansion Act, therefore, did not carry any specific dollar amounts
for aid but authorized "such sums as may be necessary," leaving this to be decided in later
appropriations. During House hearings, witnesses said they expected trade adjustment to help
90,000 workers, at a cost of $44.5 million (1962 dollars), over five years, and they estimated that
700-800 firms would qualify for aid over five years, costing about $120 million, much of which
would be in repayable loans (CQ Almanac 1962, p. 276). We will see below how close these
estimates were to the actual program in later years of its implementation.
These adjustment assistance provisions represented major side-payments to dislocated
workers and firms. All assistance to workers and firms were targeted at those suffering from the
trade liberalization due to the TEA and future tariff-cutting legislation. All of the assistance,
moreover, was separate from the tariffs and any other protections that the TEA gave presidents the
authority to reduce in international negotiations. Since the provisions for workers included
relocation and retraining assistance, and nominally required recipients of the TRAs to be enrolled in
a retraining program when referred to one by Labor Department authorities, the labor provisions
also promoted adjustment to market pressures. Although the assistance to firms was not to tie
provision of aid to adjustment to market conditions, the assistance was geared toward facilitating
investment in better products or processes. Administration intentions made this orientation
explicit. Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges defended the TAA by saying "adjustment
assistance is not a dole or subsidy. It is directed not at compensation for injury, but at creative
adjustment that will remove the injury" (Senate Hearings 1962, p.52).
2.4.3. The Fight for Adjustment Assistance: Narrow Victory in the House and Senate
Unlike the side-payment packages for lumber and textiles, the actual provision of
adjustment assistance as compensatory side-payments rested on its survival of House and Senate
scrutiny along with all the other provisions in the TEA bill. As it turned out, adjustment assistance
only narrowly survived the scrutiny of those groups and legislators hostile to such assistance in the
hearings in the House Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committees, in the Committees'
deliberations, and on the floors of the House and Senate. Those opposing adjustment assistance
included both protectionists and free-traders, mainly pro-business groups but also labor groups,
mainly Republicans but also many Democrats. However, strong support of labor and of a few
free-trade business groups, and from powerful (mostly Democrat) legislators preserved adjustment
assistance at every stage of the proceedings, and in fact culminated in its modest expansion.
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2.4.3.1. Group Stands in House and Senate Hearings
Among the groups testifying in favor of adjustment assistance provisions at the House and
Senate hearings, labor groups were the most insistent and supportive. The most encompassing
level of labor organization, the AFL-CIO, continued to be the strongest among these. George
Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, gave his testimony to House Ways and Means on March 19th.
Announcing the AFL-CIO's official support for the TEA bill "with certain modifications," Meany
called mainly for an expansion of the adjustment assistance provisions. He said that the proposed
readjustment allowance of 65 percent of a worker's average weekly wage was "the very minimum
that could be suggested," that the 78 week limitation on the length of training allowances was "an
irreducible figure," and that part-time workers ought to be covered by the program in addition to
full-time workers. He also urged that guaranteed portion of loans to businesses hurt by import
competition be set at 100 percent rather than the 90 percent proposed by the bill, and that the
interest rate on such loans be 3.5 percent rather than 4 percent (CQ Almanac, p.268).
Most importantly, Meany claimed in crystal-clear terms that the AFL-CIO supported TEA
tariff-cuttinlg only on condition that the adjustment assistance provisions be retained. In the House
Hearings, he said that the two main parts of the bill -- tariff cutting authority and adjustment
benefits -- were "inseparable," and that the AFL-CIO would not support one without the other (CQ
p.268). Referring to official AFL-CIO resolutions adopted at the 1961 Constitutional Convention,
he then stated that trade adjustment assistance program is absolutely essential to a successful
foreign trade policy, and as we have said repeatedly, it is indispensable to our support of that
policy" (House Ways and Means, p. 1163.). As if the union organization's position weren't clear
enough, Meany told the Finance Committee, at a stage in the legislative process when the
adjustment assistance was under attack:
...I gather from newspaper reports and other sources that trade adjustment assistance
still remains one of the most controversial features of the program you are considering.
This causes us the gravest concern. In our opinion there is no question whatever that
adjustment assistance is essential to the success of trade expansion. And as we have said
many times it is indispensable to our support of the trade program as a whole. (Senate
Hearings, p.241, italics mine.)
Finally, the AFL-CIO Executive Council on International Trade floated a press release after the
Hearings in which they claimed that their support of TEA was "wholly contingent" on adjustment
assistance (AFL-CIO Press Releases 7, August 16, 1962, p.30; quoted in Zeiler 1992, p. 141).
Although Meany never stated what the AFL-CIO would do if adjustment assistance was dropped
or weakened, it was certainly clear that it would withdraw its support for final voting on the TEA.
In this linkage between support for tariff-cutting and the maintenance of the adjustment
assistance provisions, the AFL-CIO was joined by several other member unions. David McDonald
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of the US Steelworkers endorsed the TEA bill, including the adjustment assistance provisions,
recalling his original recommendation for such assistance during the 1954 Randall Commission
(Mitchell 1976, p.34). The President James B.Carey of the United Electrical Workers, likewise,
supported TAA (Mitchell 1976, p.34; House Hearings, p.2392).
Walter Reuther, President of the United Auto Workers, redoubled Meany's request for
expanded assistance, and declared his union's support for the TEA tariff-cutting contingent upon
adjustment assistance:
with adequate improvements to assure sufficient provision of assistance to those who might
otherwise suffer hardship in the course of readjustment to new conditions, and a clear
statement of policy in support of the negotiation of fair labor standards in international
trade, we shall wholeheartedly support the bill now before Committee. (CQ Alm.,p.268).
Reuther and the UAW, however, were more circumspect in their support for TAA than their AFL-
CIO leadership counterparts. They clearly and explicitly saw the existing provisions as necessary
for their support of the overall bill, but also believed these provisions to be inadequate. At the 18th
constitutional convention, held between May 4th and May 10 while the House Ways and Means
was deliberating over the bill, the attendees passed a resolution that commended the TEA's broad
liberalization designs, but then stated requests that adjustment assistance be improved and that the
Bill ought to contain a statement of US support for international fair labor standards. The strongest
of these statements first called for a series of improvements in the TEA 87 and then proclaimed:
This Convention declares that the UAW cannot in good conscience continue its support of
the Trade Expansion Bill unless adequate provision is made for the assistance of those who
may suffer in consequence of its passage. (UAW 18th Constitutional Convention,
Resolutions, 1962, p. 192, italics mine).88
Such a resolution simultaneously reiterates the organization's support for the TEA conditional upon
the TAA provisions, while pressing for the strengthening and expansion for those provisions.
Even the unions most ambivalent or hostile to TEA tariff-cutting authority had supportive
words for the adjustment assistance provisions. George Baldanzi of the United Textile Workers of
America supported TAA while calling for peril points and the escape clause (p.2827 House
hearings). The spokesman for the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, legislative counsel
87 In particular, the resolution stated that the TEA:
should not be allowed to become law without strengthening of the provisions for financial assistance to
workers who may be adversely affected by increased imports. Such strengthening should include an increase
in both the benefit formula for adjustment allowances and the allowance ceiling, an extension of duration
whenever suitable jobs are not available, continuation of benefits for as long as a worker is taking approved
training, and better provisions for older workers, including a lower eligibility age than 60 and a
combination of adjustment allowances and pensions which would provide for them adequately from time of
their displacement through the remainder of their lives. (UAW 1962, p. 192).
88 The other statement on improving adjustment assistance "urges amendment of the Bill to make provision for
assistance to communities which may be adversely affected." And the international labor standards plea "calls for
inclusion in the Bill of a statement that it is the public poilicy of the US to include in international trade agreements
provision for the establishment and effective application of international fair labor standards." See UAW 18th
Constitutional Convention 1962, Resolutions, 1962, p. 192
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Sidney Zagri, walked the narrow line of opposing most of Kennedy's bill, including assistance for
industries, but supported expanded assistance for workers (House Hearings p.2229). 89
As in the years before Kennedy introduced his TEA bill, labor groups were not the only
societal supporters of adjustment assistance. Both the House and Senate Hearings received
testimony from free-trade oriented business lobbies strongly supporting the adjustment provisions.
The strongest of these remained the Committee for a National Trade Policy. Carl J. Gilbert,
chairman of the CNTP in 1962, reiterated his organization's traditional support for adjustment
assistance, saying explicitly that he supported giving special-treatment to trade-impacted workers,
though at what level he left to debate. Beyond this, he took the position that the federal
government should pay for the entire program for workers, rather than pay only for the difference
between state welfare levels and the levels mandated by the TAA (Senate Foreign Relations 1962,
pp.330-31).90 The CNTP's support for TAA was joined by more unlikely supporters, such as the
American Bankers Association. Charles E. Walker, the executive vice president of the
Association, supported TAA, both because it was "morally appropriate" to share the burden of a
change benefiting everyone, and because it sought to promote market adjustment, unlike programs
such as the Agricultural Adjustment Act (House Ways and Means Hearings 1962, p.2004).
Arrayed against these groups supporting the adjustment assistance were several on both the
protectionist and free-trade sides of the aisle. Some hard-line protectionists opposed adjustment
assistance, because they saw it as creeping government intervention of the wrong kind, drawing
attention and support away from more appropriate protections like the escape clause and peril
points. An example was the testimony of James Ashley, the president of the Trade Relations
Council, the "grandfather" of protectionist groups, with a membership consisting of some wealthy
businessmen, trade associations and farm groups (CQ Almanac 1962, p.293).91 More visible was
O.R.Strackbein's Nation-wide Committee on Import-Export Policy, founded just before the
creation of the Randall Commission in 1953.92 In his testimony to the House, Strackbein
denounced adjustment assistance both because it stood in the way of protection as an "American
tradition" and was, at the same time. "another form of socialism" (CQ Almanac 1962, p.268).
891n Senate testimony, he supports adjustment assistance for workers while at the same time pointing out that "the
adjustment provisions of the act is a major shift in policy from the present selective use of trade agreement authority
for the purpose of voiding injury to the new policy of using trade agreement authority indiscriminately so as to cause
injury. Is this congressional abdication of its tariff making functions necessary?" (p.362 in Senate Hearings).
90 Charles P. Taft, general counsel for the CNTP, also offered a rebuttal to critics of the TEA who had already given
testimony. In it he defended TAA on grounds that relief was justifiable because injury from import competition
would be caused by direct government action in the national interest. (CQ Almanac 1962, p.271).
91 Ashley claimed "that HR 9900...establishes a dangerous principle of Government responsibility for private
business injured by an act undertaken in the public weal; that it seeks to replace private initiative by government
control and management" (CQ Almanac 1962, p.268).
92 Although the Committee was really run by Strackbein and a few others, it had considerable influence with a
number of neutral and protectionist Senators and Representatives.
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Joining these protectionist lobbies were a few industry groups and unions particularly
vulnerable to international trade. Two textile groups in segments of the industry not covered by the
LTA were especially critical of TAA, including the American Silk Council and the Man-made Fiber
Producers Association.93 The American Farm Bureau Federation's president, Charles B. Shuman,
supported minimum duty rate restrictions, an enlarged role for the Tariff Commission, an
expanded escape clause and complete abolition of the adjustment assistance provisions. (CQ
Almanac 1962, p.27 1). And even some of the unions speaking against the TEA also opposed the
adjustment provisions. Mildred Homko, secretary of the glass Workers Protective League of
Indiana, Ohio, Penn. and W.Virginia, opposed adjustment assistance, saying that reemployment of
retrained workers was not realistic. Her opposition verged on the eloquent when she lamented that
through passage of HR9900 "we shall have the best trained, most highly skilled unemployment
lines in the world" (CQ Almanac 1962, p.269).
Some of the strongest opposition to the adjustment assistance, however, came not from
protectionist labor and industry groups, but from free-trade business associations, like the
Chambers of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers. The National Association
of Manuacturers gave one of the strongest critiques on which much of the other free-trade
business opposition built. They stated four main points:
1. Adjustment assistance seems to imply that there is something wrong with the operation
of the free market....
2. Business enterprises and their employees are continuously affected, for better or worse,
by all sorts of events beyond their control...We...oppose singling out any one of these
possibilities as a basis of a special program of Federal assistance.
3. It's impossible to trace out all the effects of any given tariff change....Judgments as to
which firms or persons would be entitled to special assistance would...be arbitrary...
4. All experience warns that programs of this type inevitably expand and proliferate.
(Senate Foreign Relations Hearings 1962, pp. 1630-31; quoted in Mitchell 1976, p.34)
This line of testimony and argument was echoed by other business association representatives,
such as the director of the national Chamber of Commerce and several regional affiliates, and a few
other businessmen. 94 Interestingly, none of these business representatives seemed to mind the
industry assistance (CQ Almanac p.268).
93 The American Silk Council's president, for instance, spoke in support peril point and escape clause protections
and opposed TAA by saying that "we feel that the government would accomplish more by realizing our problems
and encouraging us in conducting our business as free enterprises rather than considering us expendable, but worthy
of relief' (p.3156 of House hearings).
94 A.B.Sparboe, director of the Chamber of Commerce of the US, supported TEA, but said that "aid to displaced
employees should be administered by the states and should not exceed in amount or duration the benefits provided by
state unemployment compensation laws" (CQ Almanac 1962, p.269). Robert L. Bean, speaking for the Chicago
Association of Commerce and Industry, also endorsed the bill but opposed most of the adjustment assistance
provisions (Almanac, p.271). And Leslie j. Dikovics, for the Council of State Chambers of Commerce, opposed
the bill's provisions for readjustment allowances for workers displaced by import competition. These Chamber
representatives were joined in their criticisms of adjustment assistance by Theodore Hauser, spokesman for the
Committee for Economic Development and Robert S.Eckley of Caterpillar Tractor Co.
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Given how the testimony of TEA supporters and opposition often turned into debate over
adjustment assistance, it is little surprise that such assistance was the most controversial subject of
the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance deliberations, and of floor debate in both Houses
of Congress. In both Houses, the divide on trade adjustment assistance was heavily partisan.
Republicans and conservative Democrats generally opposed the program "on the grounds that
workers idled because of imports should not be given higher and longer-lasting unemployment
compensation than other unemployed workers receive under the existing federal-state system"
(CQ, p.277). Supporters, meanwhile, rested most of their arguments on the claim that TAA was
preferable as special treatment to tariffs and other protectionist barriers.
2.4.3.2. Winning By a Hair in the House
The adjustment provisions were approved by the House Ways and Means Committee on
May 18th, after it rejected three amendments designed to gut the provisions. First, the committee
defeated, by a vote of 11 to 14, an amendment sponsored by Rep. John W. Byrnes (R-Wis.) that
would have scaled-down the adjustment provisions by making them part of the Manpower
Development Training Act (MDTA), passed earlier in 1962, with a maximum of 52 weeks of
benefits and a ceiling on payments. All ten Republicans voted for this amendment, and were
joined by Rep. James B. Frazier Jr. (D-Tenn.). Second, the committee defeated by an even
slimmer margin another Byrnes amendment to scale-down the training allowances to match those
given under MDTA (approved earlier in the year), which varied by according to different state
unemployment compensation payments. The amendment (PL 87-415) was narrowly defeated by a
vote of 12-13, with all 10 committee Republicans, plus Reps. James B.Frazier Jr. (D-Tenn.) and
Burr P.Harrison (D- Va.), supporting it. After this very close call, the Committee defeated by a
vote of 10 to 15 a motion by Rep. Bruce Alger (R-Texas) to cut the adjustment assistance
provisions entirely. Nine Republicans and Rep. Harrison supported the gutting, and 14 Democrats
plus Rep. Howard H.Baker (R- Tenn.) prevented it (CQ Almanac 1962, p.277). Wilbur Mills's
Committee passed its marked-up version of TEA on June 4th by a 20 to 5 vote, with all the Ways
and Means Democrats and five Republicans voting in favor, and five Republicans opposed. 95
In passing the TAA, however, the Ways and Means Committee reported a bill that
modestly altered the provisions. First, both workers and firms were to apply initially to the Tariff
Commission for relief, rather than to have workers apply directly to the president. Second, the
Commission was to report to the President within 60 days of receiving petitions whether it found a
firm or a group of workers eligible for tariff or trade adjustment assistance relief, and within 120
95 The five Republicans supporting the TEA with adjustment assistance were Byrnes, Baker, Thomas B.Curtis
(Mo.), Steven B.Derounian (N.Y.) and Herman T.Schneebeli (Pa.).
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days for industries. The President was then to make a final decision on eligibility (which was
thought to be essentially pro forma), and the Labor and Commerce departments were to then screen
specific applications from workers and firms, respectively. Third, the president could rule to
provide escape clause tariff relief and adjustment assistance at the same time, rather than one or the
other. Fourth, the retraining of workers was to be implemented under existing programs, such as
the Area Redevelopment and the Manpower Development and Training Acts. Finally, the
Committee passed an amendment by Howard H.Baker (R-Tenn.) providing that Congress may
override a presidential decision not to invoke the escape clause contrary to Tariff Commission
recommendation, by a majority vote of both Congressional Houses (CQ Aim. 1962, pp.275-77).
The Ways and Means Committee sent its revised TEA with these TAA revisions to the
floor of the House on June 27th, after a fight over voting rules. Supporters of the TEA, especially
Democrats, wanted to refer the bill to the floor with a closed rule, barring all but committee
amendments from the floor, a common procedure for House trade bills.96 MaLson (R- Ill.) wanted
to exercise his prerogative to make a re-committal motion "with instructions that a substitute be
reported back to the House extending the existing Trade Agreements Act for one more year" (CQ
Almanac 1962, p.278). Representative John W. Byrnes (R- Wis.), next in Seniority to Mason,
requested a more open rule, "allowing a separate vote on an amendment by him and Rep. A.
Sydney Herlong (D- Fla.) cutting the adjustment assistance from the bill" (CQ Almanac 1962,
p.278). The House Rules Committee voted to adopt the closed rule by a vote of 8 to 7, with the
support of only the Kennedy Democrats. With no floor fight to overturn the rule, the House
passed the closed rule by voice vote on June 27th (CQ Almanac 1962, p.278).
With a closed rule that asked Congressmen to choose between passage of an intact TEA
with adjustment assistance, and no TEA at all (de facto one-year RTA extension), the deck was
stacked in favor of passing adjustment assistance when the House floor action finally began. After
only one day of floor debate, Mason's re-commital motion was defeated by a roll-call vote of 171
to 253. 127 Republicans voted for the motion, and 43 voted against; 44 Democrats supported the
motion, 210 voted against. This set the stage for House passage of the TEA by a vote of 298 to
125. In this case, 80 Republicans voted for the bill, while 90 opposed it; 218 Democrats
supported it, and 35 voted against.
Several close calls, therefore, cleared the way for adjustment assistance compensation in
the House: one- and two-vote margins against Committee amendments gutting assistance; a re-
commital motion that forced moderates on trade policy to choose a TEA with adjustment assistance
or nothing at all; and a one-vote-margin supporting a closed rule in the House rules committee.
96 Under such a rule, the only way to change the bill under review is through a motion to recommit the bill to the
reporting committee. Motion for such a rule is usually offered by the senior, minority-party member of that
reporting committee, in this case Representative Noah M.Mason (R- Ill.).
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2.4.3.3. The Senate's Expansion of Adjustment Assistance
In the Senate, the fight for adjustment assistance was also narrowly won, but ultimately
expanded the provisions beyond the President's request. In Finance Committee, the closest call
involved an amendment sponsored by Chairman Byrd (D A.) on September 14th to eliminate the
adjustment assistance sections of the bill. The motion was defeated by a vote of 8 to 7. The seven
voting for the elimination were Byrd, Herman E. Talmadge (D- Ga.) and five Republicans.
Senator Robert S.Kerr (D Okla.) rallied Committee Democrats to defeat the amendment. 97
The other amendments that the Senate Finance Committee passed generally expanded and
strengthened the adjustment assistance provisions. The two most important were, first, the
amendment sponsored by George A.Smathers (D-Fla.) requiring the federal government to pay the
full cost of the unemployment compensation for workers rather than to pay the difference between
the state rates and the rates set under the bill. Second, the committee passed amendments
sponsored by Kerr that loosened language governing Tariff Commission decisions of eligibility:
eligible workers and firms need to suffer serious injury "as a result in maior part of concessions
grarx,ed under trade agreements" rather than "as a result of concessions," as in the Administration
and House bills. Some Committee members worried that the "as a result of' standard would
require proof that the tariff concessions were the only cause of injury, when in fact a slightly lower
standard was most appropriate (CQ Almanac 1962, p.2 8 1).98 The other change was that the
Commission would grant assistance to firms unable to operate "at a reasonable profit" instead of
"at a profit." The Senate Committee also eliminated the requirement that the Tariff Commission
make an industry-wide investigation when only segments of an industry file for assistance.99
After the Finance Committee approved the final marked-up version of the bill by a 17-0
vote, Senate floor action again went after adjustment assistance. Among several floor amendments
revising the TEA, two sought to limit or eliminate the adjustment assistance provisions. One was
sponsored by Carl T.Curtis (R-Neb.) calling for elimination of the trade adjustment altogether. It
was defeated in a roll-call vote of 23-58. 18 Republicans supported this amendment, and 8
97 Sens. Albert Gore (D- Tenn.), a known supporter of adjustment assistance, and Thruston B. Morton (R- Ky.),
known to oppose assistance, did not vote (CQ Almanac 1962, p.280).
98 "In major part" was initially interpreted by the Tariff Commission representatives to mean that the tariff
concessions were "more important than all other causes combined" in creating the injury. After 1969, the
interpretation softened somewhat, to mean "greater than any other single cause." The interpretation of the eligibility
rules is not certain, as the phrasing suggests. On the interpretation of the eligibility provisions, see Charles Frank,
Foreign Trade and Domestic Aid; and OTA, Trade Adjustment Assistance.
99 Other revisions were more trivial, such as lengthening the time in which the Commission was to make its report
on industry-wide investigations of escape clause eligibility from five months to six months, and gave the Tariff
Commission 60 days to establish investigatory procedures before any adjustment assistance petitions could be filed
(CQ Almanac 1962, pp.281-2).
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opposed it. 5 Democrats, meanwhile, supported it, and 5 opposed it. The closer call was an
amendment sponsored by Harry Flood Byrd (D- Va.) to make the level of unemployment
compensation payments under the bill the same as those paid under the lower federal-state system
already in existence. It was defeated in a roll-call vote of 31 to 51, with 20 Republicans and 5
Democrats supporting it, and 6 Republicans and 45 Democrats rejecting it (CQ Aim. 1962, p.687).
2.4.3. The Effectiveness of Adjustment Assistance in Lowering Opposition to TEA
One question remains in the history of adjustment assistance as compensation for TEA
tariff-cutting: was it effective in facilitating passage of TEA liberalization? Unlike the textile and
lumber compensations this question is actually two-fold. It not only concerns whether the
compensation lowered the opposition of protectionist groups who would otherwise oppose TEA's
tariff-cutting authority; but also whether and to what degree the compensation sparked opposition
to the TEA from groups who would otherwise support liberalization. Since the Congressional
proceedings reveal there to have been a number of groups to express opposition to TAA despite
support for free-trade, this second consideration is important. Even if the adjustment assistance
might have bought some support and votes for TEA, any extra support might have been vitiated by
the opposition the assistance provoked.
The evidence leaves room for interpretation, but I maintain that the inclusion of the
adjustment assistance provisions in the TEA legislation, on balance, facilitated passage of its tariff-
cutting provisions. Adjustment assistance was not adequate compensation to some protectionist
groups, such as those ideologically opposed to openness and those who were particularly
vulnerable to foreign competition. Adjustment assistance was, however, essential to garnering
organized labor's support for the TEA bill. The statements and actions of the AFL-CIO and a
number of other member unions, before and during the legislative struggle for TEA, demonstrates
that their support for tariff-cutting was "wholly contingent" upon adjustment assistance -- that they
would not have supported the bill had the adjustment assistance provisions been gutted.
Gutting the adjustment assistance compensation in the TEA in the face of Labor's explicit
policy stance would have three implications. First, it would certainly imply that AFL-CIO, UAW,
and other union lobbyists would have tried to pressure members of Congress and Senators to vote
against the passage of TEA. Second, labor might have retaliated in some way against those
legislators pushing through TEA and without assistance. Third, and most likely, pushing through
free-trade legislation in the face of Labor opposition would erode Labor's support for individual
legislators, President Kennedy, and the Democratic Party. Given that the organizational and
financial support unions provided the back-bone of the Democratic electoral coalition, and given
that 1962 was an election year, passage of the TEA -- the "most important piece of legislation of
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1962" to quote Kennedy -- could be held back by the anticipation of labor's retaliation. In short,
the Administration's TEA bill needed to make labor happy.
Exactly how many votes were won by maintaining adjustment assistance, how much of the
TEA tariff-cutting was maintained, is a matter of speculation. The votes most likely affected were
those of Democrats who were closely allied with unions and who traditionally voted pro-union.
More generally, the legislators most sensitive to union demands were probably Democratic
Senators and House Reps representing constituencies with a high proportion of union members.' 00o
On the basis of these two assumptions, we can move a bit beyond conjecture in estimating
the efficacy of adjustment assistance by consulting the statistics on union density, by state, in Table
4.11. According to this table, sixteen states had more than 30 percent of their industrial employees
in unions, most of which were affiliated with the AFL-CIO. These Senators, one can very roughly
assume, were more likely to support the AFL-CIO's stance on trade and adjustment assistance. Of
course, even the most pro-labor Democrats might vote against a piece of legislation they whole-
heartedly oppose for other reasons in the face of union support.
These high-union-density Senators and Congressmen, however, overwhelmingly
supported adjustment assistance and the Trade Expansion Act. On the Senate vote over the Bush
amendment restoring peril point protections, the closest vote on the Senate floor, all twenty-two
Democratic Senators from states with union densities above 30 percent voted for free trade.'01
Since many of these legislators and their organized labor constituencies had traditionally supported
free trade legislation for more than 25 years prior to 1962, voting patterns of these legislators on
previous RTA extensions do not provide much information. It is reasonable to infer, however,
that many of these votes in the House and Senate depended upon the inclusion of adjustment
assistance in Kennedy's original TEA bill, and in the final House and Senate versions.
But the votes for and against TEA tariff cutting didn't only involve protectionist or
ambivalent free traders; they also included free traders. We know from the congressional
proceedings that a number of free-trader business alliances and legislators supported TEA tariff
cutting but opposed the inclusion of adjustment assistance -- including the two main spokes-
organizations for US business, the Chambers of Commerce and the National Association of
Manufacturers, and several powerful legislators, such as the Finance Committee Chairman Harry
Byrd (D- Va.). At no point in the deliberations, however, did any of these groups threaten to
100 The two simplifying assumptions on which this claim is based is that states with high union densities are also
states with a lot of industrial employer might, and that Democratic representatives tend to support the worker side of
industrial relations, whereas Republicans support the employer side.
101 The Senators were the following: from Alaska, Bartlett and Gruening; from California, Engle; from Illinois,
Douglas; from Indiana, Hartke; from Michigan, Hart and McNamara; from Minnesota, Humphrey and McCarthy;
from Montana, Mansfield and metcalf; from Oklahoma, Kerr and Monroney; from Oregon, Morse and Neuberger;
from Pennsylvania, clark; from Washington State, Jackson and Magnuson; from W.Virginia, Byrd and Randolph;
from Wisconsin, Proxmire. Their voting on the Bush amendment documented in CQ Almanac 1962, p.687.
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Table 2.11
Union Density by State (1968)
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland-D.C.
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Total Union
Membership
193
27
89
97
2118
149
275
53
279
239
70
37
1538
653
183
124
235
187
58
429
562
1068
375
76
584
61
79
52
43
735
37
2539
124
29
1345
121
213
1585
83
66
24
Ranking
24
48
32
31
2
27
17
41
16
19
36
44
4
8
26
29
20
25
40
14
10
6
15
35
9
39
34
42
43
7
45
1
28
47
5
30
22
3
33
37
49
Membership as a % of
Manufacturing Employees
19.9
33.8
18.8
18.9
31.9
21.9
23.7
26.2
14.4
16.4
27.4
19.2
36
35.9
21.4
18.5
27.1
18.2
17.9
22.6
25.5
35.9
30.1
13.9
35.9
31.3
17.3
29.3
17.1
29.6
13.4
36.3
7.4
18.7
35.9
16.6
31.4
37.2
24.2
8.4
14.4
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Ranking
28
10
33
32
12
25
23
20
44
43
18
31
5
6
26
35
19
37
38
24
21
7
15
46
8
14
39
17
40
16
48
4
50
34
9
41
13
3
22
49
45
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Total Union Membership as a % of
State Membership Ranking Manufacturing Employees Ranking
Tennessee 246 18 19.5 29
Texas 474 11 13.9 47
Utah 62 38 18.4 36
Vermont 29 46 20.7 27
Virginia 230 21 16.6 42
Washington 454 13 41.3 2
West Virginia 213 23 41.9 1
Wisconsin 473 12 32.1 11
Wyoming 20 50 19.3 30
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Directory of National Unions
and Employee Associations, p.84
withdraw their overall support for TEA if the adjustment assistance provisions were retained. On
the House floor, representatives were forced to choose between TEA with assistance, or nothing at
all, in voting on Mason's motion to recommit the TEA bill in favor of a bill with one year RTA
tariff-cutting. In that vote, both of the Ways and Means Democrats voting to gut adjustment
assistance, Reps. James B.Frazier Jr. (D-Tenn.) and Burr P.Harrison (D- Va.), voted against the
motion, and both votedfor final passage of TEA. In the Senate, after several amendments cutting
adjustment assistance were defeated, almost all those voting for gutting assistance but against the
Bush amendment reviving peril-point protection votedfor TEA passage. This included Harry
Flood Byrd (D- Va.), sponsor of one of the amendments seeking to kill adjustment compensation.
Like the textile and lumber compensation, therefore, adjustment assistance insured support
from a number of important societal groups and their legislative allies. And adjustment assistance
had minimal impact in inspiring opposition to the TEA among those supportive of free trade.
These considerations suggest that adjustment assistance was effective in facilitating free trade and
support the counter-factual this effectiveness implies: if adjustment assistance was not included in
the TEA, Kennedy and the Democratic Congress would have been forced to water-down, reverse,
or abandon the tariff-cutting provisions in the TEA.
3. Explaining and Evaluating the Advent of Compensated Liberalization
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 is important to the history of US political economy
because it ushered in the era of compensated liberalization. Prior to 1962, trade initiatives had
either tended towards compromised liberalization or protectionism, or had brought freer trade
without side-payment compensation for the groups losing from such trade. The TEA granted
unprecedented authority to liberalize trade, through deep linear tariff cuts and the virtual or total
elimination of peril point and escape clause relief. But this liberalization brought with it side
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payment compensation for the textile and lumber industries and adjustment assistance for trade-
impacted workers and firms generally. How can we explain the advent of compensated
liberalization? And what has the history so far told us about the usefulness of compensation in off-
setting social costs of and facilitating freer trade?
3.1. Explaining Modest But Promising Side Payment Compensation
The case history suggests that the shift to compensated liberalization has its roots largely in
the egoistic bargaining between protectionist and liberalizer groups, and particularly in the
coincidence of power and multi-issue trade policy platforms of several protectionist groups.
Between the 1958 renewal of RTA and the 1962, the influx of imports following successive tariffs
reductions and foreign industrial recovery made a number of groups more determined and
mobilized protectionists. In the face of such heightened protectionism, Kennedy sought in the
TEA the most ambitious trade liberalization since the failed ITO. The result was a much larger,
broader protectionist coalition that in aggregate threatened to scuttle Kennedy's hope for
Congressional approval. Kennedy ruled out revising the liberalization, at least until trying to
ignore, exempt, or compensate the protectionist groups.
The groups differed in their power resources and their trade policy platforms -- varied both
relative to one another and relative to their predecessors -- and this difference co-varied with the
response they elicited from Kennedy and other liberalizers. Many industry groups demanding
redress had the same power-platform characteristics of projectionists in US episodes gone by. A
number of protectionists lacked the power resources to threaten the liberalization, such as the
leather shoe industry, bicycles, pottery, flat glass, watches or fur. These groups were essentially
ignored by the Kennedy liberalizers. Several other groups, however, had significantly higher
structural and incidental resources in terms of employment, concentration, and contacts. Of these,
a few -- especially petroleum and agriculture -- approached the TEA struggle through hearings
testimony and other statements that betrayed single-minded protectionism. As in previous
episodes, these protectionists won protectionist redress -- in the form of tariff and quota
exemptions that allowed the Administration to shave off some of the most powerful elements of the
protectionist coalition. Shifts in the power and platforms of three groups, however, implied a
different pattern of bargaining, which in turn underlay the advent of compensated liberalization.
3.1.1. Explaining Textiles and Lumber Compensation
Two industrial groups combined the political resources with the trade policy platforms that
commanded a mix of protectionist exemption and side payment compensation. Most politically
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mobilized and well-placed was the textile industry, in particular cotton and wool producers. As
cotton and wool producers suffered competitive pressure due to lower tariffs, contradictions in US
textile policies, and a variety of conditions advantaging textile importers, industry representatives
increasingly demanded quota and tariff protectionism. Through a process of contagion, moreover,
synthetic textiles and the apparel industry also joined the protectionist bandwagon by the end of the
1950s. When Kennedy proposed a particularly ambitious trade bill that promised major cuts in
tariffs, the gutting of peril point protections, and the abolition of the escape clause, the textile
industry's "interest" in protectionism was all the greater.
In the years leading up to the TEA fight, moreover, the textile industry organizations
became increasingly inclusive, centralized, and consensual in injecting their demands in the
Congress. And the heavy concentration of the textile industry in a number of key Southern states
amplified the importance of industry's demands to a Democratic president with an ambitious
legislative program and a desire for reelection. The organizational and strategic position of the
producers, therefore, allowed them to credibly threaten to scuttle or constrain Kennedy's TEA, or
retaliate against TEA supporters in other arenas. If Kennedy wanted to preserve the integrity of his
TEA liberalization, he had to not just promise, but actually implement, a package of assistance.
The associations and unions representing the cotton, wool and other textile and apparel
segments of industry focused their pleas on quantitative quota limits -- voluntary if not legislated --
but by the 1962 initiative, a number of textile producer and labor associations were involved in
demanding a variety of other provisions. In Foreign Relations and House testimony, in press
statements, and in Pastore and other governmental/congressional deliberations, the demands
focused especially an end to two-price cotton, the creation of research and development monies,
and other kinds of assistance. Thus, at least some of the textile protectionist representatives had
broadened their trade policy platform -- beyond that prior and during the 1958 RTA extension.
The result is that Kennedy sought a package of benefits that essentially sought to buy-off
the minimum but most powerful and determined textile associations with a package of redress.
That meant a side payment package combined with the promise to pursue the more protectionist
redress. The hope was that the provision of some compensation and the promise of protectionist
redress would buy off textile ire, even before having to really go through with the divisive quota
arrangements. When the VER protectionist exemption seemed to be all that would do, the
Administration focused on the most insistent and powerful cotton and wool segments in the LTA,
though promising to bring the synthetic and apparel segments of the industry into the arrangement.
The power and platforms of lumber were in important respects similar to that of textiles,
but chance and timing played a much larger role for lumber. Even more than the cotton and wool
segments of the textile industry, softwood lumber producers experienced a sudden and major
inlflux of import competition in the years immediately preceding Kennedy's TEA bill. And as
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much as textile groups, softwood lumber producers sought protectionism as the best corrective for
this influx. However, the softwood lumber groups commanded around 73,000 people, fewer than
some of the industrial protectionists who received nothing in the fight over TEA. Moreover,
lumber employment was important to the economies of only a few states in the Northwest. How,
then, were they able to get a generous package of side payments?
Several factors coincided to make the improbable possible. First, the industry was lucky in
making its demands strongest and most credible just when Kennedy was trying to cobble together
votes for what he expected to be a close vote in the Senate. Second, the industry had the good
fortune of being represented by some very powerful members of that Senate, especially Democratic
Whip Mike Mansfield who was crucial to Kennedy's desire to rally the Democrats behind the TEA
and other initiatives. Third and most importantly, the lumber industry groups succeeded in linking
their plight to that of lumber producers in other states that Kennedy was especially worried about,
namely the South. By explicitly saying that compensation for textiles demanded equal treatment
for lumber, especially given the existence of non-softwood lumber manufacturers in the South,
softwood lumber representatives nudged Southern legislators to stand beside their Northwest
colleagues -- either to show concern for a significant industry in their states or to defend their core
textile gains from attack. The fact of textile compensation made such an alliance possible, and the
idiosyncratic importance of the South to Kennedy's TEA and other legislative ambitions made it
important. Thus, like textiles, the incidence of lumber compensation rests on the increased
determination of lumber groups in protection, combined with their increased, incidental power
resources to get it by threatening to scuttle, revise or retaliate against TEA passage.
The kind of redress Lumber received, however, again was shaped by relatively broad trade
policy platforms compared to previous trade episodes, and compared to many protectionist groups.
Lumber-industry workers and firms were heavily involved in voicing their protectionist demands,
rather than relying on their Senate agents. Although less so than textiles, they emphasized
,_,.•ntitative restrictions on imports, but simultaneously made a retinue of other, non-protectionist
policy demands, especially reform of the Jones Act and better access to US forest-lands.
Faced with such a stance, backed by such considerable incidental resources, the Kennedy
Administration again calculated that the best route to protecting the integrity of TEA liberalization
was to provide a package of compensation and protectionism consistent with the industry's
platform. First was the promise to pursue voluntary quotas with a major lumber competitor. But
also like the textile compensation, lumber's package included the end to a government regulation
that discriminated dgainst them; preferential treatment by US government; new loan promises from
the Small Business Administration. The end result of the package weighed heavier on the
compensation than the protectionist redress. Lumber did not also receive any promises for escape
clause tariff relief, and the negotiations with Canada for import quotas never yielded an agreement.
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In short, for both of the industry compensation packages, compensation was provided
because it was politically expedient. Fairness norms may have played a role, given Kennedy's
past a textile state representative and his New Deal beliefs in moderating excesses of the market.
But neither textiles nor lumber could be said to have faced prospect of more hardship from TEA
liberalization than did several other smaller, less politically-threatening industries (e.g. watches or
clay pot producers), who received much less or no protectionist and compensatory redress.
3.1.2. Explaining Labor's TAA Compensation
Explaining adjustment assistance is a bit more complicated. Power and platform conditions
were necessary to the creation of adjustment assistance compensation. Labor groups were some of
the first and most vocal in proposing the idea of adjustment assistance, such as Stanley Ruttenberg
of the CIO and David McDonald of the Steelworkers during the 1954 Randall Commission. The
AFL-CIO and member unions were vocal supporters of congressional initiatives to create
adjustment assistance, by 1958 hinting that labor support for tariff-cutting would be contingent
upon provision of such assistance. More importantly, when Kennedy was drawing up his TEA
bill, labor apparently contacted Administration representatives to urge inclusion of adjustment
assistance, explicitly linking that inclusion to their support for liberalization. And throughout the
legislative debate over the TEA bill, the AFL-CIO, the UAW, and other unions repeatedly
announced that they would only support TEA if the adjustment assistance was preserved.
Kennedy and his advisors were very much aware that labor support was needed for the
passage of TEA. The membership and industrial breadth of organized labor was still near its zenith
when Kennedy sought his liberalization. And Labor was particularly crucial to the electoral and
policy position of Democrats in general and Kennedy in particular. The AFL-CIO and member
unions could well scuttle the TEA, or at least significantly water-down its ambition. And they
could certainly retaliate against Democrats in future legislative and electoral battles. In light of such
opposition, adjustment assistance was a useful political expedient, a buy-off.'02
But other characteristics of the history suggest that the Kennedy Administration's desire to
promote fairness in trade policy was also important to explaining the incidence of adjustment
assistance. Kennedy and his Administration defended adjustment assistance as promoting fairness
and equity in trade policy, never discussing how it might deflect opposition to liberalization,
though this is not to deny that most politicians defend their preferred public policies with principled
rhetoric. Much more important, Kennedy was among the first national politicians to champion
adjustment assistance. Together with a number of free-trade business groups, citizen action
102 Such is how several of the Kennedy trade policy-makers saw adjustment assistance at the time, and in their
recollections (e.g. interview with Raymond Vernon).
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groups, and economists, he stuck his neck out for adjustment assistance before labor had made its
support of free trade contingent upon such assistance. Similarly, the TAA provisions included in
the TEA bill provided assistance to workers in non-unionized as well as unionized industries, and
to employers as well as workers -- to groups other than the target of the buy-off. Finally, support
for assistance came from legislators and interest groups representing a variety of interests,
including the voting support of legislators from many states with very low union densities.
These characteristics suggest that the political exchange basis of adjustment assistance
shouldn't obscure the role of ideas about fairness. Although the power-platforms of organized
labor in getting adjustment assistance suggest that some compensation was to be forthcoming, the
encompassing and innovative quality of the assistance has its roots in fairness principles. Put
differently, Kennedy was probably more concerned about fairness norms than his predecessors,
and was particularly interested in adjustment assistance. But the President faced substantial
opposition that made him willing to forego pursuit of that assistance. It took labor union support
for adjustment assistance, upon threat of abandoning Kennedy's TEA, to convince Kennedy and
Democratic legislators to stick with the adjustment provisions. Even giving full credit to the role of
ideas, therefore, labor union support was necessary for the translation of those ideas into policy.
In sum, side payments were provided in 1962 and not before, and to textiles, lumber and
labor and not to other groups, primarily because of the coincidence of increasing protectionist
determination and power of these groups in 1962 compared to previous years, and because of their
increasingly multi-issue trade policy platforms. The jurisdiction and welfare generosity of the
institutions through which liberalizers and protectionists negotiated the liberalization changed little
for TEA compared to earlier episodes. The broad correlation, thus, supports the general
predictions of the power-interest conditions of the theory. For at least the Labor compensation,
however, fairness ideas and the "altruistic" perspective generally is also consistent with some of
the history. Kennedy's election increased the stock of ideas about fairness in political economy,
and the increased suffering of certain industrial actors and called for some policy redress consistent
with those ideas. But the clout of these ideas was still very much advanced by the power and
interests of organized labor. And the fairness ideas, in particular, cannot explain why so many
other suffering industries were not given the same side-payment treatment. The egoistic bargaining
as shaped by the power and platforms of protectionists, however, can.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 graphically illustrate this argument. Figures 2.4 illustrates how the
power and platforms of the respective groups in 1962 constrained bargaining between liberalizers
and protectionists. The least powerful groups don't even make it onto the bargaining space in
Figure 2.4, giving liberalizers the opportunity to liberalizer their sector without redress.'03 The
103 Hence, their position is captured by Figure 2.1. above, where a protectionist indifference curve doesn't even
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Figure 2.4
Textile, Lumber, and Labor Indifference Curves Shift to Steeper Slope,
While Liberalizer Indifference Curve Shift More Modestly to Flatter Slope
4
Trade
Protection
L
a)
L(b)
P(b)
Compensation
powerful and single-minded protectionists make it onto the space, but their single-minded
protectionism implies difficulty or unwillingness to identify and exchange compensation for
protection -- captured by a flat indifference curve P(a) in Figure 2.4. In this case, the liberalizer
and protectionist curves intersect at the status-quo, but they do not overlap in such a way as to
create any space for pareto-improvement between them. Liberalizers may be in principle interested
in side payment exchange, and in fact with Kennedy Administration's heightened concern for
standards of fairness in trade policy the indifference curve may be flatter still, hence the shift from
L(a) to L(b). But liberalizers in any event recognize they have little hope of buying support for
lower levels of protection (closer to the origin on the "trade protection" axis) through any means
other than protectionist exemption (since revision was less desirable).
Figure 2.4 also shows how the coincidence of significant power resources and of multi-
issue platforms among textile, lumber, and labor groups -- in contrast to most other groups during
1962 and in previous episodes -- meant that the groups would get taken seriously by liberalizers,
and that they would invite discussion of some bargained outcome that would combine some
liberalization with some series of compensation. Any one or all of the three distinct series of
textile, lumber, and Labor negotiations or confrontations -- implicit and explicit -- can be
characterized by the steeper sloping protectionist group indifference curve (P(b) than captured the
confrontations in previous US liberalization episodes. The Labor indifference curve, of course
share space with the liberalizer curve in the Edgeworth space.
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Figure 2.5
Power and Platforms of Protectionist Industry and Labor
(Newly engaged groups in italics)
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would be significantly steeper than the textile and lumber groupings. In any event, the shifts create
a zone of possible agreement that facilitates identification and provision of side payment linkage in
exchange for liberalization. In so far as Kennedy approached trade liberalization with a greater
concern for standards of fairness, moreover, the flatter L(b) increases the zone of agreement.
The result of these respective bargaining contingencies can be captured by the positioning
of these groups on the matrix in Figure 2.5. Most of the groups did not change significantly in the
level of opposition they posed to the TEA compared to the determination and resources with which
they approached the 1955 and 1958 RTA Extensions. Those with relatively lower power
resources, unable to win any redress, essentially got ignored -- though they might have stood to
gain from implementation of the adjustment assistance program. The powerful, single-minded
protectionists, on the other hand, forced liberalizers to provide some kind of protectionist
exemption -- which for petroleum and agricultural protectionists took the form of continued or
heighten quotas or tariff-relief.
Figure 2.5 also illustrates, however, that the shifts in the power and platforms of textiles
and lumber, and more clearly the shift in the AFL-CIO's position on trade, created the
preconditions for compensated liberalization. The textiles industry significantly increased its
determination and gained incidental resources to threaten the initiative, and to some extent they
more consistently spoke of non-protection alternatives in their litany of demands. This is captured
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by the northeasterly shift in its positioning on the matrix. Two groups hitherto either in the
liberalizer camp (AFL-CIO) or relatively quiet on trade policy matters (Lumber) appeared broadly
within the protectionist coalition for the first time in 1962. They both appear on the matrix in
italics, roughly positioned proportional to their respective power and platforms.
3.2. Evaluating TEA Compensation
Whatever the origins of the TEA side payment packages, important questions for future
liberalizers and protectionists was whether those packages offered meaningful redress to the
groups facing the risks of liberalization, and whether those packages facilitated freer trade. In the
immediate aftermath of the episode, the short term virtues and limitations of the compensation were
pretty clear. As designed, the adjustment assistance compensation was an innovative form of
relief. Together with the Manpower Development Training Act, passed in the same year as the
TEA, the program represented the first experiment in post-war US history with active labor market
policy. Its focus on the suffering of workers and firms due to international competition focused, in
the first instance, on the effects of TEA liberalization. But the program was to help vulnerable
groups, regardless of sector, beyond that piece of legislation. Most importantly, where the quota
arrangements in the textile and lumber compensation helped workers and firms by sheltering them
from the winds of competition, with no explicit expectation or demand that adjustment take place
during that sheltering, the program was conceived as an alternative to protectionist sheltering. It
sought to provide help and incentive to adjust to market competition.
The TAA and other programs created as compensation were to provide benefits, moreover,
roughly in accord with the level of pain the groups anticipated. For textiles and lumber, the
prospects of some VER protection meant that the TEA tariff liberalization -- which would turn out
to be less than 20 percent -- would not pose sizable dislocation. And the compensation was
modest in the amount of money spent, but offered genuine redress in line with the perceived needs
of industry representatives. The same can be said of Labor -- though only given the design of the
compensation and anticipation of American industrial competitiveness. Most of the side payment
program costs (e.g. lumber roads, TAA, reformed two-price cotton, etc.) were to be borne by tax-
payers generally -- groups on whom the benefits of liberalization would be significant. And the
design of TAA compensation would target for assistance the groups most deserving of assistance,
in the sense of suffering trade-related and significant dislocation. On the other hand, some
vulnerable groups would get less than others, particularly when one compared textiles and lumber
with the others. So the equity of the compensation looked promising but not perfect.
As for the degree to which the compensation facilitated liberalization in the short term, the
story was mixed. Both the lumber and textile compensation packages were combined with VER
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protectionist redress, complicating our assessment of how much side payments independently
defused opposition. The history of the textile compensation pretty strongly suggests that the side
payment provisions had little if any effect in buying off textile opposition -- since all the groups
and their legislative champions explicitly held out their votes for the LTA. But the lumber
compensation appears to have had a stronger and more positive effect -- despite the ambiguous and
ultimately unfulfilled promise of VER protection. And the TAA appears to have played a very
strong role in buying the politically necessary support of the UAW and the AFL-CIO
representatives. And all of the packages may have angered or frustrated some groups, but no votes
or clear group stands against the TEA appear to have been sparked by the compensation.
These short-term benefits and gains left a promising legacy for future struggle over US
trade liberalization. Groups seeking to protect themselves from the ravages of international
competition could look to the 1962 experience to see that successful agitation need not yield
continued protectionism in the face of a liberalization initiative, but can yield side payments that
compensate for the pain of that initiative. Those seeking liberalization, likewise, could look to the
TEA history and conclude that providing various kinds of side payments to the groups most
opposed to liberalization can successfully dampen their opposition or even buy their active support.
With this precedent set by the 1962 compensated liberalization, every subsequent initiative since
has been accompanied by consideration of some compensation for groups who stand to lose.
Continuation of compensated liberalization may have rested mainly on the power and determination
of protector groups to threaten or retaliate against future liberalization. But knowledge of the 1962
exchanges put compensation on the agenda for both protectionists and liberalizers.
In the longer term, however, the jury was still out on both the political effectiveness and
humanity of compensation. The usefulness of compensation depended in part on how adjustment
assistance would be implemented -- how much training assistance, income supplements, and other
benefits would flow forth, and to whom. It also depended upon whether programs would promote
or discourage economic adjustment out of non-competitive industry. In the years to follow, as
Chapter Three explains, the implementation of adjustment assistance in the subsequent several
years suggested that the compensation would fall well short of its promise to off-set social costs
and to facilitate liberalization. More importantly, in part because of these disappointments, the
political legacy suggested by the immediate aftermath of the TEA's passage also foundered on the
rocks of TAA's implementation, with groups on both sides of the free trade aisle increasingly
suspicious of compensation as a useful means to humanize and facilitate further openness.
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Chapter Three
Within a few years of getting started under the Trade Expansion Act, US compensated
liberalization ran into trouble. The trouble unfolded over the next ten years of policy-making, as
Kennedy concluded the GATT Round his TEA had authorized, and as Johnson and Nixon
administrations championed new liberalization initiatives -- a bilateral liberalization agreement, the
1965 US-Canada Auto Pact, and preparations for a new GATT round. As the decade unfolded,
the implementation of previous side payment assistance and the declining international
competitiveness of many American industries led to a maturation, followed by a decline, in the use
of compensatory side payments to humanize and facilitate freer trade. This chapter tells that story.
The side payment politics on which this chapter focuses is heavily influenced by the
implementation of trade adjustment assistance, the broadest and most promising compensatory side
payment of the 1962 TEA. Set up primarily as side payments to organized labor, the program
ended up benefiting very few workers and firms because eligibility was rarely granted, and the
benefits modest and slow in coming when it was. Whether or not liberalizers purposefully limited
adjustment assistance, organized labor and a number of other groups became increasingly
disenchanted with such assistance as a viable imperfect substitute for protectionism -- with
important implications for side payment politics.
In the first test of compensated liberalization following the 1962 TEA -- the 1965 Canadian-
American Automobile Pact -- the tight administration of adjustment assistance may have
emboldened rather than dampened interest in side payments. When the US auto manufacturers and
other government groups sought a bilateral agreement with Canada, the United Auto Workers
strongly criticized the early experience with adjustment assistance, but redoubled their commitment
to its improvement. Liberalizers, for their part, recognized the importance of providing some
safeguards against pain from Auto Pact liberalization, not only to smooth the path to freer auto
trade but to keep together their labor-industry coalition behind free trade generally. The result was
the provision of improved adjustment assistance for workers and firms affected by the Auto Pact.
Mindful of the past but seeking a better future with adjustment assistance, this episode marked a
maturation of compensated liberalization.
As the decade matured, however, continued frustration with the broader TAA program
actually sewed the seeds of compensated liberalization's demise. Organized labor was the most
important coalition in this process. Faced with continuing onslaughts of foreign imports along-
side substantial job and wage losses among their ranks, the AFL-CIO and most of its members
became increasingly disenchanted with such assistance as a viable imperfect substitute for
protectionism. Even though their new trade policy stance explicitly brought in issues of investment
regulation hitherto separated from the trade arena, this disenchantment was so thorough-going that
the AFL-CIO turned away from a position of conditioning support for or moderated opposition to
freer trade upon provision side payments of any kind, embracing instead unconditional
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protectionism. In addition, labor groups suffered declines in their party and membership base,
hence political power, thus becoming increasingly unable as well as unwilling to extract
compensatory side payments. The UAW and a few other unions were more cautiously optimistic
about the benefits of adjustment assistance given their good experience with the 1965 US-Canada
Auto Pact, and they continued to support expansion of adjustment assistance as a condition for
their support of the liberalization. But this support was growing thinner.
Although labor was increasingly disenchanted with such payments, adjustment assistance
enjoyed modest support among some protectionists and a number of legislators: the UAW
continued to hold out hope for its expansion and reform; those generally supportive of
liberalization could show their constituents they cared about and were doing something to help the
losers of trade, and such assistance was already on the books and was, therefore, virtually costless
as a subject of side payments; and the provision continued to appeal to fairness ideas pervasive
among many liberalizers and the polity at large. As a result, adjustment assistance was neglected
when trade policy was not on the docket, but every time it was -- whether the legislative initiative
was protectionist or liberal in its thrust -- bargainers put forward proposals to expand adjustment
assistance as a side payment to protectionists, to victims of freer trade.
This interest was for naught, however, when surging protectionist tides yielded alternating
episodes of aborted liberalization and blocked protectionism. Other than the Auto Pact glimmer,
the offer of compensatory side payments did little to dampen opposition, even in concert with a
variety of exemption, revision and other bargaining tactics. And other than the Pact, struggles over
trade yielded no actual side payments during the decade. With adjustment assistance being the
main subject of such payment politics, this meant no improvement in the operation of side
payments and deepening cynicism about the humanity and political effectiveness of side payments
on both sides of the freer trade aisle.
The maturation and subsequent decline in the incidence and effectiveness of side payments
between 1963-1972 trade policy-making mostly corroborates the theory of compensated
liberalization. The 1965 US-Canada Auto Pact, brought government, industry, and labor groups
together in a forum for intensive consultation, and included concentrated and powerful auto labor
unions with a emboldened interest in improving adjustment assistance provisions as an explicit
compensated liberalization strategy. With such a coincidence of the UAW's power and relatively
conciliatory, multi-issue platform, the theory predicts provision of side payments.
As the decade wore on, and in the broader multi-sectoral trade policy-making arena, the
conditions were not so favorable or simple. Continued non-administration of the adjustment
assistance side payment, marking intentional or unintentional reneging on a side payment promise,
undermined trust in the usefulness of side payments, and this fueled a narrowing of the AFL-
CIO's trade policy platform towards unconditional protectionism. But some groups, especially the
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UAW with its more favorable experience with the Auto Pact TAA, remained at least tepidly
committed to adjustment assistance as a subject of compensation. And other factors outside the
theory pushed for continued TAA side payments -- the ease of relying on some policy pork already
on the agenda, the symbolic value of adjustment assistance, and the way such assistance appealed
to fairness ideas generally. These conditions perpetuated interest in the adjustment assistance as a
side payment, but the lack of acute interest as part of a strong protectionist group's trade policy
platform meant that adjustment assistance compensation would be confined to a modest and
politically-precarious level of funding and entitlement.
This story of the maturation and decline of compensated liberalization can be told in three
parts. First is the history of the US-Canada Auto Pact in 1965, the sectoral liberalization initiative
that yielded a maturation of the adjustment assistance compensation for organized labor. The
second section chronicles developments in side payment politics that undermined interest in
compensated liberalization among various protectionist groups, especially organized labor. Third
is the story of how these shifts in trade policy stances fueled years of frustration in US trade
policy-making, foregone and blocked initiatives by the Johnson and Nixon Administrations, and
the protectionist initiatives by unconditional protectionists -- all of which provoked lots of interest
in and talk of, but also no provision of side payments. A final section of reviews the decade's
post-Auto Pact side payment disappointments in light of the theory of compensated liberalization.
1. The 1965 Canadian-American Automotive Products Agreement
The first significant trade liberalization initiative after passage of Kennedy's 1962 Trade
Expansion Act turned out to be a bilateral and sector-based initiative that took place completely
outside of the GATT arena. The Kennedy Round was well under way, but was mired in
disagreements between the US and the EC over reciprocal industrial and agricultural concessions;
any major liberalization to emerge from the talks were distant or out of sight. Meanwhile, a crisis
was brewing in US-Canadian automobile trade that was ultimately resolved with negotiation of the
US-Canada Automobile Pact in 1965. The Pact was a bilateral agreement on auto trade that
dramatically reduced both US and Canadian tariffs on autos and auto parts. Growing out of the
mix of unqualified support of auto manufacturers, the qualified support of unions, and the strident
opposition of US parts producers and Republican partisans, the resulting liberalization dramatically
increased US-Canadian trade. And the Pact foreshadowed the free-trade zone bilateralism that has
come to share center stage with GATT multilateralism in the US trade policy-making of the 1980s
and 1990s. For this reason, alone, the politics of the Pact deserves more study than the scant
attention it has so far received from historians and scholars of US trade policy-making.'
' There are a number of fine studies of the nature and effects of the US-Canada Auto Pact, including of its
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The 1965 Auto Pact should also be remembered as a maturation of the compensated
liberalization begun in 1962. The US legislation ratifying this liberalization ended up providing
clear and significant expansion of trade adjustment assistance for the US workers and firms
expected to suffer from the adjustment caused by the Pact's liberalization. This assistance
stemmed from the anticipated welfare losses and the need to buy political opposition of groups
who had made clear their continued interest in but disappointment with the 1962 Trade Adjustment
Assistance. Offering specific revisions in the eligibility criteria that eased access to adjustment
assistance, the Johnson Administration was able to secure the support and votes of a number of
groups, without whom the Auto Pact may well have never made it through Congress. What
explains this maturation of compensated liberalization, and to what extent did it actually improve
upon past compensation?
Answering these questions begins with understanding the Pact as an example of substantial
trade liberalization and not just market rationalization. It then requires overview of the societal
opposition and conditional support for the Pact among auto-parts producers and labor unions,
followed by details the Johnson Administration's enactment legislation that combined liberalization
with side payments. Overview of the legislative battle for the legislation in both the House and
Senate then reveals how much the compensatory side payment reflected pragmatic response to
UAW demands, and the extent to which the compensation lowered political opposition and secured
political support for the Pact.
1.1. The Prelude and the Pact
The Auto Pact grew out a crisis in US-Canadian trade relations that, in turn, grew out of
the Canadian government's long-standing attempt to sustain and protect a domestic automobile
industry. Even though Canadian auto workers earned substantially less than their US
counterparts, economic pressures strongly discouraged any substantial Canadian auto
manufacturing, and favored an integrated market where US manufacturers would be the
predominant producers (Woodcock, House Ways and Means 1965, p.256).2 In view of these
pressures, the Canadian government sought to nurture a Canadian auto manufacturing industry
behind tariffs of between 17.5 percent on finished autos and 25 percent on most auto parts,
substantially higher than the US tariffs. The Canadian government acknowledged that some auto
adjustment assistance provisions, such as the Beigie 1977 on which I draw heavily. But not a single study exists to
my knowledge that details its political history.
2 The Canadian auto market was small, estimated at around 7 percent of the US market, and could not absorb auto
production runs of a size that could sustain the massive economies of scale in production and learning advantages
that the nearby US producers had long relied on to keep prices low (Beigie 1970). Also, many of the Canadian
producers were actually subsidiaries of these huge US producers eager to produce their cars as efficiently as possible,
and Canadian auto exports faced substantial US tariffs.
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Table 3.1
Canadian Automotive Trade with the
United States 1961-64 (in millions of Canadian dollars)
Net balance of Percent, col.(3)
Automotive trade with the United States international as a percent of
Exports Imports Balance payments col.(4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1961 $12 $398 -$386 -$982 39.3
1962 15 505 -490 -874 56.1
1963 37 587 -550 -557 98.7
1964 97 681 -584 -453 128.9
Source: House Ways and Means Hearings on US-Canada Automotive Products Agreement, p.257.
parts couldn't be economically produced in Canada, and these could be imported from the US duty
free providing they were used in cars that met a minimum of overall "Canadian content."
This policy of protection proved to be unsustainable. Canadians bought plenty of imported
US luxury cars, despite the high tariffs, and the Canadian auto producers required substantial
inflows of dutied or duty-free US-made parts. At the same time, the Canadian parts and finished
vehicle producers were unable to compete effectively in the tight and moderately protected US
market. US tariffs were 6.5 percent on finished autos and 8.5 percent on most parts. The result,
revealed in Table 3.1, was a very lop-sided and growing trade imbalance in auto vehicles and
parts. In 1961 the deficit stood at $386 million (Canadian dollars), growing to $490 million in
1962, $550 million in 1963, and $584 million in 1964, representing a high percentage of Canada's
overall $962 million trade deficit. By 1962, in fact, Canada's overall balance of payments situation
worsened to the point that it was forced to devalue against the US dollar. This devaluation helped
to improve the overall trade deficit, but the auto trade deficit continued to grow.3
Canada's response to the problem was initially unilateral, and therein lay the seeds of a
crisis. In 1962, the Canadian government renewed the duty-free status granted to automatic
transmissions from the US before that status expired, but it added the condition that for every
dollar by which the auto manufacturers increased their exports to the US they could bring in an
equal value of US-made transmissions duty free. 4 This remission plan gave Canadian producers
strong incentives and the ability to expand exports to the US, and at the same time gave US auto
companies strong incentives to reallocate production from their US plants to Canada in order to
3 As Table 3.1 shows, and as UAW Leonard Woodcock was to later point out, the trade pattern underlying this
deficit was "almost exclusively a one-way street (Woodcock, p.256). The Table also shows how the auto deficit
grew even as the overall trade balance improved after the 1962 devaluation:
4 On October 22, 1963, the government generalized this program with the "full duty-remission program." This
program "allowed a manufacturer (defined as a firm producing in Canada at least 40 percent of the vehicles it sold
there) to earn the remission of duties on a dollar's worth of any new vehicle and original parts imports for each dollar
of Canadian content in vehicle and parts exports in excess of the Nov. 1,'61-Oct.31,'62, base level" (Beigie p.38).
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take advantage of the rebates. The trade balance figures between 1962 and 1964 (shown in last
footnote) show that such incentives were working: both exports and imports rose substantially.
The same incentives also meant that the remission duty program amounted to the first salvo
of a brewing trade war. By March 1964, the plan had become a major bone of contention in
Canadian-American trade relations.' Whether or not a trade war was really about to break out,
bilateral negotiations between US and Canadian officials ensured a more amicable, and liberal,
solution. Trade, Commerce, and Treasury officials frequently shuttled back-and-forth across the
border between April 1964 and January 1965, searching for a solution that would help Carnada's
ailing auto industry and expand US-Canadian auto trade.
The fruit of their efforts was the Automotive Agreement of 1965, establishing conditional
duty-free trade between Canada and the United States in most auto products. The Agreement was
signed by President Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson on January 16, 1965.6 The Agreement
sought the dual, if somewhat contradictory, objectives: to promote and protect a Canadian
automobile industry and to expand and liberalize US-Canada automobile trade. The trade
expanding and liberalizing aims were formally expressed in the intergovernmental Agreement as
the dominant aims of the Agreement. Article I states that the purposes of the Agreement were
three-fold:
(a) The creation of a broader market for automotive products within which the full
benefits of specialization and large-scale production can be achieved;
(b) The liberalization of United States and Canadian automotive trade in respect of tariff
barriers and other factors tending to impede it, with a view to enabling the industries of
both countries to participate on a fair and equitable basis in the expanding total market of
the two countries;
(c) The development of conditions in which market forces may operate effectively to
attain the most economic pattern of investment, production and trade.
(Agreement, reproduced in Beigie 1970, p.109).
This market liberalization was to be enacted by elimination of US and Canadian tariffs and other
duties. For both countries, this represented substantial liberalization. On completed vehicles, US
tariffs in 1964 were 6.5% for passenger cars, 8.5% for trucks, and 7.5% for buses. On virtually
all auto parts, both specified (when of a class of part) and unspecified (such as brake linings), the
' Formally, the controversy arose from the plan's apparent conflict with the provisions of Section 303 of the US
Customs Act of 1930. This Act provided that if a certain product exported into the US was being subsidized by a
"bounty or grant," as determined by the US Treasury Department, the US would impose a countervailing duty even
if its import wasn't causing domestic injury (Beigie p.38). By April 15, 1964, a parts company in Wisconsin filed a
petition with the US Bureau of Customs charging that the Canadian plan represented a "bounty or grant" by the
definition of the 1930 Customs Act. This led to a formal review of the company's petition by the US Treasury.
Both the US and Canadian governments, as well as their employer and employee constituencies, recognized that the
next step was going to be imposition of a counter-veiling duty or some other retaliation, which would in turn spark
a Canadian counter-retaliation. A number of groups openly spoke of an impending trade war.
6 The Auto Pact actually had two components, a formal intergovernmental Agreement and side conditions placed
upon vehicle manufacturers and formalized in "letters of undertaking" that auto manufacturers operating in Canada
submitted, more or less confidentially, just days before signing of the intergovernmental Agreement.
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tariff was 8.5% (CQ Almanac 1965, p.5 10). 7 Canada, meanwhile, started with even higher tariffs
on most products. So the agreement ushered in significant liberalization, even though provisions
designed to expand and protect Canadian auto presence constrained the degree of openness,
particularly from the perspective of Canadian producers (Beigie 1970, CQ Almanac 1965, p.509).8
From the perspective of US producers, those auto factories and people operating in the US,
the Agreement was clearly liberalizing and potentially dislocating. The removal of tariffs on
completed vehicles and parts ensured substantial new competition and a relocation of production
that would entail declining exports, and the pledges by manufacturers to meet Canadian production
targets ensured even more relocation than market rationality might advise.
Significantly, the Auto Pact contained no explicit or new safeguards for the groups in the
US or Canada expected to suffer adjustment dislocation as a result of the liberalization and
expansion of Canadian production. Only through exemption, via tariff relief for Canadian parts-
producers, were there any adjustment safeguards. There were no requirements for any passive or
active labor market policies, technical assistance, and the like, beyond the provisions in the two
countries that were already in place for all trade-displaced or generally aggrieved workers or firms.
Such uncompensated and compromised liberalization would probably have stayed that way
were it not for the separation of powers in the US. Canadian participation in the Pact was formally
established by parliamentary order immediately after its signing.9 But US participation required
Congressional ratification, because the agreed-upon removal of tariff barriers on auto vehicles and
parts was greater than the elimination and reduction authority granted the president in the 1962
Trade Expansion Act. It was during the ratification process that there was an opportunity for
groups opposed to or ambivalent over the Pact to limit the liberalization, to revoke the
commitments to expand Canadian production, or to establish adjustment safeguards. Therefore,
when the Agreement was signed on January 16, 1965, it was on that ratification process that
ambivalent and opposition groups set their sights.
' Some specialty vehicles and parts were to be exempted from this liberalization, as were all tires and tubes used as
original equipment or replacement (Beigie, p.46). The removal of US duties, moreover, was extended only to
Canadian producers whose product content achieved a minimum North American content to prevent "third country"
producers from using Canada as a means to circumvent the US tariff.
8 The commitment to expand and protect a Canadian auto presence found expression in both the intergovernmental
Agreement and the "letters of undertaking." Article 2 (5), Annex A of the intergovernmental Agreement specified
that only certain vehicle manufacturers could enjoy duty-free treatment. To be eligible a firm had to satisfy
requirements assuring continued growth of Canada's vehicle assembly and sustaining independent Canadian parts-
producers during the period of transitional adjustment to the provisions of the Agreement.8 In addition to these
formal commitments to sustain or expand Canadian production, producers pledged in their "letters of undertaking" to
increase by 1968 their value added in Canada by an amount equal to 60 percent of the growth in net sales value of
cars and 50 percent of the growth in net sales value of commercial vehicles sold in Canada plus a total of $260
million (Canadian) (Hearings 1965, p. 158-9).
9 Orders in Council P.C. 1965: 1/98, P.C. 1965 - 1/99, and P.C. 1965 - 1/100, all dated the same day as the
signing of the agreement, January 16, 1965.
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1.2. Support, Opposition and an Ambivalent UAW
In the period just before, during, and after signing of the Auto Pact, the only groups to take
a stand were those directly interested: auto manufacturers, independent parts producers, and
unions on both sides of the border. The vehicle manufacturers -- mainly the Big Three (Ford,
GM, and Chrysler) but also American Motors -- were strongly in favor of the Pact. Indeed, they
were at the center of its formulation and negotiation. Most Canadian and American manufacturing
and trade took place under the auspices of these producers. With the agreement substantially
lowering duties and other barriers, these manufacturers anticipated higher profits at existing price
levels,'0 an expanding market in so far as prices could be lowered, and greater freedom to move
production facilities to wherever locational, labor, and other characteristics made manufacturing
most cost-effective. In exchange for these advantages, the manufacturers made promises in their
"letters of undertaking" to expand production in Canada, expansion that generally conformed to
their optimal production profile independent of the political pressures (Beigie 1970). In other
words, the big producers had the most to gain from the agreement.
The group with the most to lose, on the other hand, were the independent parts producers
based in the US. These manufacturers and their wholesalers include some 20,000 automotive
firms, located in all 50 states, and employed more than 400,000 people (Levine to Ways and
Means, p.244)." These manufacturers were represented mainly by the Automotive Service
Industry Association (ASIA), which claimed membership of more than 5,000 manufacturers,
rebuilders, warehouse distributors, and wholesalers of auto replacement parts, tools, equipment,
and other accessories. These independent suppliers stood to suffer from the Auto Agreement for
three reasons. First, the elimination of tariffs was not to apply to all replacement parts, so
internationally competitive producers of such parts couldn't gain access to .the Canadian market.
Meanwhile, these producers feared that US tariffs on the replacement parts could be circumvented
by Canadian companies importing duty free into the US parts ostensibly for use in original
equipment but destined for the replacement parts market. Finally, many independent parts
manufacturers expected to suffer the loss of their few customers as Big Three vehicle assemblers
moved facilities North of the border.
The third actor, organized labor, had a clear interest in the Pact's outcome but was neither
an opponent nor an unconditional supporter of the Agreement. The United Auto Workers
international union represented virtually every person working in the automobile industry -- in the
US and Canada. UAW representatives, therefore, had a strong interest in any change in US-
to This benefit, in fact, became the subject of criticism by the UAW and a few others, who demanded that
manufacturers pass benefits of lower tariffs and, hence, costs onto the consumers rather than into their own pockets.
" The Tariff Commission estimates that over 10,000 independent US businesses supply parts to US auto
manufacturers (Senate Finance Committee Minority Report 1965, p.39).
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Canada trade. One of organized labor's most internationalist supporters of expanded trade, the
UAW strongly favored the liberalization and integration of the US and Canadian markets. But they
conditioned this support on the provision of safeguards for workers likely to be dislocated as a
result of the liberalization's dislocation. Their power and ambivalence over the Pact made them the
most important player in a story about the Pact as compensated liberalization.
Prior to the US-Canada Auto Pact episode, the UAW had long been one of the strongest
supporters of compensated liberalization. By the mid-1960s, UAW representatives aggressively
supported freer and expanded trade that they saw benefiting society as a whole, combined with
generous and accessible assistance for workers and firms bearing the costs that they believed
accompanied such trade. Before, during, and after the political struggle over the 1962 Trade
Expansion Act, the UAW was one of the strongest and most vocal unions within the AFL-CIO to
support the TEA's tariff-cutting authority, conditional mainly upon adjustment assistance for the
victims of freer trade.12
But the UAW was also, recall, the most circumspect about whether the adjustment
assistance provisions in the TEA were adequate compensation for the injury that authority might
cause. They called for, among other things, an increase in adjustment allowances, an extension of
duration when suitable jobs proved unavailable, provision of assistance to adversely affected
communities, and continuation of benefits for as long as workers were enrolled in approved
training." After the Senate modestly expanded the program, though short of these demands, the
UAW still supported TEA passage.
On the issue of expanding and liberalizing US-Canada automobile trade, the UAW was
more strongly supportive, but also even more adamant that such liberalizing be accompanied by
better safeguards for dislocated workers. Among the many reasons for supporting the Pact
integration and liberalization,' 4 UAW representatives saw the possibility of doing something the
union had hitherto been unable to do, leverage-up wages of Canadian auto workers to US levels by
removing the argument of auto companies that lower Canadian wages reflected lower efficiency."5
As Reuther was to later point out, the new arrangement, predicated on evening efficiency across
12 They also took interest in labor standards.
3 See Chapter Two discussion of House Ways and Means hearings and also UAW 18th Constitutional Convention,
Resolutions, 1962.
14 Their support for an integrated market was stronger than for general trade liberalization for a variety of reasons.
As virtually all auto workers on both sides of the border were UAW members, the prospect of expanded trade did not
entail new competition from non-union producers who would displace uc~in-members. And the union recognized
the company line that an integrated, freer market would lead to increased efficiency, reducing costs and prices, and
thereby increasing total sales. This, in turn, could be expected to result in benefits in the form of higher wages and
more stable employment for the workers in the firms doing the selling.
15 The auto companies had long paid Canadian workers substantially less than their US workers, an average of over
50 cents an hour in the Big Three and much more than that in many supplier companies, and they had done so on the
argument that Canadian production was less efficient. Leonard Woodcock, UAW Vice President, claims that the
difference is 40 or more cents per hour. See Woodcock testimony in House Hearings 1965, p.256.
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the US-Canada borders, "will remove any possible justification for continuing the present disparity
in wages between the United States and Canadian auto workers" (Reuther 1966, p.134). This, in
turn, "will not only mean a substantial improvement in living standards for our Canadian members
and their families, but will eliminate the threat of removal of US plants to Canada in search of
lower wage costs."' 6
But by the time the bilateral arrangement was being negotiated, the conditionality of the
UAW's support for freer trade had also hardened. UAW leaders continued to see freer trade as
fraught with adjustment dislocation for the few that necessitates compensation in the interest of
fairness." Beneath this principled fairness stance, however, lay more narrow concerns that the
Auto Pact promised significant dislocations for its union members as US and Canadian firms
shifted production facilities. This dislocation was more certain for union workers in independent
parts suppliers, whose closing from Big Three relocation was inevitable.
UAW's position on safeguards was also more skeptical than it had been in 1962 because of
the Trade Adjustment Assistance program's actual record of assistance. Since its passage in 1962,
UAW and other unions were acutely aware, the program had done nothing to help the victims of
liberalization. The TAA provisions stipulated that assistance could not be provided until the Tariff
Commission made a determination that tariff concessions caused serious injury to the group
applying for assistance. As of early 1965, there had been 18 requests for such determinations --
five initiated by workers, four by individual firms, and nine by representatives of industry
groups.•" In not a single one of those cases had the Commission made a favorable determination.
The UAW and most other unions and other commentators attributed this record to excessively tight
eligibility criteria set up in the TEA act, and a very tight reading of those criteria by the Tariff
Commission.' 9 As UAW representative testimony was to complain, "if auto workers and small
firms had to rely on Trade Expansion Act for protection [as a result of the US-Canada Pact], they
would in fact have no protection at all" (Woodcock, p.266).
As for the kind of compensation that would provide real protection, the union was more
ambiguous, sometimes speaking of narrow revisions of the TAA program, sometimes talking of
international wage supports that resembled the European Coal and Steel Community schemes. But
16 The agreement actually strengthened the position of the UAW in its collective bargaining in 1964, with the
bilateral initiative imminent. Woodcock points out that UAW negotiators were able to narrow the wage gap to just
short of 10 cents "predicated upon the imminence of this agreement" (Woodcock testimony, p.2 7 1). It isn't clear
whether this wage concession represented a side payment to the union, to buy its support for the agreement, or
whether the impending increases in Canadian production efficiency justified the increase on its own merit.
17 As UAW President Walter Reuther quoted Henry Ford approvingly in his testimony over the Trade Expansion Act
in 1962, "There is real justice in the idea that, since a liberal trade policy is essential for our nation as a whole,
special hardships that might be created by such a policy ought not to be borne by a limited group in the society"
(quoted in UAW 1962, p.69-70).
18 None of these petitions came from the UAW or from vehicle or auto parts manufacturers.
19 The nature and origins of the Trade Adjustment Assistance program's poor performance will be discussed in more
detail below.
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more often, UAW representatives used more general language of safeguards, as when Reuther
remembered that the union's support for the Pact and its ratifying legislation would depend "both
upon the adequacy of the protection it would provide for affected workers and their families and on
whether it, in fact, would provide definite assurance that the workers would actually receive the
benefits provided" (Reuther 1966, p. 137).
So the UAW approached the issue of US-Canada auto trade with a hardened stance in
support of compensated liberalization -- better compensation for more thorough-going
liberalization. In 1960, well before the crisis in trade sparked bilateral negotiations, the UAW
acted on this stance when the Canadian government appointed a Royal Commission to look into the
problems of the auto industry in that country. The Canadian section of the UAW made a proposal
to the Royal Commission that was said to have been very similar to the actual Auto Pact agreement
in combining duty free liberalization and market integration with production targets for Canadian
producers (Woodcock, p.255). According to UAW Vice President, "we also proposed such
necessary safeguards, including adjustment assistance for workers" (Woodcock, p.256).
As for the negotiation of the Auto Pact itself, UAW representatives were only peripherally
involved. Representatives of the UAW met from time to time with representatives of the US State,
Labor and Commerce Departments while negotiations were under way. And at the same time,
George Burt, the UAW's Canadian Regional Director, and some of his staff, consulted with the
Canadian Ministers of External Affairs, Industry and Labor and their staffs (Reutherl966,p. 135).
We don't know the details of the consultations, how much emphasis was on the need for
safeguards and how much for a particular degree or kind of market expansion and liberalization.
When the Agreement was signed on January 16, 1965, however, UAW President Walter
Reuther immediately made a speech laying out the union's compensated liberalization position.
Reuther pointed out that his union had "long favored trade legislation and expansion" and that "we
have advocated for many years the creation of such a common market" (Reuther 1966, p. 137).
The Auto Pact's market opening, he said, would "prove to be in the best interest of the economies,
the consumers and the workers of both countries" (Reuther 1966, p. 137). But Reuther then called
upon both the US and Canadian government to provide safeguards for dislocated groups:
In order to achieve the more rational division of labor made possible by the Agreement,
there will inevitably be some readjustment of production within and between both
countries. This could result in hardship and dislocations for some groups of auto workers
and their families unless effective steps are taken to tide them over the transition period.
We call upon both governments to assure that adequate protection will be provided for
those who would otherwise be adversely affected by the agreement. It would be wholly
improper for the auto corporations and car consumers to enjoy the benefits of the agreement
while auto workers and their families bear the burden and sacrifices resulting from it.
(quoted in Woodcock 1965, p.256).
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Reuther provided no specifics about specific kinds of safeguards, but he explicitly singled out the
European Coal and Steel Community plan as a good model, referring to how it was a "comparable
situation" in how it was a regional integrating of markets that was likely to dislocate workers in all
the countries being integrated. The ECSC plan, Reuther pointed out, "provides 'tide-over'
allowances for workers that run as high as 100 percent of wages plus other forms of assistance
including supplementation or reduced wages received on new jobs" (Woodcock 1965, p.256).
Table 3.2
US Auto Industry Employment, 1958-64 (in Thousands)
%Chnge
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 since '61
Motor vehicles 242,000 272,500 295,300 253,700 275,200 301,400 313,500 30%
Passenger car bodies 54,700 60,500 65,900 56,200 61,100 61,100 58,200 6%
Truck and bus bodies 25,400 28,800 30,900 29,600 30,800 33,000 33,800 33%
Car parts/accessrs. 267,700 309,400 313,000 276,300 304,200 328,300 343,300 28%
Added totals 589,800 671,200 705,100 615,800 671,300 723,800 748,800 27%
TOTAL* 606,500 692,300 724,100 632,300 691,700 745,200 771,100 27%
* Totals do not add up for reasons I don't understand, perhaps rounding
(Source: US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employment and Earnings."
In making these remarks, Reuther had his sights set on the implementing legislation that the
Johnson Administration would have to submit to Congress to ratify the agreement. The hope was
to pressure the Administration to include in its legislation, some explicit safeguards that improved
upon or replaced the existing and failed Trade Adjustment Assistance program. As Reuther
remembered, "We needed to make certain that eligibility requirements for benefits to workers under
the legislation implementing the agreement were reasonable, that the benefits were adequate and
that the administration of the act would be fair and equitable" (Reuther 1966, p.137). Although
the detail of the proposals are unclear, the UAW continued its pressure for such safeguards while
the Administration's ratification bill was being drafted. During that time, Walter Reuther explicitly
discussed the need for accessible and adequate assistance with president Johnson, Secretary of
Labor Wirtz and officials of other US government agencies (Reuther 1966, ibid.).
So the UAW made their support for the Pact liberalization clearly conditional upon the
inclusion of substantial and accessible safeguard assistance in the enactment legislation. But
should the Johnson Administration care about what the UAW wanted? The answer is that they
needed to care very much, because the size and distribution of auto employment, the UAW's
predominance in representing those employees, and the UAW's influence in the AFL-CIO, gave
the union power to threaten passage of the Auto Pact and even future liberalization initiatives.
Automobile employees numbered nearly 1,000,000 people. Most of these were employed
in segments of industry whose main production was for the production of automobiles. This
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includes, of course, vehicle assembly, but also the production of car bodies, and motor vehicle
parts and accessories. Table 3.2 above shows the growing trends in the number of these
employees. Between 1958 and 1964, the total number of auto workers employed in firms whose
main activity was the assembly or production of autos and auto parts grew from 606,000 to
771,100, an increase of more than 27 percent in six years. In addition to these 771,000 workers,
another quarter-million workers were employed in industries producing auto products but whose
major output was outside auto production, as Table 3.3 below shows.
Table 3.3
Non-automotive industries producing
Parts and Accessories, Employment in 1958
1958 Whole Automotive products
SIC Title
3011 Tires and inner tubes
3461 Metal stampings
3429 Harware
3694 Engine elect. equip.
3211 Flat glass
3599 machine products
3691 Storage batteries
3642 Lighting fixtures
3821 mech. meas. devices
3651 Radio&TV sets
3493 Steel springs
3641 Elect. lamps (bulbs)
3069 Fabric. rubber prods.
TOTAL
Industry
89,400
125,600
88,200
39,800
21,200
115,500
14,900
47,300
50,000
66,500
6,800
21,500
119,600
806,300
1958 1959*
71,000 81,044
28,500 32,532
26,000 29,678
25,000 28,537
15,000 17,122
13,000 14,839
10,500 11,985
7,100 8,104
4,500 5,137
4,200 4,794
3,300 3,767
2,800 3,196
4,850 5,536
215,750 246,272
1960*
84,767
34,026
31,041
29,847
17,908
15,521
12,536
8,477
5,373
5,014
3,940
3,343
5,790
257,584
1961"*
74,020
29,712
27,106
26,063
15,638
13,553
10,947
7,402
4,691
4,379
3,440
2,919
5,056
224,928
1962* 1963* 1964*
80,974
32,504
29,652
28,512
17,107
14,826
11,975
8,097
5,132
4,790
3,764
3,193
5,531
246,058
87,237
35,018
31,946
30,717
18,430
15,973
12,901
8,724
5,529
5,160
4,055
3,440
5,959
265,090
90,269
36,235
33,056
31,785
19,071
16,528
13,350
9,027
5,721
5,340
4,196
3,560
6,166
274,303
* All employment figures between 1959 and 1964 are estimated by extrapolating from the 1958 ratio of non-
automobile sector prod. for the auto industry to total auto sector production in Table 3.2
Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "1958 Census of Manufactures"
These workers enjoyed wages higher than almost any manufacturing workers, making
them all the more noticeable and the envy of most manufacturing industries. Average hourly
earnings in 1964 were $3.20, 18 percent higher than the figures for all durable goods
manufacturing and 26 percent higher than the wage average for all manufacturing (Wirtz testimony,
p.90). 20 In all, the payroll for workers in motor vehicle and equipment industry was around 7
percent of the payroll for all of manufacturing in 1963, (Wirtz, p.90).
20 Those working in the parts industry enjoyed comparable wages, only one percent less than those producing bodies
and assembling vehicles.
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Auto manufacturing and its employment was relatively concentrated in roughly ten states,
as Table 3.4 shows.
State
1 Michigan
2 Ohio
3 Indiana
4 New York
5 Wisconsin
6 California
7 Missouri
8 Illinois
9 Pennsylvania
10 New Jersey
Source: US Department
1939-63." 1963
fable 3.4
Top Ten Auto Industry Employers and Their Employees
# of SIC 371
# of Mnftrg. Motor vehicles # of Auto Auto er
employees employees employees as % of
961,090 263,442 338,500
1,239,515 112,368 92,600
609,840 60,226 58,000
1,853,050 40,348 45,200
461,807 37,721 42,100
1,398,611 31,090 31,200
391,254 23,467 26,500
1,210,802 22,409 19,800
1,392,922 5,276 16,200
829.201 718 13.900
mplys.
ftotal
35%
7%
10%
2%
9%
2%
7%
2%
1%
2%
of Labor. "Employment and Earnings Statistics for States and Areas,
The UAW's influence went beyond its dominance among auto industry employees. The
UAW was by far the largest member union within the AFL-CIO, with a total membership in 1965
of 1,150,000 workers. This represented nine percent of the AFL-CIO's total paid membership of
1,2,919,000 (AFL-CIO 8th Constitutional Proceedings, 1969, p.37-39). The next largest member
union was the United Steelworkers with 876,000. Given the UAW's dominance within the AFL-
CIO, a Johnson Administration concerned not so much with its relations with auto workers, but
with labor the AFL-CIO generally, had to take the UAW demands seriously.
1.3. Johnson's Compensated Liberalization
Between the pressure from the UAW and the Administration's commitment to redressing
adjustment costs of the Agreement, the end-product was a proposal for compensated liberalization.
The Johnson Administration drafted its enactment legislation between late January through March,
sending to Congress a completed bill on March 31, 1965. During the drafting, the Administration
chose to propose enactment of the intergovernmental Agreement without any revision or
exemption. The major liberalization provisions of the bill gave the President authority to
retroactively abolish, to January 18, 1965, the 6.5 percent tariff on Canadian autos and 8.5 percent
on Canadian parts. 2
21 Other sections "authorized the President to make similar agreements with other countries, [and] to make
agreements with Canada and other countries for duty reductions on automobile replacement parts" (CQ Almanac
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Also included in the bill were substantial safeguards for the victims of the Pact. The
safeguards took the form of revisions to the existing Trade Adjustment Assistance program that
would significantly expand access to adjustment assistance. The special program revisions were to
take effect in the beginning of 1966 and to last for three years, through June 1968. On the basic
assistance to be provided, the proposed adjustment assistance was identical to that promised under
the TAA. Firms ruled to have been dislocated by the Pact's liberalization and market integration
were to receive financial, technical, and tax assistance. Workers ruled to have been hurt were to
receive "readjustment allowances" (supplements to unemployment benefits, SUBs), training and
training allowances, and relocation subsidies.
On process and eligibility criteria, however, the Auto Pact legislation's provisions were
very different than the TEA adjustment assistance. As for process, the Auto Pact removed
decision-making from the Tariff Commission to an Automotive Agreement Adjustment Board,
comprising the Secretaries of Labor, Commerce, Treasury, and Small Business Administration.
Once eligibility by this Board was approved, subject to Presidential veto, individual workers from
eligible firms would petition the Department of Labor for dispensation of benefits. The Tariff
Commission, thus, was relegated to a fact-finding role in the service of the Board's decision-
making authority. This was different than the TAA procedure in that the Tariff Commission was
staffed mainly by lawyers and those likely to deliberate on more painstaking detail and to be more
averse to providing benefits, whereas the Auto Agreement Adjustment Board was likely to take the
industry concerns as more urgent.
A still bigger difference lay in the much looser eligibility criteria the governing body was to
follow in considering petitioning workers or firms. The TEA made adjustment assistance
eligibility as difficult to meet as escape clause tariff relief eligibility, both requiring that serious
injury (significant unemployment or underemployment of workers) be due "in major part" to tariff
concessions. "In major part" was interpreted to mean "more important than all other causes
combined" and required applicants to show such causation not only between dislocation and
increased imports, but also between increased imports and tariff concessions. The Auto Pact
adjustment assistance, in contrast, required that the Pact be "a primary cause" of actual or
threatened "dislocation," where this was interpreted to mean that the Pact was a cause of injury
which is "more important than any other single factor, but which does not have to be greater than
any combination of other factors" (Manley 1969, p.301). 22
1965, p.510). This authorization would make any resulting agreements automatically binding unless Congress
passed concurrent "resolution of disapproval" within 60 days of signing. Since these tariff reductions were not to be
passed onto other GAT1' signatories despite the GATr "most favored nation" rule, Johnson proclaimed that duty
reductions would not take effect until 60 days from the bill's signing. This would allow enough time for the 66
member nations of the GATT to act on the US's waiver request (CQ Almanac 1965, p.509).
22 Apparently, there was no need to show a causal relationship either between the agreement and some increase in
imports, or between a change in trade flows and dislocation, both of which were necessary under the TEA. All that
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The Auto Pact legislation's adjustment assistance provisions represent a clear side payment
compensation. Even though the proposed program promised no change in the benefits to be
provided to dislocated workers and firms, no supplements to the existing provisions established
under the Trade Expansion Act, the liberalized eligibility criteria and shift in decision-making
authority from the Tariff Commission to the Auto Agreement Adjustment Board promised
expanded access to the program that would help the victims of the proposed liberalization. This
expanded access was, moreover, clearly separate from the core protections being removed by the
Auto Pact, tariffs and duties that hampered US-Canadian auto trade. As a compensatory side
payment, therefore, the auto adjustment assistance provisions were very similar to their TAA
counterparts. Like the 1962 TAA, moreover, the historical questions remaining are similar. Could
the provisions could survive legislative scrutiny, and would they increase the support for the
liberalization without at the same time sparking new opposition?
1.4. The Legislative Fight in the House and Senate
The answer to both these questions, in turns out, is "yes." A number of House and Senate
Republicans, and independent auto parts manufacturers and their legislative agents put up
substantial opposition to the Pact liberalization and, to a lesser degree, to its adjustment assistance
provisions. But support from the Democratic majority, from plenty of Republicans, against a
back-drop of strong support from the automobile manufacturers and, especially, the UAW ensured
an uneventful and clean passage through both the House and Senate. The UAW made its support
for the liberalization clearly and explicitly conditional upon inclusion of the adjustment assistance
provisions, while other groups supporting or opposing the liberalization took positions on those
provisions which ranged from active support to very modest discomfort. Given the UAW's
influence among many Democrats, therefore, adjustment assistance appears to have again done a
lot more good than harm to the liberalization cause.
was required was that "real or threatened unemployment or underemployment of a significant number or proportion
of workers" in an auto firm or subdivision occur at the same time as an "appreciable" change in US-Canadian trade
flows or production (79 Stat. 1019, cited in Frank 1977, p.55). The coincidence was "regarded as prima facie
evidence that the operation of the agreement was a primary cause of the dislocation" (Frank 1977, p. 55).
Other wording was ambiguous, but generously interpreted. Under the Auto Pact, "appreciable" increases in
Canadian imports were not the only relevant trade flows to implicate the agreement as the cause of suffering; so too
were decreases in US exports to Canada greater than any increase in Canadian production of a good, or shifts in
production within the US as part of market rationalization. Although "unemployment or underemployment of a
significant number or proportion of workers" and "appreciable" changes in trade or production were not well defined
in the bill, generous targets were discussed and the Review Board was directed to interpret generously. And
"significant number or proportion of workers" of a particular firm was ambiguous, but the Review Board ultimately
interpreted as "5 percent of the workers or fifty workers in one firm, whichever was less (Manley 1969, p.30 1).
Finally, "appreciable" increase in imports or decrease in exports was also vague: it turned out to be roughly a 5
percent change over the most recent three or four months prior to the period in which dislocation was said to exist
(Frank 1977, p.56). In any event, there was ambiguity that was left to the discretion of the review board.
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The legislation's journey through the House and Senate followed very similar paths. Both
chambers held hearings on the legislation -- the House Ways and Means Committee hearing
testimony between April 27th and the 29th, the Finance Committee hearing testimony from mostly
the same witnesses between September 14th and the 16th, and on the 20th. 23 Both the House and
Senate committees only modestly amended the Administration's bill, sending the amended measure
to their respective floors for limited debate before voting. The expressions of support and
opposition to the bill came from basically the same representatives in both the House and Senate
fights, in the form of testimony, statements and letter-lobbying outside the Congressional halls.
Consistent with the pre-legislation political terrain, the strongest and most unambiguous
support came from the automobile manufacturers, especially the Big Three. Representatives from
GM, Ford, and Chrysler, as well as from American Motors, appeared before both the Senate and
House hearings to testify in favor of the Agreement. 24 They all expressed their strong support for
the liberalization, and took pains to justify these changes as in the interest of the American
consumer, labor, and parts manufacturers, and not as something promoting oligopoly. None of
the representatives in any of the hearings mentioned the adjustment assistance provisions. So it
isn't clear from the legislative episode what stance they took on that side payment. By their
silence, it's fair to say, they were at least not actively against inclusion of the provisions.
Also consistent with the pre-legislation terrain, the strongest and most unambiguous
opposition came from independent parts producers and their legislative agents. These
manufacturers were represented at the hearings by the Automotive Service Industry Association
(ASIA), the Motor and Equipment Manufacturers Association, the Anti-friction Bearing
Manufacturers, and the occasional congressman representing states rich with independent parts
producers. In all cases, the representatives pointed out that the Agreement was designed to benefit
the Big Three at everyone else's expense, by virtue of leaving many replacement part tariffs in
place and by encouraging the flight of assemblers to Canada. None of the industry representatives,
however, said anything about the adjustment assistance provisions. Even though many of them
would be eligible for assistance if they were to find themselves dislocated because of industrial
relocation, increased imports or decreased exports, they apparently were unimpressed. On the
other hand, they apparently didn't take offense at the provisions, or try to see them strengthened.25
23 The Senate Finance Committee controlled the bill's passage through the Senate, but the Foreign Relations
Committee held preliminary hearings on February 10th, before the Administration had introduced its enactment
legislation. In those hearings, there was no talk of providing adjustment assistance or other safeguards in that
legislation.
24 In the House Hearings, GM was represented by James M. Roche, executive vice president; Chrysler was
represented by David W.Kendall, vice president of legal affairs; Ford was represented by Fred C.Secrest, vice
president and controller; and American Motors was represented by Bernard A.Chapman. In the Senate Foreign
Relations hearings, the companies were represented by the same people, except the American Motors Corporation
which was represented by Frederick Holder, director of corporate planning. See House and Senate hearings, passim.
25 The only other unqualified opponent of the agreement outside of government who was to try to cut-down the
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1.4.1. The UAW's Legislative Fight
The UAW's ambivalence made it the pivotal actor in the plight of adjustment assistance
during the legislative fight. The UAW stuck with and clarified the compensated liberalization
stance it had established prior to the enactment legislation. Representatives of the union explicitly
supported the liberalization conditional upon the provision of its adjustment assistance provisions.
The highest profile expressions of this position were Vice President Leonard Woodcock's
testimony to the House Ways and Means, and Nat Weinberg's testimony to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. In his written testimony, Woodcock begins by expressing the UAW's
support for the liberalization of Canadian and US trade providing there are safeguards. But in his
spoken testimony, the first thing Woodcock says, before even explaining the union's support for
the liberalization, is a word of caution that the union's support depends addressing the costs of
liberalization: "Some workers in this country will inevitably be adversely affected by the operation
of the intent of the legislation. Our support, then is possible only because of the adjustment
provisions in the bill" (House Hearings 1965, p.267).26
This stark statement set the stage for a more detailed defense of the union conditioning its
support for the auto market liberalization upon adjustment assistance. In a variety of places in the
testimony, both UAW representatives point to how broad moral standards of fairness require
compensated liberalization. The initial statement of the position by Woodcock, in which he equates
fairness issues of the Auto Pact liberalization to those of military base closures, provides the
clearest statement of the position:
The position of any workers who may be adversely affected [by the Agreement] is
essentially the same as that of workers who are affected by any other Government action
taken for the good of the country as a whole -- for example, the closing of defense
bases....
The Government's responsibility to workers affected by the closing of bases stemmed
from the fact that these were Government decisions made in order to achieve desired
economies, reduce Government expenditures of taxpayers' money, and so benefit the
whole country. The position of workers adversely affected under this agreement will be so
different. The agreement has been entered into because our Government believed it would
bring benefits to our country and to the people of our country. But, in achieving those
benefits for the people as a whole, adjustments will undoubtedly have to be made within
the auto industry....Then why should not the cost of these dislocations be considered
simply as one of the costs of a national benefit, to be paid for by the Nation?....We believe
agreement was O.R. Strackbein, the inveterately protectionist Chairman of the Nationwide Committee on Import-
Export Policy. Although he was less critical of the Auto Pact on the grounds that it entailed a freeing of trade
between countries with similar wage patterns, he nonetheless criticized the Agreement on several counts. Among
them was that the adjustment assistance provisions gave unjustified special treatment to auto workers and firms, and
were thus "distinctly offensive to the sense of fair play" (Strackbein testimony in House Hearings, p.305).
26 The statement of this position at the very outset of his testimony, a position that doesn't get stated in the written
testimony until page three, suggests that Woodcock wanted to leave no doubt in the minds of the Committee
legislators that the UAW's support was conditional.
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there would be every justification for adopting the principle that any worker adversely
affected by the implementation of the auto products agreement ought to be protected in full
against any consequent financial loss. (House Hearings 1965, p.259-260)
Echoing Reuther's earlier statements that such a principle has a real-life precedent in the European
Coal and Steel Community, Woodcock goes on to point out that the proper policy would provide
full and complete safeguards for the income of dislocated workers, safeguarding 100 percent of
their wages (Woodcock, p.259). 27
The UAW's defense of their demand for the adjustment assistance provisions, then, moved
from the moral to the political. Woodcock explains why it was necessary to write special
provisions into the bill rather than to rely on the provisions of the Trade Expansion Act, "especially
since this bill provides that the forms and amounts of assistance provided for under [that] Act shall
apply" (Woodcock, p.260). The reasons, he insisted, were that existing TAA wouldn't cover
some of the expected Auto Pact dislocation, and that existing TAA has been so inaccessible. 28
Whatever the justification, the gist of the union's position on this issue is made crystal clear to the
Committee when Woodcock concludes that "If no assistance had been offered but that available
under the provisions of Trade Expansion Act, we would have had no alternative but to oppose the
agreement" (p.260). As if Woodcock's threat that the UAW would withdraw its support if the
adjustment assistance provisions were removed wasn't enough, he went on to suggest that the
support of the entire US union movement for free trade generally was on the line.
The AFL-CIO as a whole and the UAW conditioned support off the Trade Expansion Act
upon the inclusion of adjustment assistance provisions. Now that the assistance promised
under that act has proved illusory, it will be impossible to mobilize future labor movement
support for trade liberalization unless and until it is demonstrated that meaningful assistance
can and will be provided. The Automotive Products Agreement could be the first step
toward free trade be the first step toward free trade between the US and Canada in a wide
variety of products leading ultimately to a North American common market. It would be
tragic if that possibility were destroyed by failure to provide meaningful adjustment
assistance to workers affected by the Auto Products Agreement. (Woodcock, p.260-1)
Here, the UAW Vice President really took off the gloves. Forget the hallowed principles of
fairness. His point was simpler: liberalizers needed to retain or expand the assistance provisions
they need only consider their political calculation, taking into account not only the UAW's
27 Having identified both the fairness principle of compensated liberalization and a real-life precedent of that
principle, Woodcock says "The bill does not go nearly that far [as far as full protection against consequent financial
loss]. But it does recognize the principle that the country has a special obligation to workers who are adversely
affected by the Automotive Products Agreement, and on that basis we support it" (Woodcock, p.260).
28 In making the first point, he argued that the Auto Agreement is different than the TEA in calling for complete
elimination of duties and in promoting full integration of the market that Woodcock insisted would lead to
dislocation from reduced exports and intra-country production rationalization not safeguarded under the existing TAA.
As for the second reason, Woodcock simply said "...the administration of the Trade Expansion Act has been such a
total failure as far as adjustment assistance is concerned..." (p.260).
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hardened conditionality for the Auto products liberalization but it must also the entire US labor
movement's hardened and more skeptical conditional support for all future liberalization.
1.5. The House and Senate Results
Against the back-drop of these positions and arguments, the legislative fight was pretty
uneventful, with neither the overall liberalization nor the adjustment assistance safeguards ever in
danger of being cut down. 'a the House Ways and Means Committee, partisanship ruled the day.
The 17-member Democratic majority reported the Auto Products Trade Act of 1965 (HR 9042) to
the floor without any changes to the President's bill. In its report, the members noted that
"Fundamentally, it represents a decision by Canada to join with the United States in a relationship
that will allow development of a single North American automotive industry on the basis of
efficient and rational production" (CQ Almanac 1965, p.510).
All eight of the Committee's Republican minority, however, struck a very different
stance. 29 They were concerned at the departure from mu1,ti'ateralism the agreement represented,
and at the potentially more costly adjustment assistance.30 In their minority report, they pointed out
that the President's bill "provides assistance, at the expense of tax payers generally, for
dislocations resulting from business decisions made within the auto industry, and even within a
specific company" (House Minority Report 1965, p.57). Since the US government "has no
control" over these decisions, they argued, "it would be more suitable, if there is to be any such
expense, that the cost be borne largely by the automobile industry itself, since the auto
manufacturers and their Canadian subsidiaries are the principal beneficiaries of this agreement"
(Ibid.). And the Republican minority also stated that the bill, without justification, "singles out the
auto worker for special treatment, while all other workers displaced as a result of tariff concessions
must rely upon the adjustment assistance procedures in the Trade Expansion Act" (Ibid.).
This partisan outcome within Committee starkly contrasts the relatively non-partisan and
modest jostling on the floor of the House. With Ways and Means committing the bill to the floor
with a closed rule that limited debate to three hours and precluded floor amendments, debate began
and was brief on August 30th. On that day five Representatives, four Democrats and one
Republican -- all of whom had large independent auto parts constituencies -- sent a letter on that
29 These members were John W.Byrnes (Wis.), Thomas B.Curtis (Mo.), James B.Utt (Calif.), Jackson E.Betts
(Ohio), Herman T.Schneebeli (Pa.), Harold R.Collier (Ill.), Joel T.Broyhill (Va.), and James F.Battin (Mont.).
30 They all signed a minority report stating that "regardless of their individual position with respect to this bill,
[we]...are seriously concerned because the bill represents a complete departure from the multilateral trade negotiations
which the US has advocated for many years"; might shift so much car production to Canada as to "result in a net
loss to the US economy"; and reflects a missed "opportunity to obtain other concessions...with respect to which
Canada has an unfavorable balance of trade with the US...(particularly wood and paper products)..." (House Minority
Report 1965, p.57).
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day to all House Members asking them to vote against the bill, but their complaints said nothing of
adjustment assistance."3 But the floor debate was to last only sections of the 30th and the 31st.
During that debate, scarcely a word was heard of the adjustment assistance provisions, let alone a
disparaging word. And on August 31st, the House passed the bill by a 280-113 vote, with the
majority of both parties supporting. Among Republicans, 71 voted for and 59 against the
measure. And among Democrats, 209 supported and 54 opposed it. Of the eight Republicans to
file the minority report against the agreement, six voted in favor of the bill. 32
In the Senate, the path was similar to the events on the House Floor -- few sparks, strong
opposition from only a few, and no controversy over the adjustment assistance safeguards. In the
Finance Committee, the majority report trumpeted the Agreement as representing a "new and bold
approach directed toward the dismantling of trade barriers thwarting the economic growth of the
US-Canadian auto industry," ultimately reducing the price of cars to Canadian consumers and
increasing sales for US parts manufacturers (CQ Almanac 1965, p.510). Three Committee,
members, all Democrats, dissented in a minority report, which said nothing of the adjustment
assistance.33 This dissent aside, the Committee reported a bill that only modestly altered the House
version, mainly by setting up a duty sanction should the Canadian government increase its content
targets, and by requiring Congressional approval for any future auto negotiations.34
The Finance Committee sent its revised bill to the Floor of the Senate on September 27th,
setting the stage for a short but heated debate before passage. The debate was spear-headed by the
same three Senators sponsoring the minonrity report in Committee -- Albert Gore (D.-Tenn.),
Abraham A.Ribicoff (D.-Conp.), and especially Vance Hartke (D.-Ind.). Hartke spoke the most
stridently. Having witnessed the transfer of the Studebaker Corporation's production facilities
3~ Their letter faulted the bill on grounds that it was a "give-away to Canada of an important segment of the US
market in auto products and a congressional sanction of the operation of in effect a North American cartel in the auto
products field" (Congressional Record, Aug.31, 1965, p.22380). The Democratic Reps were McClory (R.-Ill.), John
Brademas (D.- Ind.), Lynn E.Stalbaum (D.Wis.), John O.Marsh Jr. (D.- Va.), and Frank A. Stubblefield (D. - Ky.).
32 John W.Byrnes (Wis.) supported both the closed rule and the final bill, Thomas B.Curtis (Mo.) supported the
final bill but not the rule motion, James B.Utt (Calif.) voted for the rule but against the bill, Jackson E.Betts (Ohio)
supported the bill but not the rule, Herman T.Schneebeli (Pa.) supported both, Harold R.Collier (Ill.) also, Joel
T.Broyhill (Va.) also, and James F.Battin (Mont.) supported the rule but not hill. See CQ Almanac 1965 , p.995).
" The dissenters were Abraham A.Ribicoff (Conn.), Vance Hartke (Ind.), and Albert Gore (Tenn.) (CQ Almanac
1965, p.510). And the up-shot of their dissent was very similar to the written and spoken dissents in the House:
"the hearings have demonstrated that this legislation is special interest legislation of the most restrictive sort, the
opposite of free trade, detrimental to our balance-of-payment situation and harmful to American industry and jobs"
(Senate Finance Minority Report 1965, p.38).
34 The Committee demanded three changes, in particular. First, it provided that that present US duties would be
reimposed if the Canadian government increased "the percentage of local parts and labor that Canadian subsidiaries of
US auto companies had agreed to put into autos produced in Canada for the 1965-1968 model years" (CQ Almanac
1965, p.511). Second, it required that "any future automotive agreement negotiated by the Administration must be
submitted for the approval of Congress before the change could take effect," whereas the House bill granted
automatic approval of such agreements "unless Congress passed a concurrent resolution of disapproval within a 60-
day period" (Ibid.). And finally, the bill was revised to modify tariff schedules so as to designate auto products on
which duties were to be removed.
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from South Bend, Indiana, to its Canadian plant in Ontario, Haitke said the agreement "clearly
contemplates the exportation of jobs to Canada" (quoted in CQ Almanac 1965, p.5 11)."5 Such
dissenting voices didn't prevent smooth passage of the amended bill on September 30th, by a vote
of 54-18. Among Republicans, 19 voted for and one against the measure. And among Democrats
35 voted for, and 17 against the measure. The opposition was scattered among the different
regions of the US, with no clear regional concentration. Those voting against, however, were
either from states with high concentrations of independent parts producers -- such Senators Bayh
and Hartke, the Indiana contingent -- or were traditional protectionists with ties to internationally
vulnerable industries -- such as Rhode Island Senators Pastore and Pell, whose constituency
included a large and import-competing textiles, apparel, and shoe industry.36
With a relatively easy journey throug;h both the House and Senate, and with so little
discussion of the adjustment assistance pro- isions in that journey, it is difficult to gauge the
political effectiveness of the adjustment assistance provisions in securing passage of the Auto
Agreement. There is little question that the UAW's support for the bill rested on the inclusion of
those provisions; their statements before the legislative fight and their testimony during the
Committee fight show that their support for the assistance conditional upon the adjustment
assistance provisions was consistent, unambiguous, and explicit. How important this UAW
position was for the legislative outcome, however, is more ambiguous. There were certainly blocs
of Representatives and Senators whose ties to the UAW in particular and to organized labor
generally, made them bound by the union's compensated liberalization. But as with the 1962
fight, it is difficult to know how many were so bound. The same districts with high concentrations
of UAW employees also had high concentrations of auto employers, whose position on the Pact
swung completely free of the adjustment assistance provisions -- whether they were Big Three
producers gung-ho about the Pact or independent producers angry about it. So it is difficult to
know how many of the legislators with UAW concentrations would have jettisoned the Agreement
if the adjustment a3sistance provisions were removed, and how many would have sided with the
various industry manufacturers, who didn't care much either way.
The position of the independent producers, moreover, remind us that the adjustment
assistance was not effective in buying off the opposition of a number of independent parts
producers and their associational and legislative representatives. The adjustment assistance
provisions contained tax, technical, and financial assistance that was to benefit them as well as their
3 These three Finance Committee Senators were joined by others, like Frank Carlson (R.-Kan), who took issue
with the Agreement's bilateralism in violation of GATT multilateralism, and Gaylord Nelson (D.-Wis.) who claimed
that the agreement was nothing more than a cartel arrangement" (Ibid.). Supporters conceded some of these points,
bt insisted that the agreement on the whole was good for American consumers, producers, labor, and the US-
Canadian partnership. Senate Majority Whip Russell B.Long (D.La.), for instance, "conceded that the pact would
result in higher employment in Canada, but insisted that it would not come at the expense of US jobs" (Ibid.).
36 For voting distribution, see CQ Almanac 1965, p. 1 0 7 7.
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employees, and could well have made the liberalization and market rationalization more palatable.
But some parts producers weren't sold on this basis. And there were no legislators who were
representing or particularly concerned about such producers and who claimed to have been swayed
in any way by inclusion of the adjustment assistance. So we can see, here, the limits of the side
payment's political efficacy.
Although complexity and ambiguity in the history counsels modesty, it is still fair to say
that the adjustment assistance facilitated the liberalization. The inclusion of the provisions did not
appear to alienate any legislators who otherwise supported the liberalization. And we know that
the support for the agreement depended, in part, on the ability of the liberalizers to convince those
legislators on the fence that the Agreement was not simply a special-interest legislation benefiting
Big Three oligopoly, but also consumer and worker welfare. Together with the UAW being one
of the largest members of the AFL-CIO and, therefore, having influence over all legislators who
value their relationship with organized labor, this consideration suggests that the adjustment
assistance provisions made a difference.
1.6. Analyzing the Auto Pact's Maturation of Compensated Liberalization
The auto pact story, as a tale of compensated liberalization, resembles that of the TEA
compensated liberalization, both in terms of the actors and provisions of assistance and in the way
the history conforms very closely to the theory developed in Chapter One. As in the 1962 case, the
power and platform conditions worked very much in favor of the provision of compensatory side
payments, and were helped along by equally auspicious fairness ideational conditions.
First, consider the power story. The UAW represented nearly all of the workers in one of
the largest industrial employers in a number of states, and was growing along with the rest of the
auto industry. The union, moreover, was one of the largest and most influential internationalist
forces within the AFL-CIO. For these reasons, alone, liberalizers desiring solid support for the
Pact and for liberalization into the future, needed to heed the UAW's demands. But more
incidental conditions enhanced their influence. The UAW was particularly concentrated in a
number of states critical to the Democratic coalition, and had ties to the Johnson Administration.
Moreover, the shoddy performance of the Trade Expansion Act's adjustment assistance provisions
meant that large sections of organized labor, including the AFL-CIO generally, were becoming
increasingly skeptical of liberalizer promises that the provision of adjustment assistance would
make liberalization a winning proposition for all citizens. These other union forces were looking to
how the UAW's demands were treated -- and the Johnson Administration must have known that.
So, on both structural and incidental grounds, the UAW was powerful in the liberalization fight.
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The important platform story is the importance the UAW attached to adjustment assistance
as the main issue on its trade policy-making platform that could be easily made the subject of issue
linkage. Not only did they explicitly champion this issue before and during the Pact negotiation
and ratification fight, their platform made it the most cost effective possibility. The only other
issue the union mentioned in its discussion of trade liberalization was the protection of international
fair labor standards. They didn't make the protection of such standards through some new
administrative or legislative action a precondition for their support, because they still had hope for
adjustment assistance and because they knew how difficult it would be to do more on the labor
standards front. So the preexistence of the adjustment assistance issue on the UAW's trade policy
agenda made it the most obvious and least costly, indeed the only, viable subject of compensation.
And, of course, neither revision of nor exemption from the reach of the liberalization was ever
discussed by the union. So we have here a pretty strong coincidence of high structural and
incidental political power of the UAW with a very explicitly compensated liberalization stance --
multi-issue platform.37
Such a coincidence of power and platforms implies a bargaining game similar to that for
adjustment assistance discussed in the conclusion of Chapter Two -- a willingness to trade-off
levels of liberalization for levels of compensation that implies a relatively steep rather than flat
indifference curve.38 The auto parts producers, by virtue of their dispersal and employment, lack
the political resources to command attention from the liberalizers -- and hence don't make it oiltO
the Edgeworth space. The resulting bargaining over the Auto Pact by UAW and auto parts
protectionists leads to a pattern of compensated and uncompensated liberalization as diagrammed in
Figure 3.1 below. There, the coincidence of high power resources and multi-issue platforms
predicts compensated liberalization. And the coincidence of low power resources and single-issue
platforms for the auto parts protectionists -- represented by the Automotive Service Industry
Association (ASIA), the Motor and Equipment Manufacturers Association, and others -- predicts
uncompensated liberalization.
That the power-platforms of the two groups correlate with the actual combination of
uncompensated and compensated liberalization suggests that the bargaining logic can explain the
"7 Other conditions outside the theory's focus on the power and platforms of the protectionists were conducive to the
provision of side payment compensation. First, the negotiating environment was fertile ground for providing
adjustment assistance as a side payment. The recent history of side payment politics was mixed, in that the UAW
had reason to distrust liberalizer promises that adjustment assistance would make a difference. On the other hand,
this may have made revision of such assistance all the more likely as liberalizers tried to protect their reputation as
trust-worthy bargaining partners. More unambiguously conducive to low transaction-cost side payment exchange,
the negotiations over the Pact and its enacting legislation engaged many fewer players than was true for the more
general multi-sectoral trade liberalization. It involved a centralized union, the Big Three auto manufacturers, and the
Administration -- making it easy to know and act upon who wanted what.
38 See Figure 2.4, which shows that the relatively steeply sloped P(b), which could represent UAW representatives,
creates a significant zone of possible agreement given the intersection and overlap with the indifference curve L(a) or
L(b) of the liberalizers.
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incidence of side payments in this case. The fairness logic, meanwhile, appears to have been much
less important. Although the Johnson Administration in its trade and other legislation continued
the Kennedy tradition by making occasional statements about the need to redress the pain of the
few caused by changes to benefit the many, there is little evidence that the provision of adjustment
Figure 3.1
1965 Auto-Pact Power-Platforms
Platforms
Single-issue Multi-issue
Compromised Compensated
Liberalization Liberalization
High UAW *
Power
Resources
0
A.S.I.A. etc.
Low (auto parts)
Uncompensated Uncompensated
Liberalization Liberalization
assistance was a major priority for its own sake. In announcing conclusion of the Agreement on
January 16th, neither Johnson nor his advisors made any mention of the need to provide redress
for the workers and firms likely to be dislocated by the Pact. More importantly, the Administration
could have provided a loosening of adjustment assistance eligibility through its own initiative,
either separate from or before the enactment legislation. But it did so only in drafting enactment
legislation that required congressional approval and after the UAW made such loosening a
condition for their support of that legislation. It's always difficult to distinguish the expediency
from the fairness imperative or logic, but these conditions suggest that in the Auto Pact episode the
bargaining logic predominated.
Did the compensation work? As we have seen, the compensation was probably crucial to
the support of the UAW and of many pro-union representatives, but unsuccessful in buying off
parts manufacturers whom stood to benefit from the assistance. In the longer term, the adjustment
assistance compensation provided some significant redress for dislocated groups, and may have
had an even more significant effect on opposition to openness. As the program was implemented
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after passage of the Agreement, it actually helped sustain support for the Auto Pact, for continued
openness in auto trade, and perhaps most importantly for the history of compensated liberalization.
The filing period for petitions under Auto Pact adjustment assistance spanned January 20,
1966 to June 30, 1968, when the Pact was set to expire. During that period, 21 groups of workers
filed petitions to the adjustment assistance board, while no firms applied for the relief. Of those 21
petitions, 14 were granted eligibility, representing 2,493 workers. Of these 1,943 were found
eligible for assistance payments, and these represented only .3 percent of the 1964, auto industry
work force. The majority of these workers lost their jobs when a modest number of small plants
connected to the major independent auto and parts producers were shifted to Canada under the
Auto Pact incentives. The remaining number of the eligible workers had lost their jobs through
plant rationalization that shifted jobs, not plants, to Canada (Jonish 1970, p.557; Frank 1977,
p.57). Of these roughly 2,000 workers, most received 20 weeks of readjustment allowances and,
on a much smaller scale, retraining benefits -- totaling about $2,100 per worker. This brought the
total expenditures of the program to $4.1 million (Ibid., p.57; Fooks 1971, p.352).
In subsequent union reports of the UAW Conventions in 1965 and 1967, and in testimony
to Congress on possible extension of the Auto Pact, union officials reiterated their continued
support for the Pact and for free trade generally. How much of this good faith and continued
support was based on reasoned consideration of the benefits of the adjustment assistance side
payment, and how much was due to the continued growth and prosperity of the auto industry --
well beyond expectations and, as it turned out, not to last too many more years -- is an open
question that cannot be answered here. It is fair to assume, however, that the relatively easy and
fast provision of relatively generous adjustment assistance affected the Union's stance on the Pact,
independent of the industry's general performance.
In any event, the UAW's good experience with the Auto Pact side payment went well
beyond the Pact and auto trade. It actually rejuvenate the active support by UAW officials not just
of trade liberalization but of compensated liberalization -- active promotion of freer trade
conditional upon the provision of adjustment assistance side payments. The Union's faith in this
position, as it turned out, outstripped that of many of its organized labor representatives, and of
other members in the liberalizer and protectionist coalitions. And it had implications for the future
of side payment politics, as we will see in the subsequent cases chronicled.
The Auto Pact episode, in short, represented a maturation of compensated liberalization.
Its politics were marked by the expectation among unions and their legislative champions that
safeguards needed to accompany its liberalization. Rather than consider possible safeguards from
scratch, moreover, these groups chose to work with policies already provided as safeguards or
side payments in a previous liberalization initiative, in this case the adjustment assistance
provisions of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. And the belief that such adjustment assistance
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should accompany the Auto Pact liberalization was dominated by the critical memory that the
existing assistance program needed to be reformed in order to be of any use. Once demanded,
finally, most groups within the liberalizer coalition either saw the provision of such improved
adjustment assistance as desirable or were neutral enough to the idea as to say nothing against it
when given the chance. Thus, the adjustment assistance side payment had become an expected and
accepted part of the politics of trade liberalization.
2. Fading of Compensated Liberalization as Strategy: AFL-CIO's Turn to Unconditional
Protectionism, 1966-1972
By representing a maturation of compensated liberalization, the Auto Pact episode offered
the promise that future struggles over trade liberalization would customarily involve not only fights
over the degree and nature of the liberalization but also over what kinds of safeguards or other off-
setting provisions would be provided to cushion the blow to those expecting to lose from
liberalization. The generosity of the side payments and their effectiveness in defusing opposition
might vary, but their existence would not. For better or worse, they would be a standard feature of
trade policy-making.
The events of the next five years, however, marked increasing disenchantment with
compensated liberalization. Labor unions, the groups previously most insistent upon and most
likely to benefit from adjustment assistance side payments, increasingly regarded such assistance
as virtually useless safeguards against injury from increased international openness. Not only did
the groups increasingly stop demanding or accepting offers of adjustment assistance reform as a
price for acceptance of liberalization, they also gave up demanding or accepting other possible side
payments that could cushion liberalization. In doing so, some groups threw the baby out with the
bath water and turned to unconditional protectionism. Liberalizers, for their part, were too late and
modest in offering adjustment assistance reform as a side payment, and as the attractiveness of this
side payment failed, they seldomly offered different side payments that would clearly address some
of the explicitly stated concerns of labor and other groups on issues related to trade.
The period between 1966 and 1972 was the major turning point in this decline of
compensated liberalization. It begins with the signing of the Kennedy Round of GATT
negotiations in 1967, whose extensive market-opening conspired with a variety of other changes in
the international political economy to substantially increase import competition. These changes
fueled increasing despair on the part of the US's manufacturing base in the overall benefits of free
trade. In the poor administration of the adjustment assistance program designed to cushion the
costs of such trade, moreover, the period also witnessed dissolution of belief that side payments
might off-set such costs. So unconditionally protectionist groups became more so, conditional
protectionists became unconditional; and even some free traders became unconditional
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protectionists. The end result was increasingly infertile ground for the provision of side payments
to humanize and clear the way for liberalization, or even to defuse a growing protectionist tide.
2.1. International Political Economy Threats: Kennedy Round and Structural Economic Change
The turning point away from compensated liberalization has its roots in the confluence of
domestic and international political economy developments that fueled increasing protectionism and
despair with existing side payment safeguards. The first of these developments was conclusion of
the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations. The Kennedy Round talks had formally begun in
Gei,eva on May 4, 1964, and included some fifty-two GATT participants. Sixteen of these
countries were negotiating on a linear basis and 37 others were negotiating on a non-linear basis.
Thanks to the 1962 TEA, the US was one of the sixteen. The major participants, with the US in
the lead, were committed to a 50-percent linear cut in industrial and agricultural tariffs. After more
than three years of road blocks, especially over proposed reductions in agricultural tariffs and
certain non-tariff barriers, the Kennedy Round negotiators reached agreement on May 15, 1967. 39
Agreement was reached, not coincidentally, less than seven weeks before expiration of the 1962
TEA's negotiating authority.
The resulting agreement brought about extensive market opening throughout the
industrialized world, to take place beginning in 1968. It reduced tariffs by an average of 35
percent, covering some 60,000 products that constituted about $40 billion in world trade (in 1964
dollars) (CQ Almanac 1967, p.805). The US agreed to lower tariffs on industrial manufactures on
the order of 35 percent, less than Congressional authorization, but this constituted reductions on
products whose important represented $8 billion of the $25 billion total. This liberalization reached
already trade-impacted and protectionist industries like steel, textiles, and lumber, though often
well below the 35 percent average (reductions in US steel tariffs were only 7 percent). In return,
the US received tariff concessions, many at the 50 percent level, affecting about $7 billion of its
exports, while the shifting of some products to duty-free status brought total reductions on US
exports to $8 billion (CQ Almanac 1967, p.808). Agricultural barriers were not reduced as
dramatically, despite US pressures to do so. And the agreement also called for changes in an
important non-tariff barrier, a new international anti-dumping code that would pattern the
procedures of other countries after those in the US.
"9 A number of political economists and historians have provided detailed accounts of the Kennedy Round
negotiations and its outcome. I have relied mainly on Preeg 1970 and Evans 1971. According to those sources and
a few others, including Curtis and Vastine, Destler 1980, and the CQ Almanac 1965, 1966, 1967, there were no
domestic political side payments provided as part of the negotiations taking place at the international level. As we
see below, this stands in contrast to the Tokyo Round of GATIT.
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The agreement also called for two changes that would require congressional action because
they went beyond the negotiating authority granted to the president in the 1962 Trade Expansion
Act. The first was relatively un-controversial in the US, a grain agreement that guaranteed a higher
minimum price on wheat and a multinational food program to aid less-developed countries -- both
of which were to entail more foreign purchases of US wheat. This required Senate ratification
because it was a treaty. The second Kennedy Round concession involved the chemical industry
and was much more controversial. In addition to agreeing to reduce tariffs by 50 percent on
chemical products with tariffs above 8 percent and by 20 percent on items with tariffs at or below
the 8 percent rate, the US tentatively agreed to eliminate the American Selling Price (ASP) method
of evaluating tariffs on benzenoid chemical imports. 40 The ASP system involved computing tariffs
not on the basis of wholesale prices in the country of origin but on the basis of the generally higher
US wholesale price. Applied to benzenoid chemicals and three other groups of products, the ASP
method entailed much higher effective rates of protection even where nominal tariff rates might
appear very modest.4 ' Eliminating this ASP system for the chemicals required approval from both
the House and Senate because the 1962 authority only allowed reductions of 50 percent on
products with existing tariff rates above 5 percent.
In the perception of many industrial groups in the US, these components of the Kennedy
Round liberalization conspired with a variety of other forces in the international political economy
to pose dangerous threats from foreign competition. On the policy plain, the EEC introduced a
value-added tax that was widely seen as promoting their exports and discouraging imports, and
joined forces with the discriminatory effects of the Common Agricultural policy that had been
initiated in 1962 (Pastor 1980, p. 122). More structurally, the Japanese and European economies
continued to recover and undergo continued industrial diversification out of low-wage, low-
technology industries like textiles to more advanced, moderate or high-wage sectors like steel and
automobile production. And the more fundamental tension between the US's different roles as
economic and political hegemon -- providing the lead currency in the Bretton Woods system on the
one hand, and the heavy defense and foreign assistance role as leading the Cold War fight -- fueled
growing overvaluation of the currency and balance of payments deficits. These developments, in
turn, drew attention to a perceived problem of imports continually outpacing exports.
' Benzenoid chemicals included "coal-tar or petroleum derivatives used for dyes, pigments, plastics, drugs and other
products" (CQ Almanac 1967, p.807).
'4 The other groups of products whose tariffs were calculated using the ASP system were rubber-soled footwear,
certain canned clams and woolen knit gloves or mittens (CQ Almanac 1967, p.807; Evans 1971, p.).
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2.2. Threat in the Domestic Political Economy: Hollow Promises of Escape Clause and TAA
Coinciding with these threatening changes in the international political economy, moreover,
was an important development in the domestic political economy that undermined faith in the
propriety of compensated liberalization: the non-performance of the escape clause and adjustment
assistance relief mechanisms. The Trade Expansion Act had maintained the escape clause
provisions to provide tariff relief for workers and firms substantially hurt by competition from
imports. And as we have already seen, it also set up the adjustment assistance program as a side
payment. However, the same non-performance that motivated the UAW to demand adjustment
assistance reform as a condition for its acceptance of the 1965 US-Canada Auto Agreement also
plagued a number of import-competing industries and firms throughout the 1960s.
Between the initiation of the program in 1962 and the middle of 1969, 28 groups of
workers and/or firms filed petitions with the Tariff Commission for either escape clause or
adjustment assistance relief. Thirteen petitions came from firms asking for escape clause tariff
increases to relieve their suffering, seven petitions came from firms asking for adjustment
assistance, and eight petitions came from groups of workers (usually via unions) asking for
adjustment assistance. The Tariff Commission was given six weeks to tender a decision on the
adjustment assistance petitions and six months to do so on escape clause petitions; and the
Commission was given the option of recommending adjustment assistance alone or in combination
with tariff relief for petitions to get escape clause relief. Table 3.5 shows that the largest number of
these petitions came from the shoe industry, with the piano industry coming in second.
Every one of these petitions was rejected.42 The reasons for this one-sided administration
of the relief were many. One was that with the economy booming through the middle of the
1960s, and with Kennedy Round tariff cuts authorized by the 1962 TEA beginning only in 1968,
there were few groups hurt by trade liberalization and petitioning for relief. But the relatively small
and declining number of petitions -- only one in 1967 -- had more to do with the realization that
upon petitioning for relief, a group could expect only rejection from the Tariff Commission.
Most of the reasons for the record of non-performance involved the administration of the
escape clause and adjustment assistance programs. First, the sheer complication of the application
procedure was enough to discourage petitions and to ensure lots of chances for rejection. For
instance, firms applying for escape clause relief had to go through fourteen steps before relief
could be provided (Frank 1977, p.42-43). 43 And workers applying for adjustment assistance
42 One petition, from the National Tile and Manufacturing Co., was discontinued as an escape clause request and
then rejected as an adjustment assistance request.
43 As Frank 1977 summarizes, here were the steps: (1) firm petitions the Tariff Commission for either escape
clause or adjustment assistance relief; (2) Commission holds hearings and presents its findings; (3) firm applies to
secretary of commerce for certification of eligibility to apply for adjustment assistance; (4) Secretary of commerce
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Table 3.5
Tariff Commission Actions, 1962-69
Kind of
Petitioner Petition
Lumberman's Economic Survival Committee escape clause
Hatter's Fur Cutters Assn. of U.S. escape clause
Intl. Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers adjust. assist.
American Fine China Guild Inc. escape clause
US Potters Assn. escape clause
Publicker Industries Inc. escape clause
American Ceramic Products Inc. adjust. assist.
Intl. Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers adjust. assist.
United Steelworkers of America adjust. assist.
Textile Workers Union of America adjust. assist.
Industrial Biochemicals Inc. adjust. assist.
Winburn Tile Manufacturing Co. adjust. assist.
Danaho Refining Co. adjust. assist.
Umbrella Manufacturers and Suppliers Inc., and
Umbrella Frame Assn. of America Inc. escape clause
Bulova Watch Co., Elgin National Watch Co., and
Hamilton Watch Co. escape clause
National Tile and Manufacturing Co. adjust. assist.
National Tile and Manufacturing Co. adjust. assist.
General Plywood Corp. adjust. assist.
Mushroom Canner's Committee and the Pennsylvania
Canners and Food Processors Assn. escape clause
Roller Derby Skate Corp. and Nestor Johnson
Manufacturing Co. escape clause
Intl. Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers escape clause
Barber chair manufacturers escape clause
Emil J.Paidar Co. (barber chairs) adjust. assist.
Koken Companies Inc. (barber chairs) adjust. assist.
United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America adjust. assist.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union escape clause
United Shoe Workers of America adjust. assist.
Maine Sardine Packers Asn. Inc. escape clause
Armco Corp., Weld Mill
US Steel Corp., Shiffler Transmission Power Plant
adjust. assist.
adjust. assist.
Votes
(yes-no)
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-4
0-5
0-5
0-5
0-5
0-5
Comm's
Decision
negative
negative
negative
negative
negative
negative
negative
negative
negative
negative
negative
negative
negative
0-5 negative Sep-64
0-5 negative
withdrawn
2- 3 negative
2- 2 tie vote#
0-5 negative Jan-65
0-5
0-4
0-5
2-3
0-5
0-5
0-5
0-4
5-1
5-1
negative
negative
negative
negative
negative
withdrawn
negative
negative
negative
positive
positive
issues certification; (5) firm files application for adjustment assistance with that Secretary; (6) firm presents an
adjustment proposal; (7) Secretary of commerce certifies that proposal; (8) same secretary submits proposal to
relevant agencies to seek technical or financial assistance; (9) these agencies determine assistance they are willing to
provide: (10) commerce secretary determines exact form and amount of assistance; (11) firm applies for tax relief;
(12) secretary of commerce certifies this tax application; (13) certification for tax relief forwarded to IRS for
implementation; and (14) Congress approves any tax rebate over $100,000. See Frank 1977, p.4 3 .
191
Date
Decided
Feb-63
Mar-63
Mar-63
Apr-63
Apr-63
Apr-63
Apr-63
May-63
Jun-63
Jul-63
Jul-63
Nov-63
Aug-64
Oct-64
Oct-64
Dec-64
Dec-64
Feb-65
Oct-67
Jan-68
Jan-68
Jan-68
Jan-68
Mar-68
Mar-68
Jul-69
Nov-69
Nov-69
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Kind of
Petitioner Petition
US Steel Corp., American Bridge Division
Plant at Los Angeles adjust. assist.
National Piano Manufacturers Assn. escape clause
American-Saint Gobain, Libbey-Owens-Ford,
Mississippi Glass, PPG Industries (sheet glass) escape clause
(plate, float, rolled and tempered glass) escape clause
Emil J.Paidar Co. escape clause
Emil J.Paidar Co. adjust. assist.
United Steel Workers of America adjust. assist.
United Glass and Ceramic Workers of N.America adjust. assist.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., Tower Depts.,
Pinole Point Works
Employees of Uniroyal Inc. (Woonsocket. R.I., plant)
Umbrella Frame Assn.Inc. escape clause
Votes
(yes-no)
5- 1
3-2,1-4
Comm's
Decision
positive
positive
3- 3 tie vote*
2-4 negative
3- 3 tie vote*
3- 3 tie vote*
5- 1 positive
2-4 negative
pending
pending
pending
1-3 negative
# Tie vote not broken by President
* Resolved in the affirmative by the President
Sources:US Tariff Commission 1970/1971; Fowlkes, Frank V. March 7, 1970."Commnission's recent votes
relax Tariff pressures in Congress," National Journal; and Fowlkes.7/24/71. "Administrative escape valves
relieve pressures of imports on domestic industries," National Journal 1971.
faced only slightly fewer steps but an even more baroque administration, given the need for the
secretary of labor and state-level providers of assistance to coordinate their decisions and actions.
The time and money required to pursue relief in view of these complications was enough to
discourage petitioning and to anger those who petitioned anyway.
But much more important than the complexity of the application procedures were the
exceedingly tight eligibility requirements applicants for either escape clause or adjustment
assistance had to meet. As discussed in the section on the Auto Pact above, petitioners for
adjustment assistance relief and escape clause relief had to meet the same high standard: they had
to show that their substantial and actual injury was due "in major part" to tariff concessions. "In
major part" was interpreted tightly by the Tariff Commissioners to mean more important than all
other causes combined, and such strong causality had to be shown between both the tariff
concession and the increase in imports and the increase in imports and the injury. This was a
particularly difficult standard to meet since petitioners had to show the connection between
substantial injury in the present and tariff concessions implemented many years earlier. Since the
last major tariff concessions were authorized in the early 1950s, this sometimes was more than
fifteen years (Frank, p.41). Murray and Egmand, in fact, claim that the Commission interpreted
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1970
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1970
1970
Burgoon
Chapter Three
"in major part" to require a close coincidence in time between concession and injury so that it was
impossible to meet the standard of proof (Murray and Egmand 1970, p.415, in Frank 1977, p.4 6 ).
Just as important as the specific wording was the fact that eligibility for adjustment
assistance was the same as that for the more obviously protectionist escape clause relief. As a
writer critical of the program was later to write, "The International Tariff Commission could not be
liberal in approving adjustment assistance petitions without being liberal in approving escape clause
petitions. Thus, adjustment assistance -- which was supposed to foster freer trade -- was included
in the Trade Expansion Act in such a way as to make its actual use inconsistent with that objective"
(Mitchell, p.43, cited in Goldstein 1993, p.191).
As early as the middle of the 1960s there were movements for reform of the adjustment
assistance provisions, less so for escape clause, but no changes were implemented until the end of
1969. The 1965 Auto Pact liberalized the eligibility criteria and mo' ed decision-making authority
out of the Tariff Commission to make access to adjustment assistance easier, but such eased access
didn't extend to any workers or firms outside of the automobile sector. And as early as debate
over the legislation to enact that Auto Pact, Johnson Administration officials and a number of
legislators began calling for reforms in the adjustment assistance provisions. But the Johnson
Administration, and the Nixon Administration after it, chose to pursue such changes only in the
context of its trade policy reforms, not through administrative mandates or through separate
legislation.44 So there was little solace to the workers and firms in the many other industries who
tried or considered petitioning for relief under the TEA's adjustment assistance.
In mid-1969, however, Tariff Commission representatives responded to growing
disillusionment with the escape clause and adjustment assistance programs by independently
loosening their interpretations of existing eligibility standards. The shift was not requested by the
Nixon Administration. Instead, it resulted from changes in heart and composition in the Tariff
Commission. Bruce Clubb joined the Commission in 1967 and is reported to have begun to worry
that the tight eligibility language had "turned the commission into a blind alley..." (NJ 1-24-71,
p. 1545). After asking the commission staff to construct a hypothetical case that would pass the "in
major part" standards and finding that none could be devised, Clubb saw the writing on the wall:
The escape valves were not operating, and there we were, wondering where all the
protectionist sentiment was coming from. the answer was that it was coming from a
bureaucracy which was following a doctrinaire interpretation of the law. Protectionism is
the response of people who are subject to a bureaucracy which they no longer trust. (N.J.
1-24-71, pp. 1545-47)
With this realization, Clubb and one of the five other commissioners Penelope H. Thunberg,
established a looser standard, called the "but for" test (Ibid.; US Tariff Commission 1969, pp. 10-
" See below for discussion of the proposals for reform within liberalization initiatives under Johnson and Nixon.
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11).45 These two commissioners began using this looser interpretation in mid-1969, and were
joined in their affirmative judgments by a third commissioner, George M. Moore, who joined the
Commission in August 1969. Even if the commissioners weren't actively using this looser "but
for" test, they sometimes loosened their interpretation of the various eligibility criteria and
wording, especially "in major part," "serious injury," or "like or directly competitive with," and
these looser interpretations fueled more frequent affirmative rulings.46
With these three commissioners joining forces in making affirmative rulings, the six-person
Commission began to turn out consistent affirmative or split votes by November 1969.47 Table
3.5 reveals the stark shift. Many more firms and workers began submitting petitions, and by mid-
1971, 15 had received affirmative rulings, and another 38 tie votes, all of which were resolved in
favor of the affirmative. Between that time and April 3, 1975, when the Trade Expansion Act
expired, the number of petitions increased substantially, but the proportion of affirmative rulings
slowed down somewhat. Take worker petitions for adjustment assistance. Between November
1969 and April 16th 1971, the Commission approved 40 of 76 worker petitions for relief, a rate of
51%. Between April 16th 1971 and mid-1975, however, only 55 of 178 rulings were affirmative
or tie votes, a rate of only 31 percent (See US Tariff Commission 1975; and Frank 1977, p.46).
Overall, between 1969 when the first petition was granted when the Trade Expansion Act
expired in mid 1975, the Commission can be said to have found at least some religion. The
Commission approved adjustment assistance for 8 of 14 escape clause rulings, for 25 of 60 firm
petitions for adjustment assistance, and 95 of 260 rulings on worker petitions for adjustment
assistance (Frank 1977, p.46). 110 groups of workers, totaling about 54,000 people, were
certified by the Department of Labor to receive adjustment assistance. Of these, about 35,000
actually received benefits, mainly readjustment allowances rather than training or relocation
assistance. According to the Department of Labor, "no complete record was kept of those
receiving training [between 1969 and 1974], but they were few..." (OTA 1980, p.25). In fact,
only about 10 percent of all workers receiving assistance got placement services or training, and
45 According to this standard, petitioners would be granted assistance if they were judged to have been spared injury
in the event of two counter-factual: "but for a tariff concession, would imports stand at this level?"; and "but for the
current level of imports would the domestic producer have suffered injury?" (N.J. 1/24/71, p. 1546)). This "but for"
or "except for" standard implied more sympathetic ruling even when there were major delays between tariff
concessions and injury, and also implied a looser conceptual standard of "in major part" -- from "more important than
all other factors combined" to "except for" (See Frank 1977, p.47). See also US Tariff Commission 1969, pp. 10-
11, and Murray and Egmand 1970, p.410.
' TC Commissioner Moore, for instance, denied using the "but-for" standard, but nonetheless interpreted the "in
major part" wording more loosely than his other counterparts and predecessors (N.J. 1/24.71, p. 1546). Rather than
interpreting "in major part" to mean "more important than all other factors, significant or not, weighted together,"
Moore and other commissioners sometimes interpreted it to mean "no other specific, significant, timely changes in
the situation" coinciding with the change in imports and injury (Frank 1977, p.47-8).
47 In the event of a tie vote, the President had the power, no specified in statute, to break the tie. With presidents
eager to defuse protectionist waves, virtually all ties were broken in favor of affirmative rulings. See Table 5.5.
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fewer than 125 actually received relocation allowances (Frank 1977, p.53). In this period,
allowances cost $86 millio, and total training costs were a mere $3 million (Ibid.).
For firms, the story was similar, though the Tariff Commission was a bit less generous in
its rulings. Between 1960 and 1975 when the program expired, 39 firms, more from the shoe
industry than anywhere else, requested eligibility for adjustment assistance, having been qualified
to do so through Commission injury findings in either petitions for escape clause relief or
adjustment assistance. 16 of these were approved for loans and loan guarantees, which amounted
to $32.5 million, of which $14 million went to two plants. Thus, although the Commission found
religion, it was a modest one, with budget and scale totals that were still far below the initial
estimates of what the program would forecast. 48
This "switch in time" by the Tariff Commission, in any event, was not enough to reverse
the disillusionment among groups dislocated by trade. First, the looser interpretation was widely
regarded as a capricious and tenuous shift. By mid-1971, two of the loose interpreters had left the
Commission, leaving Moore as the only commissioner consistently willing to grant affirmative
rulings to petitions. It meant that with replacements, the rate of approval went down somewhat, as
we saw above. And absence of statutory authority to justify the President's practice of breaking tie
votes in the affirmative fueled worry that the more generous mood of the Commission would be
short-lived. In any event, by the time the Commission began approving petitions and the Labor
and Commerce Departments dispensed benefits, cynicism among recipients had already taken hold.
2.3. Emboldened Protectionism and the Rejection of Compensated Liberalization
The consequence of these developments in international and domestic political economy
were major: emboldened protectionism for some groups and a rejection of compensated
liberalization in favor of unconditional protectionism for others. Industry and labor groups already
tending to protectionism became more vocally and intensely so. A few other industry groups that
had hitherto unconditionally supported continued trade liberalization became increasingly
protectionist. And most significantly for the cause of liberalization and for the cause of
compensated liberalization, some groups whose support for trade liberalization had been contingent
on the provision of adequate adjustment assistance compensation -- the champions of compensated
liberalization -- turned to unconditional protectionism. This section summarizes each of these
kinds of groups, with the most attention devoted to the last.
48 The estimates during the 1962 TEA hearings were around 90,000 workers in a five-year period, and 700-800 firms
at a cost of $120 million over the same period. A rare example of government grossly underestimating the scale and
cost of one of its programs.
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A number of industries emerging from the 1962 fight as part of the protectionist coalition
but became more stridently so during this period. The most important of these were textiles,
chemicals, shoes, and steel. The textile industry and its unions struggled unconditionally for
extension and tightening of the Long Term Textile Arrangement, particularly focusing on
narrowing trade with Japanese producers. As an explicit part of their strategy, they sought to
strengthen their hand with the Administration, and in turn the Administration's hand with the
Japanese, by pursuing legislated quota protection. Having received exemption once, in other
words, no other imperfect substitutes that could be subject to side payment linkage were ever
explicitly considered.
The chemical industry, although traditionally more internationalist than textiles, was mainly
on the defensive, trying to prevent the provisionar1 repeal of chemical industry ASP tariff valuation
as agreed upon in the Kennedy Round. After losing its battle during the international phase of
negotiating, even though the liberalization involved a non-tariff barrier that the president had no
authority to reduce without legislative approval, the industry sought to prevent the ASP-repeal at
the legislative ratification phase (Hearings Foreign Relations on Kennedy Round 1967/8).
The steel industry, increasingly un-competitive with growing imports due to its own
investment blunders and to massive investment and promotion of steel production from foreign
producers in Japan and Europe, was initially interested in pursuing voluntary quotas, following the
early example of the textile industry. When that strategy came up short, however, they sought any
prot-ectionism on the agenda, from tariff exemption to the legislated quota bandwagon. Like the
other industries, steel industry representatives never mentioned any other policy proposal outside
of traditional protectionism that could be made the subject of side payment linkage (Hearings Ways
and Means, and Senate Foreign Relations 1967/8).
2.3.1. AFL-CIO Goes Unconditionally Protectionist, the UAW Stays the Champion of
Compensated Liberalization
For the history of compensated liberalization, this period's most important shift in trade
policy stance involved the most powerful and explicit champion of compensated liberalization: the
AFL-CIO and the vast majority of organized labor they represented. Beginning in the middle of
the 1950s through the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, the AFL-CIO supported trade expansion
through market liberalization, on the condition that safeguards be provided to those expected to
suffer from such liberalization. Protectionists might support a liberalization initiative after being
given some kind of side payment and liberalizers might accept the provision of side payments to
buy off their opponents, but the AFL-CIO and its member unions were the most important group
to go into trade policy-making struggles explicitly supporting compensated liberalization. Only a
few of the AFL-CIO member unions were unconditional protectionists, such as textiles and
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shoe/leather unions, and there were really no vocal unconditional liberalizers. The UAW was one
of the most ardent compensated liberalizers, but their basic stance was the same as most AFL-CIO
member unions and their leadership, and the AFL-CIO's position was widely expected to speak for
working men and women generally. Given its political influence and its explicit support for
liberalization conditional upon provision of a specific side payment, the AFL-CIO was most
responsible for getting the trade adjustment assistance program created during the 1962.
By 1970, however, the AFL-CIO and most of its member unions had completely jettisoned
this compensated liberalization stance. Instead, they saw market liberalization and expansion as
inimical to the interests of America's common working people, and moreover believed that
adjustment assistance or other related policies that might safeguard against liberalization's costs
were not acceptable compensation. Generous provision of adjustment assistance or other policies
might be desirable in and of themselves, and might justify relaxing support for various kinds of
protectionism, but no longer would the union go into trade policy-making struggle supporting trade
expansion conditional upon some side payment. In this sense, organized labor became
unconditional protectionists.
This rejection of compensated liberalization in favor of unconditional protectionism didn't
happen all at once. Instead, it took place in three stages between 1962 and 1970. In the first stage,
the Federation leadership was still nominally committed to compensated liberalization where the
side payment on which support of liberalization was conditional was still adjustment assistance.
But AFL-CIO spokesmen expressed disappointment in the poor administration of the TAA
provisions, saw that administration as a betrayal, and stridently called for reform of the provisions.
In their 1963 Constitutional Convention, for instance, the membership supported a resolution
stating that
The power to prevent or to cure injury [from expanded trade] is within the provisions of the
current law. However, the administration of the statute by the Tariff Commission has
indicated that the new concept of trade adjustment assistance -- a 'constructive,
businesslike' approach to liberal trade, in President Kennedy's words -- has become
meaningless....The AFL-CIO calls upon the President and the Congress to carry out the
promise of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. If American labor is to continue its support
for liberal trade in the national interest, then the national interest must be served. (AFL-CIC
Convention Proceedings 1963, p.79).
The resolution stated that serving the national interest required aggressive trade negotiating to lower
tariffs abroad, the extension of the LTA, and the pursuit of two kinds of possible side payments.
There was the loose call for stronger promotion of improved labor standards in international trade
through better reporting by GATT members and through stronger efforts in the ILO for inclusion
of labor standards in international trade. And there was the very specific and more strongly
worded call for improving adjustment assistance:
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the trade adjustment assistance program should be made effective through administrative
action, or amendments to the current provisions should be adopted by the Congress as
soon as such action is feasible. The nation cannot afford to wait until the end of the GATT
negotiations, starting in 1964, to find out whether this program is working. If the Tariff
Commission does not show that it can effectively administer the law, the Trade Expansion
Act must be amended. Labor's support was based on adequate assistance or relieffor
those adversely affected by imports. Its continued support for liberal trade depends on the
fulfillment of this premise. (AFL-CIO Constitutional Convention 1963, p.60, italics mine)
The Federation stuck to this support of compensated liberalization for only a few more years.
By 1967, the year the Kennedy Round was concluded, the AFL-CIO had entered a second
stage in its disillusionment. It had given up on adjustment assistance as a condition for their
support of liberalization, but still claimed to support trade expansion and liberalization, implicitly
conditional upon liberalizers meeting a number of other policy goals. In testimony, policy
statements and the Constitutional Resolutions, the Federation's leadership still asked for
liberalization of access to the TAA, and by 1967 could rely on the US-Canada Auto Pact
experience to know specifically what changes were necessary. Calling the existing incarnation of
the assistance "valueless" and a "total failure,"4 9 the union stated that the "trade adjustment
provisions should be amended to make the government's judgment of criteria for relief more
realistic and equitable....Decisions on trade adjustment assistance cases should rest in the executive
branch of the government and not in the Tariff Commission" (Constitutional Convention 1967,
p.581; 1969).50 Unlike previous calls for adjustment assistance reform, however, the Federation
no longer called attention to how such assistance used to be, or was in the present, a condition for
the Federation's support for liberalization.
Instead, the Federation listed a variety of trade and related policy changes it sought to make
existing US trade policy acceptable. The specific requests involved demands for revision or
exemption related to negotiating issues of the Kennedy Round, such as preserving textile quotas or
opposing elimination of the American Selling Price system. On less specified grounds, the
Federation also called for two sets of policy reforms separate from the trade protections under
GATT review. One of these was for better protection of labor rights, a request long on the AFL-
CIO's trade policy agenda. But in 1967, the Federation brought into their discussions of trade
policy-making another linkable issue, the regulation of outgoing foreign direct investment through
tax policies and capital controls. The 1967 Convention resolved in Resolution No.207 that:
The export of US capital and its effect on international trade should be thoroughly
investigated and appropriate supervision and necessary controls should be instituted by
government authorities. Until the balance-of-payments problem improves, there should be
direct restrictions on US investment in developed countries. Mechanisms for such
restrictions are already established in all other major industrial countries. Effective tax
49 These were the words in Resolution No.181 in the 1969 Constitutional Convention, Daily Proceedings, p.287.
50so The 1969 Resolution No.205 used identical wording in its demand for adjustment assistance reform. See Daily
Proceedings, p.280.
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policies should be adopted to prevent avoidance and/or evasion of US taxation on profits
from foreign investment. (1967 Constitutional Convention, p.582).
Neither this outward-FDI nor the labor rights side issues were as detailed as the adjustment
assistance demands. More importantly, neither received the explicit priority the AFL-CIO had
granted adjustment assistance -- that it was a side payment condition for the union's acceptance of
trade expansion. Instead, the side issues were simply desirable changes, implicitly just two of
several other exemption or revision conditions for continued support of trade expansion.
The transformation to unconditional protectionism was complete when the AFL-CIO
formally withdrew its support for trade expansion and liberalization in 1970. The Federation did
so at the winter meeting of its 35-member Executive Council in Bal Harbour, Florida, in February
of that year. The Council based its deliberations on a report from the economic policy committee
of the AFL CIO drafted by Nathaniel Goldfinger, the federation's director of research (NYT
1970). Discounting adjustment measures as ineffective in compensating for the many losses recent
international and domestic had imposed on workers, the AFL-CIO report called for "a multi-
pronged response that would not entail a choice of protectionism over free trade, but rather an
orderly expansion of world trade" (Ibid.).
The details of these prongs were developed over the course of the next two years. On May
12th, 1971, the executive council met and pulled together a legislative program on the international
trade situation. The Council's resolution supposedly drew heavily on Nat Goldfinger's September
1970 report, "A Labor View of Foreign Investment and Trade Issues" (National Journal 1971, ) --
-- a revision of his late-1969, early-1970 report." The recommendations soon thereafter got
expression in the dissent that the US Steelworker President I.W. Abel and the Machinists
International President Floyd Smith offered within the high-profile Williams Commission, a
Commission the Nixon Administration convened to review trade policy in 1971 (Williams
Commission Report 1971). Their published dissent to the Council Statement was released in July
1971. That dissent, the May executive council statement, and the Goldfinger report all proposed a
nine-point legislative program, and these nine points were later spelled out in detail in the Hartke-
Burke proposal, the Foreign Trade and Investment Act of 1972.
The up-shot of their proposals were that they sought greater protections for major
manufacturing industries in the US through either voluntary or involuntary quotas, stronger
"escape clause liberalization and anti-dumping modernization," and through "truth-in-labeling"
laws requiring that country of origin of products be labeled (Williams Commission Report, Annex
" Another report was influential in AFL-CIO policy development, former Assistant Secretary of Labor Stanley
Ruttenberg's "Wanted: a Constructive Foreign Trade Policy." Among other things, the report based some of its
findings on statistics by the Bureau of Labor Statistics that showed foreign trade had caused a net loss of jobs
numbering 500,000 between 1966 and 1969 (cited in National Journal 1-15-72, p. 109).
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3, pp.341-42). As part of the same program, however, they also demanded policies strongly
distasteful to their employers:
1. New tax measures for...the multinational corporations should halt the export of US
productions and jobs. Deferral of taxes on income earned by foreign operations should be
ended by collecting the tax at the time the profits are earned. All other tax and tariff
incentives that help transfer production abroad should be removed now.
2. Capital outflows should be curbed and supervised and regulated by the US
government....;
3. The export of US technology, now aided by the US government should be curbed,
supervised an regulated by the US government.
4. International fair labor standards are necessary. The State Department and other
government agencies should be directed to press for such standards in trade agreements....
8. Federal standards of reporting by US-based firms of their international accounting is
needed. (Williams Commission Report, p.340).
These FDI and labor standards demands represented the majority of the trade policy-making
demands of the Federation, tax policies and capital controls to discourage outward FDI. But not a
peep was heard of the former lynch-pin of the AFL-CIO's compensated liberalization, adjustment
assistance.
What explains this shift? AFL-CIO and other union representatives explained the shift not
as a reflection of changes in the union's composition or philosophy, but of domestic and
international political economy developments. They emphasized a general deterioration in the US's
trade balance and position, strongly affecting a number of industrial sectors with large labor forces,
like glass, steel, electronics, textiles, and shoes. They saw such a deterioration as due to the
proliferating use of managed-economy trade policies of the US's industrialized competitors; the
internationalization of technology; the skyrocketing rise of investments by US companies in
foreign subsidiaries; and the spread of MNCs based in the US (NYT Feb.20, 1970). The
industries hit hardest by these developments were, indeed, the manufacturing industries like steel
and electronics that, unlike textiles and glass industries, had done relatively well internationally in
the early 1960s. Moreover, these industries employed the majority of the AFL-CIO's
membership. Little wonder that the Federation blamed much of their new protectionism on the
position of their membership in the international economy.
The AFL-CIO also claimed their shift was a response to the false promises by liberalizers
that the benefits of trade liberalization would be pursued in a way that adequately compensated the
victims of liberalization. They referred, in particular, to the failures of the Trade Adjustment
Assistance program they had made the condition for their support of liberalization between 1955
and 1962. Twelve of the rejected petitions for adjustment assistance filed between 1962 and 1969
were filed by frustrated unions. Consistently and explicitly pointing to their disappointment that
the adjustment assistance and escape clause mechanisms did nothing for workers, representatives
of the AFL-CIO and member unions claimed that accepting promises for such assistance was
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naive, since they would remain hollow and unfulfilled. Even if such assistance were provided, the
labor officials reasoned, it would represent mere "burial insurance."
But the change also coincided with major developments in the union's membership and
strategy. Between 1962 and 1970, the union lost its largest and most internationalist champion
when the United Auto Workers (UAW) withdrew from the AFL-CIO in 1968. Well into the 1970s
the UAW did not completely give up on compensated liberalization, long after they left the
federation. The liberalization of adjustment assistance provisions granted under the US-Canada
Auto Pact renewed for a time the UAW's faith that adequate safeguards could accompany
liberalization to make compensated liberalization a viable and preferable alternative to unconditional
protectionism or liberalization. UAW president Walter Reuther withdrew his union from the
Federation for a variety of reasons,5 2 but differences between the UAW and the Federation over
trade was apparently not one of them, as they never get mentioned in secondary and primary
reports of the conflict between the union leaderships. On the contrary, the split between the UAW
and the AFL-CIO was a cause rather than a consequence for the shift in AFL-CIO trade policy.
With the departure of the UAW, the Federation lost by far its largest and most ardent supporter of
compensated liberalization. What was left were the member unions that were the big industries that
were traditionally or more recently hammered by international trade -- steel, textiles, shoes, etc.
The importance of the UAW's departure to the shift is suggested by the sequence of events.
As late as the 1967 convention, the AFL-CIO was still in its first stage of transformation from
compensated liberalization -- anger and skepticism but continued commitment to compensated
liberalization. In the intervening two years, during which the UAW made its vocal break with the
Federation, the AFL-CIO position moved decidedly further, to a more resolute repudiation of free
trade, whatever the reform offered to adjustment assistance or other side payments.
Among the leadership and the member unions that stayed, moreover, the commitment to
compensated liberalization appears to have been thin and brittle, or to have been reversed, since it
crumbled quickly in the face of the unfulfilled promises that many liberalizers acknowledged as
unjust and in need of remedy. As the Tariff Commission continually rejected applications for
adjustment assistance, the AFL-CIO's research and legislative policy-making unit and its member
unions lost faith in the possibility that the program could be reformed. They lost this faith, even
though liberalizers explicitly explained that liberalizing adjustment assistance was a high priority,
52 The reasons for withdrwaing, instead, involved disagreement with the Federation's policies on a variety of issues,
including its rabid anticommunist support for the Vietnam war and for other US policies against parts of the
international free labor movement. More generally, the UAW and Reuther, in particular, claimed to take issue with
the Federation's alleged unwillingness "to permit in-depth discussion of issues,.. to evaluate new ideas with an open
mind,...[and] to share democratic leadership in the formulation of policies and programs and their implementation"
("A Statement Regarding UAW Relationship with the AFL-CIO," signed by Reuther and the three other UAW
principal officers, quoted in AFL-CIO Convention, p.405).
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and even though both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations continually tried to act on that
priority in their trade policy proposals.
More important, the AFL-CIO gave up on a compensated liberalization stance that would
make their support of liberalized trade conditional upon provision of side payments other than
adjustment assistance. The AFL-CIO continually made reference to two issues that could be made
the subject of such linkage: the protection of labor rights, and the regulation through tax and other
policies of outgoing foreign direct investment. Even if adjustment assistance really was a wash out
-- mere "burial insurance" -- the Federation or other unions could have made these other policies
the subjects of side payments in exchange for liberalization. But their support for such policies
tended to be vague and never explicitly linked to acceptance of freer trade. In other words, the
AFL-CIO appears to have gone beyond skeptical punishment of an unfulfilled promise and a poor
reputation by liberalizers, and to have instead thrown the baby out with the bath-water.
Such a position starkly contrasts with that of the United Auto Workers, the one major labor
group to stick with its explicit support for compensated liberalization. At the center of the UAW's
trade policy-making strategy was explicit compensated liberalization premised upon improvement
in adjustment assistance. As the decade matured and as the Auto Pact fight faded, UAW
representatives no longer needed to play up the special position of auto workers justifying urgent
changes in adjustment assistance for auto interests, and instead began to agitate for generalization
of the improvements in auto adjustment assistance to the general TAA program. They also sought
more sweeping expansion in the scale and reform of the program, calling for among other things
more money for workers, expanded training and relocation benefits, and quicker processing of
petitions. Beyond these general recommendations, they were not specific about the changes they
desired (UAW Convention 1967, p.). More important, as part of a compensated liberalization
stance, UAW representatives explicitly stated that their continued support for freer trade was
premised upon such improved adjustment assistance.
Aside from this specific compensated liberalization, the UAW lobbied heavily and explicitly
for several other elements of the AFL-CIO's new stance -- but in a way that invited side payment
linkage. In particular, the UAW was one of the first and most vocal proponents of changing the
tax code on multinational corporations, setting up monitoring and regulations on outgoing FDI, all
designed to discourage MNCs from exporting jobs to take advantage of lax labor standards and
low wages. And the UAW also supported paying greater attention to the protection of international
labor standards through the International Labor Organization, though like the Federation they were
again hazy on specifics. Unlike the AFL-CIO, the UAW's explicit linking of liberalization and
adjustment assistance implied a flexibility on trade matters. This, in turn, opened the possibility
that their support for these other policy areas might also be made the subjects of side payments.
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3. Fading of Compensated Liberalization as Outcome: Ineffective Side Payments, Lost
Liberalization, and the Protectionist Tide, 1967-1972
Such significant moves towards protectionism and away from compensated liberalization
frustrated the liberalizers interested in continuing their legislative gains of the early 1960s. The end
result was a series of delayed or aborted liberalization initiatives, and an increasingly aggressive
and politically successful series of protectionist initiatives. In the struggles over all of these
initiatives, the only side payment offered or discussed was modest liberalization of the adjustment
assistance program, a side payment offer that was increasingly received as too little too late.
3.1. Delayed and Aborted Liberalization in 1967 and 1968
The first round of that frustration spanned the last two years of the Johnson
Administration, in the immediate aftermath of the Kennedy Round of GATT. The Administration
and its liberalizer allies sought modest legislation to ratify some of the cuts agreed to in that Round
and to minimally renew presidential negotiating authority set to expire in 1967. In this effort,
however, they faced concerted efforts to block any such liberalization and to set-up legislated,
mandatory quotas for a variety of distressed industries. The resulting struggle led the
Administration to delay its liberalization initiative in 1967, and to abort its initiative in 1968 --
defeats that came in the wake of failed efforts to buy-off opposition through modest adjustment
assistance side payments and exemption via voluntary quota negotiations. On the up-side for the
liberalizers, hard-ball tactics and veto threats accomplished what these buy-off tactics couldn't, and
stemmed the quota tide. The side payment offers, it appears, played a minimal role.
3.1.1. 1967 Delay and Worry
As the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations came to a close in May 1967, most
internationally vulnerable groups had to accept the deep cuts in tariff barriers as fait accompli, since
the cuts were made under the auspices of negotiating authority granted in the 1962 TEA. But the
chemical industry, which faced the tentative agreement devised under GATT to repeal the American
Selling Price (ASP) tariff valuation for its industry, had another option. They could try to block
chemical tariff liberalization because ASP repeal entailed cuts that were deeper than that authorized
under the 1962 Act, requiring that the Johnson Administration get to get congressional approval for
that repeal. So throughout 1967 trade policy involved a series of legislative quota initiatives by
industries seeking to off-set the GATT cuts with quota legislation, while the chemical industry
sought to protect the ASP when the Administration sought its repeal through the liberalization
initiative everyone knew it had to introduce.
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The fight over the chemical industry's ASP began as early as June 1966, when reports
circulated that the US negotiators were considering bargaining on the ASP at the Common
Market's insistence, the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Assn. (SOCMA) campaigned
to prevent ASP repeal. By Senate voice vote on June 29th, 1966, the Senate adopted a resolution
urging President Johnson to instruct US negotiators "to bargain only on provisions authorized in
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962" (CQ Almanac 1967, p.8 10). The Senate Finance Committee
report on the measure, according to the CQ Almanac, "was aimed directly at the chemical issue and
had the unanimous backing of the Committee" (Ibid.). When the Administration ignored this
request, 183 Members of Congress wrote either the President or the Tariff Commission to protest,
and on May 12, 1967, 12 members of the House Ways and Means Committee contacted US
negotiators asking them not to make any commitments. Thus, when the Administration went
ahead and tentatively negotiated elimination of the ASP, the stage was set for strong opposition to
the repeal -- both on grounds of helping the industry and on grounds of the Administration
encroaching upon Congress's perceived jurisdiction.
In 1967, the Chemical industry rallied against ASP repeal, before the Administration tabled
any legislation. SOCMA was joined in protecting ASP by the Manufacturing Chemists
Association (MCA), "the leading chemical trade group" whose membership included a number of
internationally-oriented firms that were traditional free trade stalwarts (CQ Almanac 1967, p.810).
The Members of Congress representing states with large benzenoid chemical concentrations, such
as New Jersey (30,000 benzenoid workers, Texas (13,000), W.Virginia (7,000), and
Pennsylvania (2,000), repeatedly announced their opposition to ASP repeal throughout that year.
And the CQ Almanac reported that 10 new lobbying organizations registered with Congress during
the summer of 1967 as lobbyists against ASP repeal (Ibid., p.8 1 1). By October, Administration
officials began to acknowledge they were falling behind in their effort to ratify that repeal.
Throughout 1967, much more attention was devoted to a rash of protectionist quota
legislation for import-competing industries than to the ASP problem. The industry leading the way
in quota action was textiles. On May 17th, two days after the Kennedy Round agreement was
announced, Senator Hollings (D. S.C.) introduced a bill (S 1796) to impose quotas on textile
imports. Soon thereafter, House Ways and Means Committee chairman Wilbur D.Mills (D.-Ark.)
introduced a similar measure, even though his traditional stance as a defender of free trade made
his motivation ambiguous. 53 This House quota bill was joined by a flurry of other textile bills. By
the end of the session, the Senate bill had won 68 Senate co-sponsors, just enough to override a
presidential veto. The House quota measures, meanwhile, gained a total of 153 sponsors for quota
53 Some speculated that Mills introduced the measure "only in order to keep it bottle up in his committee..." (CQ
Almanac 1967, p.8 1 1). Mills also later stated that he favored holding off action on the quota proposal until a
presidentially-mandated Tariff Commission study of textiles was concluded.
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legislation -- short of being veto-proof but expected to win more support if it came to a vote
(Ibid.).
The textile industry may have been the most visible subject of quota legislation, but it was
really the tip of an iceberg. The steel industry also was the subject of import quota bills. Industry
supporters had spent most of the year working for increases in tariffs and a state-level "buy
American" campaign, both of which bore no fruit. Late in the year, they switched to support for
import quotas, with Sen.Vance Hartke (D.Ind.) introducing a bill (S 2537) and was cosponsored
by 35 others. To textile and steel quota bills, the congress added quota bills for oil, introduced by
Russell Long and gained 28 other cosponsors, as well as for a variety of other smaller industries.54
And two other Senate bills (S 1446, S 2476) sought a more general quota measure that would
provide quota protection for any industry found to be threatened by import injury. This measure
received more than 20 Senate supporters. Throughout the 1967 session, 90 of the 100 members of
the Senate had sponsored at least one of these quota bills (CQ Almanac 1967, p.8 10).
Congress held several sets of hearings on the various quota initiatives, and on related
legislation. Between early April and late June, the House Committee on Education and Labor
heard testimony from a variety of industry and labor groups on the impact of Kennedy Round cuts
and on proposals to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act. Later in the year, Hale Boggs's (D La)
Subcomittee on foreign Economic Policy of the House-Senate joint Economic Committee
sponsored a hearing to consider quota legislation, and only allowed injured industries to submit
written statements. And the Senate Finance Committee sponsored hearings between October 18th
and the 20th to consider the quota packages. All the representatives to give testimony on behalf of
unions and industries were single-minded in their pursuit of quota protection. None of them
mentioned an interest in other policies related to trade protection that might help their position, and
that might be made the subjects of side payment linkage..
The Johnson Administration first responded to this protectionist onslaught on July 7th, in a
conference to discuss the impact of the Kennedy Round. The Administration defended its actions
during the GATT negotiations, including its 35 percent or more linear tariff cuts and its tentative
plan to cut ASP protection for chemicals. It also gave some preview of the kind of safeguards it
would provide in liberalization legislation, were it to submit such legislation that year, when Under
Secretary of Labor James J.Reynolds told import-competing firms and workers that the few
industries and unions to suffer serious injury would be able to receive aid from a revised
adjustment assistance law. As quota pressures mounted, the Administration decided that 1967
would be a bad year to introduce its legislation, and instead it focused its trade policy attention on
defeating the quota initiatives. On November 2nd Johnson said "I think those protectionist bills
54 These others included meat, dairy products, lead and zinc, strawberries, honey, footwear, electronic equipment,
scissors and shears, etc.
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just must not become law...and they're not going to become law as along as I am President" (CQ
Almanac 1967, p.8 13 .).
After delaying its liberalization initiative and speaking out more strongly against the quota
legislation, the Administration was able to delay the quota initiatives. By late in the Fall, it became
clear that the House wasn't going to act on the quota legislation until the next year. In the Senate,
the pressure for the quota bills was stronger, particularly for the textile quotas, one of which had
68 cosponsors. After waiting in vain for the House to act, Senator Dirkson planned to attach an
omnibus quota amendment to the Johnson Administration's Social Security bill (HR 120080), its
top priority for that session. Before he could do so, however, Johnson informed some
congressional leaders that he would veto the Social Security measure if it became a vehicle for the
quotas. In any event, the senior-citizen lobby mounted a loud campaign to block Dirkson's attempt
at linkage. The intensity of the quota drive, however, promised to continue into the next session,
when Johnson was expected to push harder for his TEA renewal and ASP repeal.
3.1.2. 1968 Surrender
In 1968, the story was similar to the previous year, but more developed. This time, the
Administration sought to push through its liberalization initiative, the 1968 Trade Expansion Act,
which gave authority to modestly cut existing tariffs, to repeal the American Selling Price system,
and to revise adjustment assistance. The adjustment assistance provisions represented a
compensatory side payment to industry and, especially, labor groups increasingly ambivalent or
opposed to the liberalization. This effort to buy off opposition was joined by some attempts to
secure voluntary quota agreements, to cut off the legislated efforts. Despite these tactics, the
Administration got nothing in 1968. On the other hand, the many attempts to pass quota legislation
ultimately went no where as well.
The Johnson Administration introduced its Trade Expansion Act of 1968 in a message to
Congress on May 28th. As the administration had signaled for a couple of years, the bill was
relatively modest. It called for extension of negotiating authority until June 30, 1970, granting the
president powers to continue to modestly cut tariffs. More ambitiously, it called for elimination of
the entire American Selling Price system of tariff valuation, not just the ASP for chemicals. The
1968 TEA also called for extension of the soon-to-expire Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965
until June 30, 1971.
Explicitly praising the adjustment provisions in the Auto Pact Act, the Administration also
proposed to loosen the eligibility criteria and reform the administration of the Trade Adjustment
Assistance. In particular, Johnson proposed to make relief available whenever increased imports
were "a substantial cause of injury" rather than a "major cause," as was the TAA and escape clause
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status quo. This language was similar to the escape clause criterion prior to the 1962 TEA
tightened the language. More importantly, Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz later explained that
the criterion was no longer to require that petitioners show a strong, "in major part" link between
tariff concessions and increased imports, but only a "substantial cause" link between import
increases in injury (House Ways and Means Hearings 1968, p.37-39). The details of how to
interpret "substantial cause" were left ambiguous, but generally understood to mean as important
as, though not necessarily greater than, any other single cause (Mitchell 1976, p.47). Also, the
adjustment assistance and escape clause petitions were to be decided by the Secretaries of Labor,
Commerce, and Treasury, rather than by the Tariff Commission.
In these ways, the proposed adjustment assistance reform was similar, actually more
generous given the slightly looser eligibility criterion, to that passed under the Auto Pact. As in the
struggle over that Pact, the adjustment assistance provisions of the 1968 TEA were side payments
because they were designed to off-set the pain ratified or introduced by the 1968 measure's
liberalization and were separate from the provisions being liberalized.
The 1968 TEA initiative was short-lived. The House Ways and Means Committee took up
the bill (HR 17551) and held 19 days of hearings between June 4th and July 2nd. More than 300
witnesses gave testimony. The ASP repeal drew the most fire, with the chemical industry and its
legislative champions leading the charge. More important than criticism of the TEA's provisions, it
became clear that protectionist industries and unions were going to push to secure quotas, either
through amendment of the TEA or through the flurry of independent quota legislation that had
already been initiated in 1967.
The adjustment assistance provisions garnered little praise from the protectionist groups at
whom it was principally targeted. US Steelworkers President I.W. Abel's was typical in
explaining that the adjustment assistance would be no more than a drop in the bucket and that
quotas were the only way to go. Meanwhile, the adjustment assistance provisions had mixed
success among liberalizers. On the one hand, it was neutral or positive for a few groups, such as
for the Chamber of Commerce representatives (House Hearings, Jay H.Cerf testimony, p. 17 10).
Other groups, however, saw in the adjustment assistance provisions pandering to protectionists
and the danger for a program that could grow out of control. Such was the position of the National
Foreign Trade Council, Inc., as expressed by its president, Robert Norris. Norris recommended
that adjustment assistance eligibility should still require showing a strong link between tariff
concession and imports (House Hearings 1968, p. 1495).
And these protectionist groups put forward few linkable issues that could be used as
alternative side payments to the adjustment assistance. Abel and some other labor leaders, such as
the United Textile Workers of America President George Baldanzi, also stated the trade stance that
was soon to be that of the AFL-CIO, that restrictions on out-going foreign direct investment were
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also necessary to promote the orderly expansion of trade (House Ways and Means Hearings 1968,
p. 1 845). In identifying such a linkable issue, however, they stood apart from other protectionists,
all of whom gave testimony offering little in the way of alternatives to quotas in their stated
positions on the TEA bill.
As pressure for the quotas mounted and various attempts to defuse that pressure went
nowhere, Wilbur Mills decided to table the bill for fear that it would become a quota Christmas
Tree. Robert Pastor and John Evans both quote Mills as having lamented the danger of a
protectionist log-roll: "However sympathetic individual Representatives or Senators are to the
textile import problem, there are other industries which are seeking the same form of relief and
which also have supporters in the Congress. Thus, it appears difficult, if not impossible, to work
out an import quota law for one industry and prevent its extension to the products of other
industries" (Evans 1971, p.303-4; Pastor 1980, p. 122). Whether or not the Administration agreed
with this tactic, it had no choice but to accept Mills's decision to abort.
After Mills forced the TEA's surrender,5" the quota tide flowed forth, and the liberalizer
coalition had to go on the defensive. They were largely successful, though only by a hair. The
textile industry, predictably, made the most ground. With the 1967 Senate textile bill still in the
Finance Committee, textile industry and labor groups managed to attach the measure as an
amendment to the Administration's tax surcharge legislation designed to remedy the growing
balance of payment problem. In conference, Congress removed the rider in the face of strong
Johnson Administration opposition. Johnson then had to actually use his veto to strike down a
protectionist bill cleared by both the House and Senate that would take away extra-long staple
cotton quota from countries with whom the US discontinued diplomatic relations, in this case
Egypt and the Sudan, and transfer it to American producers (CQ Almanac 1968, p.728).
Only a few other quota and other protectionist initiatives made it this far. The steel industry
didn't get its 1967 quota legislation to go any further, but they sparked US negotiations with Japan
and other countries for voluntary controls and restricted US participation in the Kennedy Round's
negotiated changes to the International Dumping Code. Other industries didn't even get this much.
For instance, the 1967 oil quota bill went nowhere, and in fact the Johnson Administration allowed
companies unable to use full quotas in 1967 because of the Arab-Israeli struggle to increase their
1968 imports to take up the slack.
That the quota wave of 1968 bore so little fruit can be attributed mainly to efforts by
liberalizers to block action at every turn. In the case of steel, the Administration also pursued the
exemption option, by trying to negotiate a voluntary quota arrangement. But for all other sectors,
brute force was the order of the day at every decisionmaking juncture, up to and including a
" The word "surrender" here is meant to connote the idea that the initiative was aborted. Since "abortment" isn't a
word I figured I would look elsewhere rather than use the overly provocative "abortion."
208
Burgoon
Chapter Three
sustainable veto of completed legislation. Although the Administration had proposed a
compensatory side payment in its 1968 TEA, the surrender of this initiative meant that there were
none offered in direct connection with the fight against quota protectionism. Only the faint
prospect of loosened adjustment assistance sometime in the future, and a liberalizer coalition's
conflicted commitment to such assistance, entered the policymaking mix. It's fair to say that this
vague trace of a side payment had no discernible effect on the developments in 1968, either in
helping or hindering the TEA or in stemming the quota tide.16
3.2. Nixon Does No Better in 1969 and 1970
The trend of failed liberalization, stemmed protectionist tides, and modest and ineffective
compensatory side payments continued under the Republicans. The Nixon Administration
positioned trade policy relatively low on its legislative agenda, but international considerations put
strong pressure on the Administration to ratify GATT-negotiated promises and thereby maintain
US credibility in present and future trade and other negotiations." So by the end of its first year,
the Administration was ready to introduce liberalization legislation.
In contemplating the legislation, however, Administration representatives were acutely
aware of continued protectionist demands and eroding support for compensated liberalization.
They recognized, in particular, that the escape clause and adjustment assistance programs had not
done what they were supposed to do and had, as a result, rationalized stronger protectionism. The
Tariff Commission had independently loosened its interpretations of existing escape clause
eligibility standards. But Administration officials knew that protectionist pressures would mute
any of the bill's liberalization tenets while attaching quota and other protections in the process.
Therefore, even though both Nixon and Secretary of Labor George Shultz were publicly
ambivalent about programs giving special treatment to groups dislocated by trade, the
Administration sought legislation that combined the liberalization measures with explicit protections
and improvements in the escape clause and adjustment assistance provisions (National Journal 5-
16-70, p. 1035).
56 Congress did pass one small piece of legislation liberalizing trade in 1968, when it cleared a bill (HR 7735)
extending duty suspension of imports of alumina, calcined bauxit and bauxit ore. After passing the House, the
Senate added three unrelated amendments, one of which may have entailed a modest side payment. That amendment
called for extending from three to six months the period in which refund claims might be filed for tax paid on
distilled spirits used in the production of nonbeverage products. Whether this was a side payment is unclear, because
it isn't clear whether the tax refund sought to off-set pain of those legislators or constituencies opposed to the
liberalization. This isn't clear because the Senate vote for the amendment and the final bill was a voice vote, making
it impossible to see who supported and who opposed the liberalization and the amendment. [how about industrial
break-down?]
57 Among the many other reasons was that foreign governments sought "concrete assurance that the new Republican
Administration would continue the free trade policies of the previous Democratic administrations" (National Journal,
p. 1815).
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So the Administration tabled a modest trade liberalization initiative on November 18, 1969,
calling for much the same as Johnson's failed 1968 Trade Expansion Act. It called for
authorization to make reductions in US tariffs by not more than 20 percent below the rate existing
on July 1, 1967, or 2 percent ad valorem, and for elimination of the American Selling Price (ASP)
system. On the other hand, the bill would strengthen the President's authority to retaliate against
unfair trade practices by other countries.
The bill also called for significant loosening of the adjustment assistance and escape clause
eligibility, though less so than either the 1968 proposal under Johnson, or the Auto pact
provisions. For both the escape clause and the adjustment assistance provisions, the bill ended the
requirement that petitioners show a strong connection between tariff concessions and import
increases and offered relief for threatened as well as actual injury. For the escape clause the
standard went from "in major part" to "primary cause" (like the Auto pact language, meaning
greater than any other single cause), and for the adjustment assistance program the standard was to
be yet looser: from "in major part" to "contributed substantially," meaning "no less important than
any other single cause." In this latter respect the Nixon proposal actually called for greater
liberalization of the eligibility criteria than did the Auto pact provisions. But the Nixon proposal
retained the decisionmaking procedure whereby the Tariff Commission had the main
decisionmaking authority on whether to accept or reject petitions from labor or employer groups.
Before the House Ways and Means Cormmittee considered the Administration's
liberalization bill, legislators and Administration officials also put forward a variety of other trade
policymaking measures -- most of them protectionist. A couple were proposals for export
incentives, including a House-introduced measure calling for a large tax rebate to exporters and a
more modest Administration proposal to boost exports by providing tax breaks to new corporate
entities that US-based firms could set up, called (DISC).
The most important of the bills, however, was one introduced by the House Ways and
Means Chairman Wilbur Mills, calling for quotas for textiles and footwear. The Mills bill (HR
16920) was a response to strong labor and textile industry pressure for quota protection, but was
designed mainly to pressure Japan and other countries into accepting voluntary quotas favorable to
US producers in the on-going negotiations between these countries and the Administration. Mills
claimed that this was his motivation, given Japanese intransigence in the VER negotiations, and
particularly its hubris in predicting that Congress wouldn't actually act unilaterally (National
Journal 5-16-70, p. 1036). The Mills bill also contained reforms for the adjustment assistance and
escape clause relief programs, very similar to the Administration's requests. The main difference
was that the Mills bill called for slightly looser escape clause eligibility criteria: where the
Administration called on petitioners to show that injury was due "in primary part" to import
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increases, the Mills bill required that they show only that injury was due "in substantial part" to
import increases, the same standard as for adjustment assistance.
In May 1970, the House Ways and Means Commrittee took up the Administration's
liberalization bill (HR 14870) as well as several others, including the DISC proposal and the Mills
quota bill. It held hearings for twenty days, beginning on May 11, to hear testimony on all of
these initiatives. Like the hearings in the last several episodes of liberalization, the focus of most
of those testifying during these hearings was on the most protectionist elements of the bills being
considered: the textile and footwear quotas, and repeal of the ASP provisions. The Nixon
Administration officials to testify, including its most protectionist member, Secretary of Commerce
Maurice H.Stans, spoke out against the quotas and ASP. Stans asked that the Committee withhold
judgment or action on the Mills textile quota provisions until negotiations with Japan could be
concluded, but when those negotiations reached stalemate on June 24th Stans appeared again
before the Corrmittee to express the Administration's reluctant support for the quota since it
allowed voluntary agreements to supersede the legislated quotas. On footwear Stans and the
Administration was unambiguously opposed.
The range of groups testifying on behalf of creating legislated quotas and of maintaining
ASP were generally unwavering and single minded in their testimony, claiming that the only trade
policy provisions acceptable to the interests of their industry was the protection under review.
There was no signaling of possible linkable issues among these industry groups. Organized labor
was again an exception, signaling not only its position on the main protection elements of the bill --
its strong support for quotas and for retention of ASP tariff valuation, and its opposition to the
DISC export credits -- but also its support for tax and regulatory policies that would discourage
outgoing foreign direct investment that would cause mass unemployment at home (House Hearings
1970, May 19th, Andrew J.Biemiller [check this pg.]).
The adjustment assistance measures also received some attention, mostly favorable but
frustrated. Organized labor, for instance, made clear its support for loosening eligibility criteria.
But representatives took pains to point out that the program didn't buy AFL-CIO or member union
support for liberalization, as had been the tradition since the mid-1950s (Biemiller testimony, ).
This was consistent with the Federation's February announcement that it was dropping out of the
free trade coalition. Other protectionists expressed greater frustration with the proposed revisions.
O.R. Strackbein of the Nation-Wide Committee on Import-Export Policy pointed out that the most
liberal combination of the eligibility language -- the "contributed substantially" language in the
Mills version -- was no more generous than that provided before the 1962 TEA tightening. And
since a very small proportion of petitioners got affirmative rulings from the Commission during
that earlier period, there was no reason to rejoice at the 1970 proposals.
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Among liberalizers, support for loosening escape clause and adjustment assistance
eiigibility was also strong, but frightened by the frustration expressed by protectionists. The
National Journal reported in that year that many supporters of economic liberalization had "brought
about a reversal of attitudes towards liberalizing the escape clause in the liberal trade community"
(NJ 5-16-70, p.1035). David J.Steinberg, secretary and chief economist for the Committee for a
National Trade Policy said that his group had become convinced that liberalization of the eligibility
criteria was necessary "as a way to forestall legislated quotas" (Ibid.). The truth was that the
Committee had already gone on record in 1967 and 1968 in support of loosening eligibility, but
they apparently sought to highlight the shift in attitudes to garner greater support for that loosening.
Other liberaitzers explicitly recognized the frustration among protectionists with the assistance
provisions and were disappointed with the modesty of the proposed reforms. Rep. Henry
S.Reuss (D.-Wis.) [check vote], for instance, thought the proposed loosening of eligibility criteria
for adjustment assistance was far too little, saying that such assistance should be provided "on an
almost Appalachian scale" (National Journal 5-16-70, p. 1036).
After nearly a month of hearings, during which 370 private witnesses gave testimony, the
Ways and Means Committee redrafted the various proposals into a bill substantially more
protectionist, but also more generous in the side payments to be provided, than the president had
requested. The Committee granted the Administration its basic request for modest tariff cutting
authority and for new authority to retaliate against unfair trading practices, through revision of the
1921 Antidumping Act and expansion of the countervailing duty piovisions. It also extended the
Auto Product Trade Act of 1965, which had expired two years earlier, and the requested DISC
export credit.
The Administration also managed to get a minimalist version of its basic ASP request. The
Committee initially voted to reject the requested ASP repeal. But Administration officials informed
chemical industry and Committee representatives that the President might veto the legislation
without ASP repeal. According to a National Journal report, Administration officials also used
other strong-arm tactics. They called chemical industry officials, "leaving them with the clear
impression that without repeal of ASP there would be no bill and no quotas on imports of
manmade fibers" -- a major product made by the big chemical producers (N.J. 8-22-70, p. 1815-
6). And they notified "the large textile companies -- the major consumers of manmade fibers -- and
asked them to put pressure on the chemical companies to stop opposing ASP repeal" (N.J. 8-22-
70, p. 18 1 6). Despite all this pressure, the Committee did not grant full authority to repeal ASP.
Instead, the Administration was allowed to repeal ASP for chemicals but not for rubber -soled
footwear (the other main product covered by ASP), and repeal had to be submitted to both houses
of Congress for 60 days, after which it would become law unless both houses passed a concurrent
resolution opposing repeal (CQ Almanac 1970, p. 10 6 1).
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In part because of this apparent trade-off, the Ways and Means bill contained a variety of
quota provisions. It included the Mills quota provisions for textiles and shoes, legislation
simultaneously under review alongside the President's from the beginning. But the Committee
created a new quota mechanism called the "Byrnes basket," after its initiator, the senior Republican
Ways and Means member John W.Byrnes. The Byrnes basket set up a review process similar to
the escape clause provisions through which industries could receive quota or tariff protection if
adequate injury could be shown to the Tariff Commission. Doing so would require higher
eligibility standards than for the escape clause or adjustment assistance. Byrnes thought the new
provisions necessary in the interest of equity given the textile and shoe quota, and in the interest of
preventing a log roll toward more specific legislated quota protection (N.J. 8/22/70, p. 1818).
Along with this creeping protectionism, the Ways and Means Committee also adopted more
generous loosening of the escape clause and adjustment assistance measures. It accepted Mills's
proposal for a looser standard for escape clause eligibility -- "contributed substantially" rather than
the Administration's "due in primary part." More significantly, the Committee called for
significantly easier access to the adjustment assistance provisions than the "contributed
substantially" loosening implied. First, injured workers and firms could petition directly to the
President, rather than the Tariff Commission, and the President was required to ask the
Commission for an investigation of the petition within five days of its receipt. The Commission
was in turn required to provide a factual report on the basis of which the President was to make a
decision within 30 days. Beyond this loosening, the Committee also required to grant adjustment
assistance eligibility whenever workers or firms were granted escape clause relief by the Tariff
Commission, even if the President chose not to act on such an affirmative ruling (CQ Almanac
1970, p. 10 6 1). These provisions significantly watered down the conservative Commission's
decisionmaking authority, and implied an application process as loose -- and a side payment as
generous -- as had been created under the Auto Pact.
The various mandatory quotas attached to the legislation inspired alarm among most
liberalizers in and out of government. All of the free-trade lobbies, such as the Committee for a
National Trade Policy, urged its re-writing or veto. Leading Congressional liberalizers warned that
the bill would spark massive retaliations against US exports and drive the US into economic
isolation. And on July 20th, President Nixon declared that he would veto mandatory quota
legislation on products other than textiles: "I would not be able to sign the bill because that would
set off a trade war, [that would] cost us more jobs in the exports that would be denied
us...and...even more important, [that would be] highly inflationary..." (CQ Almanac 1970,
p. 1060).
Despite such saber rattling by the Administration, the House passed the protectionist
measure on November 19th, 1970, after two days of debate. The final vote was a strong 215-165.
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Apparently the various tactics of revision (escape clause liberalization), exemption (textile quotas),
and compensation (adjustment assistance), were insufficient to buy enough support for a cleaner
bill. The only alternative was veto, a step that was never to be tested because of developments in
the Senate.
Since the House didn't pass the measure until so late in the Congressional term, Senators
supporting its final passage couldn't wait until the House's final vote before acting. The Senate
Finance Committee, led by its Chairman Russell B.Long (D.-La.), reached a tentative decision on
October 18th and voted on November 30th to attach most of the bill's provisions to a bill
establishing Social Security Amendments (HR 17550). The motivation for such piggy-backing
was obvious: liberalizers opposed to the protections in the bill would have a difficult time
defeating the bill "by stretching out debate until the end of the post-election session if, in doing so,
they would kill an increase in social security benefits" (CQ Almanac 1970, p. 1064).
The result was a Social Security bill reported out of the Finance Committee that increased
such benefits but also included almost all of the protectionist trade bill passed by the House --
minus the DISC export credit and the core liberalization provision sought by the Administration,
repeal of ASP protection for chemicals. To sweeten the Social Security deal, finance Committee
leaders also added three other provisions: "a limited test of the President's family assistance
plan,...a national insurance plan against catastrophic illness, and...an increase in veterans'
pensions" (CQ Almanac 1970, p. 1066).
Given even the slimmest chance at amending the bill, the Finance Committee also chose to
modestly expand the House-passed adjustment assistance provisions by increasing adjustment
allowances for dislocated workers to the lower of 75 percent of actual wages or national average
manufacturing wages. This was an increase of 10 percent over the existing law or the existing
House bill. When the Social Security bill was sent to the Senate floor on December 1 Ith, increases
in social security benefits were held hostage by supporters of the protectionist trade provisions.
Opponents of those provisions, most of whom strongly supported the social security hikes, had to
choose between swallowing the protectionist measures as a price for those hikes, and halting the
protectionism at the price of no hikes.
In the end, opponents of the trade provisions called the protectionists' bluff and chose the
latter. After the bill made it to the Senate floor on December 11 th, opponents of the trade bill
knew they could not vote out the protectionist provisions through amendments, so their only
strategy was to filibuster the entire package until it was too late to pass the legislation and reconcile
differences with the House -- all of which needed to be done before January 3d. Between the 1 1th
and the 22nd, therefore, the liberalizers filibustered the measures, delaying action on any of the
legislation until after a recess between December 22nd and the 28th. But when that recess began,
House Ways and Means Chairman Mills and ranking minority member Byrnes together stated it
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would be impossible for a conference committee to complete action on the Social Security-trade
bill. So Senator Long proposed to drop the trade provisions in the hopes of getting the Social
Security provisions through. The protectionists had admitted defeat. As even the social security
provisions proved impossible to reconcile with the House counterpart before adjournment, the
liberalizers proved themselves willing to post-pone or give up Social Security improvements to
prevent passage of the quota-filled trade legislation.
In short, to prevent passage of protectionist provisions unprecedented in the previous forty
years of trade policymaking, liberalizers found that revision, exemption, and compensation all
failed to defuse the protectionist tide. Only the willingness to sacrifice more widely popular, and
possibly much higher priority legislation, was successful.
3.3. Burke-Hartke, Labor's Uncompensatable Protectionism, 1971 and 1972
The experience of the previous year convinced the Nixon Administration not to pursue any
legislated trade liberalization for fear of repeating the pattern of having such legislation bastardized
by unwanted legislated quotas. More important, perhaps, the Administration was engaged in a
series of much more sweeping and fundamental overhaul of its foreign economic policymaking
organization, policies, and strategy. In May 1970, just as the Administration was giving up on the
Mills Bill legislation of that year, Nixon initiated the first step in that overhaul by appointing the
Williams Commission to investigate all aspects of foreign trade and investment policy. In January
of 1971, Nixon then moved to rationalize the various departments involved in foreign economic
policy by creating the Council on International Economic Policy, designed to express the greater
importance the Administration would grant foreign economic policy's given how Nixon and
Kissinger had prioritized such issues well below high politics matters in the past.
Recommendations flowing from the Williams Commission (formally releasing its report in
July 1971), from the Council, and from Peterson's own writings fueled Nixon's dramatic New
Economic Policy, unveiled in August 1971. The policy called for well-known and sweeping
changes in the US's macro- and micro-economic policies, including suspension of US
convertibility to Gold and a 10 percent surcharge on all imports. The scale of these changes and
continued strategic rethinking on trade policymaking completely foreclosed any possibility of
liberalization legislation for 1971 and 1972.
Instead, the next two years of trade policymaking were dominated by protectionist moves,
both Administered protection for textiles and steei, and continued legislative protectionism -- this
time in legislation that joined together investment and trade policies in 'dihe Burke-Hartke Trade and
Investment Act of 1972. This legislation was in all respects organized labor's baby. Even though
the legislation's various kinds of protectionism proved too controversial to make it out of
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committee in anything resembling its initial form, it was the fullest expression of labor's break with
the free trade coalition and with its compensated liberalization stance.
By late 1971, the AFL-CIO had well publicized its break with its compensated liberalization
past. It had announced a general break with the free trade cause following its February 1970
Executive Council meeting. It gave more detail and expression to that break in its May 1971
executive council economic policy platform, based on the trade and investment policy
recommendations in head researcher Nat Goldfinger's September 1970 report, and more widely
publicized in the union representatives' dissent to the Williams Commission report and to
testimony by Federation President George Meany's press statements and testimony in the same
year.
Soon after the executive council announced its new platform in May 1971, Federation
lobbyists sought to translate the platform into actual legislation. Ray Denison, an experienced
AFL-CIO legislative representative specializing in tax, tariff, and trade matters, talked to Senator
Vance Hartke (D-Ind.) and Rep. James A.Burke (D-MA) about the proposals in the hopes that they
would sponsor legislation along the lines of the nine-point executive council program. Denison
targeted these legislators for this effort because both were strongly supported by and supportive of
the labor agenda. Hartke's Indiana constituency included a number of vocal employer and
employee groups hit hard by international competition, including volume and specialty steel, and
he had been supported by the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education during his close 1970
campaign (N.J. 1/15/72, p.1 11). Burke, meanwhile, had also been supported by the same AFL-
CIO electoral unit and represented a significant number of textile, leather and other declining
industries in his New England district. Just as important as the strength of their commitment to the
labor cause, both Hartke and Burke were high-ranking members of the Senate Finance and House
Ways and Means, respectively, the committees with the most power over the plight of trade and
investment legislation (Ibid.).
Within a few months, both legislators were on board. As Thomas J.Brunner, a former
legislative assistant to Senator Hartke said to the National Journal, "it is an open secret that much
of the impetus for this legislation came from organized labor....The bill was drafted under the
auspices of the AFL-CIO" (N.J. 1/15/72, p.1 11). According to Burke's executive assistant, "the
final draft of the bill was a joint effort of Burke's staff, Hartke's staff and the AFL-CIO," with
Elizabeth R.Jager, an international economist on the AFL staff providing a lot of information for
the drafting.
The bill was formally introduced in September 1971 as the Foreign Trade and Investment
Act of 1972, with a very respectable 80 co-sponsors. The bill simply detailed the AFL-CIO's May
1971 executive council platform, calling for a series of sweeping changes in trade and investment
policy. The bill called for, in particular, increased taxes for companies investing in foreign
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countries, for new percentage quotas on virtually all imports, and for a new and powerful
government agency to regulate investment and imports. The tax and regulatory provisions,
particularly those that called for repeal of the existing tax provision allowing US companies to
receive full credit for tax payments to foreign governments -- were not protectionist in at all the
sense that the quotas were. The trade and investment provisions were given equal weight in most
statements and defenses of the bill, though Hartke and others gave special attention to how the bill
was "aimed at protecting the best interests of the nation against the worst practices of international
corporations" (Congressional Record, September 28, 1971; quoted in Ibid, p. 112).
The bill received support from most, though not all segments of organized labor. The
legislative campaign was championed by the AFL-CIO's Industrial Union Department, which
represented 59 unions of about six million members. This Department's 11-man International
Trade Committee took particular interest. The Committee comprised senior representatives from
internationally vulnerable unions, including the United Steelworkers of America, the United
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, the United Shoe Workers, United Glass and Ceramic
Workers, and the Textile Workers Union.
On the other hand, the United Auto Workers, which had left the AFL-CIO in 1968, was
deeply and openly ambivalent about the legislation. On the one hand, they clearly favored some
new legislative action to regulate outgoing foreign direct investment. Indeed, the UAW had been
the strongest and longest proponent of public policies that took better account of the internationally
mobile character of US business. The UAW representatives also recognized and were very
concerned at increasing auto imports into the US. But the UAW continued to support trade
expansion and trade liberalization, conditional upon safeguards such as adjustment assistance.
Such a position was in direct conflict with Burke-Hartke's protectionist quota provisions. So the
UAW did not actively or explicitly take a position on the whole bill. When UAW President
Leonard Woodcock met with Hartke a month after the bill was introduced and urged by the Senator
to support the bill, one of Hartke's aids noted that "Woodcock said he had some problems about
supporting the legislation" (Ibid., p. 1 14). John J. Beidler, legislative director of the UAW's
Washington office, was also at the meeting. In a later interview, he pointed out the union's
historic support for freer trade and opposition to quotas and said that "I think we could support
every pait of [the Burke-Hartke] bill except the quota provisions" (Ibid.).
The bill's combination of trade and investment provisions and the resulting labor
positioning had ambiguous implications for the possibility of side payments being provided to
defuse the most protectionist elements of the bill. Since the regulatory and tax changes were
substantively distinct from tariff and non-tariff barrier protectionism, but at the same time were a
central part of labor's trade policymaking platform, they might be targeted as subjects of side
payment linkage to soften or eliminate Burke-Hartke's strong quota protectionism. With the
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investment and trade provisions given equal weight in the main text of the legislation, labor
representatives and their legislative supporters did not give clear indication that they would accept
such linkage. But labor's clear focus on the investment provisions suggested the possibility that
they would sacrifice trade protectionism before they would sacrifice the investment regulations.
And the UAW's explicit support for the investment provisions and opposition to the quota trade
protections left the door open to allow a softening or elimination of the quota protections as a way
of getting more support for the investment provisions. And from the perspective of liberalizers,
the UAW's position offered various prospects for using concessions on the investment provisions
as a way of splitting the labor coalition in favor of some kind of Burke-Hartke legislation. Any
such exchanges would represent the use of a side payment to defuse a protectionist initiative.
On the other hand, the stances of liberalizers and protectionists precluded such linkage.
First, labor had by then spoken out against the possibility of trading off issues, of accepting side
payments or concessions of non-trade barrier policies in exchange for freer trade -- the perceived
reneging over the adjustment assistance side payment pushing them toward a hardened, inflexible
stance. At least that was the perception in the media, and presumably among many who might be
in a position to offer some side payment linkage.
Second and more importantly, industry and government liberalizers were just as or more
alarmed by the investment provisions as they were by the quota protection. The National
Association of Manufacturers leaders made blocking the bill one of its top priorities in 1972, even
though it was traditionally and explicitly neutral on the issue of foreign trade. The NAM director
of international economic affairs, William Pollert, pointed out that "The NAM does not take a
position on foreign trade, but we think the major issue in this legislation is the political control of
direct foreign investment" (Ibid.). To defeat such political control, Pollert warned, "we are going
to put a lot of money, manpower and resources into this" (ibid.).
The NAM was joined by a host of other liberalizer lobbying groups, including the Chamber
of Commerce, various importers associations, and the Emergency Committee for American Trade
(ECAT). ECAT represented about 50 large multinational corporations and created in 1967 to
combat protectionist initiatives. The focus of ECAT's ire, judging by the narrow focus of its
statements against the legislation, was on the investment provisions. The group conducted a study
on the relationship between foreign trade, investment, and jobs, the results of which focused on
debunking claims made by labor and other groups on behalf of the Burke-Hartke investment
provisions. "We think the bill is based on faulty premises," one ECAT representative noted. "The
allegation labor makes is that US corporations close plants here, open plants overseas, and ship the
goods back here. Our study will show that this is hogwash. About 85 percent of the sales of
overseas affiliates went to overseas markets." Except for the importers associations, the anti-
Burke Hartke opposition focused more on the investment provisions than the trade provisions.
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The chances of conceding some ground to labor on the investment provisions in favor of
eliminating or softening the quota provisions was, thus, unlikely. Even modest elements of such
provisions, such as tax provisions that would treat FDI as neutral rather than as more desirable
than domestic investment, were jealously and unequivocally opposed. So even though Labor's
issue agenda included linkable issues, the divisiveness of those issues narrowed the possibility of
an obviously pareto improving exchange of defused protectionism for investment policy side
payments.
The result was that liberalizers were able to delay or defeat Burke-Hartke without providing
side payments or using other bargaining tools. Burke-Hartke was unable to make it out of the
Ways and Means committee, in spite of the AFL-CIO's intensive lobbying and the bill's 80 co-
sponsors. Chairman Mills allowed hearings, but ultimately tabled the initiative hoping the pressure
behind it would dissipate by the next session, and that some more liberal trade initiative out of the
Nixon Administration in the following year might eclipse at least the most protectionist elements of
the bill. At the same time, Mills was convinced that incorporating some elements of the bill,
including some MNC tax or investment regulations, would be politically necessary and equitable,
and he explained as much to the Administration. Thus, with the heavy opposition by the
Administration and business liberalizers, and with a split in the organized labor constituency
behind various elements of the bill, a free trader Ways and Means chairman was able to use his
discretionary power to at least delay the Burke-Hartke train. But the momentum of that train had
implications for the trade liberalization initiative the Nixon Administration was still hungry to pass.
And more important for our concerns, it had strong implications for the side payment politics of
that initiative.
4. Compensated Liberalization in Decline?: The Shift to Stronger and Unconditional Protectionism
US trade policy-making between 1965 and 1972 disappointed the promise of compensated
liberalization. Despite the Auto Pact's improvement of adjustment assistance for workers displaced
by liberalized auto trade, the AFL-CIO, the main champion of compensated liberalization, gave up
on adjustment assistance and most side payments except massive regulations against outgoing FDI.
The UAW's persistent compensated liberalization stance, premised upon support for improved
adjustment assistance, might be enough to promote the provision of side payments. But the AFL-
CIO, being the larger, more representative and powerful agent of working Americans, had turned
to a strategy that undermined some of the main benefits for providing side payments at all. When
the trade adjustment improvements were offered as compensation in spite of these developments,
they received a tepid reception. Only protectionist exemption or revision -- or even better,
increased protectionism -- would do. The net result was that liberalization initiatives went no
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where, eclipsed by nearly-successful protectionist initiatives, and throughout, only strong use of
exemption, revision, and all other possible bargaining tactics were able to dampen protectionist
forces. Can the theory of compensated liberalization make sense of these developments?
The theory of compensated liberalization can capture the shift to unconditional
protectionism and explain the declining compensated liberalization in the period, though it is
indeterminate in doing so. The theory focuses first and foremost on the coincidence of
protectionist power and platforms of protectionist groups. The power-platform conditions predict
either modest or non-provision of side payments, and increasing compromised liberalization. In
contrast to the UAW's almost complete representation of auto workers, organizational
centralization, and extensive influence on the shop floor, the AFL-CIO in its more generalized
economic and political context had much lower and a diminishing political influence given
declining membership. And organized labor's incidental power by virtue of its connection to the
Democratic party suffered some set back with Nixon's election in 1968. But their worsening lot in
the international economy, combined with their sour TAA experience, had much increased the
determination of the AFL-CIO and many member unions to oppose liberalization. And Labor was
still a potent force in American politics, able to muster enough Democratic votes to threaten any
ambitious liberalization. And they pushed to join forces with protectionist industrial associations,
themselves growing in determination and number as foreign competition in rust belt industries
grew. In short, although the AFL-CIO suffered some declining power resources, the aggregate
resources of the protectionist coalition had grown significantly since the beginning of the decade.
As for platforms, the story is basically a shift toward or maintenance of single-minded
protectionism. The history of bargaining between the AFL-CIO and liberalizers was plagued by
the non-administration of TAA, creating distrust that would require a huge effort by liberalizers to
overcome. And the Federation's stated trade policy-making agenda had eschewed any interest in
adjustment assistance and championed extensive investment policy changes along-side its
unconditional protectionism, changes that generally expressed inflexibility, got rid of a cluster of
linkable issues -- all those related to welfare and adjustment policies -- and introduced another that
was completely unacceptable to liberalizers and others.
The significant minority in the US labor movement was the UAW. They were happy to
join forces with the AFL-CIO in expressing criticisms of adjustment assistance, and they were also
happy to endorse the cluster of tax and other regulations designed to discourage outgoing FDI, but
they continued their experience with the Auto Pact had convinced them that adjustment assistance
was a reasonable and salvageable tool to mitigate the risks of openness. Thus, they approached
bargaining with a broader platform than their compatriots, and a platform much more negotiable
with the liberalizer coalition. These changes in the strategy predict little interest among Labor in the
provision of side payments, and that is what happened.
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Meanwhile the balance of the protectionist coalition had also either drifted towards or had
never budged from single-minded protectionism. The textiles and apparel industry -- inspired by
their successful protectionist redress under the LTA -- had focused all their attention on expansion
of the quota arrangement, to the exclusion of any other side issues that had occupied their agenda
between 1958 and 1962. And other industrial groups new to or traditionally part of the
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protectionist coalition -- such as steel in the former category, petroleum and leather shoes in the
latter -- continued to tow single-minded protectionist lines in all Hearings and other trade-related
fora in Congress.
Such a shift in platform changed the bargaining climate in the confrontations over trade
policy-making that dotted the late 1960s and early 1970s -- both liberalization and protectionist
episodes. In terms of the Edgeworth representations, the move to unconditional protectionist
represented a gradual flattening of the protectionist indifference curve, P -- from P(a) to P(b). By
decade's end, if we were to represent protectionist groups individually, the UAW could still be
symbolized by a steeper curve than the AFL-CIO, with the former overlapping the liberalizer curve
so as to maintain some room for pareto-improving exchanges of compensation for lower or
moderated trade protection. The AFL-CIO, however, would have become enough disenchanted
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with adjustment "burial insurance" and just about any other subject of side payments as to yield no
such space.58 Figure 3.2 above captures these possibilities.
This changed bargaining climate, in turn, predicts more modest side payment compensation
during liberalization initiatives -- less compensated liberalization -- and more use of protectionist
redress to buy-off the growing protectionist opposition -- compromised liberalization. Figure 3.3
below captures this prediction. Existing protectionists from previous episodes grew more
determined and, especially in the case of the AFL-CIO, more single-minded protectionist in their
platforms. And at various times during the late 1960s these groups were joined by equally single-
minded and powerful protectionists, such as benzenoid chemicals who successfully blocked
ratification of the Kennedy Round actions on ASP non-tariff barriers. Even if some of these
single-minded protectionist groups were individually lacking in the resources to extract redress,
acting in loose concert they were able to extract plenty of protectionist revision and less
compensated liberalization.5 9 But the UAW's continued embrace of adjustment assistance and
other subjects of side payment linkage implied that at least one important player in the protectionist
coalition would invite some secondary bargaining.
These predictions are roughly, though not completely, in line with the history. The few
liberalization initiatives that were considered or introduced ran into so much protectionist
opposition as to be aborted or never formally introduced. And the protectionist tide had so turned
that more baldly protectionist initiatives were tabled and received sustained consideration in
Congress. Throughout the period, modest improvements in the Trade Adjustment Assistance
program -- still a subject of side payment linkage -- were brought into the bargaining over both the
protectionist and liberalizer initiatives. But the assistance was to be legislated as part of any
completed trade legislation, not as stand-alone provisions. The result was lots of compromised, or
blocked, liberalization, no uncompensated liberalization, and no compensated liberalization
between 1965 and 1970. This is all consistent with the combination of increased power for the
protectionist coalition in the aggregate -- despite losses in power resources for some groups, like
the AFL-CIO -- and of more single-minded protectionism.
58 In so far as the AFL-CIO continued to have something broader than a true single-issue stance -- given the union's
support for outgoing FDI investment regulations -- the curve should not be completely fPat, though certainly more
so than that for the UAW. If the Edgeworth space were to represent only such outgoing FDI provisions as the sole
subject of "compensation" the bargaining environment would be best captured by a slightly steeper slope for the
AFL-CIO, say at P(b), but also a very steep -- even vertical -- slope for the liberalizers, representing their utter
unwillingness to offer any FDI impediments in exchange for liberalization. And the result of these respective P and
L indifference curves would be again virtually no overlap and no zone of possible agreement for pareto improvement.
59 Figure 3.3, alas, doesn't fully capture the role of individual protectionist groups acting in concert with one
another, leading to protectionism or compromise liberalization. It does, however, capture the existence of a number
of powerful groups combining high power resources with single-issue platforms, along-side other less powerful
groups with similarly single-minded protectionist platforms.
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Figure 3.3
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But the theory is not as strong on some important details. The continued use of trade
adjustment assistance as a side payment in the bargaining is consistent with the UAW's continued
conciliation and interest in TAA, but its interest wasn't strong enough and widely enough
publicized to make its power-platform mix an adequate explanation. Instead, the history suggests
that the use of TAA side payments reflected conditions outside the group-institutional theory of
compensation: more autonomous considerations among legislators on more fairness or at least
symbolic grounds, where continued or expanded TAA is through to provide cover from
constituency worry over free trade's victims. Thus, the theory is consistent with the post-1965
developments, but the details require considerations outside power and platforms of protectionists.
Whatever can explain the decade's developments, side payment politics between 1965 and
1972 did not offer much promise for the next decade. On the one hand, the Nixon Administration
might have learned some lessons that would increase the likelihood and usefulness of side
payments in subsequent rounds of trade policy-making. First, it could learn the log-rolling danger
posed by writing exemptions for particular industries into its trade legislation. It might also learn
that tinkering with adjustment assistance would not be a meaningful side payment, and instead
could have made a more ambitious adjustment assistance, or more ambitiously still, concessions to
organized labor's investment policy platform, a more central part of its trade strategy. On the other
hand, the unconditional protectionism of organized labor and other groups, and the divisiveness of
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any policies that intervene with investment decisions by multinational corporations, were likely to
make such a strategy unlikely. Since adjustment assistance appeared the main focus of all side
payment politics, this suggested that the incidence and political effectiveness of compensatory side
payments was likely to be even more disappointing in the next decade. As the next chapter shows,
the complexity of side payment politics proved this anticipated decline in compensated liberalization
to be premature.
224
Burgoon
Chapter Four:
The Tenacity of
Compensated Liberalization, 1973-1981
1. The Trade Act of 1974: Baroque Side Payment Politics and Tenacious Adjustment Assistance
1.1. From House-keeping to Swash-buckling Liberalization
1.2. The Administration's Side Payment Politics: Out With the Old, In With the New
1.2.1. Out With the Old: Rejecting Adjustment Assistance
1.2.2. In With the New: Proposing Welfare, Pension, and Corporate
Tax Reform Instead
1.2.2.1 Origins of MNC Tax Side Payment: A Faint Nod
to Labor's Burke-Hartke
1.2.2.2 Origins of Welfare and Pension Reform Side Payments:
Nixon's Loose Ends
1.3. Business and Labor Side Payment Politics: Out with the New, In With the Old
1.3.1. Liberalizers and Third Parties
1.3.2. The Split in Organized Labor: Unconditional
Protectionism vs. Compensated Liberalization
1.4. The House and Senate: Compensated Liberalization, TAA-style
1.4.1. Rejecting Welfare, Pension, and MNC Tax Side Payments
1.4.2. Expanding Trade Adjustment Assistance: House and
Senate One-upsmanship
1.4.2.1. TAA in the House
1,4.2.2. More TAA in the Senate
1.5. Explaining the Baroque Side Payment Politics of the Trade Reform Act
2. The Tokyo Round and the Wine Gallon Dispute: Compensated Liberalization-on-the-Fly
2.1. Removing the Wine Gallon Tax in a Two-level Game
2.2. Domestic Distilling Puts up a Fight, and the US Trade Representative Fights Back
2.3. Dealing with Domestic Industry When Off-setting Liberalizations Aren't Enough
2.4. Explaining the Wine Gallon Side Payment
3. The Aftermath: Cycling Fortunes of Trade Adjustment Assistance
3.1. Trade Adjustment Assistance: Revamped, Grown-up, and Still Unpopular
3.2. Unpopular, Perhaps, But a Side Payment Still
3.3. Without its Value as a Side Payment During Trade Legislation, a Sitting Duck
4. Conclusion: Tenacious Compensated Liberalization or the Last Harrah?

Chapter Four
If the previous decade revealed increasing disinterest in and inefficacy of compensated
liberalization, the next decade revealed its tenacity. Trade policy-making in the 1970s was
dominated by a single liberalization episode connected to the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations -
- beginning with the 1974 Trade Reform Act, followed by international GATT negotiations
through 1979, culminating with Fast Track ratification of the agreement that same year. For side
payment politics, most of the action took place during the 1974 Trade Reform Act. Over twenty
months of struggle over that Act, compensated liberalization saw its nature and fortunes shift at
least three times. The Nixon Administration raised side payments to the center of its political
strategy to push the liberalization through Congress, but after considerable internal struggle it did
so by rejecting trade adjustment assistance in favor of an alternative package of reform of broader
welfare and pension policies, and of increase taxes on multinational corporations. This package
was received, however, by a polity unified in its cynicism and antipathy to the Administration's
offer and "virtual repeal" of trade adjustment assistance. Organized labor flatly rejected the offer,
but was split on whether to promote expanded adjustment assistance in exchange for the Act's
liberalization. Most others in the polity, however, unambiguously supported expanding such
assistance. The end result was struggle not over whether and what kind of side payments to
provide, but over how much adjustment assistance to provide.
The changing fortunes of adjustment assistance as a side payment in 1974 were odd in light
of the previous decade's experience, but odder still was the provision of side payments during the
Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations for which the Trade Reform Act gave negotiating authority.
A dispute between the US and European Community over linked liberalization concessions
involving US distilled liquors and various EC agricultural products gave rise to a package of tax
deferral and other benefits to the US distilled liquor industr,. Such provision was the first instance
in US trade liberalization, at least the first discernible instance, that side payments emerged from
domestic struggle during the international phase of trade liberalization. Previously, side payment
politics was a purely domestic and legislative sport.
The side payment politics of the decade ended on a whimper. No sooner had trade
adjustment assistance and, by implication compensatory side payments generally, received a vote
of confidence during the Trade Reform Act battle when it came under increasing and broad attack --
this time as much from its liberalizer champions as from its remaining protector supporters. The
administration of trade adjustment assistance combined with industrial decline and import
penetration to diminish liberalizers' faith in the usefulness of such assistance to remedy the pain
from and political opposition to freer trade. Trade adjustment assistance continued to be the
predominant subject of side payment politics, consistently a part of trade policy discussions and
struggle, but by 1981 diminishing faith made the program vulnerable to attacks when the openness
of trade policy was not at stake. This gave rise to a cycle of upward-ratcheting as a side payment
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during trade policy initiatives, and decay and retrenchment virtually all other times. Given the
monopoly status adjustment assistance enjoyed as compensation in trade struggles, this cycle
imperiled the future of compensated liberalization.
This chapter tells this story of tenacious but tenuous compensated liberalization with an eye
to describing and explaining the side payments negotiated and provided during the period. The
specific historical questions it seeks to answer are what explains the cycling in the trade adjustment
assistance side payment politics -- from disrepute, to side payment savior, to disrepute again -- and
what explains the odd provision of side payments during the international phase of liberalization.
The broad theme of the chapter is that the answers to these questions can be found, broadly though
not completely, through the lenses of the power-platform theory of compensated liberalization.
The cycling rejection and provision of adjustment assistance reflects developments that the
theory of compensated liberalization predicts will lead to variations in the provision of side
payments: the coincidence of protectionist power and off-and-on multi-issue trade platforms.
Trade adjustment assistance was more than a traditional side payment easily grabbed as a subject
for any side payment politics. Most sector-based employer and trade associations within the
protectionist coalition approached the liberalization episodes with single-minded, unconditional
protectionism. But organized labor's position within the protectionist coalition was still central,
and the threats posed by that coalition were fresh in everyone's minds given the recent Mills bill
and Burke-Hartke experiences. As for Labor's platform, the story was still mixed. The AFL-CIO
continued to trumpet its single-minded protectionist indifference or hostility to adjustment
assistance or most any compensation, except perhaps sweeping regulations to discourage outgoing
FDI. But the AFL came to the defense of adjustment assistance when the Nixon Administration
proposed its virtual abolition. More strongly, the UAW explicitly split from the rest of organized
labor in continuing to pursue its multi-issue platform of compensated liberalization. Most
liberalizers, furthermore, entered the 1970s wanting to improve their bargaining reputation, which
they understood, often explicitly, to be tarnished by the sad past administration of trade adjustment
assistance. And many legislators were still interested in TAA compensation's symbolic value.
These conditions continue to predict modest but continued provision of TAA
compensation. TAA needed to be provided as compensation for the pain felt especially by
workers, but the backing and power underlying such TAA compensation was insufficient to create
meaningful reform and entitlement backing of TAA, and the lack of a forward-looking constituency
to protect TAA when trade policy episodes were not explicitly under review. The narrow
platforms of most protectionist groups, meanwhile, identified virtually no other issues that could
be more defensible subjects of side payment compensation. The commitment to TAA among
legislators in the face of ambivalence and mixed signals among organized labor suggests the
explanatory importance of fairness norms. But the existence of vocal support for TAA in the
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protectionist coalition combined with the Nixon Administration's unambiguous antipathy to TAA
suggest that, at most, the fairness norms were only "activated" by concern for the political viability
of the liberalization initiative.
The Tokyo Round side payment reflected egoistic bargaining even more than did the TAA
side payments, but the power-platform conditions go only a limited distance in explaining the
compensation. That the last-minute "wine-gallon" dispute culminated in liquor lobby
compensation where countless industry groups before them got no such payments, partly reflects
the two incidental factors that increased the power resources of that lobby: the special access the
industry enjoyed with the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and the widespread
conviction that liberalization of the liquor industry's barriers was crucial to successfully concluding
the Tokyo Round. These incidental conditions substantially increased the industry's bargaining
power among trade bureaucrats and legislative liberalizers, and this power out-stripped the ability
of trade bureaucrats to rely on their usual "international phase" political tactic of defusing domestic
opposition by seeking liberalization concessions from other countries and industries that off-set the
pain out of which that opposition grows. But the platform of the liquor industry was not multi-
issue until the endgame of the dispute when the industry asked for some kind of explicit
compensation for their pain. Thus, the theory predicts some kind of protectionist exemption
outside of the GATT context. The provision of side payments in this case doesn't reflect the
coincidence of multi-issue platforms with the extraordinary incidental power resources as much as
it does the combination of such resources with the unavailability of any protectionist redress.
This chapter's two cases also reveal the more general indeterminacy and predictive
limitations of the theory. First, it is precisely the mixture of multi-issue and single-minded
platforms among protectionists that captures how TAA compensation could be villainized and
rejected by some liberalizers and protectionists, while becoming even more important to expand
and improve by others -- thus making its fortunes cycle. The details of the compensation to
emerge from such a mixture are difficult predict, especially without supplemental conditions
separate from the theory, such as symbolic commitments to TAA. Second, the theory's
explanation for the Tokyo Round side payments is neither determinate, nor predictive. The
incidental power and the last-minute platforms of the industry group were artifacts of circumstance
not foreseeable by the players or analysts of the history. And the responses of trade bureaucrats
and other liberalizers to that power is an indeterminate and unpredictable artifact of how limited off-
setting liberalizations and other bargaining tools can be at defusing and cauterizing opposition. In
short, the power-platform theory of compensation understands but doesn't completely predict the
side payment politics in the 1970s and early 1980s.
The chapter develops these claims in a chronological history of the decade's side payment
politics. The bulk of the chapter reviews the politics of the 1973-74 Trade Act, spanning two-
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thirds of the cycle in the TAA program's fortunes -- from disrepute to rehabilitation. The second
section reviews the Tokyo Round Wine Gallon dispute, addressing the puzzle of the rare provision
of side payment on the fly -- during the international phase of liberalization. Each of these sections
concludes with a theoretical review of the history in light of the theory of compensated
liberalization. The chapter concludes with a brief epilogue on the re-declining fortunes of trade
adjustment assistance between 1979 and 1982.
1. The Trade Act of 1974: Baroque Side Payment Politics and Tenacious Adjustment Assistance
In a dramatic reversal of its aborted liberalization and of its shaky stand against the
protectionist tide, the Nixon Administration and its liberalizer allies managed in 1974 to push-
through a substantial liberalization mandate. The bill gave the President, among other powers, the
right to negotiate and liberalize US non-tariff barriers, to grant special duty free entry for imports
from developing country preferences and to implement most-favored nation status to Communist
countries (CQ Almanacs 1973, 1974, passim). In the face of the same protectionist forces that had
frustrated Nixon's earlier liberalization efforts and the Administration's rapidly diminishing
political capital given the Watergate scandal, it took nearly two years and all variety of political
maneuvering to win the liberalization's passage. That maneuvering included not only several
iterations of exemption and revision of the liberalization's reach, but also several offers of
compensatory side payments.
Compared to both the 1962 or 1965 episodes of compensated liberalization, the struggles
over these side payments were more complicated and fractious. The Administration repudiated
what had become a standard side payment for potentially dislocated industries and labor -- trade
adjustment assistance -- and instead looked for ways to off-set the costs of the liberalization
without singling-out trade-sensitive groups for special treatment. Addressing the demands voiced
by a few protectionist groups, but also advancing the legislative agenda of various members of the
liberalizer coalition, the Administration settled on a very different package of side payments:
separate legislation revising and modestly expanding unemployment insurance, pension programs,
and taxation of multinational corporations. Unhappy with such payments, however, other
members of the liberalizer coalition sought generous expansion of trade adjustment assistance. The
protectionist groups, for their part, were divided in their response to both sets of side payment
offers. The struggle that ensued among and between various protectionists and liberalizers
culminated in a compensated liberalization that was a major defeat for the AFL-CIO and other
protector groups, and a major victory for liberalizers and some labor and legislative protectors.
Understanding this episode's side payment politics requires, like Chapter Four's review of
the 1962 Trade Expansion Act , recasting the already rich accounts of the Trade Reform Act of
230
Burgoon
Chapter Four
1974 as a history of compensated liberalization.' This account deals very cursorily with the basic
fight for and over the liberalization and focuses instead on the origins and nature of various side
payment offers, of their provision, and of their political effectiveness in lowering opposition.
Dividing the history into four sections highlights these parts of the story. The first is the genesis of
the liberalization initiative in the face of the continued protectionist tide that had frustrated previous
initiatives and that persisted. Second is the history of the origins and nature of the Nixon
Administration's attempts to overcome this opposition through the design of the legislation and
through maneuvering before and after introduction of the legislation. This includes the origins of
its side payment offers. A third section details the responses to these offers among liberalizers and
protectionists in society, responses that included a series of side payment counter-offers that
divided organized labor. Finally, the history includes the House and Senate responses to the
Administration's compensation liberalization and to the reaction it sparked among liberalizers and
protectionists. That history involved a rapid series of side payment counter-offers and counter-
counter offers, as the bill wound its way through the House and the Senate.
1.1. From House-keeping to Swash-buckling Liberalization
The proposal and push for the Trade Reform Act reflected fundamental reform by the
Nixon Administration in the organization, strategy, and substance of its foreign economic policy.
The Administration's surrender of its last effort to legislate modest liberalization in 1971 coincided
with the appointment of the Williams Commission, formally tasked with rethinking all elements of
foreign trade, investment, and monetary policy. This first step in the rethinking called for, among
other things, "a major series of international negotiations...to prepare the way for the elimination of
all barriers to international trade and capital movements within 25 years" (Williams Commission
1971, p.10, cited in Destler 1980, p. 137).
By the report's release, Nixon and his closest advisors also decided to reorganize and re-
prioritize trade and foreign economic policymaking. First, the Administration rationalized its
foreign economic policymaking, which had hitherto been cobbled together by some 60 separate
departments, through the appointment of a Council of International Economic Policy (CIEP)
(National Journal 11/13/71).2 Second, the Administration raised the priority of trade policymaking
by appointing and empowering a larger Office of the Special Representative for Trade
I Two very strong and similar accounts of the domestic politics of the period are in chapters nine to twelve of
Destler 1980 and chapter five of Pastor 1980. My account relies heavily on these, but also on the newspaper,
National Journal, and Congressional Quarterly accounts -- as well as various hearings, congressional record, labor
union and business press releases, a few interviews and primary sources.
2 The Commission was to be headed by Williams Commission member and Chicago businessman Peter Peterson,
and was to coordinate all Administration activity on foreign economic policy, as an economic counterpart to
Kissinger's National Security Council (Pastor 1980, p.139).
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Negotiations. William Eberle was appointed the new Special Trade Representative (STR),
replacing Curtis, and was allowed, for the first time, two deputies.3 Nixon mandated his new STR
to drum-up interest in new multinational GATT liberalization (Destler 1980, Pastor 1980).4
It was the sweeping substantive reform of Nixon's foreign economic policy, however, that
ultimately drove the push for major liberalization. This reform took place within the CIEP and
elsewhere, and found its most far-reaching and dramatic expression in Nixon's New Economic
Policy, beginning with the August 1971 suspension of dollar-gold convertibility and imposition of
the ten percent import surcharge. Trade liberalization was a necessary consequence of this series
of policies. In the weeks after the August "big bang," Nixon's Secretary of the Treasury John
Connally set forth "very demanding terms for an international economic settlement, including
unilateral trade concessions by the EC and Japan" (Destler 1980). This was followed by the
Smithsonian Agreement in December 1971, in which the US lifted the import surcharge in
exchange for substantial exchange rate realignment. In February 1972, the US reached agreements
with both the EC and Japan providing for limited unilateral concessions and for the inauguration of
new multilateral negotiations to be begun formally in Tokyo in September 1973 (Destler 1980
p. 139). This new round multilateral negotiations, of course, would ultimately require renewed
presidential negotiating authority via major trade liberalization legislation.
To this end, Nixon set up a series of inter-agency task forces to investigate and begin
drafting various elements of trade legislation. 5 The resulting bill reflected major rethinking and
some debate within the Administration over trade policymaking strategy and substance. Destler
1980, Pastor 1980, and other accounts all describe dissent between neo-mercantilist and a free
trader camps within the Administration.6 As an ideological divide, the split between these camps
3 Eberle and the Administration chose William Pearce to oversee domestic-legislative affairs, and Harald Malmgren
to oversee international affairs
4 All accounts highlight the conflicts between the STR and the CIEP, mainly over the degree to which STR was to
be subordinate to CIEP action. The Williams Commission and the original plan for CIEP was that it would absorb
STR, but Peterson treated STR as an autonomous entity. Peterson's successor, Peter Flanigan, saw STR essentially
as a sub-department of CIEP, and called for the former's dissolution.
The most important implication of this bureaucratic conflict is the tension it revealed between the
Administration's general desire to rationalize and make a higher priority all elements of foreign economic
policymaking, in line with "high politics" foreign policymaking, and its specific policy desire to push harder and
better for trade liberalization legislation.
5 All of these task forces were coordinated by staff of CIEP, first under Peter Peterson and after February 1972 under
his successor, the more politically-conscious Peter Flanigan. Among these was a task force headed by the Labor
Department devoted exclusively to study the adjustment assistance program -- both its economic and human impact,
and its political effectiveness. In May 1972, the CIEP and Nixon set up two broader inter-agency committees to
develop trade policy -- one to take an advanced look into international options, appropriately chaired by the STR
international specialist Malmgren, and the other to develop trade legislation, appropriately called Trade legislation
Committee. This Legislation committee was initially headed by a relatively junior CIEP official and later headed by
a senior and more influential State Department official, Deane Hinton. The latter committee assignment miffed the
recently appointed STR Deputy William Pearce, who assumed he would chair any such group. Seeing the STR "as
an arm of CIEP," Peter Flanigan thought otherwise (Destler 1980, p.139).
6 There was also some sympathy for stronger protection, especially in Maurice Stans's Commerce Department, but
such sympathy was very much in the minority at the time (Destler 1980, p.141, Pastor 1980, p.140). Pastor 1980
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mattered mainly for the focus of the bill's liberalization core. The neo-mercantilist camp was
mainly Treasury Secretary Connally and his staff, and to a lesser degree Connally's replacement as
Treasury Secretary, George Shultz. They saw the US as "more sinned against than sinning" in
trade, and believed aggressive and conditional market opening to be a good way to improve the
US's balance of payments deficit without resorting to austerity or exchange rate depreciation
(Destler 1980, p. 140; Solomon 1977, p. 190). These neo-mercantilists wanted policies that would
improve the US's trade position relative to its trading partners, and pushed for more militant
market-opening powers like counter-veiling duties, and for stronger unfair trade standards.
The free trader camp included the STR, the State Department, and the Council of Economic
Advisors, all of whom saw trade through more classical economics lenses and therefore pushed for
reciprocal liberalization without so much regard for the relative position of US concessions and
trade balance, and with safeguards for vulnerable workers and firms (Ibid., Pastor 1980). 7
Among other measures, these free traders wanted to maximize presidential negotiating authority,
including authority to negotiate non-tariff barriers, because they felt the US took a real blow to its
credibility by not being able to get Congress to ratify its negotiated down-scaling of ASP during
the Kennedy Round.
The liberalization initiative that ultimately emerged from the drafting process revealed that
these various substantive and political positions were mutually compatible, easily accommodated
within one piece of legislation. The bill asked for unlimited authority for the president to negotiate
tariff reductions. This appealed to both the neo-mercantilist and free trader camps among the
drafters, because it gave power to raise tariffs against unfair competitors and non-cooperative
bargainers as much as to lower them to zero for some industries for maximum reciprocal
bargaining leverage. More boldly, the bill requested authority to negotiate elimination of many
non-tariff barriers, such as the American Selling Price, without prior mandate from Congress and
of some others as long as Congress did not pass a "legislative veto" within ninety days of the
negotiated reduction. The bill also requested presidential authority to eliminate tariffs on
manufactured goods from developing countries, an idea that had been around for some time but
had gained wide international support through the lobbying of UNCTAD's Secretary General.
If these various liberalization provisions tilted somewhat to the demands of the "free trader"
bloc within the Administration, the "neo-mercantilists" got strong language and a tightening of
powers to deal with unfair trade practices. The bill devoted a separate title to these matters, and
gave the president authority "to retaliate against any country that maintained 'unjustifiable or
claims that such protectionism also found favor within the Department of Labor, particularly Secretary of Labor
Brennan (Pastor 1980, p. 140).
7 Seeing the need for safeguards had both a political (defusing opposition) and economic efficiency/optimalityjustification. I mention it here in the summary of the neomercantilist and free trader camps for the latter motivation.
I discuss the political motivation in a moment.
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unreasonable tariff or other import restrictions; against the US, or pursued other discriminatory or
subsidy policies that damaged the US trade position (Destler 1980, p. 146). The tools for
retaliation included the power to impose duties or quotas at any level on any basis "for such time as
he deems appropriate" (Ibid.). Finally, the bill included provisions giving the Administration
power to tighten existing countervailing duty and anti-dumping laws. So both of the main
ideological camps within the Administration got their way.
1.2. The Administration's Side Payment Politics: Out With the Old, In with the New
Everyone in the Administration was acutely aware that such an ambitious request for
authority was going to inspire huge protest among protectionist groups. Indeed, many of the
players were still licking their wounds from the aborted legislation in the previous two years. And
the new players were brought in explicitly to do what had been politically unworkable before. So,
before, throughout, and after design of the bill, attention was paid to how to manipulate and work
to counter protectionist opposition that the liberalization provisions would provoke. And this
attention was explicitly focused on how to learn from the recent experiences with the protectionist
tide and aborted liberalization of the past few years. The focus was on all aspects of such
manipulation and work, from the wording of the liberalization provisions in the bill, to safeguard
provisions in the bill, to extra-legislative exemptions and back-channel negotiating, and, as it
turned out, to side payments.
Of the many protectionist forces the Administration sought to take-on, organized labor was
probably the most important, in the sense of receiving the most attention and action. All of the
participants in Administration's foreign economic policymaking generally, and in the Trade Act's
drafting in particular, were aware of organized labor's shift towards unconditional protectionism
over the course of the previous years -- having freshly opposed the AFL-CIO's unwavering
support for Burke-Hartke and having been frustrated by that union's support for the Mills quota
provisions in the aborted 1969-1971 efforts. As Destler and others have noted, in the
Administration's deliberations over the bill, "no one expected labor to support the bill, but there
was hope that its opposition might be softened" (p. 151.). An anonymous Administration official
involved in the drafting of the Administration's trade bill made the point more strongly in an
interview with the National Journal: "it was inconceivable that any Administration group working
on these issues would not be aware of the strength of the labor unions' feeling and try to come up
with a bill that had a chance of passage" (N.J. 7/28/73, p.1093 ). The question with labor, as with
the array of other protectionist industries expected to fight against liberalization -- from steel, to
shoes, to textiles, to electronics -- was how to "soften" that opposition.
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Deciding how, it turned out, was more divisive and reflected more rethinking on the basis
of past experience than deciding what basic liberalization authority to seek. All participants
drafting of the Trade bill recognized the importance of countering protectionist sentiment and the
mistakes in the Administration's past efforts to do so. But they had different theories of trade
politics and interpretations of what went wrong and what would make things go right in the future.
One of the major splits over political design overlapped the ideological split between neo-
mercantilist and free traders over what kind of trade policy was most in the nation's interest.
Although this split coincided with the same players Destler and Pastor reported to side with one or
another of the ideological camps, it was driven less by neo-mercantilist vs. free trade ideological
commitments than by different views on how to deal with protectionist opposition and on
interpretations of the Administration's previous and aborted liberalization efforts. Both Pastor
1980 and Destler 1980 report how the neo-mercantilists in the Treasury believed past legislation
used language and provisions that lacked appropriately threatening rhetoric or tools to combat
unfair trade practices. Such provisions and practices, these representatives argued, were necessary
not only to promote national interests consistent with a neo-mercantilist view of political economy,
but to get the bill accepted by a skeptical polity (Pastor 1980, p.140, Destler 1980, p. 140). For the
present bill, therefore, these neo-mercantilists sought a more aggressive stance on behalf of a more
competitive US taking on unfair foreign trading partners.
The STR, State Department, and Council of Economic Advisors whom Destler 1980 refers
to, fairly, as "free traders," had a more nuanced theory of trade politics and more specified and
ambitious ideas about how to act on that theory. The theory grew out of disenchantment with two
characteristics of the Administration's recent, aborted liberalization initiatives. First, the
Administration's 1969-1971 legislative initiatives all sought very modest presidential liberalization
powers to minimally enable the executive to service existing trade agreements -- a "housekeeping
bill," as it became derisively called. This modesty, by the free trader reasoning, offered few major
gains and did not have any link to impending negotiations, and so did little to inspire the interest of
internationalist businesses and other liberalizers in society. And, indeed, liberalizers were not as
active in supporting the bill as the Administration might have hoped, though plenty of liberalizer
business coordinated and concentrated their legislative action during the period. Second, the
Administration sought to defuse some of the protectionist opposition to its liberalization aims by
allowing, even endorsing, the attachment of textile quotas from the Mills Bill to its own more
liberal provisions. Such legislated exemption for a particular group, the free traders believed,
made it easier for groups to call for extension of such quotas to other industries on account of
fairness, thereby lowering the costs to log-rolling within both houses of congress.
Partly cause and partly consequence of this learning from the Administration's recent
experience, the free traders in the Administration saw a generic problem in trade policymaking --
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that liberalization confers diffuse benefits and concentrated costs, generally making the support for
the liberal cause underprovided and opposition susceptible to log-rolling politics (Destler 1980,
p. 141, Destler 1986, Pearce 1974). Although it isn't clear how articulated and consistent the actual
thinking in deliberations, the Administration "free traders" drew two conclusions from this
perspective: first, societal groups with something of a sta'Xe in liberalization need to have their
interest in political action inspired by liberalization that maximizes those stakes and by having those
stakes spelled out and highlighted for them;8 and second, liberalization legislation needs to
minimize the legislated exemptions it includes for protectionist groups, for fear that such
exemptions can spark log-rolling exchanges that extend exemptions to other groups. Thus, free
traders argued that the Administration's new bill needed to seek ambitious liberalization, linked to
pre-announced multilateral talks, and to contain no legislated exemptions for particular industries.
These different views within the Administration on how to deal with opposition were, like
the main liberalization tenets, resolved without much discord. The grand ambition of the requested
liberalization, tied to the scheduled GATT round, appealed to the political sentiments of both the
neo-mercantilists and those free traders to the "bicycle theory" of trade legislation. More
importantly for side payment politics, the Administration representatives also easily agreed among
themselves to exclude from the bill any legislative exemptions for particular industries that might be
catalysts for log-rolling protectionism. Such an exclusion foreclosed one of the Administration's
mechanisms for defusing opposition, and drew attention to alternatives.
Some of these alternatives -- most importantly, the non-legislative and escape clause
exemptions -- did not provoke much controversy within the Administration. The non-legislated,
industry-specific exemptions were already established or well under way by the time the
Administration was cobbling together its bill. These exemptions came in the form of administered
voluntary export quotas for the industries that had proven themselves in the previous few years (as
well as the previous decade) to be the most concentrated, vocal, and entrenched industries: steel
and textiles. The threat of less malleable and possibly more permanent, legislated quotas -- in the
Mills bill, its progeny, and the pending Burke-Hartke bill -- strengthened the Administration's
hand in the international negotiations. So in 1972, the renewed the 1969 voluntary agreements
with the EC and Japan on carbon steel imports -- this time lowering the allowed increase of imports
from 5 to 2.5 percent, and imposing specific tonnage limits (Hufbauer et.al. 1986, p.155). And in
early 1973, while the Administration's bill was being drafted, U.S. negotiators were seeking
formalized expansion and consolidation of the LTA into the Multi-fiber Arrangement, ultimately
8 This perspective is the core of what has become known as the "bicycle theory" of trade liberalization, wherein
legislated trade liberalization needs to maintain a certain momentum and pace such that societal beneficiaries of
liberalization stay engaged in a struggle where the diffuseness of interests favors protectionists. I.M.Destler does not
use the label in his 1980 history of the 1974 Trade Act, but he does in later historical and theoretical work. See, for
example, Destler 1986.
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concluded in 1974. Both of these arrangements struck at the core of the protectionist requests the
textile and steel industry representatives had been requesting in their trade policy platforms.
The Administration was also willing to stick with and ease access to one kind of legislated
exemption -- escape clause relief. This exemption was acceptable to "free traders" because it was
generalized rather than industry-specific, and therefore didn't pose the threat of slippery-slope log-
rolling protectionism. The main revision the Administration proposed was to liberalize the
eligibility criteria for tariff or other protection. The 1962 TEA, remember, required petitioners to
show that their significant injury was due "in major part" to increased imports that, in turn, were
due "in major part" to tariff concessions. Even though the Tariff Commission had liberalized its
interpretation of this criterion in 1969, the Administration had already sought in 1969 and 1970 to
liberalize it further by requiring that petitioners show real or threatened injury due "in primary part"
to increased imports or reduced exports. This was looser because "in primary part" meant "more
important than any other single cause" (vs. "all other causes combined"), and because it no longer
required petitioners to show a causal link between trade concessions and changed trade flows.
Commerce Department reps argued in favor of further liberalizing eligibility to require only
that imports "were causing 'material injury,' and that 'market disruption' was present" (Destler
1980, p. 145).9 This position was eventually defeated, and the Administration decided to stick with
its 1969 request, with the only concession to the Commerce view being that "market disruption"
would be seen as "prima facie evidence" that imports met the "primary cause" criterion (Ibid.).
1.2.1. Out With the Old: Rejecting Adjustment Assistance
Although both the escape clause relief and the extra-legislative quotas for industry were
uncontroversial alternatives to legislated, industry-specific exemptions, the other alternatives for
defusing political opposition that the Administration considered were not. Closely related to the
escape clause safeguards were the trade adjustment assistance provisions, which had become a
customary tool to remedy economic disko.ation and defuse opposition during all liberalization
initiatives of the last decade, both those that passed, those that were aborted, and those that never
made it out of the gate. When the Administration deliberated over the provisions for its 1973 Trade
bill, it inevitably took on the subject of what to do with the existing program and with the tradition
of providing such assistance became a major subject of debate.
Even though Administration officials didn't consider the program as "side payments," the
discussion of the adjustment assistance was a discussion of what had become the most common
9 According to Destler 1980, "market disruption" meant a situation where imports of a product were "increasing
rapidly, both absolutely and as a proportion of domestic consumption, and were being offered at prices substantially
below those of comparable domestic articles" (Ibid., p. 145).
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side payment in trade liberalization. As it turned out, disagreement within the Administration over
what to do with the adjustment assistance program became the most divisive issues in the drafting
process, and gave way to a broader controversy about how best to use safeguards distinct from
protection to take account of trade dislocation and to defuse opposition. In other words, the
Administration was divided more generally on what kinds of side payments would be most
economically and politically effective.
The Administration was divided into two camps on the issue of adjustment assistance, and
on side payments more generally (though only implicitly), with the camps cutting across the "neo-
mercantilist" and "free trader" split on other issues. The first camp included representatives from
the Departments of Labor (Secretary Brennan) and State, and the Special Trade Representatives
Office (William Eberle as STR and William Pearce as legislative politico), all of whom supported
the adjustment assistance program and believed that it ought to be expanded as part of the
Administration's bill (National Journal 7/28/73, pp. 1093-4). They proposed building on the
Administration's 1969 and 1970 proposals that had modestly expanded the program and liberalized
its eligibility criteria so that it would be easier to get than escape clause relief. As frameworks for
their proposals, they considered both recommendations from the inter-agency task force on
adjustment assistance, and legislative proposals that were then floating around.'0 Beyond
advocating increasing substantive benefits and loosening eligibility, all these players suggested that
the program's administration be restructured, minimally to transfer decisionmaking authority from
the Tariff Commission to the Labor and Commerce Departments, similar to the Auto Pact and
Johnson 1968 TEA proposals.
All of these supporters valued adjustment assistance as helping to humanize and make
liberalization more societally efficient, but their interest was mainly political (National Journal 1-
13-73). According to Pastor 1980, these actors, especially Pearce from the. STR office, "insisted
that the inclusion of a generous trade assistance section was the only way a trade bill could pass the
Congress" (Pastor 1980, p.143). Organized labor was the main subject of their considerations,
given the program's genesis and the up-swing in labor's protectionism. But Pearce and the others
acknowledged that the AFL-CIO might not be bought through such inclusion. Still, they argued
that the adjustment assistance "might win over as many as one hundred congressmen who could
use the adjustment assistance package to show their constituents that the trade bill was not
insensitive to job displacement" (Ibid). They could have but, apparently didn't, refer to the active
Congressional legislation to expand adjustment assistance as evidence for this claim.
10 Not long before the debate over adjustment assistance was heating up, in February 1973, Representatives Johin
Culver, Charles Whalen and forty-three other congressmen introduced legislation calling for a strengthening of the
adjustment assistance program. New York Times, February 28, 1973, p. 53.
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Against this perspective was Treasury Secretary and Nixon's rising economic advisor,
George Shultz, together with various representatives from the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), and from the Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP). They all saw the
adjustment assistance program as too expensive, inequitable, and politically ineffective. Shultz led
the chargu, having long been aware of the ineffective administration of the program, of labor's
position, and of its cost, and having already expressed his misgivings in previous Administration
traac policymaking, during his tenure as Labor Secretary.
The officials saw the argument against adjustment assistance as over-determined. First,
Shultz and others also objected to how trade adjustment assistance "set up a categorical program
for workers who lost their jobs because of imports" (N.J. 6/9/73, p.828). Why, he asked in the
earlier deliberations, should workers and firms dislocated because of trade be treated differently or
better than those dislocated for other reasons, such as changes in consumer tastes or in technology?
Instead, they argued that "as a matter of equity all unemployed workers should get the same
benefits, regardless of the cause of their unemployment" (N.J. 7/28/73, p. 1094). Shultz and the
OMB officials also argued that the program was too expensive, and that a larger program "might
push the Administration's budget over the $268.7 billion ceiling that Mr. Nixon had set for
expenditures in fiscal 1974" (Ibid.). Even those more sympathetic to the program had a problem
here, as a business lobbyist's comment about the debate pointed out: "To make [adjustment
assistance] work, it would have cost a good deal of money, or at least to try to make it work.
given the Nixon budget restraints, this was not in the cards" (N.J. 6/9/73, p.829).
Most importantly, however, Shultz and the other skeptics argued that the expanded
adjustment assistance program would offer few political benefits. Shultz agreed with the AFL-
CIO's criticisms of the program. As he was later to emphasize in a White House briefing, one
reason the existing adjustment assistance program was a failure was because "it has been very
difficult for anyone to get access to the procedure. Because of the tightness of the procedure
involved, it has been practically a dead letter...." (N.J. 6/9/73, p.828). Shultz also knew
intimately George Meany's and the AFL-CIO leadership's position, having been Labor Secretary
and having cultivated a personal relationship with the Federation president. He concluded, on
these terms, that adjustment assistance had little chance of swaying organized labor (Shultz and
Dam 1978, pp. 139-145)." Shultz and these others were also not convinced of the broader, more
diffuse, benefits among legislators that the Pearce and Eberle emphasized. For any such political
benefits, Shultz and the others preferred an alternative package of side payment benefits that would
not single out trade-impacted groups.' 2
11 On this position he was strongly supported by the CIEP leaders, Flanigan and Hinton, who frequently argued the
case in the deliberations (Pastor 1980, p.143).
12 More on this in a moment.
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After months of deliberations and what was, by all accounts, a close fight, Shultz and the
anti-adjustment assistance forces prevailed. According to an industry spokesman "close to the
drafting team,...there was fighting all the way up to the end. It [adjustment assistance] was in and
out of the bill" (N.J. 7/28/73, p. 1094, cited in Pastor 1980, p.143). Pastor reports that the
meeting at which the final decision on adjustment assistance provisions was to be made, attended
by all the cabinet officials, "Secretary of labor Brennan was expected to make the case for an
expanded program, and he was briefed beforehand by his assistants, but even though STR [Eberle
and Pearce] nudged him in the meeting, Brennan hardly uttered a work, and the case was lost by
default" (Pastor 1980, p.143).
Rather than ineptitude or apathy among the adjustment program's supporters, the outcome
reflects how Brennan and other supporters were junior within the Administration's power
hierarchy in relation to the anti-adjustment assistance group -- especially Shultz, who was the most
strongly opposed to the provisions. By all accounts, Shultz was Nixon's most influential
economic advisor at the time, and in the decisionmaking hierarchy in the Trade bill's drafting,
CIEP representative Hinton "ruled on disagreements" and Shultz was "available for appeals"
(Destler 1980, p. 142). In such an environment, more strenuous arguments by Brennan, Pearce,
Eberle, or anyone else may well have been moot.
The consequence of this "decision" on adjustment assistance was that the Administration
decided to "go for a minimum program" (N.J. 7/28/73, p.1094). On the one hand, they proposed
significant loosening of adjustment assistance eligibility criteria, no longer requiring petitioners to
show prior tariff concessions causing import increases and requiring that they only show such
increases as having "contributed substantially" to real or threatened injury -- meaning "no less than
any other single cause," thereby looser than the escape clause criterion and than what Nixon had
proposed for adjustment assistance in 1969. Like the 1969 proposal, however, the proposed
loosening for 1973 left the free-trader-biased Tariff Commission with the main authority to decide
eligibility. But in all it was still a loosening compared to the 1962 status-quo ante.
On the other hand, the Administration's proposed gutting the generosity of the benefits to
be provided to those petitioners granted an affirmative ruling. The bill would limit the duration of
the payments to the maximum specified in state laws, which was 26 weeks in most states and less
than half of what the existing adjustment assistance program guaranteed -- 52 weeks for all trade-
impacted workers, 78 for those in retraining programs, and 65 weeks for trade-impacted workers
60 years or older. And the benefit levels would also be reduced; the proposal called for the federal
government to "augment the unemployment benefits of trade-impacted workers to ensure that they
receive at least half their weekly wage or two-thirds of the state's average weekly wage, whichever
is less" (National Journal 6/9/73, p.828).'3 This was, again, substantially less than what existing
13 This part of the proposal was connected to the Administration's proposal to revise general unemployment
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adjustment assistance provided: 65 percent of the worker's average weekly wage up to 65 percent
of average weekly wage in US manufacturing. Retraining and relocation benefits would be
roughly the same, no increases. And for firms, the proposal was harsher: the entire adjustment
assistance program established in 1962 would be terminated.
1.2.2. In With the New: Proposing Welfare, Pension, and Corporate Tax Reform Instead
This decision and the entire debate over the future of the TAA program took place in the
context of a package of policies that Shultz and others offered as an alternative to adjustment
assistance: unemployment insurance reform, protection of worker pension rights, and reform in
taxation of multinational corporations. The policies were explicitly discussed and adopted as
methods to off-set the cost of liberalization and dampen political opposition separate from the core
protections being liberalized. And given these purposes, Shultz and others believed and argued
that the package would be superior to adjustment assistance in budgetary cost, in economic
efficiency and fairness, and in political effectiveness. So when the Administration decided to gut
adjustment assistance, it also decided to pursue Shultz's alternative package.
The Administration announced the package at the same time that it formally introduced its
Trade Reform Act on April 10th, 1973. It proposed to enact the package through three separate
pieces of legislation, and Shultz and other Administration officials detailed the proposed legislation
in three consecutive days of briefings following announcement of the Trade Reform Act. In one of
the briefings on April 12th, however, George Shultz emphasized how tightly the Administration
saw these pieces as linked: "From the President's point of view he wanted to get the whole
package out in front of the Congress when they considered any one piece, and I think that is an
important thing to do" (N.J. 6/9/73, p.82 1). Although introduced as such between April 10th and
12th, the Administration didn't actually submit the proposed legislation to the House Ways and
Means Committee -- the proper committee for all three kinds of legislation -- until May 7th.
Two parts of this legislative package were pretty modest, whatever their political and
symbolic significance. At the April 10th announcement of the Trade bill, the Administration spoke
with some pomp, if lots of ambiguity, about its tax proposals on foreign earnings. But when the
Administration finally sent its bills to the Ways and Means Committee on May 7, the actual tax
provisions turned out to be a bunch of notes more than a proposed bill. The proposal, however,
was clear in proposing to eliminate beneficial tax deferrals on foreign-earned income for US
companies "that have left to take advantage of tax breaks overseas and that ship at least 25 percent
insurance provision, to be discussed momentarily. The adjustment assistance provisions would be provided at this
prescribed level, under the adjustment assistance authority, only until the more general program could take over.
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of their foreign-produced goods back to the US" (N.J. 5-12-73, p.69 7). As one commentator was
to later quip; the proposals were essentially to reign-in "tax havens."
The legislative proposal to protect pension rights was somewhat more developed, if also
quite modest. The bill provided federal guarantees that employees eligible for company pension
benefits received those benefits, even if a company folds or a pension fund collapses. It might also
have made it more difficult for employers or unions to dismantle or draw on pension funds,
without the consent of their rank-and-file workers.
The most sweeping of the proposals was what the Administration called the Job Security
Assistance Act, that called for substantial expansion and reform of the nation's unemployment
insurance. This Act would set for the first time federal standards requiring states to pay a certain
benefit to eligible unemployed workers, regardless of the source of their dislocation. Most
important, the bill would amend the Internal Revenue Code by adding a requirement that,
beginning July 1, 1975, "states must pay eligible unemployed persons a benefit equal to half of
their average weekly wages or two-thirds of the state's average weekly wage, whichever is less"
(N.J. 6/9/73, p.827). The bill also called for extending coverage of unemployment insurance to an
estimated 635,000 farm workers, almost two-thirds of the one million full-time farm workers in
the labor force. It would do so by applying to farm employers with four or more workers in 20
weeks in a year or those who paid $5,000 in wages in any calender quarter. This would represent
only 7 percent, or 66,000, of all farm employers (Ibid.). Third, the bill would deny
unemployment compensation to workers declaring themselves on strike, on account that they are
not "involuntarily unemployed." And finally, the bill proposed to replenish the federal funds
provided to pay for emergency unemployment benefits extended in 1973.14
All three of these proposals grew directly out of the Administration's search for alternatives
to the adjustment assistance program. According to a former high Administration official, who
talked about the proposals at the time to the National Journal but who did not want to be identified
by name, "Shultz and his associates designed the legislative package as a calculated effort to obtain
support from organized labor for the trade bill" (N.J. 6/9/73, p.827). This same official
embellished on this claim:
14 This provision sought to pay, in particular for benefits provided under the 1971 Emergency Unemployment
Compensation Act that authorized additional benefits up to 13 weeks for those who had already exhausted their
regular benefits -- averaging a guarantee of up to 52 weeks of benefits during periods of high unemployment. The
special funding for the extra benefits fell short when Congress voted a few weeks before the law was set to expire in
June 1972 to extend eligibility to the end of December 1972, and to pay benefits until April 1973. The roughly
$400 million bill of this extension was paid for with general revenues. The Job Security Assistance Act proposed a
.08 percent increase in tax on the wage base for calender 1974 and 1975 to pay back this outflow. The new tax was
expected to bring in revenues of $375 to $448 million for the two additional years. See National Journal 6/9/73,
pp.827-828 for more details.
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Before Watergate, the president's major legislative goal was the trade bill, and properly
so....We have an increasing deficit in trade and a monetary crisis....This country is facing
the most serious threat to our world position that we have ever had....
The President said, 'What do we need to get broad support for this trade legislation?'
The unions are concerned with workers displaced by trade and they have gone
protectionist.
To reduce organized labor's opposition, these trades on foreign taxes, pensions,
unemployment compensation and foreign tax changes, have been offered" (Ibid.).
While organized labor appears from the content of the bills and from these statements to have been
the main target of the package, another industry official, also anonymous, told the National Journal
that "the people sitting in the drafting sessions said that there was concern not only for labor but for
industries that have problems -- electronics, shoes, textiles, ball bearings" (N.J. 7/28/73, p. 1092).
This packaging and the substance of the bills show that the package represents side
payment compensation, because the clustering of the three pieces of legislation were meant to off-
set the costs of the proposed Trade Reform Act and differed substantively from the proposed
reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers at the center of that Act. Yet, each of the provisions had
deeper origins, the details of which tell the story of why these provisions were chosen as side
payments -- not just over adjustment assistance but over the many other hypothetical possibilities.
1.2.2.1 Origins of MNC Tax Side Payment: A Faint Nod to Labor's Burke-Hartke
The MNC tax reform was unambiguously a side payment drawn from and appealing to
organized labor's trade and investment policymaking agenda. In the two years leading up to and
including the time the Administration was drafting its 1973 trade initiative, labor's position was
clearly expressed in the Burke-Hartke bill. Among the quota and investment policy reforms, the
bill demanded that US multinational companies lose the credits they then got against their US taxes
for the taxes they paid to foreign countries and their right to defer US tax payments until their
overseas earnings were repatriated (National Journal 1/15/72, p.1 10). Throughout this period, the
Administration had stood firmly and unambiguously against Burke-Hartke in general, and the bill's
MNC tax provisions in particular. And when the Administration was pulling together its 1973
Trade Act it did the same. At the end of March 1973, before Nixon had publicly announced his
Trade Reform Act but after some of its details had already been leaked to the press, the National
Journal reported that the Administration was "standing firm" against labor's agenda, and that it had
"considered then rejected" the latter of the Burke-Hartke tax provisions -- the right to defer
payments on earnings until they are repatriated (NJ 3/31/73, p.472).
However, by the time the Administration's bill was taking shape, Wilbur Mills, chairman
of the House Ways and Means and widely regarded as the most powerful congressman on trade
issues, pressured the Administration to include in its trade bill some action on MNC taxes. On the
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substance and details of such action, Mills was not specific. But he had a variety of strong
motivations to get the Administration to consider the tax reform as part of its liberalization. The
substantive motivation was that he favored doing something modest to reform taxes of foreign
corporations in the interest of fairness. As one industry lobbyist put it:
Mills feels he needs tax provisions in the bill...He believes that, on balance, MNCs benefit
the economy and, because they are, he does not see the rationale for discouraging direct
foreign investment....But he recognizes that there is a lot of ferment in the country on the
multinationals, much of it coming from labor but also from other taxpayers who feel that
these companies are not paying their fair share of taxes. (N.J. 7/28/73, p.1093).
Most obviously and explicitly, however, Mills believed that some action on MNC taxes would be
politically important to passage of the Administration's inchoate trade legislation. Mills was
frequently consulted by the Administration about how to design its Trade Reform bill, and Mills
was the man who had to help construct a piece of legislation that he could clear with his committee
and on the floor. No one knew better than he what could and could not as much. Toward that
end, he wanted to demonstrate "a sufficient concern for Labor's interests," knew that the taxation
of foreign-source income was a central part of Burke-Hartke, and pushed for a provision that could
be included, if for no more than "presentational purposes" (quoted in Pastor 1980, p. 148).15
On the receiving end of this advice were members of the Nixon Administration tasked with
pulling together a liberal bill able to make it through Congress, bearing Mills's mark and meeting
his approval. Apparently, the most solicitous of these representatives was CIEP-head Peter
Flanigan. In deliberations over the Administration trade bill, Flanigan is said to have had the most
contact with Mills and to have made the most of both that contact and congressional input during
the bill-drafting process (Ibid., p. 147). Flanigan later plainly explained to the National Journal
his, and his interpretation of the Administration's, motivations in considering the tax provisions:
No one ever drafts legislation as an academic exercise but as a package that will be passed.
We never thought we'd get labor's support by doing this [proposing the tax changes] but
we were hopeful that our efforts would win us some support. (N.J. 7/28/73, p. 1093)
Making the link to the Burke-Hartke tax provisions, another official noted that "When you have
something as high-level and as talked about as Burke-Hartke on the Hill, you can hardly escape
addressing yourself to these issues...(Ibid.). And Kenneth Dam, chairman of the inter-agency
staff-level task force looking into unemployment and TAA reform, said that the Nixon proposals
on taxation of foreign-source income "were designed, at least in part, as a response to the labor-
backed Burke-Hartke bill." (National Journal 6/9/73, p.827). He told the National Journal:
We wanted to have our entire package before Congress so that in judging any one part of it
15 But a more personal-political motivation may also have entered the mix. Mills and Burke, the House co-sponsor
of labor's bill, had become politically very close colleagues. Not only was Burke the third most senior Democrat on
Mills's Ways and Means Committee, but he was also the manager of Mills's abortive campaign for the Democratic
Party's presidential nomination. It wouldn't be too surprising if Mills sought to push some of his colleague's MNC
tax provisions as a personal favor or political debt.
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they can take a look at what else we have proposed....We wanted them to know what our
position was on the taxation of foreign income.....Given the Burke-Hartke bill, any
Congressman or Senator would have the right to ask us what we are doing on the tax side
and undoubtedly would have asked" (Ibid., p.827).
Even though the provisions chosen were a distant cry from what labor had advocated in
Burke-Hartke, those supporting the President's liberalization saw the modest provisions as key to
the debate. Revealing this sympathy, the National Journal reported at the time that "the fate of
trade legislation could be determined by what congress does on the tax provisions" (N.J. 5/12/73,
p.696). Importantly, no one in the Administration checked ahead of time with organized labor to
see what they thought of the proposals, to assess whether the particular tax provisions had any
virtue in their eyes, let alone whether labor had other proposals in mind -- parts of Burke-Hartke or
something else -- that might be part of the Administration's trade policy package.
1.2.2.2 Origins of Welfare and Pension Reform Side Payments: Nixon's Loose Ends
Unlike this MNC tax reform, the welfare and pension reforms that the Administration
proposed along side its Trade Reform Act did not grow out of labor's trade policymaking agenda.
Instead, they grew out of the Administration's previous welfare and pension policy efforts,
pursued independently of commercial policy politics. In particular, the proposals represented an
attempt by the Administration, in particular by economy-czar George Shultz, to take advantage of a
political opportunity to hit two birds with one stone: consolidate support for trade liberalization,
and tie up some the loose ends left over from the earlier welfare and pension efforts. 16
In July 1969, the Administration laid out a series of proposals to substantially reform
welfare provision, the majority of which Congress made into law with its passage of the 1970
Employment Security Amendments (184 Stat 695). One of the most important of these
amendments was federal mandate to extend unemployment insurance coverage to an estimated 4.8
million workers not previously covered, including state hospital and university workers,
employees of small businesses and of non-profit organizations (N.J. 6/9/73, p.824). Another was
the requirement that states pay up to an additional 13 weeks of benefits to eligible workers when
the national unemployment rat.e topped 4.5 percent for three consecutive months or "when state
unemployment was 20 percent higher in a 13-week period than the average of the corresponding
periods for the two preceding years (Ibid.). Half of the costs of this extension was to be borne by
the federal government and the other half from state unemployment taxes." With the states
averaging coverage of 26 weeks, this extension represented a substantial increase in benefits.
16 My account of these origins relies heavily on a couple of National Journal articles, especially Charles Culhane,
"Labor Report: Labor Readies Stronger Jobless-pay Plan, Rejects Version Offered with Nixon Trade Bill," National
Journal. 6/9/73, pp. 82 1-830 .
17 Regular unemployment insurance benefits were administered by the states, within very broad federal guidelines
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Several of the Administration's proposals, however, didn't pass Congress. Among these
were the changes in federal guidelines such that states would be required to withhold
unemployment insurance benefits to striking workers and that they extend coverage to a large
percentage of farm workers not previously covered. Each of these provisions ran into substantial
opposition in both House and Senate deliberations. Organized labor lobbied strongly against
changes in federal guidelines on striking workers, the status quo ante prohibiting states from
denying these workers unemployment benefits. Farm employers, large and small, took issue with
the extension of benefits to farm workers, because the employers would have to bear the cost of
that extension and because they argued their sector was inherently more volatile and dependent on
part-time and temporary workers and to seasonal swings in employment -- all of which justified
and necessitated taking less financial responsibility for the economic position of their employees
(CQ Almanac 1970). When Nixon signed the Employment Security Amendments on August 10,
1970, he made clear his desire to pursue the matter further in future legislation: "These farm
workers deserve this added protection, and it is my intention to resubmit legislation to help them
gain this objective" (N.J. 6/9/73, p.824). [[get more on this]]
More disappointing than these Congressional defeats, however, was the poor response by
states to Nixon's request that states pay their workers higher benefits. The federal government had
never imposed guidelines on states setting minimums or maximums on amounts states were to pay
unemployed workers. But in his July 1969 message to congress on welfare reform, Nixon stated
that "if state laws set maximum benefit standards requiring payment of at least two-thirds of the
state's average wage, or one-half of the claimants' average weekly wages, whichever is less, this
would result in benefits of at least 50 percent of their wages to at least 80 percent of the insured
workers" (cited in Ibid). Threatening to set federal guidelines for the first time if states didn't heed
his request, Nixon stated in the message: "I call upon the states to act within the next two years to
meet this goal, thereby averting the need for federal action" (ibid.).' 8 Despite Nixon's requests and
warnings, by 1973 only four states -- Hawaii, Arkansas, Utah and Washington D.C. -- had met
his guidelines, meaning that only 2.5 percent of the nation's insured workers received "adequate"
benefits (Ibid.). 19
In the years immediately following these frustrations, the Administration's rethinking of
foreign economic policymaking, and trade policy in particular, became inter-mixed with review of
and with federal tax monies financing that administration. All actual benefits, however, were to be financed by state
taxes. So the extensions were a relatively lighter burden.18 Renewing this plea when signing the 1970 Employment Security Amendments, Nixon said "Maximums are still
too low to provide adequate benefits for the great majority of workers and more rapid progress is required" (ibid.).
19 The National Journal reports that, by contrast, "in 20 states representing 60.8 percent of the nation's insured
workers, the maximum benefits were less than 50 percent of the state's average weekly wage" (ibid.).
Similar frustration marked the Administration's attempt to reform access to pension funds. In December
1971, the Administration introduced legislation that Congress refused to enact (Ibid, p.827). And there, again, the
Administration warned it would try again. (N.J. Vol.4, no.37, p.1415).
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these welfare and pension reforms. George Shultz was the advisor most responsible for the linked
review of such otherwise distinct foreign and domestic economic policies. As Secretary of Labor
at the time of the frustrated welfare and pension initiatives, Shultz was reported to have been
strongly in favor of those initiatives that did not make it into either federal or state law. Over the
course of the next two years, Shultz's political fortunes grew beyond this post. 20 And in that new
capacity, Shultz led the Administration's retooling of both domestic and foreign economic policy,
even though he was reputed as having cared more and been more knowledgeable about domestic
reform (Destler 1980, p. 140).
Part of that retooling, we have seen, involved review of the various elements of commercial
policy, including a review of adjustment assistance by the Department of Labor. Shultz named
Kenneth W.Dam, who was then executive director of the Council of Economic Policy, to head the
inter-agency task force reviewing adjustment assistance. Shultz directed this task force to develop
recommendations not only for adjustment assistance, but for unemployment insurance system
generally. In addition to Dam, this group included staff members from the Departments of Labor
and Commerce, and from the office of Management and Budget and from the Council of Economic
Advisors (N.J. 6/9/73, p.825). Between January and mid-March of 1973, the staff-level group
debated a variety of different proposals on how to reform unemployment insurance, most of which
built on the loose ends left by the previous legislative episode -- extending benefits to farm
workers, prohibiting extension to strikers, and a federal standard for maximum benefits.
The chief confrontation pitted representatives from the Department of Labor against those
from Commerce. The lead Labor Department representative was Robert Goodwin, associate
manpower administrator and director of the Unemployment Insurance Service. According to the
National Journal, Goodwin and the other Labor representatives proposed a provision that would
have extended the duration of regular unemployment insurance benefits to 39 weeks regardless of
the level of national or state unemployment, and provided "emergency benefits" for another 13
weeks during periods of high unemployment -- bringing the total, federally mandated maximum to
52 weeks (Ibid.). Commerce Department representatives strongly opposed this proposal, and also
informally recommended that the Administration propose to phase-in the increased benefit
maximums over a period of months or years, rather than require that states raise benefits
immediately. These representatives were concerned, appropriately given their bureaucratic
position, that the higher benefit maximums and durations would be too costly for businesses,
especially in those states whose existing benefit standards were lowest.21 In this conflict, the trade
policy politics may have mattered, but only in the background.22
20 He took over the Treasury Secretary's post in 1972, and in December 1972 Nixon appointed Shultz special
assistant to the President for economic affairs and chairman of the new Cabinet-level council for Economic Policy,
making Shultz the Administration's most powerful economic advisor.
21 Indiana and Minnesota, for instance, would have a lot of taxes to raise if they were going to meet the new
247
Burgoon
Chapter Four
Resolution of this and other staff-level coniroversies waited until cabinet-level
representatives of the same Departments involved in the staff-level deliberations met in mid-March.
At this cabinet level, the deliberations explicitly weighed the welfare and pension policy
controversies, and trade policy controversies simultaneously. In the welfare and adjustment policy
task force, Department of Labor Secretary Brennan had supported the more ambitious
unemployment insurance package as well as the strengthened and expanded trade adjustment
assistance program. At the same time, he had been supporting the latter in the other task force
deliberations drafting the Trade Reform Act, joining forces with the STR and others. And in those
trade policymaking deliberations, the adjustment assistance was being opposed by the same
officials who opposed the expanded welfare provisions in the welfare task force.
The official who resolved the both of these controversies was, again, George Shultz,
clearly and explicitly juggling the Administration's trade liberalization and welfare reform
priorities. One lobbyist told National Journal at the time, referring to resolution of the debate over
how to reform unemployment insurance, that "Shultz was the master technician in all of this...As
special assistant to the President on economic affairs he has super-Cabinet status" (Ibid., p.826).
During the Trade Reform bill-drafting, Shultz had tipped the balance against expansion of trade
adjustment assistance. In its place, he had argued in favor of accompanying the trade liberalization
initiatives with various unemployment insurance reforms being discussed in the welfare reform
task force. In the latter task force, simultaneously, Shultz supported a middle ground position
between Labor and Commerce on expanded welfare benefits. He supported legislating the 1969
Nixon welfare priorities, including the creation of federally mandated benefit standards for the first
time, but he did not support Labor's more expansive proposals.
More important than his splitting the difference between Labor and Commerce were the
arguments he made for doing so. According to a "high Administration official" interviewed at the
time by the National Journal, "Shultz and his associates designed the legislative package as a
calculated effort to obtain support from organized labor for the trade bill" (N.J. 6/9/73, p.827). In
the same report, other anonymous commentators embellished the logic of this linkage:
"Administration officials hope that employers, particularly those with large stakes in higher levels
of foreign trade, will relax their traditional opposition to higher unemployment taxes and help
swing labor behind the trade bill" (Ibid, p.8 2 1). Importantly, however, this judgment was made
without any substantial input by organized labor. Shultz and other officials were said to have been
standard. As of the middle of 1973, Indiana gave benefits that averaged only 29-42 percent of the state's average
wage; Minnesota gave only 38 percent. And most states were well below the standard. See benefits table in
National Journal 6/9/73, p. 826.
22 In defending higher benefit and duration standards, for instance, Goodwin explained how support for some
expansion needed to take account of trade dislocation, as well as other "special" economic problems: "we see long-
range unemployment resulting from defense cutbacks, actions on environmental issues and because of trade impact.
A lot of these people aren't taken care of under the regular programs" (Ibid., p.825, italics mine).
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in contact with the groups during various stages of designing the trade bill and other legislation,
but organized labor was never consulted on the unemployment insurance or pension reforms.
Most provisions of the proposal, however, had some reasonable potential as side
payments. The creation of a higher unemployment insurance benefit standard, the extension to
farm workers, and guaranteed pension rights all clearly appeal to organized labor's perceived and
explicit interest in welfare reform and expansion. And the financing of the previous year's
emergency unemployment insurance extensions also appealed to the interests, if not the demands,
of labor, by virtue of making such insurance extensions more politically viable for states well into
the future. The inclusion of the old Administration welfare reform provision prohibiting states
from giving unemployment insurance benefits to striking workers is a bit more puzzling in that
labor was unambiguously and explicitly against the proposal. This provision, however, may have
been seen as the price the Administration would have to pay in order to get the rest of the
unemployment insurance package together. Indeed, Chamber of Commerce research associate
Michael J.Romig later commented that "the Administration thought of this [the denial of benefits to
strikers] as a sweetener that business would like" (Ibid., p.829). In other words, there may have
been worry that the promise of trade liberalization of which more expensive unemployment
insurance benefits might be the price, might not have been seen as enough of a "sweetener."
There is some ambiguity in the degree to which the Administration's proposal of the
unemployment insurance and pension reforms were motivated mainly as a side payment to buy
support for its trade liberalization, or whether something else was afoot. To be sure, other
motivations were at work in motivating the welfare and pension reforms. The unemployment and
pension provisions appear to have been provisions that the Administration wanted to get anyway.
No doubt, introducing them along-side the Trade Reform Act proposals could be seen as making
them politically more palatable because they would thereby be linked to the trade liberalization,
thereby buying the support of business types reluctant to support them generally but more so if
they are a necessary cost of getting liberalization. With this logic, some welfare reformers with no
care or interest in trade policy might have sought, secretly hoped for, or accepted the linkage as a
way of getting their package through -- where the trade liberalization was a side payment to
business groups expected to suffer from the welfare reform. Without more information on what
went on in the deliberations, or better yet, in the heads of the deliberators, we can't know what mix
of side payment logic underlay the Administration's decision to combine the welfare and pension
reforms with the trade liberalization initiatives.
What matters here is that the attachment or linkage was made at least in part with the
intention of off-setting some of the costs expected to be borne by victims of the liberalization.
Minimally, the timing and rhetorical defense of the welfare and pension reforms were side
payments to potential victims, mainly organized labor, from the Trade Reform Act liberalization.
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Maximally, they wouldn't have been pursued were it not for their role as side payments. On their
own merits, then, the welfare and pension reforms represented a significant side payment offer.
How significant and generous a side payment offer they represented, however, depended
on one's point of view. For those workers eligible for trade adjustment assistance, and certainly
for trade-impacted firms, the Shultz-endorsed package was expected to be less generous in
monetary terms than either the adjustment assistance status quo-ante or proposed expansion. The
existing adjustment assistance program guaranteed eligible workers unemployment insurance
supplements representing 65 percent of the worker's average weekly wage up to 65 percent of the
average weekly manufacturing wage. This was substantially more than the 50 percent of a
worker's average wage up to 66 percent of the state's average, especially since manufacturing
wages tended to be higher than other segments of the economy. A Labor Department official
pushed to compare the proposal with the adjustment assistance it would supplant conceded, "only
workers in a handful of states would be eligible for more than that [provided under adjustment
assistance] or even that" (N.J. 6/9/73, p.828). And these income supplements were only part of
the adjustment assistance program; also included were relocation and training assistance, and the
various provisions of assistance for firms.
The Commerce Department estimated that the unemployment insurance reform offered to
replace adjustment assistance would cost employers an additional $970 million a year in state
unemployment taxes to cover the higher state average benefits and the coverage of farm workers.23
This was substantially more than the adjustment assistance program, in either its existing form or
in its proposed revised form, cost -- the estimates of which were never over $500 million.24 The
moneys involved in the proposed welfare reform, therefore, were significant. They might,
therefore, be less than what trade-impacted workers might expect under adjustment assistance, and
they were in any event more than employers would want -- especially since the sister program of
adjustment assistance for firms was to be phased out and would not, therefore, offer any hope that
they might be compensated for the new expenditures. But the general welfare reform offered more
to workers on the whole, and especially to generally vulnerable workers and to agricultural
workers. And when all of these benefits from the other two proposed pieces of legislation --
discouraging tax haven investment and protecting worker pension rights -- the package is relatively
more generous for the average worker than the adjustment assistance provisions. Accordingly,
one might predict from these relative benefits that the AFL-CIO -- as the supposed, and to some
23 Unemployment insurance was paid for by employer contributions to these taxes, not directly from federal funds
or employee contributions. The $970 million estimate comes from the Commerce Department's judgment that "the
maximum-benefit standard could add $850 million to business costs in 1976 and that coverage of farm workers
would cost another $120 million (National Journal 6/9/73, p.825).
24 When the worker adjustment assistance program was ultimately expanded, as we will learn, it was estimated to
cost in its first fully operating year (1974), $534,823,000. See Mitchell 1976, p.66 .
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extent actual, political representative of working people generally, not just those vulnerable to
competition from imports -- would prefer the Shultz package to the adjustment assistance package.
1.3. Business and Labor Side Payment Politics: Out with the New, In With the Old
As it turned out, this prediction was dead wrong. From the day the Administration
announced its side payment package on April 10th through House Ways and Means mark-up, the
new package of side payments and a new compensated liberalization found no takers. Although
just one set of many subjects of controversy sparked by the Administration's trade liberalization
initiative, the side payment package immediately drew unambiguous fire from the whole spectrum
of groups active in welfare, tax, and trade policymaking. It not only alienated groups central to the
Administration's liberalizer coalition but also inspired active opposition from groups otherwise
silent on trade policymaking. As for the would-be beneficiaries of the side payment package --
organized labor -- the package was even more of a bust. All of organized labor immediately and
wholeheartedly rejected the Administration's package, with the AFL-CIO taking an
uncompromising stand in opposition to any liberalization, compensated or otherwise.
This same spectrum of groups, however, didn't reject compensated liberalization generally,
only the Administration's. Instead they embraced expansion of the traditional side payment -- trade
adjustment assistance. Throughout debate over the Administration's bill, liberalizer groups sought
to bring TAA back from the brink. And organized labor turned out to be split over compensated
liberalization. Although the AFL-CIO towed its unconditional protectionist line throughout, the
United Auto Workers actively lobbied for a compensated liberalization where expanded trade
adjustment assistance was the price for its acceptance of tariff and non-tariff barrier liberalization.
1.3.1. Among Businessmen: Liberalizers and Neutral Parties
On the issue of trade liberalization, the American business community had traditionally
been split, with international business the back-bone of liberalizer coalitions and with more
domestic oriented and import-competing businesses either opposed or ambivalent over
liberalization. On the Administration's side payment package, however, both these segments of
business were united in their opposition. The unemployment insurance reform and the tax
provisions sparked the strongest response.
A variety of business groups spoke out early and often against almost all elements of the
proposed changes in federal standards on unemployment insurance. Most vocal was the Chamber
of Commerce. Michael J.Romig, a Chamber of Commerce research associate, explained some of
the Chamber's reasons. He and others tried to sound fair in their opposition. They pointed out
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that the bill's provisions extending insurance to hitherto uninsured farm workers was "not
unreasonable" (ibid). But the changes in federally mandated benefit standards, which would
require businesses to pay substantially higher payroll taxes, absolutely were. As Romig explained,
"The Administration is raising a gut issue, a dollar issue" (National Journal 6/9/73, p.829). But
the Chamber's opposition went deeper, at least rhetorically: "We oppose any change in the idea of
shared responsibility between state and local governments. We anticipate opposing this
legislation" (NJ 6/9/73, p.829). Other groups, such as the National Association of Manufacturers
and the American Farm Bureau Federation, were not much softer in their criticism. 25
Given that these businesses had to pay for the higher costs of the unemployment insurance
side payment, their opposition to the federal benefit standards isn't surprising. More surprising,
however, was that they found little solace in the bill's provision prohibiting extension of benefits to
striking laborers and to prohibit states from denying payments to innocent bystanders -- referred to
by some as a "sweetener" designed to soften business opposition to the reforms. This provision,
however, drew fire as well. Chamber of Commerce and National Association of Manufacturers
spokesmen "were favorably disposed" toward the idea of barring unemployment compensation to
strikers, but were convinced that it would be unenforceable, and were concerned that protection of
"innocent bystanders" would lead to unfair and unnecessary intrusions by federal authorities into
industrial relations matters. As a sympathetic Administration official told the National Journal at
the time, "The problem is, what the hell is an innocent bystander?....Once you get around to
defining this term you're in a swamp" (Ibid.).
On the Administration's side payment tax provisions, opposition was even stronger. Not
only the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce, but also the
stalwarts of the liberalizer coalition, the Emergency Committee for American Trade (ECAT) --
representing about 60 of the nation's largest multinational corporations -- expressed their
opposition. They all argued that the Administration's tax proposals should be left out of the trade
bill and should, instead, be taken up as part of the general tax reform legislation later in the 93rd
Congress (N.J. 11/24/73, p.175 1). In saying this, many business groups were conceding that
some changes in MNC taxation was likely, something they lamented and attributed to organized
labor's Burke-Hartke protectionist agenda.
25 The National Association of Manufacturers, for instance, was initially circumspect in its opposition, claiming
that "our traditional view has been in opposition to federal standards. I don't see any possibility that we'll reverse
that position at the moment" (Ibid, p.830). After "studying the proposal in detail" over the course of the next few
months, as it turned out, they didn't. And the closest the unemployment reform came to getting business support
came from the American Farm Bureau Federation, representing some 2.7 million families, including retired farmers
and those who own farms, was tepid in its support. Assistant legislative director for the Federation, Matt Triggs,
said "We are not sure how we are going to deal with this proposal to cover farm workers....We would be reluctant to
oppose it. A good many farmers want to provide unemployment compensation for their permanent help...." But the
Federation did not come out formally in favor of the proposal, instead claiming to conduct a detailed study of the
proposal before adopting a policy. (Ibid.). And during the rest of the deliberations they said nothing.
252
Burgoon
Chapter Four
Their big concern was that such tax measures not under any circumstances become part of
the liberalization legislation. The NAM's director of international economic affairs, Nicholas
E.Hollis told the National Journal in late 1973, for instance, that "the bill was shaky as it was, so
they [the Administration] shouldn't alienate their supporters" (Ibid., p.1752). In an earlier
interview, Hollis pointed out that "there is a real danger that a lot of companies that are neutral on
the trade bill suddenly will find a tax title in the committee's bill and oppose the whole bill" (N.J.
7/28/73, p. 1098). The Chamber of Commerce echoed this concern when staff associate for the
international group of the Chamber of Commerce, L.Oakley Johnson, said "if there are tax
provisions in the Ways and means Committee's bill, business organizations are going to face the
dilemma of supporting a bill which includes tax provisions which they do not support....We are
hoping not to have to grapple with that problem" (N.J. 7/28/73, p.1098).
While the Ways and Means Committee had carried out its hearings and during mark-up of
the bill, the business groups continued their lobbying against the tax provisions. On June 25th,
during Committee mark-up, the Chamber w,;ote each Ways and Means Committee member a letter
warning that "unfavorable tax provisions in the trade bill could force the business community to
oppose the entire package, thereby jeopardizing needed trade reform" (Ibid., pp. 1751-2).
In proposing the MNC tax and unemployment reforms as side payments, the
Administration not only was "alienating its [liberalization] supporters" as the NAM official
claimed, but it also inspired some action by groups otherwise quiet on trade issues. The
unemployment insurance reforms, for instance, inspired action from the political representatives of
the state agencies responsible for administering unemployment insurance, the Interstate Conference
of Employment Security Administrators. According to the NJ, the 14-member legislative
committee of the conference met May 24th and discussed the proposal for a federal benefit
standard, something they had traditionally opposed. In a poll among the members of the
conference, a majority opposed the standard. The reasoning, according to one official, was
concern that the standard was a slippery slope fear of federal power: "if you have a standard in that
area it will be a prelude to standards in other areas: eligibility, duration....The more federal
standards you have the more concentration you have of federal power" (ibid., p.830).
Having opposed the Administration's package of side payments, however, most of the
business representatives, especially those most supportive of the Administration's trade
liberalization, called for expansion of the trade adjustment assistance program. For all of these
groups, the adjustment assistance program was vastly preferable to the Administration's package
for a variety of reasons. For one thing, adjustment assistance was supposed to provide benefits to
trade-impacted firms as well as workers, even though assistance to firms was even more
disappointing than the assistance to workers, given tight implementation of the 1962 program.
Loosened eligibility of the program, as proposed by the Administration, might be expected to
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benefit vulnerable firms, whereas the Administration offered nothing for such firms. More
importantly, the adjustment assistance program, in its current incarnation, implied a substantially
lower tax burden for businesses, in comparison to the unemployment insurance reform. At the
same time, the cheaper adjustment assistance program would be a good way to show concern for
the costs of the liberalization they either supported or themselves feared.
Thus, a variety of business groups, especially the free-traders, spoke out in favor of
adjustment assistance throughout deliberations over the Administration's bill. All called not only
for maintenance of adjustment assistance in the face of the Administration's request for reduced
benefits and duration, but also for substantial expansion of benefits and, in some cases, even
looser eligibility criteria than the Administration bill requested. In their defense of adjustment
assistance, however, the groups emphasized different motivations and recommendations.
The business associations that represented the back-bone of the liberalizer coalition --
ECAT, the National Retail Merchants Association (NRMA), the American Retail Federation, and
the American Importers Association -- called for the most ambitious increases, and were focused
mainly on the politics of trade. Representatives from the organizations called for program
expansion as a political tool in interviews, lobbying and testimony to the House Ways and Means
and Senate Finance Committees. Raymond Garcia, program director for ECAT, expressed this
view in an interview with the National Journal: "Our hope is that if the President gets a good trade
bill with liberalized criteria for protectin3 workers against import competition and a much better
adjustment assistance program than the Administration has proposed, then labor might, just might,
reconsider its position" (N.J. 7/28/73, p. 1097, italics theirs).
In this hope, the groups were aware of how the stingy history of adjustment assistance
fueled labor's disenchantment with such assistance as compensation for liberalization. Kurt
Orban, President of AIA, made this point in his testimony to the Ways and Means Committee, but
called for expansion of the program as the appropriate remedy:
AIA shares the disappointment of all concerned that the 1962 adjustment assistance
provisions did not live up to expectations. We are even more concerned, however, that the
adjustment assistance provisions of HR 6767 do not go far enough.
HR 6767 not only unwisely reduced adjustment assistance benefits for workers, it
totally eliminates any possibility of adjustment assistance for firms. While the adjustment
assistance program for firms has not been a notable success, we believe that it is short-
sighted to deprive the President of this option in appropriate cases.26
Others supported an expanded TAA, but also were concerned that Trade Adjustment
Assistance could discourage rather than encourage adjustment out of non-competitive economic
activity and into competitive. Among these more circumspect supporters was the National
26 US House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings on the Trade Reform Act of 1973, H.R.
6767, Part 3 of 15 Vols. p.777.
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Association of Manufacturers. After emphasizing the NAM's support for the concept of trade
adjustment assistance, Douglas Kenna, President of NAM, argued that
The core problem of domestic import dislocation will not be solved by expanding
compensation efforts but rather with a balanced approach aimed at early industrial self-help
and increased productivity to promote job creation and job retention.
We need a redefinition of the adjustment process and the role of competitive free
enterprise in it so that the program emphasis can be properly placed on employment
creation as opposed to after-the-fact compensation systems, which are otherwise known as
"burial expenses."27
Whatever their particular cut, business lobbying groups in and out of the liberalizer coalition were
unified in their opposition to the Administration's side payment package and in their support for
expanded adjustment assistance.
1.3.2. The Split in Organized Labor: Unconditional Protectionism vs. Compensated Liberalization
The question for liberalizers interested in buying support for the trade liberalization was
whether organized labor preferred the Administration's chosen side payment package, the
traditional adjustment assistance side payment, or some other package of policies. The answer to
this question came in stages. Early indications suggested that labor might be pacified by the
Administration's overall design of the Trade Reform Act. In February 1973, while the trade bill
was still being developed, senior Administration officials consulted with AFL-CIO officials to
discuss the bill and to try to soften labor's opposition, or maybe even some qualified support. As
the bill drafting discussions revealed, no one in the Administration really expected anything more.
Treasury Secretary George Shultz and Secretary of State William P.Rogers met with Meany and a
few of the top AFL-CIO officials to discuss trade and other economic issues. Then, on February
19th, Nixon met with the AFL-CIO executive council at the federation's annual mid-winter meeting
in Bal Harbour, Florida. Nixon and his advisors apparently spoke in "vague generalities" and
emphasized all the elements of the proposal that the Federation might like to hear, such as the
unfair trade provisions, the escape clause loosening, etc. (N.J. 7/28/73, p. 109 1).
The meetings ended with very positive soundings from both sides. At a press conference
held after the meeting with the President, AFL-CIO president George Meany praised the outline of
the Administration's bill:
[Mr. Nixon] wants to negotiate with these countries with authority from Congress to apply
different methods of negotiation to block them off if they are blocking us off....From the
point of view of a trade unionist, who likes to go to the bargaining table with options open
and with authority to give and take, I think that the idea itself is attractive (National Journal
7/28/73, p. 1092, cited in part in Destler 1980 and Pastor 1980).
27 US House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings on the Trade Reform Act of 1973, H.R.
6767, Part 6 of 15 Vols. p.1915.
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He even tempered his support for the Burke-Hartke proposals, restating his general endorsement
of the bill but noting that "We know that when you get into the so-called nitty gritty of legislation
there has to be some give and take" (ibid). In his conciliation, however, Meany stopped short of
supporting the Administration's bill, claiming to await disclosure of its details. However qualified,
the buddy-buddy quality of the remarks fueled speculation that the Administration might have
successfully won over labor's support, perhaps through some secret buy-off.
However, when the details of the Trade Reform Act and the accompanying side payment
provisions and legislation were unfurled between April 10th and the 12th, the AFL-CIO's
conciliatory stance completely crumbled. In a press conference called on April 1 Ith, Meany said
the Administration's proposals "would open the door to further deterioration of America's position
in the world economy and to the further export of American jobs" (NJ 7/28/73, p.1091). Some of
his ire was directed at the main liberalization provisions: "the trade proposals provide no specific
machinery to regulate the flood of imports and, indeed, some would increase the amount of
damage to American employment and industrial production" (Ibid., p. 1094). In the same
statement, however, Meany directed some of his criticisms at the Administration's proposed
package of side payments. On the proposals to tighten the tax treatment of income from foreign
plants, Meany pointed out the provision "would do nothing to close lucrative tax loopholes for US-
based multinational corporations" (Ibid). On the pension provisions, he said, rightly, that "the
pension bills are almost identical to the Administration's 1971 proposals, which the AFL-CIO still
feels are inadequate" (Ibid). And on the unemployment insurance provisions, Meany said that "its
redeeming features 'are heavily outweighted [sic] by numerous and glaring deficiencies"' (Ibid.).
As the Administration's various side payment provisions were detailed in succeeding days
and weeks, so was the AFL-CIO's opposition. When Administration officials outlined on April
12th the details of the welfare reform legislation they hoped labor and other groups would
recognize as part of the grander trade reform package, AFL-CIO officials clarified their opposition.
No one was surprised to hear that the Federation opposed the proposal to bar unemployment
benefits to strikers. As assistant director of the federation's social security department James
O'Brien modestly protested, "we think the disqualification standards are unnecessarily harsh in
many states" (N.J. 6/9/73, p830). But the federation also took issue with the specific benefits
promised to working people. To George Shultz's April 12th press briefing outlining the welfare
reform side payment, George Meany clarified his criticisms on the same afternoon:
Almost four years after he threatened the states with federal standards if they did not
improve their laws, the President has submitted standards that are just not good enough.
The omission of standards that would determine how long an individual must be
employed on a job to be eligible for benefits and standards defining how long a jobless
worker is entitled to receive benefits make the proposal unacceptable (N.J. 6/9/73, p.830).
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In other words, the provisions the AFL-CIO wanted in the welfare reform were exactly those
supported by the Department of Labor, opposed by the Commerce Department, and explicitly
feared most by the Chamber of Commerce and other business groups: federal standards for
eligibility and duration.
This critique by Meany dove-tailed with his angry acknowledgment that the
Administration's proposal in many respects was worse for trade-impacted workers than was the
adjustment assistance status-quo it was meant to supplant. "The failure to include them [eligibility
and duration standards] in new unemployment compensation legislation would mean workers who
lose their jobs because of imports would have less income protection than is currently available
[under the adjustment assistance program]" (AFL-CIO Convention Proceedings 1973, p.153, and
N.J. 6/9/73, p.830). In short, as soon as the Administration laid out it's plan for compensated
liberalization, the AFL-CIO rejected it as worse than its previous unfulfilled attempts at
compensated liberalization with adjustment assistance as the side payment. As Meany concluded,
"This is a step backward and the AFL-CIO will vigorously oppose it" (Ibid., p.830).
Clinton Fair, legislative representative for the Federation, captured the AFL-CIO's rebuke
of the various offers as failed attempts at side payment politics. He pointed out that "the
Administration miscalculated in its efforts to gain labor support for the trade bill" (National Journal
6/9/73, p.830), "I think they thought they might be able to sell Mr. Meany on it....But only a
misreading of George Meany would have let them think that they could sell this unemployment
insurance bill against the Burke-Hartke bill" (Ibid., p.830). 28
28 The AFL-CIO representatives were not the only organized labor representatives to speak out against the
Administration's side payments and overall proposal. During the House Ways and Means Committee Hearings, held
between May 9th and June 15th, several AFL-CIO affiliates carried the mantle of unconditional protectionism. In
doing so, however, they also made the adjustment assistance program out to be the lesser of two side payment evils.
In his May 17th testimony to the Committee, for instance, I.W. Abel, president of the United Steelworkers, the
AFL-CIO's largest member union, vividly spoke out in opposition to the bill, in favor of Burke-Hartke, and
somewhat ambivalently on trade adjustment assistance:
In lieu of jobs or job programs, the administration's attitude toward the import-injured worker is demonstrated by
the bill's repeal of the adjustment assistance program of the 1962 Trade Act. That program has been ineffective
and few workers have received aid, but it its place would be substituted an unemployment compensation program
that...is a step backward....
It must be remembered that the entire program of adjustment assistance was designed and viewed by its
supporters in 1962 as a stopgap program....It was not meant for use against the onslaught we are now suffering...
Adjustment assistance is at best is burial insurance, not a jobs program. What we want is the restoration of a
diversified industrial society that provides jobs, not jobless pay.
The idea of adjustment assistance was proposed by organized labor in 1954 and supported by us ever since. It
finally became part of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. The AFL-CIO conditioned its support for the TEA on the
promise that adjustment assistance would be made available to those adversely affected by imports. That promise
was not kept.
Abel punctuated his testimony's opposition to the Administration's proposals and criticism of adjustment assistance
as appropriate compensation for liberalization with the warning that dept the door open for adjustment assistance:
"we don't think much of the present program [of adjustment assistance], but we're not going to stand still for
scuttling it for something that's worse" (Ibid., quoted in N.J. 6/9/73, p.830).US House of Representatives,
Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings on the Trade Reform Act of 1973, H.R. 6767, Part 4 of 15 Vols. p.1218.
257
Burgoon
Chapter Four
Although the AFL-CIO and most of its member unions were not as hard on adjustment
assistance as they were on the Administration's package of side payments, their basic position was
unconditional protectionism. The centerpiece of this stance was the Federation's all-out and
uncompromising push for the Burke-Hartke bill. When the Ways and Means Committee heard
testimony on the Administration's bill, it also considered testimony on Burke-Hartke. Very soon
into the proceedings, however, it became clear to all involved that big labor's preferred trade and
investment bill was going nowhere. Burke-Hartke had been reintroduced in late January, but by
late May support had markedly dwindled: of the original 80 co-sponsors only 60 were left, and on
the Ways and Means committee only William J.Green (D.-Pa.) was willing to join Burke as a co-
sponsor (N.J. 7/28/73, p. 1095, Pastor 1980, p. 146).
When this happened, the AFL-CIO went through the motions of trying to import some of
the protectionist guts of Burke-Hartke into the Administration's bill, but really sought simply to
defeat that bill. On June 12th, a few days before the Ways and Means Committee wrapped up the
hearings and began mark-up sessions on the Administration's bill, Rep. Joseph E.Karth (D.-
Minn.) and five other labor-oriented members of the Ways and Means committee met with AFL-
CIO legislative director Andrew Biemiller and federation lobbyist Roy Denison. At the meeting the
legislators offered to consider any amendments to improve the bill from labor's point of view. At
this meeting, Karth remembered, "there was unanimity of opinion that Burke Hartke wasn't going
to pass" (N.J. 11/24/73, p.1752, see also Destler 1980,p.164, and Pastor 1980, p.146?). 29
However, after this meeting with sympathetic Committee members but before the Burke
amendment proposals, AFL-CIO officials basically urged defeat, not revision, of the TRA bill.
Joseph Karth, who had held out an open channel with Federation officials in the hopes of working
with them to improve the bill, claimed thiat the June 12th meeting was "the last time I heard from
them in terms of any positive action until the day before we voted the bill out of committee when I
was asked to vote against the bill" (Ibid.).
In the intervening period, federation lobbyists and officials were not exactly flexible in their
opposition. On June 14th, Andrew Biemiller, director of legislation for the AFL-CIO, sent a letter
to Members of Congress urging them to support the Burke-Hartke bill and to vote against the
Administration's (N.J. 7/28/73, p.1097). And on June 19th, Roy Denison met with roughly a
dozen lobbyists for unions affiliated with the federation and supportive of Burke-Hartke. There he
"discussed Biemiller's letter and laid out a strategy of blocking the Administration's bill" (Ibid).
29 On the basis of recommendations from Biemiller and Denison, Ways and Means Committee member James
Burke proposed two protectionist amendments a month later, on July 16th, during Committee mark-up. The
amendments were designed to bring in the spirit of the doomed Burke-Hartke bill. One would have triggered quotas
when imports exceeded current levels, and the other would have "related quotas to the foreign-import share of the US
market for each product," but both were mandatory rather than at the President's discretion (N.J. 11/24/73, p. 1752).
Despite the support of Karth and other participants in the previous month's meeting, both amendments were rejected
by votes of 7-16 within the committee (Ibid., New York Times 7/17/73, p.55)).
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He explained that "once you start shooting holes in the Administration bill then you might get
consideration of an alternative. We have always said that Burke-Hartke is not written in stone and
we are willing to consider alternatives. Meanwhile, we think Burke-Hartke is the best thing on the
block" (Ibid). United Steelworkers director of legislation John J.Sheehan was more blunt: "We
certainly would like to see the Burke-Hartke bill passed as the alternative. But if nobody can come
up with new legislation except the President's bill, why, we don't see the need for any legislation"
(Ibid). Toward this end, Sheehan sent a letter on July 12th urging his field officials to lobby the
Administration bill as "totally unacceptable" (Ibid).
As the Administration's bill made it past the House Ways and Means committee, the
federation continued its onslaught. At its Bal Harbour, Fla., biennial convention on October 19th,
the AFL-CIO adopted a resolution calling the committee bill "worse than no bill at all. The AFL-
CIO urges defeat of this bill and asks for comprehensive new policies to restore America's social
and economic strength in international relations" (AFL-CIO Proceedings 1973, p. 120; see also
N.J. 11/24/73, p.1752). By the end of the year, everyone was convinced that the federation had
no intention of doing anything but block the bill. Acting Ways and Means chairman Ullman
claimed "I don't think they seriously ever tried to improve the bill....I think their effort from the
very beginning was to kill a trade bill" (Ibid.). This conviction rang true through the rest of the
proceedings, such as when George Meany appeared before the Senate Finance Committee to give
his view of the evolving legislation. Rather than offer any reforms, he urged the committee "to
give the House-passed bill a quick burial, and turn its time and attention to the writing of new trade
legislation which will be comprehensive, flexible, and realistic, and which will meet the complex
needs demanded by today's world" (Senate Finance Hearings 1974, p. 1136, Destlerl980, p. 175).
Roy Denison defended the Federation's inflexible brand of unconditional protectionism.
He claimed that AFL-CIO and member union officials decided that "since the committee obviously
was not going to give any real consideration to the Burke-Hartke bill, labor would not offer any
perfecting amendments to the committee bill" (N.J. 11/24/73, p.1752). Doing so, Denison
claimed, "would have put labor in the position of asking for 'yes' votes on the amendments and
'no' votes on the bill itself' (Ibid.). A bit more metaphorically, he later repeated the point by
saying that trying to change some of the bill's specifics "would be like putting ten patches on a
rubber raft that has 100 holes" (N.J. 10/5/74, p.1484). And Nat Goldfinger, later explained his
version of why the AFL-CIO wouldn't negotiate details or generally participate in a new
consultative body the Administration sought to set up for input into its international negotiations:
"We're opposed to the whole trade bill and the whole operation, which would kind of foreclose
that kind of consultation. They know what our general views are, so what is it that they would
want from us -- whether they kill off 10,000 jobs or 12,0000 jobs?" (N.J. 10/20/73, pp.1568-9).
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The federation took this inflexible position even though several liberalizer legislators and
members of the Nixon Administration expressed flexibility and concern for labor's support or
softened opposition. Rep. Barber B.Conable Jr. (R.-N.Y.), the fourth-ranking Republican on
Ways and Means, for instance, said he believed that the AFL-CIO had the power to block the bill:
"Of course they can: they 'own' a lot of people in the House....They're good lobbyists and you
can be sure that they have a strategy because they always do" (ibid). Peter O.Suchman, director of
the Treasury Department's Office of Trade Policy, expressed flexibility in view of this recognition
of the AFL-CIO's power. He said that if labor came to the table, "the Administration would be
flexible although would not bargain on some issues they consider crucial" (N.J. 7/28/73, p. 1098).
He said, in particular, that "Obviously there could be some 'give' in some of our positions. I don't
think I can talk about what they would be. It would depend on what labor wanted" (Ibid). And
Oregon Rep. Al Ullman, acting chair during Committee mark-up, said "we're certainly going to
have to make some accommodations to labor if we're going to get the bill passed" (Ibid).
The inflexibility of the federation's position, however, angered many who might have
helped revise the bill through changes in side payment packages or in the core liberalization
provisions address to labor's needs. Joseph Karth and other committee members sympathetic to
labor were angry at the federation's unwillingness to "play ball." Karth later told the National
Journal that he could only assume it was the Federation's position from the beginning "that they
are going to have the Burke-Hartke bill or nothing at all. They showed extremely bad judgment,
frankly" (Ibid.). When given a chance to support the bill in the committee bill and on the House
floor, Karth and most others who had supported even the Burke quota amendments switched
positions and voted against the AFL-CIO's request.
Not all organized labor, however, joined the AFL-CIO in their inflexible and unconditional
protectionism. Two of the nation's largest industrial unions broke ranks with the federation and
gave either modest support for freer trade, or explicit and active support for compensated
liberalization. These unions were the Communications Workers of America, affiliated with the
AFL-CIO representing some 550,000 workers, and the United Auto Workers, for several years
loudly separated from the federation and still America's largest union, representing more than a
million workers. It was this split that helped fuel an alternative package of side payments to what
the Administration had proposed.30
Both unions supported part of the AFL-CIO's position on the Administration's trade bill.
All, for instance, joined in a concerted and ultimately unsuccessful effort to get Mills and other
30 Existing accounts of the politics of the Trade Reform Act of 1974 down-play differences among different
segments of organized labor. Both Destler 1980 and Pastor 1980 emphasize, for instance, how labor was generally
opposed to the Administration's bill and not interested in improving it. As we shall see, the first of these claims is
basically true, but doesn't capture different stances that are crucial to side payment politics, if not trade politics
generally. The second emphasis -- that labor wasn't interested in working to improve the bill -- turns out to be
really wrong for some unions. This, too, is crucial to the side payment politics of the case, as we shall see.
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Ways and Means Committee members to open their mark-up sessions to the public.3 ' More
importantly, both supported the AFL-CIO and Burke-Hartke stance on investment provisions. For
instance, Ronnie J. Straw, director of development and research for the Communications Workers,
testified to Ways and Means on May 22nd "that his union agrees with the intent of Burke-Hartke
bill to remove tax breaks for the overseas operations of multinational corporations and to curb the
export of capital to overseas plants" (House Ways and Means Hearings 1974, pp.2013-15, quoted
in N.J. 7/28/73,p. 1095). UAW's Leonard Woodcock also testified in favor of these provisions in
his testimony to the same Committee, and took the Administration's bill to task for not doing more
in this area, contending that "the legislation would not rectify the tax situation which gives US
corporations incentives to establish foreign factories at the expense of domestic jobs" (Ibid).
Both the Communications Workers and the United Auto Workers, however, took issue
with the AFL-CIO's unconditional protectionism, though in different ways and through different
strategies. The Communications Workers' Ronnie Straw testified to Ways and Means that they
"do not support the quota provisions of Burke-Hartke" (House Ways and Means Hearings 1974,
pp.2 0 13-2015). John T. Morgan, administrative assistant to Joseph A. Beirne, the president of
the union, explained the union's position simply: "Joe Beirne is an internationalist who doesn't
think that a strongly protectionist approach to these problems is a realistic one" (N.J.7/28/73,
p. 1095). Beyond this explicit break with the parent federation, the Communications Workers did
not offer much support for the Administration's bill, and they did not actively lobby either for the
bill or for particular safeguards or changes that would improve the bill from their standpoint. 32
The United Auto Workers representatives, however, actively and explicitly championed
compensated liberalization, with expansion of the trade adjustment assistance program as the side
payment on which their support for the Administration's bill was conditioned. In his testimony to
Ways and Means, UAW President Leonard Woodcock explained that even though "imports now
account for 16 percent of all new passenger cars sold in this country, his union still supports freer
trade" (N.J. 7/28/73, p.1095). More passionately, he pointed out how this was a fragile position,
strongly against the protectionist winds in the AFL-CIO and elsewhere: "no matter how deeply I
and the other leaders of the UAW may believe in liberal trade policies, the UAW will not be able to
resist the protectionist tide to which, regrettably, a large part of the American labor movement has
31 These sessions had traditionally been closed, but rules changes in the House required a review process prior to
mark-up during which open sessions might be accepted by majority vote of the acting committee. In this case, the
unified labor effort to open the sessions was defeated 15-9 on June 18th. See National Journal 7/28/73, p.1096. See
also Destler 1980, p.152-3, and Pastor 1980, p. 155.
32 In this way the Communications workers were only a small step beyond a few other unions even more reticent in
their trade policy stance, but much more tolerant of the Administration's liberalization bill than was the AFL-CIO.
Destler, for instance, reports how, quite late in the bill's evolution, the United Mine Workers were consulted as to
where they stood on the bill, and replied that they were "basically in favor of the bill, but that they would just as
soon not have it publicized because 'they don't want to fight with the AFL-CIO"' (Destler 1980, p. 186).
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already succumbed, unless the nation's trade policy is humanized as well as liberalized" (Ibid). 33
What Woodcock and other UAW officials had in mind as methods to "humanize" as well as
"liberalize" trade, were a variety of provisions, including the investment tax proposals they joined
the AFL-CIO in supporting.
Throughout the hearings and in subsequent lobbying, however, they gave special priority
to the expansion of trade adjustment assistance. Woodcock, for instance, explained that the
Administration's proposals to assist trade-impacted workers through revision of federal
unemployment insurance standards would not provide adequate assistance. In his sustained attack
of the Nixon proposal, Woodcock let-fly a moral argument that took its 1965 Auto Pact arguments
to the next level by connecting the Pareto principle to class politics:
An owner of property taken under eminent domain would be outraged if offered a fraction
of its value and the government body involved would be hauled into court. Yet, the
Administration would offer workers only a fraction of their normal remuneration if they
lose their jobs as a result of national trade policies. Unfortunately, such shabby treatment
of workers has been so common that few recognize it as a cause for outrage and, unlike
property owners, workers would find it futile to appeal to the courts to remedy the injustice
done them.
In a real sense, the only substantial property a worker possesses is his job. Whatjustification can there be for continuance of the double standard as between workers and
property owners in cases where both are similarly affected by actions taken in the general
public interest? (House Ways and Means Hearings 1973, pp.856-857)
Most importantly, however, the UAW representatives made a specific proposal for assisting
dislocated workers, as an alternative to the Administration's plan. Their proposal was to expand
the existing trade adjustment assistance program in various ways: loosen eligibility requirements
beyond the Administration request, substantially expand benefits for workers "to compensate them
fully for their losses," retain the industry-relief provisions of the original 1962 program, and create
a new set of benefits for entire communities facing concentrated losses and dislocations due to
trade competition. In both the lobbying and the testimony, UAW representatives made this
expanded trade adjustment assistance the price of their "acceptance" of the Administration's
proposed liberalization (Hearings 1973, p.857).
The UAW representatives, however, did not offer this position as a fait accompli, but
instead considered working with various House and Senate Committee members interested in
revising the bill. After pushing for the union's proposal, for instance, UAW director of legislation
John Beidler recognized and signalled that "the Members might not favor the level of adjustment
assistance that we propose but I think they would be interested in improving on the President's
proposal" (N.J. 7/28/73, p. 1097). And UAW officials also held out some hope that some of their
other trade and investment policy goals could make it into the legislation, including the MNC tax
33 It's worth pointing out, here, how similar this rhetoric is to UAW threats during the fight over the 1965 Auto
pact, during which UAW representatives threatened widespread protectionism unless adjustment assistance provisions
were liberalized.
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and out-going FDI reforms that they and their AFL-CIO colleagues could agree upon. With this
overlap in their trade policymaking agendas, John H.Beidler, the UAW's director of legislation
said "Except for the quota provisions, I see no bar to working closely with the AFL-CIO in all
matters before the committee on this legislation" (Ibid).
As the Administration's bill wound its way through the House and Senate, the UAW's
position moved toward the protectionist position, though always said that improved adjustment
assistance would moderate their stance. At Senate Hearings in March 1974, UAW President
Leonard Woodcock testified against the Administration's bill, and, for the first time, "for
temporary quotas on imported automobiles" (Senate Hearings 1974, pp.857-9; in Destler 1980,
p. 175). Woodcock was careful to explain that the UAW took these positions "because of what we
consider willfully inadequate provisions for adjustment" (Ibid.). The House ultimately changed
TAA, but not enough for the UAW: the House bill was "somewhat better than that proposed by
the Administration but still, in our opinion, extremely inadequate" (Ibid). After stating this stance,
however, Woodcock, Beidler, and other UAW officials continued to consult Senate Finance and
Administration officials to discuss further improvements in adjustment assistance. As we shall
see, the result was a completely different animal than what the Administration had proposed.
In short, the UAW supported, if tentatively, compensated liberalization, and it did so with a
relatively open-ended willingness to negotiate with the Administration and their labor colleagues.
In these ways, UAW's stance was the opposite of the AFL-CIO's -- rather than inflexible and
unconditional protectionism (single-issue platform), theirs was conciliatory and conditional upon
side payments (multi-issue platform).
1.4. The House and Senate: Compensated Liberalization, TAA-style
House and Senate legislators proved themselves to be as or more interested in compensated
liberalization as anyone, but they joined business groups and the UAW in rejecting the
Administration's brand of compensated liberalization, based on modest but general welfare and tax
reform, in favor of one based on expanded trade adjustment assistance. Although it took more
than a year for these legislators to rework the Administration's bill, at the end of 1974 Congress
passed and the Nixon Administration signed a compensated liberalization that helped to split to
some degree opposition from organized labor and to symbolically express concern for the human
costs. To some, the outcome of side payment politics in 1974 rekindled some of the hopes
established by Kennedy's 1962 compensated liberalization. It was a completely different game for
most societal groups engaged in trade policymaking, however, and the lack-luster political
effectiveness of adjustment assistance side payments made 1974 look to some eyes less like a
rebirth than like a "last hurrah" for compensated liberalization.
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Although the Administration sent its bill to Congress on April 10, 1973, it was not until
more than a year later, December 1974, that the House and Senate finished action on the
liberalization initiative. The numerous delays that underlay this snail's pace had less to do with
side payment politics or with struggle over the core liberalization authority than with conflicts over
the infamous Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Administration's proposal to extend Most-Favored
Nation status to the Soviet Union. That amendment conditioned extension of MFN status on
improvements and loosening in the Soviet Union's emigration policies, and was tenaciously
opposed by Kissinger and Nixon for fear that it would derail Det6nte. As a result, it was an
example of side payments but not compensatory side payments of concern here.34
During that same year, much of the struggle within the House and Senate involved the core
liberalization provisions in addition to MFN extension: the latitude of presidential authority to
reduce non-tariff barriers; tariff-cutting authority; unfair trade practice actions; and the generalized
system of preferences. Because our concern here is principally with compensatory side payment
politics, the nut-shell outcome is what matters. The president's request for negotiating authority
was substantially blunted in the House Ways and Means and in Senate Finance Committees.
Nonetheless, th. ' 11 delegated unprecedented negotiating authority to the president to reduce tariff
and non-tariff barriers and to extend preferential trade access to developing countries, and to
choose whether and how to retaliate against unfair trading practices. 35
1.4.1. Rejecting Welfare, Pension, and MNC Tax Side Payments
As for the side payment politics, the House and Senate legislative action unfolded in two
stages. The first was when the Administration announced and defended its package of side
payments involving welfare, pension, and MNC tax reform, the response in both the House and
Senate ranged from disinterest to hostility. After outlining the various provisions in its April 10th-
12th press briefings, the Administration sent to the Ways and Means Committee on May 7th drafts
of legislation for the unemployment and pension reforms and MNC tax wording for inclusion into
34 The Jackson-Vanik linkage of MFN trade liberalization to loosened emigration standards for Soviet jews is
clearly an example of a side payment during the Trade Reform politics, because it was a provision that was
considered to gain the support of the liberalization by some legislators and that was separate from the core
liberalization provisions.
This linkage, however, does not represent a side payment compensation for liberalization because it did not
attempt to use improved treatment of Soviet Jewry as a mechanism to help those likely to suffer from the
liberalization: the immediate beneficiaries of the linkage would not be noticeably more hurt by the increased trade
resulting from MFN status; those who care most about such Jewry, moreover, were not those disproportionately
vulnerable to the economic liberalization entailed by such status.
So even though the linkage meets the second defining characteristic of compensatory side payments -- that
the policy being linked or promised is distinct from the core liberalization provisions -- it clearly does not meet the
first -- that the policy be intended to help the victims of the proposed liberalization.
35 See Pastor 1980 and Destler 1980 for rich accounts of the details of these politics.
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the trade bill. The response was immediately negative. A high-ranking Republican member of the
Committee told the National Journal at the time that "The Administration can't find anybody to
introduce it. The Republican members are opposed to it. They feel that it is something they can't
support" (N.J. 6/9/3, p.829).
Their reasons for opposing the welfare and pension legislation, it turned out, were over-
determined. Most important, perhaps, was recognition of the opposition it provoked in the
business community. The same Republican official pointed out how "Businessman are very much
opposed to it. They feel that unemployment compensation has been a fairly effective system and
that it is not something that should be federalized" (NJ 6/9/3, p.829). He added that Republican
committee members "think [the proposed legislation] raises problems on how it's going to be
financed and it has been vigorously opposed by the Chamber of Commerce, which has vowed that
if it is introduced it will wage an all-out campaign against it" (ibid). But more general scheduling
considerations also made Committee members, even those favorably disposed to the idea of
welfare and pension reform as a side payment package, tepid to the Administration's proposal.
James W.Kelly, a staff assistant on the Committee, said that the already heavy schedule of
legislation involving proposed tax changes and foreign trade made it unlikely that it would act on
the welfare reform proposals: "I don't see unemployment compensation legislation coming up this
year. At least that's the present climate of affairs around here" (Ibid.). He added, however, that
"there doesn't seem to be much support for the Administration bill on the committee" (Ibid.).
In the Senate, the story was similar. Administration officials approached Senator Wallace
F.Bennett (R.-Utah), the senior-most Republican member of the Senate Finance Committee, to
introduce its unemployment bill. But Bennett was apparently "reluctant to do so because he does
not favor the bill" (Ibid).36 As it turned out, by the time the Senate actually took up the bill in late
1973, the welfare and unemployment reforms were not discussed except in the past tense.
The Administration's proposed MNC tax reform lasted somewhat longer through House
and Senate deliberations -- perhaps because it was to be attached as part of the trade legislation --
but it, too, never went far. Shortly before Mills dropped out of the proceedings because of his
back problem -- after the Committee completed its hearings on June 15th, but before mark-up -- the
committee decided to drop the tax proposals from consideration (N.J. 11/24/73, p.1752; see also
Pastor 1980 p. 156). The reasons were also similar to the unemployment insurance episode. As
Committee member Conable suggested, scheduling might have again been part of the concern: "We
felt that the tax issue would greatly protract our deliberations" (NJ 11/24/73, p.1752).
Much more important, however, was recognition of some developments in the labor and
business sides of side payment politics. As we have seen, Mills had been the main proponent for
36 It didn't help that there were other excuses not to pursue the legislation, such as breath-holding over Watergate
and the expectation that House Ways and Means had original jurisdiction over major welfare reform legislation.
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inclusion of some MNC tax reform in the first place, especially motivated by a desire to appease, if
only symbolically, the sentiments of organized labor. At the time the House Ways and Means
Committee was ready to begin mark-up, however, a number of pundits already believed that
organized labor was unwinnable and that improvements in the trade balance might make their
opposition unthreatening anyway (Destler 1980, Pastor 1980). Most importantly, however, Mills
and others on the Committee had heard the messages coming from the business community loud
and clear. That community had told the Committee in testimony and in press briefings how they
strongly opposed the MNC regulation, and had threatened to withdraw their support for the
liberalization if those regulations were included. With all these considerations, Mills withdrew.
As ECAT's Garcia told the National Journal, "because Mills felt that he had to have the support of
the business community in order to pass this trade bill, he decided that the best thing to do was to
defer taxes until the tax reform bill is taken up" (NJ 11/24/73, p. 1752).
The death of the Administration's package of side payments might have been expected to
spark some resistance, but none of the protectionist groups, no segment of organized labor, shed a
tear. But if not from those at whom the side payment package was targeted, surely resistance
should have sprung forth those devising the package. Indeed, referring to the Ways and Means
committee's early disinterest in and scuttling of the Administration's plan to replace the old
adjustment assistance program with welfare and pension reform, the National Journal said "the
Administration suffered its most resounding defeat..." (11/24/73, p.1748). Yet, Nixon officials
said very little. They were utterly silent on the decision to drop MNC tax reform, as befit their
lackluster interest and initiative in putting together the provisions for Ways and Means action in the
first place. But Shultz and other Administration officials were also surprisingly compliant with the
action against the welfare and pension package. The reason, of course, was that the motivation
behind the package was patently political, that a big part of that political motivation was shown to
be a failure, and that all the parties concerned -- societal liberalizers, protectionists and their
legislative champions -- had another package of side payments in mind.
1.4.2. Expanding Trade Adjustment Assistance: House and Senate One-upmanship
Having killed the Administration's side payment package before it ever got a full hearing,
House and Senate legislators followed the rest of the polity in calling for expanded adjustment
assistance as the alternative. After listening to literally months of testimony -- with witnesses
appearing against the Administration's package of safeguards, and consistently and unambiguously
in favor of improved adjustment assistance -- both the House of Representatives and the Senate
agreed without controversy to expand the existing adjustment assistance program. Deliberations
over adjustment assistance, in fact, went beyond controversy. Instead, legislators seemed to play a
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game of one-upsmandship by increasing benefits and loosening eligibility criteria at each stage in
the decisionmaking, over and above whatever their colleagues had offered at the previous stage --
the program ever growing in generosity as it made its way from the House Ways and Means
Committee, to the House floor, to the Senate Finance Committee, and finally to the Senate floor.
1.4.2.1. Trade Adjustment Assistance in the House
After 24 days of hearings, the House Ways and Means Committee began mark-up of the
Administration's bill, and from the beginning there was consensus that, whatever action was to be
taken on the Administration's side payment package, trade adjustment assistance needed to be
saved and expanded. Acting Chairman of the Committee Al Ullman said "it was the overwhelming
sentiment of the Committee" to save and expand adjustment assistance, "not knowing exactly
where we were going to wind up but knowing that we had to produce something good" (N.J.
11/24/73, p.1748; cited in Destler 1980, p.159).
The reasons for this "overwhelming sentiment" were, like the Committee's antipathy to the
Administration's side payment package, over-determined. In major trade legislation of the past six
years, the Ways and Means committee had consistently written into the bills it considered expanded
adjustment assistance and looser eligibility criteria -- following the leads of the executive, to be
sure, but always going beyond the Nixon and Johnson proposals. And they had actually gotten
the House to pass such expansion on behalf of the 1971 Nixon-Mills bill surrender. With
adjustment assistance a customary, maybe symbolic, component of trade policymaking, the
committee members were likely predisposed to stick with tradition. In recent months, moreover,
Rep.John Culver's Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee had been conducting hearings on adjustment assistance, and Culver and others had
written-up a series of recommendations for improving the program. These recommendations
became the basis for legislation to substantially expand trade adjustment assistance, sought
independent of the trade liberalization initiative. Pastor 1980 observed after talking to a number of
the principals that the Foreign Economic Policy Subcommittee's recommendations "were seriously
considered by the [Ways and Means] Committee" -- presumably as substantive ideas about how to
improve adjustment assistance for vulnerable constituents and as an indicator of sentiment among
House colleagues (Pastor 1980, p.155).
To this general interest in the program, the testimony and lobbying from a variety of
business and labor groups on both sides of the free trade aisle had pushed hard for expanded
adjustment assistance. As we have seen, the proponents included internationalist business
organizations, like the Emergency Committee, and the American Importer's Association, as well as
more "domestic oriented" National Association of Manufacturers. And most importantly, the
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United Auto Workers had made the centerpiece of their legislative action support for a particular
proposal to expand trade adjustment assistance "as the only way to withstand the pressures of
protectionism" (Ibid.). Beyond suggesting that improved adjustment assistance might actually buy
the UAW's support of a basically liberal authorization, the UAW's compensated liberalization
stance hinted at the possibility of splitting organized labor -- symbolically very important for those
legislators concerned about workers in their constituencies and/or beholden to labor's broader
policymaking agenda.
With this mix of motivations, Ullman and other Ways and Means Committee members
approached the Administration's representative in charge of the legislation, William Pearce, and
asked him to draw-up "a much-expanded program" (Destler 1980, p. 159). Pearce was in a
particularly good position to do so, having recently fought for, and lost, the battle within the
Administration to make substantial expansion of adjustment assistance a central feature of its
proposed bill. On the basis of the Kenneth Dam task force recommendations on adjustment
assistance and of the draft proposals for expanded TAA discussed in the bill-drafting, Pearce began
piecing-together a proposal that would hopefully meet the Committee's approval.
But first, Pearce had to meet Treasury Secretary and economic czar George Shultz's
approval, something not to be taken at all for granted given Shultz's by-then well known disregard
for trade adjustment assistance. To ease the transition from Shultz's compensation package to the
one Pearce had preferred all along, Pearce asked Acting Ways and Means Chairman Ullman to
speak to Shultz to explain the Committee's position (Destler 1980, p. 159). Ullman consented and
asked Shultz to appear before the Committee "to inform him that it decided tentatively to retain
adjustment assistance as a separate federal program and to increase its benefits to jobless workers"
(N.J. 11/24/73, pp.1748-9). At this point, before any detailed adjustment assistance expansion
had been drafted by Pearce and others, Shultz relented, agreeing "reluctantly to an expanded
adjustment assistance program if the cost were held below $500 million" (Destler 1980, p.159).
Pearce, in consultation with other Administration officials and with the House Committee,
came up with a proposal for expanded trade adjustment assistance that would increase benefits,
further loosen eligibility, and cost roughly $350 million. The Committee accepted the proposals as
drafts, and floated the provisions to various House and Administration members, especially
Shultz. According to the National Journal at the time, Shultz said the committee proposals were
acceptable, "except for the absence of some self-financing provision" (N.J. 11/24/73, pp. 1748-9).
One of Shultz's misgivings with the program, remember, was that he thought it too expensive and
potentially explosive to a budget. As an official most responsible for the budget, he had urged
during bill-drafting and at this later Committee stage that the federal government should not pay for
any supplemental unemployment insurance on its own and with undisclosed funds.
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Instead, Shultz gave a counter-proposal mandating the federal government to pay only its
share above the standard state benefits, and with a specified increase in the federal payroll tax that
employers pay at the state level (Ibid). The committee rejected this recommendation, and the
Treasury Secretary in turn rejected a proposal by Ullman "to pay for the program with a small
import surcharge" (Ibid). Finally, the committee settled upon a proposal that it knew would not
fully satisfy Shultz and other Administration officials, but that it hoped would survive the House
and possibly the Senate.
At the end of some 37 days of mark-up, the Ways and Means Committee settled on TAA
provisions with substantially looser eligibility criteria, increased benefits for workers, and retained
provisions for firms. As for eligibility criteria, the Committee went one step beyond the
Administration's already substantial loosening of the standard petitioning workers and firms would
have to meet in order to get adjustment assistance relief. Where the Administration had proposed
that petitioners need not show a link between tariff concessions and increased imports, and that
increased imports be "a substantial cause" of real or threatened injury (i.e. no less than any other
single cause), the Committee bill required only that increased imports be "an important cause" of
real or threatened injury.37 More significantly, perhaps, the Ways and Means bill went beyond the
Administration's by taking decisionmaking authority for petitions away from the Tariff
Commission and giving it directly to the Labor Department for worker petitions and to Commerce
for firm petitions (CQ Almanac 1973).
As for increased benefits and the rest of the expansion, the most important change over the
status quo ante and the Administration's proposal was that weekly payments to eligible workers
"would be pegged at 70 percent of the worker's average weekly wage for up to 26 weeks and 65
percent for the next 26 weeks, up to a maximum of 100 percent of the average national weekly
wage" (NJ 11/24/73, p. 1749). The existing 1962 benefits were set at 65 percent of the worker's
average weekly wage up to 65 percent of the average weekly manufacturing wage. According to
the Ways and Means estimates, the new formula "would increase the maximum payment from an
estimated $111 to $170 a week" (Ibid). As in the current law, moreover, the committee's
assistance would provide benefits for longer periods for older workers and for those enrolled in
training programs. And they would continue to provide placement and training services, and job
search and relocation grants. Finally, the committee also followed the suggestions of many
lobbying groups and agreed to keep the assistance for firms, though they dropped the tax break
offered to eligible firms since "it has been found to be of little help" (NJ 11/24/73, p. 1749).
37 "Important" was understood to be "important but not necessarily more important than any other cause" (Mitchell
1976,p.42). And "injury" was taken to mean: "(1) an absolute decline in sales, production, or both, in a firm or
subdivision; and (2) actual or threatened total or partial layoffs of a significant number of proportion of the workers"
(OTA 1979, p.22).
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This proposed expansion in the program, combined with the lower eligibility standards,
was expected to raise first year costs of TAA to about $350 million: for workers, Department of
Labor officials estimated costs of about $320 million, or $300 million above costs of the existing
program; for firms, the committee and the Commerce Department "agreed on an estimate of about
$25 million in the first full year" (Ibid). This budget would be paid for with a kind of trust fund
financed entirely from customs receipts not otherwise appropriated. Since the receipts would
continue to go into the general Treasury and since there would be "no legal earmarking of money
for the adjustment aid program," this financing mechanism was not a true trust fund. In any event,
the provision was the committee's final attempt to appease Shultz. As Rep.Sam Gibbons (D.-Fla.)
said, "the trust fund was a bow to Shultz" (Ibid). But committee members still expected the
Administration to find some "true self-financing as the bill moves through the Senate" (Ibid.).
When Ullman finally sent the Committee's bill to the House floor on October 3rd, after the
Jackson-Vanik delays, all its elements survived without incident, including the adjustment
assistance compensation. On December 10th, the House began debate on the bill under a
"modified closed rule" which permitted consideration of three amendments proposed by Ways and
Means members: the Vanik amendment, the entire Title IV clause on most-favored nation
extension, and Title V on the Generalized System of Preferences. The rule had been opposed by
the AFL-CIO and its defeat would probably have caused Ullman and the Ways and Means
representatives to withdraw their bill.38 Having passed, debate was limited to seven hours. With
the adjustment assistance provisions explicitly in mind, Ullman told the floor that the trade bill was
"needed to assure job opportunities for American workers" (Pastor, p. 156, Congressional Record,
12/10/73, p.40501). Beyond symbolic plugs such as this, the side payment package received no
attention, and both that and the other provisions (including the Vanik amendment) made it passed
the amendment votes. The House passed the bill on December 11, 1973, by 272-140 (CQ
Almanac 1973, p.8 33 and p. 148-H). The strong majority of Northern Democrats, the traditional
allies of organized labor, followed the AFL-CIO's requested opposition by voting against passage,
52-101 (Ibid). But among the rest of their House colleagues, they were very much in the minority.
1.4.2.2. More Trade Adjustment Assistance in the Senate
When the Senate finally acted in earnest on the trade bill, after nearly a year of delays
caused by the Jackson-Vank imbroglio, the Administration's welfare, pension and tax side
payment package was long dead, and adjustment assistance very much on the rise. The political
38 Significantly, Northern Democrats, traditionally close with organized labor, voted along with the AFL-CIO's
request by a wide margin, 39-103, even though the closed rule passed by 230-147 in the entire House. See CQ
Almanac 1973, p.148-H, and Destler 1980, p.167.
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pressure to expand adjustment assistance beyond the House, moreover, was strong. The general
pressure for passage of the liberalization was increasing, since the Nixon-Ford Administration had
already begun negotiating the Tokyo Round of GATT ("Nixon Round" was one of the last
casualties of Watergate). European and Japanese negotiators in those deliberations were very
worried that the president's authority wouldn't be forthcoming and were, as a consequence,
unwilling to make and accept off-setting concessions (N.J. 7/13/74, p. 1038-40).
At the same time, in the intervening year the trade balance had again dipped into deficit, by
November reaching the second highest deficit on record. Through the end of 1973, moreover, the
first oil crisis was aflame in the wake of the Yom Kippur war. This unprecedented supply crisis
fueled protectionist fires at home and put increasing pressure on legislators, at least as perceived by
Senators, to respond with more punitive trade authority. In the face of these developments,
Senators still wanted to minimize exemptions from the liberalization for fear of unleashing the
statutory protectionism all liberalizers had grown to fear as a slippery-slope. 39 They, thus, felt
greater need to provide some kinds of policy benefits outside of the core liberalization authority to
defuse the general opposition. And adjustment assistance was the only game in town.
More focused demands from societal groups, moreover, compounded the pressure to
expand adjustment assistance beyond the House's generosity. Business groups, as "protectionist
watchers," continued lobbying for reform of such assistance. Much more importantly, the United
Auto Workers, still explicitly committed to their compensated liberalization mantle, sharply
criticized the House-passed bill in both hearings and extra-legislative lobbying, singling out the
inadequacy of its adjustment assistance measures. Since a particular set of proposals for expanded
adjustment assistance were the center of this attack, the Senate clearly needed to do something
more with such assistance, if not to appease UAW and thereby split organized labor then to
appease the less focused, grumbling masses by showing sensitivity to that set of proposals.
During the Senate Finance Committee deliberations, three Senators were particularly
responsive to these kinds of pressures: Lloyd Benison (D.-Ex), Walter F.Mondale (D.-Minn.),
and Gaylord Nelson (D.-Wisc.). All three Committee members lobbied for substantially increased
adjustment assistance levels and new programs, including some of those provisions explicitly
singled out by the UAW (N.J. 10/5/73, p.1492). Their main opponents were not so much those
skeptical with or opposed to expanded adjustment assistance, but those who wanted to make the
program fit within their own and the Administration's budget targets. Most important of these
latter players was William V. Roth Jr. (R.-DeJ). By the end of the deliberations, the "dovish"
39 One of those few "exemptions" involved refusing Generalized System of Preferences liberalization to any
members of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), any country expropriating US property
without adequate compensation, and any country not adequately narcotics exports (e.g. Turkey). See CQ Almanac
1974, p. 5 5 7.
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proposals were somewhat toned down in scale, but a substantially more generous adjustment
assistance emerged and were unanimously supported (17-0) in the Committee's final vote.
This generosity involved very modest tightening in eligibility requirements, compensated
for by higher benefit levels and new programs. As for eligibility, the Committee accepted the
House bill's "contributed importantly" language, but directed that such language should be
implemented "by basing the test on an absolute rise in imports rather than a relative increase" (N.J.
10/5/74, p. 1492). More significantly, the Committee expanded the Trade Readjustment
Allowances that eligible workers to receive to be 70 percent of their average weekly earnings, up to
100 percent of the national average weekly wage -- all for up to 52 weeks, not just the first 26
weeks followed by 65 percent for the next 26 as the House had authorized. This was expected to
raise the upper limit from the House-approved $170 per week to $180 per week (CQ Almanac
1974, p.557). In addition to these benefit expansions for workers, the Committee also stuck with
the existing training and relocation benefits and with the benefit program for dislocated firms.
Most importantly, the Senate Finance Committee approved a category of trade adjustment
assistance that the United Auto Workers had demanded: assistance to trade-impacted regions. With
an explicit nod to the UAW platform as expressed in its months of lobbying and testimony, the
new program was aimed at creating new jobs in communities heavily dependent on industries
adversely affected by increased imports. The committee agreed in its report that "the past
philosophy of helping workers relocate was not effective because workers were not as mobile as
had been previously believed" (CQ Almanac 1974, p.557). Instead of relocating, the committee
continued, workers generally continued to live in the "depressed areas from which most industry
has disappeared" (Ibid). Thus, "what was needed more than increased worker benefits was a
program to restore the economic viability of depressed communities" (Ibid). The program the
committee had in mind would provid technical assistance, direct grants, loans and loan guarantees
to eligible communities. This assistance would be geared toward attracting new industries into the
trade-impacted region. The first year of the five-year program was to cost $100 million, and
would be authorize for loans and direct grants and up to $1 billion in loan guarantees.
If Mondale, Nelson, and Bentsen essentially got their way with the new benefits and
programs, Senator Roth and the Administration got theirs with the financing -- having the largest
implication in budget terms of all the Senate's changes. At Shultz's consistent urging and with
Roth's politicking within the Finance Committee, the Senate group rejected the House-passed
financing scheme that would have the federal government pay the entire adjustment assistance bill
out of customs receipts and general revenues. Instead, the Committee agreed that the Feds would
only pay the costs beyond those that states already paid to provide unemployment insurance, and
that the money would come from payroll taxes levied on employers rather than from general
taxpayer or import duty revenues. In other words, Shultz got his financing scheme, and
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corporations were to foot the bill. Having been talked into the overall compromise by Roth,
Senator Nelson praised the financing provisions by saying "it makes good sense" to get employers
to shoulder the burden, because to do otherwise would "encourage employees to consider layoffs
of workers as a response to problems of increased import competition" (ibid).
On the other hand, the various benefit increases, looser eligibility, and community
adjustment assistance that the Committee accepted meant that the overall program was substantially
more expensive and that the federal share of the burden was the roughly the same it would have
been under the House Act. The whole program was expected to cost about $435 million a year,
compared to the roughly $350 million House program, and the share of this total cost to be bone
by the federal payroll taxes was $335 ($100 million by the states) (N.J. 10/5/74, p.1492). With
these kinds of costs and with ambiguity in the actual program costs in the future, the Senate
Committee agreed that the programs would expire in 1980 unless Congress decided otherwise (CQ
Almanac 1974, p.557).
In a move that added a distinct side payment to its adjustment assistance package, finally,
the Senate Committee added a final plant closure provision during its discussions over the
program. The Senate set new guidelines for companies closing a plant in this country and
relocating abroad. These included the requirement that companies planning to relocate give at least
60 days advance notice to workers being laid off, and to the Labor and Commerce Departments.
They guidelines also required companies to offer other employment to the workers and assistance
in relocating, and to help their employees get all adjustment assistance and other kinds of
government benefits to which their employees are entitled (Ibid).
Long's Finance Committee sent its re-written bill with a fattened package of side payments
to the Senate floor on November 26th (as HR 10710). Compared to the House, there was a lot
more action on the Senate floor, with its many fewer constraints on amendment activity by
members.40 There would likely have been many fewer such constraints, and consequently many
more protectionist and other amendments, were it not for an unusual cloture rule proposed by
acting majority leader Robert C.Byrd (D.-W.Va.). Byrd and others wanted to get this rule before
the liberal integrity of the bill could be sabotaged by "complicated but popular non-germane
amendments" (ibid, p.558). Among these were several that Senators had threatened to propose or
were rumored to propose, including some dealing with natural gas deregulation and income tax
changes. Some, though not all of these, would have constituted compensatory side payments. 41
40 The rule invoked Rule 22 of the Senate's Standing Rules, according to which non-germane amendments may be
ruled out of order, but it did so before any filibuster action on the trade bill rather than after, as was the customary
use of the Rule 22 "cloture" rule (Ibid, p.558).
41 The most important of the latter would have been a series of amendments that Senator Hartke, of Burke-Hartke
fame, planned on multinational corporation taxation. Byrd's cloture rule passed the Senate by a vote 71-19. It was
opposed by, among others, Hartke, fearing his series would fall victim to the rule. To Hartke's chagrin, alas, Byrd
ruled the MNC tax provisions "not germane"; Hartke protested that his amendments, while not strictly germane,
273
Burgoon
Chapter Four
Despite the rule, there were still plenty more amendments considered and passed by the
Senate than the House. Some called for significant revisions of the bill, and others for exemptions
from the reach of the liberalization for some industrial groups. Of the former, the most important
was an amendment offered by Thomas J.Mclntyre (D.-N.H.), significantly restricting liberalizing
authority. It provided that if imports of an article also produced in the US reaches 33 1/3 percent
of the domestic consumption of the item for three of the past five years, the president could not
lower import restrictions on that article unless he determined the reduction would not hurt the
domestic industry (Ibid., p.559). In one of only two roll call votes (the Jackson-Vanik amendment
was the other), the Senate rejected by 35-49 this revision.42 Of the industry exemptions proposed
as germane amendments, several passed by voice vote, including John Pastore's (D.- R.I.)
exclusion of textile, apparel, watches, footwear and a series of other import-sensitive articles from
duty-free treatment (Ibid., p.560).
As for side payments among the amendments, one was a shadow of the MNC investment
provisions Hartke had hoped for. It was proposed by Senator Church, and was simply
informational. It required the secretaries of commerce and labor "to monitor imports and to collect
information on the operations of multinational corporations and their foreign affiliates, including
the amount of foreign investment by product line, their gross sales by product line, employment
data on foreign employees, research and development expenditures," etc (Ibid, p.560).
More significant, and politically revealing, side payment amendments proposed on the floor
were those that expanded yet further the adjustment assistance provisions. One was introduced
Thomas McIntyre, whose protectionist revision had recently been voted down. Fresh from that
defeat, McIntyre got the floor to approve by voice an increase in the levels of adjustment assistance
provided to workers -- from 70 percent to 75 percent of a worker's weekly wage.43 Another
amendment by Finance Chairman Long authorized the Secretary of Commerce to guarantee loans
used for plant facilities in the community assistance program his committee had just set up.
And acting majority leader Robert Byrd weighed in with his own modest expansion. He
got the Senate to approve allowing workers adversely affected by imports to apply for relocation
allowances after, not just before, moving, and by permitting them to apply for job search
allowances "for a reasonable period after completing job training," rather than the one-year limit in
the bill. It is worth emphasizing that Byrd was the one most behind the cloture rule, cutting off
some protectionist and side-payment amendments which could have so threatened the liberalizers.
Is it a coincidence that he also thought adjustment assistance needed modest expansion? Maybe.
were relevant to the trade bill and should be considered; and the matter went no further (Ibid).
42 Another rejected amendment for protectionist revision was offered by Hartke, calling for repeal of the tariff code
loophole that allowed manufactured items "assembled or processed abroad and reimported into the U.S." to enter duty
free. This provision was rejected by voice vote. See CQ Almanac 1974, p. 560.
43 To get the amendment through, he actually lowered his initial proposal to raise the benefit level to 80 percent.
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But more likely the same Senate leader who closes down his chamber to the cries of protectionist
groups has to cover his hide by at least signaling his support for, and maybe acting to expand, the
only high-profile program to provide safeguards to the victims of liberalization.
With exemptions and revisions held to a minimum, and TAA side payments further
expanded, the Senate overwhelmingly approved, 77-4, the Nixon-Ford liberalization bill. Among
the four dissenters was Vance Hartke, who lamented that the bill "endorses the same type of
unchanged policies which have been a failure in the past," including the "export" of US jobs,
capital and technology, among nine short-comings (CQ Almanac 1974, p.558).
The House and Senate conference reconciliation introduced very modest changes to the side
payment package, most of which again expanded the adjustment assistance provisions. The
conferees reigned-in somewhat the plant closure side payment provision that the Senate Finance
Committee had introduced and the Senate had passed. They agreed that "runaway" firms closing
plants in this country and relocating abroad were advised, not required, to offer alternative
employment, assist in employee relocation, and to apply for and use all adjustment assistance their
workers were entitled. On the adjustment assistance provisions, the conferees generally approved
the more generous Senate version of the bill, including the Senate financing facility, the new
adjustment assistance for communities, and higher benefit levels to eligible workers at 70 percent
of their average wage for 52 weeks (keeping the Senate Finance Committee version and dropping
McIntyre's 75 percent). In so far as the House adjustment assistance provisions prevailed over
Senate language, it entailed looser eligibility for dislocated workers and firms: the conferees
dropped Senate eligibility language requiring petitioners to show absolute, not just relative,
increase in imports; they stuck with the looser, relative increase, standard. And the conferees
agreed to go beyond the Senate's initial 1980 life span of the program, and to instead extend
adjustment assistance through September 30, 1982 (CQ Almanac 1974, p.561).
1.5. Explaining and Evaluating the Baroque Side Payment Politics of the Trade Reform Act
The history of the Trade Reform Act of 1974 provides rich ground for testing a theory of
compensated liberalization because it encompassed several packages of side payments, all of
whose politics were interconnected. The trade adjustment assistance that ultimately became the
main side payment actually provided was already a fixture of US commercial policymaking. But
the Administration's package, offered but immediately rebuffed and never enacted, was a kind of
side payment hitherto unknown in the history of US commercial policymaking. It sought to off-set
the costs of a proposed liberalization by publicly replacing this traditional trade adjustment
assistance package with an alternative that they claimed would be more equitable and efficient.
Moreover, this alternative sought to reform general welfare, pension, and tax policies, all of which
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were directed at victims of liberalization but involved preexisting policies contested in other arenas
and by players with marginal interest in commercial policy. The welfare and pension reforms,
finally, were proposed as separate legislation, to be developed along-side -- likely subsequent to --
me trade liberalization.
More than previous side payments, the offer and provision of these two packages of side
payments was intertwined with their respective political effectiveness. The Administration's
rejection of adjustment assistance was a response, in part, to its shaky past political effectiveness
and to consequent doubts that it could be politically effective in the future. Their alternative side
payment offer to reform welfare and pension reform in separate legislation, and to attach to the
trade liberalization modest reform of MNC tax shelters, was roundly rejected by virtually all
players within state and society. Business groups, all segments of organized labor, and virtually
all legislators to take a stand, saw the policies as patently unacceptable. So the Administration was
easily convinced that its side payment package needed to be dumped.
Ironically, this rejection came along with, indeed out of, outcry against the "virtual repeal"
of trade adjustment assistance -- the traditional but seemingly moribund object of side payment
linkage. In the maneuvering that followed, in fact, the side payment became ratcheted-upward in
its scale, scope, and generosity as legislators fell over eachother to defend trade adjustment
assistance. What are we to make of such an odd tale of side payment politics? What explains the
provision of these side payments? Why, in particular, was one ultimately provided and the other
not, when in fact the aggregate societal benefits of the Administration's initial offer were
significantly greater than the more narrow adjustment assistance benefits?
The theory of compensated liberalization helps us find answers to these questions. First,
consider the origins of the respective side payment packages. The theory predicts provision of side
payments as a consequence of purely political maneuvering, rather than altruistic norms of
fairness. In this case, the political conditions were ripe while the normative ones were not, and the
side payment politics were, at their motivational core, very much about buying opposition and not
at all about mitigating harm for its own sake. Everything the Administration did was "by the book"
of the political logic of the power-platform theory. The Nixon Administration and free-market
Republicans revealed themselves in their statements on TAA to be relatively unconcerned for the
special problems faced by victims of increasing exposure to international markets. Shultz, Nixon,
and the Commerce and OMB officials expressed the least concern, but STR, Labor, and State
Department officials justified and pushed for alternative side payment packages always on political,
not normative, grounds. Others in the liberalizer coalition on whom the Administration depended,
such as some congressional legislators, certainly said and acted during the 1973-4 episode and
earlier, as though the normative motivations were strong. But they, too, were doing what was
politically expedient.
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As political maneuverers, however, the Nixon Administration ran with the best of them,
and in fact proved themselves to be more adept at side payment politics than any of their
predecessors. They were mindful of the various political costs and benefits of a variety of options
for dealing with opposition to their preferred economic liberalization -- and, of course, the
liberalization itself was a reflection of similar macro political economic considerations. They
learned the lessons of the previous commercial policy frustrations well: don't provide statutory
relief to particular industries, or prepare yourself for the slippery-slope of a legislative logroll that
defeats the core liberalization you seek. They knew to provide plenty of exemptions outside of that
constraint when groups exhibit single-minded, protectionist trade policymaking agendas -- the
VERs for textiles and steel. And they knew to build plenty of room for revision in their initial
request for negotiating authority.
Most importantly for the purposes of this study, the Administration also proved savvy and
flexible in their side payment politics. Intra-administration deliberations explicitly traded off
adjustment assistance and other side payment packages according to their relative political merits --
not just the merits and demerits of the respective packages in buying off opposition to trade
liberalization, but also in trying to put together political compromises that would not only buy off
that opposition but would also tie up some legislative loose ends in the process. More importantly,
they were very flexible in the side payments they offered and considered. When their initial side
payment package fell flat from the get-go, Shultz and others were perfectly willing to consider the
trade adjustment assistance alternative that liberalizer and protectionist groups thrust their way.
They had given the program up for dead -- substantively and politically -- but found out that they
had done so prematurely. So they, especially Shultz, accepted the miscalculation and sought to
ensure that the TAA met broader budgetary guidelines while still bringing reasonable political
benefits. In short, one can criticize the Administration for not caring enough to push through more
ambitious trade adjustment assistance reform or through some other initiative, but their political
acumen finds its measure in the basic result: broad-reaching liberalization authority, accompanied
by a relatively inexpensive side payment package.
Not surprising, then, the offer of both the Shultz package and the adjustment assistance
reforms as side payments were consistent with the main "political logic" predictors of the provision
of side payments -- the coincidence of sufficient, relative political power and of at least moderately
multi-issue platforms. The Shultz package included provisions that correlated with some of the
platforms of organized labor, especially the MNC tax reform as a nod to labor's support for Burke-
Hartke package. The Administration's general policy commitments were also important to the
offer of welfare and pension reform as side payments. But in this case the side payments resulting
from the Administration's loose ends were very distasteful to members of the liberalizer coalition
and imposed significant third-party costs -- possibly making the linkable provisions neither
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narrowly or broadly pareto improving. These qualities likely explain why the welfare-MNC side
payments weren't provided in the end, leaving aside their hostile reception among protectionists.
We can capture the bargaining dynamics of the Schultz and the TAA side payment packages
by comparing the respective indifference curves they inspired by liberalizer and protectionist
coalitions in Figure 4. 1. L(a) represents the willingness of liberalizer coalitions, particularly
legislative and business representatives rather than the Schultz and the Nixon Administration (or,
we can imagine an averaging of their respective preferences). Although some in the Administration
thought the compensation package of MNC tax and welfare reform was worth trading for
liberalization, most others in the coalition saw MNC taxes and, to a lesser extent, the welfare
reform, as too costly to trade-off against liberalization, preferring to risk compromised
liberalization and hope for uncompensated liberalization. Such a preference is captured by a very
Figure 4.1
Willingness to Exchange Lower Trade Protection for
MNC Tax and Welfare Reform Compensation vs. TAA Compensation
Trade
Protection
L
fare)
kA)
Compensation (MNC/Welfare Vs. TAA)
steep indifference curve L(a). Most of organized labor, particularly the AFL-CIO, saw MNC and
welfare reform linkage as far too little compensation for the liberalization they faced, hence their
indifference curve on the Schultz compensation and trade protection is relatively flat, as with P(a).
When it came to the TAA compensation alternative, both liberalizers and protectionist
coalitions were more favorably disposed to the potential linkage. Business and legislative
liberalizers, not to mention many in the Nixon Administration, were willing to significantly expand
TAA in exchange for lower trade protection -- hence a significantly flatter L(b). They were willing
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to do so partly because of hope of buy off actively bargaining protectionists, but also because of
the symbolic role TAA might play in buying off constituency skepticism or because of concern for
fairness. Some protectionists, meanwhile, still saw hope in TAA as a reasonable safeguard against
the dislocation from imports, yielding curve P(b). The UAW was a strong adherent of this
position, but the AFL-CIO continued to tow their unconditional protectionist line, so their
participation flattened the curve more than would have been true in their absence.44 The result of
these respective positions, once TAA was on the agenda as a subject of side payment linkage, there
was a zone of possible agreement involving exchange of expanded TAA for lower protection. This
encouraged movement from the status quo mix of protection and compensation at point t' to a post-
negotiation point t" within the pareto space: Liberalize s at every veto point in legislative
deliberations over the Trade Reform Act liberalizatior, offered expansionary reforms to TAA.
The power and platform conditions of various protectionists and the predicted incidence of
compensated vs. compromised or uncompensated liberalization can be roughly captured by the
power-platform matrix in Figure 4.2 below. The power and platforms of the various protectionist
groups had changed little ,etween 1970 and 1973-4, so the positions and predictions are similar to
those summarized in Chapter Three's Figure 3.3. Thus, several groups combined high power and
single issue platforms, predicting the provision of protectionist exemption or revision. Some
agricultural groups hitherto agitating for protectionist exemptions, such as wheat producers, began
to see more virtues in access to export markets, shedding off some of the groups in the agricultural
protectionist camp, in turn constituting modest diminution in the power-resources of that camp.
Several other industrial groups combined more noticeably low power resources with single-issue
platforms, predicting uncompensated liberalization. And only the UAW's continued and explicitly
compensated liberalization platform predicts some compensation, involving TAA. In general, the
overall protectionist coalition's power-platform position predicts significantly more compromised
liberalization than compensated liberalization -- a prediction that broadly obtained in the second half
of the 1960s.
Here, however, the history is not quite so cooperative. Consistent with the theory's
general expectations, steel and textiles continued to receive VER and other non-tariff exemption.
Also, shoes/leather, clay, watches and other smaller protectionist groups received substantially less
protectionist redress than their more powerful coalition partners. And of course, the UAW's
positioning may have played a significant role in inspiring the expanded TAA offered to off-set the
costs and risks of the Trade Reform Act's liberalization. But some details and a few important
specifics are not as consistent with the theory. First, some of the groups with low power
44 But even they strongly protested any plan to gut TAA, suggesting that their opposition with TAA compensation
was somewhat less severe or determined than it would have been were there to have been no such assistance --
implying that their actual indifference curve was, as it were, steeper and accomodating of some pareto-improving
exchange than they explicitly let on.
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resources and single-issue positioning received some protectionist revision, through the Senate-
passed amendment exempting them and several more powerful groups (e.g. textiles/steel) from
duty-free treatment. Second and more importantly, the overall positioning of the protectionist
coalition suggests that there should have been more compromised liberalization than actually
emerged from the bargaining.
Third and most importantly, the power-platform of the UAW and other groups does not
predict the extent to which TAA compensation entered into the bargaining between various
protectionist and liberalizer forces. To be sure, the UAW's position invited compensation to split
organized labor as an otherwise monolithic interest groups. But the degree and detail of the
compensation suggests that other forces beyond the positioning of the protectionists was at work --
especially belief in the symbolic value of adjustment assistance for public opinion as well as
practice of fairness norms, both of which found expression in changing the slope of the liberalizer
indifference curves in Figure 4.1.
What can be said of the usefulness of the TAA compensation in humanizing and facilitating
freer trade? In the short term, the program appeared to fulfill all of the promise of the original 1962
TAA, only with the hope of better implementation given stronger adjustment incentives, aid to
communities, and looser eligibility criteria. And the effectiveness of the various side payments --
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both the MNC/Welfare reformnn in the Schultz package and the subsequent TAA -- in lowering
opposition is a mixed story. Of course, the Schultz package proved to be virtually useless in
lowering opposition, which led to its abandonment. The TAA program fared somewhat better,
though not discernibly better than the proposed TAA expansions during the failed liberalization
episodes of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Virtually all of organized labor and their closest
legislative supporters came out against the legislation, though very much to different degrees and
for different stated reasons. It also modestly softened opposition from some segments of
organized labor, especially the United Auto Workers -- though some UAW representatives didn't
admit it. And it may well have done the same with the AFL-CIO, especially if one considers the
counter-factual of what the Federation's protectionist actions would have been were the TAA to
have been gutted as the Administration originally proposed. Finally, TAA may have consolidated
some support from border-line legislators believing that the TAA was a symbol of government
concern for the victims of societally beneficial liberalization, a symbol that would protect them
from the wrath of confused but angry constituents.
In light of the history, the theory and this very brief evaluation, the 1974 case also holds
some important lessons for protectionist and liberalizer bargaining strategy. First and most
importantly, the AFL-CIO messed up by being so intransigent and unconditionally protectionism.
They could have gotten much more had they been willing to play ball. This criticism needs to be
qualified by its positioning in a broader issue about the propriety of bargaining or taking a stand:
was Labor making a responsible gamble in taking a moral stand on trade liberalization, an
unconditional and uncompromising rejection of the Trade Act's entire package -- basic tariff and
non-tariff barrier reductions and all side payment riders? We will revisit this question in Chapter
Eight, the Conclusion, because it comes up in subsequent cases, and because the answer depends
on a longer sweep of history than is revealed by the months or years of this episode. With the
information available and within the limits of this particular case, however, there seems little doubt
that labor could have gotten more of what it needed had it stayed engaged and considered and
offered revisions or alternatives to the side payment packages proposed.
On the other hand, the Administration and the liberalizers may well have also messed up by
not making the adjustment assistance more ambitious to meet the demands of those elements of
organized labor still barely holding on to their multi-issue platform commitments. Had they done
more to expand the program, or at least done more to show a commitment to listening to the UAW
suggestions, perhaps the UAW would be a more secure guardian for humane but efficient market
liberalization. As we shall see later, this was not to be.
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2. The Tokyo Round and the Wine Gallon Dispute: Compensated Liberalization on the Fly
Passage of the 197.4 Trade Reform Act cleared the way for the Tokyo Round GATT
negotiations to begin in earnest -- as they had been stalled absent the authority of US negotiators to
make credible non-tariff and tariff concessions. As the negotiations unfolded over the course of
the next four years, they sparked many of the same distributional politics that had been raised by
the legislative fights over the Trade Reform Act's extension of presidential negotiating authority.
In this way the Tokyo Round was similar to the Kennedy Round negotiations, which had also
raised plenty of domestic strife after the Trade Expansion Act had been passed but before the final
agreement was reached in 1968. As Chapter Three laid out, however, the domestic distributional
struggles that took place during the Kennedy Round international negotiation, like previous GATT
phases of liberalization, played themselves out very differently than the domestic, legislative
phases of those struggles: they didn't generate compensatory side payments.
The Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations stands in stark contrast to this pattern, because it
provides a case of an international phase of trade liberalization giving rise to side payments. The
event, in this case, was the provision of side payments during the so-called Wine Gallon dispute at
the end of the Tokyo Round negotiations. That dispute involved removal of the US wine gallon
tax on distilled liquors in exchange for a wide range of agricultural liberalization concessions by the
EC, and its resolution was critical to the overall completion and US legislative ratification of the
Tokyo Round's liberalization. For that reason, the wine gallon dispute has been widely regarded
as the US's biggest "bargaining chip," the "linchpin," of the Tokyo Round (Winham 1986, p.280;
Ways and Means Hearings 1979, p.284). In the history of compensated liberalization, the dispute
stands out because it was an international phase of debate resolved through compensation to the
US domestic distilling industry to off-set the pain of removing the favorable tax.
The Tokyo Round, and the wine gallon dispute in particular, has already been carefully and
intelligently studied by a number of historians and political scientists. Among these, Gilbert
Winham's 1986 study stands out, providing a history of the international and domestic politics of
the wine gallon episode. More on point, perhaps, the episode has also been explicitly analyzed as
a case of side payments by H.Richard Friman, in one of the few attempts to empirically study and
explain side payments in international political economy (Friman 1993). With such historical
attention devoted to the case, self-consciously interested in the provision of side payments, it might
seem unnecessary to provide another history.
But at least some review of the case is still necessary, because both the historical and
theoretical accounts do not take on a critical puzzle raised by the wine gallon episode: why were
there side payments in this international phase of US trade liberalization and not others? The
Winham history, for instance, leaves out details of this thesis' study of side payment politics
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reveals to be important -- such as the role of side payments among a variety of other bargaining
tactics available to liberalizers. The Friman account, moreover, explains the provision of the wine
gallon side payments as reflecting the modesty of US domestic opposition to the use of side
payments to the distilling industry. As we will see, such conditions certainly mattered. But why
were side payments considered in the first place when previous international phases of
liberalization relied on other tactics to defuse with domestic opposition? The account below
answers this previously unanswered question.
2.1. Removing the Wine Gallon Tax in a Two-level Game
If the wine gallon dispute was the linchpin undergirding the final Tokyo Round
liberalizations, it was not so by design as much as by circumstance -- a series of interlocking
"small decisions" (Sabel and Zeitlin 1985). The wine gallon tax had a long history in the GATT
negotiations, with several governments calling for its removal, and this gave the liberalization of
the tax real potential as a bargaining chip for prying loose concessions in the Tokyo Round. As
that Round evolved, the negotiations evolved in such a way that US negotiators viewed elimination
of the tax as absolutely central to the fragile web of bargains underlying the final Tokyo Round
Agreement. The proposed liberalization, however, unleashed a series of maneuvers by US
industry, international negotiators, and foreign industry and agricultural groups that ultimately gave
rise to side payments. In short, the motivation and consequences of the side payment politics of
this case was much more an interaction of domestic and international levels of political struggle -- a
two level game -- than compensated liberalization struggles of the previous cases.
The offending non-tariff barrier at the center of this case was the wine gallon tax, which
was a particular tax valuation procedure that discriminated against foreign liquor distillers.4 5 This
45 The reason the tax was discriminatory is actually unclear in Winham's account. At the risk of giving too much
detail, here's my, hopefully clearer, version. The wine gallon tax was a method for taxing alcohol, imposed on
"some prestige domestic products (e.g. "bottled-in bond") and on all bottled imported spirits as well" (US Trade
Policy Staff Committee 1979, p.76). Many US spirits were taxed with this wine gallon method, but plenty more
were taxed according to another method, the "proof method," according to which all alcohol regardless of packaging
and volume was taxed a the same rate -- in 1979 $10.50 per gallon of 100 proof spirits (50 percent alcohol). Spirits
taxed using the wine gallon method were taxed at the rate of $10.50 per gallon on the simplifying assumption that
each gallon was 100 proof, regardless of their actual proof rating (percentage of alcohol). Thus, producers paying
under the wine gallon method could import a batch of distilled spirits at a proof level well above the 100 proof
standard on which the wine gallon rate was set, pay the tax at that set rate, and then dilute the batch and pay a
proportionately lower tax rate. But most foreign alcohol made spirits whose final bottles had a lower proof rating --
say, 80 proof whiskey, or 25 proof wine -- yet still had to pay according to the wine gallon method.
Thus, if foreign spirits producers wanted to import such a product, they had two choices, both of which
implied that their US competitors had an unfair competitive advantage. First, they could import their product in its
final, bottled form, and pay a higher tax rate if their bottled product was below 100 proof, as it often was. This
would clearly be disadvantageous. Alternatively, they could import their product at a proof rating higher than 100
proof, pay the wine gallon tax, and then dilute their product and do the final bottling in the United States, thus
minimizing their tax rate. The problem here was that producers would thereby have to do their bottling through
subsidiaries or contracting bottling companies in the US, thereby losing some of the profits from the bottling stage
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wine gallon tax was not an intentional trade barrier, but was instead an unintentional consequence
of over 100 years of taxation and legal regulation of alcohol production in the US (Winham 1986,
pp.283-6). By the time the multilateral GATT negotiations were first initiated in 1947, however, it
was widely regarded by European and, especially, Canadian liquor producers as an unfair trading
practice, a non-tariff barrier. And domestic US distillers and bottlers, for their part, recognized the
advantages the tax provided to their overall competitiveness and to their livelihood, and fiercely
defended the tax as a result. Luckily for these domestic producers, the limits of presidential
negotiating authority meant that the wine gallon tax, as a non-tariff barrier originating in the
domestic US tax code, was safe from removal under the GAIT negotiations.
When the 1974 Trade Reform Act gave the president authority to negotiate non-tariff as
well as tariff barriers in the Tokyo Round of GATT, however, the wine gallon tax was seen by all
trade negotiators in the US and elsewhere as a potential concession and bargaining chip. Removal
of the tax was calculated by the Treasury Department to provide a windfall tax cut for foreign
producers of about $110 million, and Winham reports that this was expected to be divided as
follows: "$60 million would go to EC exporters, largely Scottish distillers and French wine
makers; $40 million to Canadian exporters, largely the spirits industry; and $10 million to less-
developed countries, particularly Jamaica and Mexico" (Winham 1986, p.286). As this break-
down makes clear, the removal of the wine gallon tax had bargaining chip value especially in
negotiations with the EC and Canada. In the context of the multilateral, multi-sectoral GATT
negotiations, of course, the question was what kinds of concessions could be gotten from these
countries in exchange for the wine gallon.
The answer was that the US trade negotiators focused mainly on using the wine gallon
concession as a bargaining chip to pry concessions from the European Community on agricultural
non-tariff barriers. 46 This choice was driven by a combination of considerations -- political,
tactical and economic -- and in the end reflected the autonomy that US trade negotiators had during
the Tokyo and other GATT rounds. Among the most important reasons for the focus on
agriculture was that the EC was particularly protectionist in that sector, substantially more so than
the bulk of US agriculture, which generally had a strong interest in getting greater access to EC
markets. And the political expression of this industry/economic interest was that agricultural
groups had strong representatives in the US Senate -- as indicated by the recent actions by
agriculture to set up in the 1974 Trade Act as favorable a mix of presidential negotiating tools as
of production, widely regarded as the most profitable stage in the value-added chain. The money saved could then be
pumped into advertising or other areas of production, improving the producer's overall market-share and/or
profitability. See US Trade Policy Staff Committee, Hearings on Wine Gallon/Proff Gallon, March 20 1979.
46 The tax bargaining chip was also targeted toward prying concessions from Canada, though here there was less to
get. Ultimately the Administration and trade negotiators settled on zeroing out Canadian tariffs on machinery
imports, what turned out to be a concession they otherwise might not have gotten but which was no match for the
windfall profits given Canadian liquor companies when the wine gallon tax was lifted. See Winham 1986, pp.29 1-2.
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possible for their sector. US trade representatives and others believed that the Senate would not
ratify47 the Tokyo Round liberalizations unless they had gotten something on agricultural products.
Such was the sentiment expressed to the media, for instance one US official's claim that "some
sort of breakthrough on agriculture is a sine qua non for an agreement" (N.J. 2/19/77, p.2 8 1).48
To even make this basic link between the wine gallon and EC agriculture possible, the US
trade negotiators had to use some fancy footwork. Given the EC's reluctance to touch agriculture,
EC negotiators were inclined to offer industrial concessions in exchange for the US offer to
remove the wine gallon tax. On the domestic front, moreover, US negotiators knew that the
distilling industry was traditionally considered under the industrial category of products in its
international negotiating platforms -- in contrast to the European practice of including liquor as part
of agriculture -- and was regulated not by the Department of Agriculture but by Commerce. This
meant that if Commerce was expected to absorb a liberalization concession in liquor, it would
expect a counter-vailing concession in its realm, meaning industry (Winham 1986, pp.286-7).49
According to Winham, the trade bureaucrats solved this twin-edged problem by agreeing to a
separation in the Tokyo Round negotiations between agricultural negotiations and concessions, and
industrial negotiations and concessions, and adopting the EC practice of including liquor with
agriculture rather than industry. This separation was something the EC had wanted and the US
had hitherto resisted. 50
Upon making such linkage possible, the question remained what particular agricultural
product concessions to seek in exchange for the proposed wine gallon concession. Here, again,
the negotiation was a complicated two-level game. It was partially driven by the logic of getting as
much in the agricultural arena as the wine gallon concession -- in concert with other' concessions --
could possibly buy. But as we will see, the pattern of agricultural concessions that US trade
negotiators sought was -- like the focus on agriculture generally -- as much.a consequence as a
cause of pushing for wine gallon liberalization, where the agricultural concessions needed to
somewhat off-set the political and economic costs imposed by removing the wine gallon tax. What
emerged from the considerations was what Winham refers to as "a shopping list of agricultural
products with the EC, which became known as the Strauss list of agricultural products" (Ibid,
p.287). And what matters most from the point of view of side payment politics was that the
47 Remember the 1974 legislation gave the House and Senate fast-track veto authority by requiring both houses to
pass enactment legislation within 90 days of Agreement completion.48 See also the statements in earlier discussions of the unfolding talks, for instance in N. J. 8/16/75, pp. 1174-6;
49 As we will see in a moment, this logic also applies more generally to societal groups within a given sector or
region: US negotiators will face strong incentives to respond to concessions by one group, one region, one political
constituency/entity by getting off-setting concessions that benefit those same groups.50 It isn't clear whether the wine-gallon logic was the only reason for accepting this separation, but upon adopting
it, the linkage was possible.
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negotiation arithmetic had mandated that the US get this shopping list, and pull together an intricate
web of other bargains in the Tokyo Round, by removing the wine gallon tax.
2.2. Domestic Distilling Puts up a Fight, and the US Trade Representative Fights Back
By the time it became clear to all concerned that the wine gallon tax was turning into the
linch-pin concession of the Tokyo Round, the US domestic distilling and bottling industry
mobilized to forcefully oppose the wine gallon liberalization. Nationally, the liquor industry
consisted of roughly 550 enterprises, employing more than 85,000 people. The industry was
divided into the following sub-segments: Malt liquor (SIC 2082), with 222 establishments and
62,643 employees; Wines and brandy (SIC 2084), with 222 establishments and 6,111 employees;
and distilled liquor, except brandies (SIC 2085), with 107 enterprises and 18,009 employees
(Commerce Department 1963).
From the point of view of the wine gallon tax, the industry was divided. Three of the
nation's largest producers were actually US subsidiaries of Canadian multinational firms: Hiram
Walker, Seagrams, and Schenley. Since these producers had made compromises in contracts with
US bottlers and were not free to import their final product without being punished by the tax, they
had a strong interest in repeal of that tax (Winham 1986, p.293).
The domestic portion of the industry included mainly bourbon producers, but increasingly
wine producers in California and elsewhere. It also included their unions, especially the
Teamsters. This portion of the industry, clearly benefitting from the tax. The industry had already
been facing a secular drop in demand, due mainly to consumer preferences shifting away from the
darker, sweeter bourbons and towards the lighter, pure malt whiskeys and other products. So any
advantage was important in this competitive struggle. More acutely, however, the domestic firms
claimed that the windfall profits that the foreign producers would receive upon lifting the tax would
allow those producers to invest in advertising and other improvements that could further drive the
domestic firms out of business (Ibid pp.294-5). Estimates of jobs lost ranged between 500 and
25,000 -- with most government studies estimating that the number was probably under 5,000.51
Most importantly, perhaps, the domestic industry had already taken advantage of the incentives the
tax provided for domestic concerns to provide bottling and distribution services for foreign
distillers (US Trade Office Hearings, March 1979), p.77). For all of these reasons, the domestic
firms very much wanted the wine gallon tax retained.
They lobbied hard toward that end. First, they took their case to the institution that the
1974 Trade Act had set up to consult with industry during the international negotiations on tariff
51 The high estimate came from Teamsters in a letter to USTR Strauss; the low end from a neutral lawyer. See
Winham 1986 pp.294-5 for an interesting discussion of these estimates.
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and non-tariff barriers -- in other words, designed exactly for this kind of contingency -- the
Industry Sector Advisory Committees (ISACs). Because the industry was divided on foreign-
subsidiary vs. purely domestic lines, however, the ISAC was also divided. As Winham observes,
"this left the bureaucracy with considerably more leeway to handle the issue than it might otherwise
have had" (Winham 1986, p.293). Next, the industry voiced their concerns when the US trade
representative's office anticipated the upset and called for a brief hearing in late March 1979. This
is where the industry laid out its biggest concerns and invoked the usual threats of their own
extinction and of lost jobs.
After this hearing, the industry opposition only increased. Ambassador Robert Strauss, the
US Trade Representative, held a meeting with representatives from 25 domestic companies, in the
hopes of assuaging some of the pain and clearing the way for the removal. But this didn't work
either. According to Winham, the industry complained that the ISAC advisory process gave as
much attention to the foreign multinationals as it did to the truly American firms, claimed political
connections between those multinationals and members of Congress were behind the trade (of
which there's no evidence), and threatened to bring a law suit for an injunction against removing
the tax (Ibid., p.295). Although this bore no fruit, the industry was prepared to fight in all arenas,
including Capitol Hill, and in particular to the Senate Finance Committee where they hoped to
spark some legislative action -- or threat of action -- that would either side track the wine gallon
concession or ensure provision of generous compensation to off-set the concession.
Politically, this opposition from the industry mattered, not so much because of its structural
power position, but because of its incidental power position. Nationally, the overall liquor
industry was quite modest, commanding a very small percentage of overall manufacturing
employment -- well under 10 percent -- and within any individual state, the industry was a top ten
employer in only a few states, like as Kentucky. The incidental position of the industry, however,
implied a substantially stronger political hand than these numbers might suggest. First, an
important and vocal domestic firm, Heublin distilling, was based in Connecticut, the home state of
the Senate Finance Committee's chairman Abraham Ribicoff. Although the domestic liquor
industry was not in the top ten manufacturing employers in Connecticut, Heublin was a campaign
contributor to Ribicoff (CQ Almanac 1973, p.?). So Ribicoff was probably inclined to at least
listen to the industry's grievances.
Second, the importance of the wine gallon concession within the Tokyo Round
negotiations made all politically-minded trade policymakers extra risk-averse in how they treated
the protectionist industry they were victimizing. They wanted to avoid at all costs what had
happened when the chemical industry successfully lobbied to prevent removal of the American
Selling Price tariff valuation as agreed in a concession at the late stages of the Kennedy Round.
Even though the entire 1974 Trade Act negotiating authority was designed to avoid this problem,
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the lesson was that industry opposition might unravel an internationally negotiated set of
concessions. And the win gallon was the grand-daddy of them all in the Tokyo Round.
Thus, at each stage in the process, even before the industry had voiced mobilized in
opposition, Administration officials, especially in the US Trade Representative's office, took
action to defuse that industry opposition and minimize its political impact. The hearings with the
Special Trade Representative, of course, were part of that defusing technique, on the premise that
airing grievances might lessen them. The hearings also were used to explain to the industry and
others how removing the tax as a bargaining chip in a larger negotiating strategy to improve the
US's international economic position and access to foreign markets.
Beyond rhetoric, this signaling was linked to the most important and traditional tool that
liberalizers used to defuse domestic opposition in the international phase of liberalization: counter-
vailing concessions in the international negotiations that off-set the costs to the liberalized industry,
the liberalized region, and the political representatives of both. Counter-vailing concession can do
so by liberalizing the barriers to potential export markets in the same industry, by liberalizing
industries "up-stream" from the one being compensated, or by liberalizing domestic or international
barriers that absorb similar labor or capital. During the negotiations, the US trade negotiators
appeared to have tried to seek concessions from the EC and Canada that not only maximized
economic and international bargaining leverage, but that also had these off-setting domestic
political benefits. The choice of agriculture as the area within which to make concessions might
fail by this standard in a narrow industry sense, but it makes more sense in a broader political
calculation of Congress wanting agricultural as well as industrial concessions from the EC.
Within agriculture, moreover, there is some indication that the US trade representatives
targeted certain EC segments for liberalization that would off-set some of the political pain caused
by the wine gallon tax liberalization and the domestic distillers' suffering. The Strauss list -- the
list of products on which the US representatives sought EC concessions in exchange for the wine
gallon liberalization -- included grapes, citrus, beef, poultry, prunes, almonds, rice and tobacco.
Some of the main US beneficiaries of concessions in these areas are in states with substantial
liquor industries. Ribicoff's Connecticut, the home of the Heublin distillers, is also a major
tobacco state (Winham 1986, p.287). Another major tobacco state was Kentucky, employing
some 10,000 workers in 34 enterprises. A concession in tobacco would handsomely compensate
for the pain of the wine gallon tax imposed on the state's liquor industry, employing some 7,500
workers in the malt liquor and distilled liquor segments of that industry.5 2 On at least a political
52 Malt liquors included 5 establishments employing 1,384 workers, and distilled liquor included 36 employing
6,296 workers. See Commerce Department Census of Manufacturers 1963 and other years. Another example is
grapes, whose US producers are concentrated in California and who often have ties and deal with wine distillers who
were somewhat hurt by removal of the wine gallon. In this case, the off-setting concession provided more direct
compensation for the industry, rather than for the political representatives of that industry.
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level, other Strauss list products smack of at least a partial political motivation, including prunes
and almonds, concentrated in states with significant liquor manufacturers.53
To whatever extent US negotiators sought such off-setting concessions as these to defuse
or cauterize opposition to the wine gallon tax repeal from the domestic liquor industry, the
important point is that they didn't do enough. As the negotiations evolved, the liquor industry and
their political representatives were not satisfied. As the industry's continued and active opposition
expressed in the hearings and meetings with USTR Strauss indicate, the usual methods for dealing
with opposition at the international phase of a liberalization were not working enough.54
2.3. Dealing with Domestic Industry When Off-setting Liberalizations Aren't Enough
If the standard tools for defusing or cauterizing opposition to the international phase of a
liberalization don't appear to be working, and the opposition is in a particularly strong political
position by virtue of its ties to a powerful Senator and its position as the linchpin bargaining chip
of the entire GATIT round, what are liberalizers to do? Consider side payments, of course.55 And
that is precisely what happened when the domestic distillers took their case to the Senate Finance
Committee and to Ribicoff in particular. Winham, from this point forward, tells the story well.
He points out that the industry had by this point accepted the wine-gallon repeal as a fait accompli,
but that they knew they could justifiably demand compensation of some kind from the Senate. As
Winham writes, "the issue was put in these terms: the government had decided through wine-
gallon repeal to give $110 million to foreign producers; now what was the government prepared to
do for the domestic firms?" (Winham 1986, p.296). When the industry came to the Senate with
this spirit of side payment compromise, the Finance Committee -- in charge of tax legislation
53 This evidence, of course, is anecdotal, and might be washed out by lots of examples that don't fit this off-setting
political motivation. A more systematic analysis of the various concessions would reveal the extent to which there
were off-setting liberalizations in the Strauss list or other targets of negotiation. This, in turn, could be part of a
more systematic attempt to discern the extent to which the off-setting liberalizations were an intentional strategy to
buy off or cauterize opposition from the domestic distilling industry. Such an analysis is beyond the reach of this
study. The more modest point I want to make is that such a motivation probably mattered, and intentional or not,
such off-setting concessions were reached in a way that should have made some difference to the political position of
US distillers. But as we shall see, only a limited difference.
54 Here, again, the claim is anecdotal and speculative, and would require more systematic measure of the network of
off-setting concessions liberalizers sought during Tokyo Round negotiations to see whether and why all possibilities
were exhausted. See section 2.4 for more on this qualification.
55 That is essentially what the EC did when the off-setting concessions emerging from the wine gallon dispute
involved conferring benefits upon mainly Scottish distillers and French wine makers and imposing costs on Italian,
Spanish, and Southern European producers of the agricultural products liberalized in exchange. The EC Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) included detailed and strong rules and conventions calling for internal compensation when
off-setting concessions with a non-EC country give benefits to some EC members at the expense of others. The
point here is that in the same case, similar political and equity considerations pushed for side payment compensation,
though in the US case this is an artifact of political struggle and exchange, not institutional design and convention.
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within the Senate -- worked together with the US trade representative and the industry to fashion a
package of compensatory side payments.
The package involved rewriting US tax legislation concerning assessment procedures on
distilled spirits. Some of these changes were uncontroversial, and seemed a reasonable next step
of tax reform upon deciding to remove the wine gallon tax. One provision removed the system of
on-site government inspectors that had long been part of the tax assessment system, and that was
expected to free the industry from "the need to mesh distillery operations with the hourly schedules
of government inspectors, and saved approximately $20-25 million" (Ibid.). A second provision
was a new assessment procedure based on bottled rather than bulk spirits, allowing producers "to
avoid paying taxes on spillage and produced an annual saving estimated at $20 million" (Ibid).
And third, "a rectification tax levied on US" but not foreign blending activities was dropped,
saving the industry another $20 million (Ibid., p.297). All these and several other modest changes
in the assessment had already been proposed by the tax comptroller, independent of removing the
wine gallon tax as liberalization. Their timing may be part of a compensatory side payment, but
their existence cannot, and despite at least one of the provisions being particularly beneficial to the
domestic producers (and not foreign producers), they were modest compensation. 56
Much more important than these provisions, then, was a part of the package that the
domestic industry lobbied hardest to get: tax deferral, in particular "extension of their tax deadline
to help cover the shortfall that could accrue between the incidence of taxation and the payment from
wholesalers" (Ibid). Bargainers argued over the duration of the deferral, with the industry as much
as a month, and other officials considering substantially less than that. This tax deferral, as
Winham notes, had general justification in that foreign-made spirits entered customs procedures
that resulted in a shorter period of time between taxation and the sale of their products, a smaller
gap than domestic producers faced. But the proposed reform was more generous than the planned
revision of the tax code, an artifact of removing the wine gallon tax. Thus, the tax deferral was
separate from that removal. And since the discussion of the tax deferral was explicitly discussed as
off-setting pain of distillers, it is more clearly an example of a compensatory side payment.
It was also more controversial as a side payment than the other tax revision provisions.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was "vigorously opposed" to the proposal, because
the deferral "was tantamount to giving away the shop: it effectively provided a working-capital
loan by the US Treasury to domestic industry, and it created an enormous question of principle and
precedent" (Ibid). OMB's opposition stalled the provision of the side payment package, much to
the chagrin of trade negotiators, liquor industry representatives on both sides of the liberalization
aisle, and of their Senate representatives. When STR Strauss got wind of the opposition, he took
56 As Winham points out, "the domestic producers calculated, $110 million went to foreigners, $60-65 million
went to the domestic industry. It was hardly equitable" (Ibid).
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the matter to President Carter, who "indicated that a general trade agreement was the highest
national priority, and told Strauss that whatever he could sell to the Senate was acceptable to the
White House" (Ibid). What he could sell ended up being a fifteen day tax deferral for the industry,
and to make OMB and their allies happy the Ways and Means report emphasized that the deferral
was a "quid pro quo as a result of the unique circumstances in this area and that it does not favor
the use of the deferral in this case as a precedent for any other area" (US House of Representatives
1979, p.169, quoted also in Winham 1986, p.297-8).
The industry was happy enough that they let the matter rest for the rest of the negotiation.
The tax deferral became law with passage of the Trade Act of 1979, which implemented the Tokyo
Round Agreement. Ribicoff and other liquor-state Senators unanimously backed the final
Agreement, as part of the lop-sided support the Act received in the Senate, 90-4. The same was
true with the margin of support in the House for the Act, 395 to 7. By the direct industry
statements and actions, and this voting pattern, it is fair to say that the compensatory side payment
was highly politically effective -- certainly more acutely and measurably so than the more diffuse
adjustment assistance package had been in the 1974 Trade Reform Act.
2.4. Analyzing the Wine Gallon Side Payment
The puzzle presented by this episode of compensated liberalization is that it stands in such
stark contrast to the other international phases of trade liberalization that came before it -- both the
ad hoc bilateral and multilateral negotiations before 1948 and the five GATT rounds that preceded
the Tokyo Round. Despite fractious internal politics over the international developments in all
these cases, the earlier international phases of trade liberalization did not yield side payments, yet
the Tokyo Round episode did. Why?
Friman's 1993 essay on side payments and treatment of the wine gallon episode doesn't
provide an answer to this particular question. His essay focuses on the importance of domestic
opposition to proposed side payments as the main causal explanation for the incidence of side
payments, and one might deduce from this focus that variations in such opposition might explain
why side payments were provided in the Tokyo Round and not previous international phases of
liberalization. The wine gallon dispute shows that, indeed, the modesty of domestic opposition to
the side payment mattered. The OMB was virtually the only group opposed to provision of the tax
deferral, and they were no match for the coalition of protectionists and liberalizers -- all elements of
the liquor industry, the US trade representatives, the President, legislators from both parties -- all
of whom saw the provision as the best way to safeguard the interlocking liberalizations in the
Tokyo Round. But in previous international phases of trade negotiations such opposition never
even arose because side payments were never seriously considered. Thus, focusing on domestic
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opposition to side payments begs the question of why side payments even made it onto the agenda
of politicking over the liberalization in 1979 and not before.
The theory of compensation developed in this thesis provides a better, though
indeterminate, solution to this puzzle. The focus on power and platforms of protectionists
generally predicts that side payments will be rarer in the international phases of trade liberalization
than in domestic, legislative phases of negotiation. The phases are importantly different in that the
legislative stages generally offer a series of veto points not available at the international stage.
Industries, labor unions, and other interest groups have always had some consultative status in the
latter, but they have never had the kind of veto power that they enjoy via their legislators during the
domestic, legislative phase. In addition to this, international arenas through which US trade
policymaking has taken place have been characterized by narrow jurisdictional breadth,
discouraging any discussion of side issues beyond trade protections. Thus, the institutional
differences between the domestic and the international phases of liberalization have strong
implications for the political power of protectionist groups and for the transaction costs of
identifying side payment linkages.
Another difference is that the international negotiations afford a lot of opportunities for off-
setting tariff reductions -- compensating for the pain of tariff reductions on one segment of industry
with the provision of some other tariff reduction that defuses or politically cauterizes opposition to
the first. Off-setting reductions can: (1) benefit either the same industry, an industry based in a
similar region, and/or one employing comparably skilled workers; or politically more relevant, (2)
benefit firms operating in the same political jurisdiction (congressional district, or at least the same
state). For all these reasons, compensated liberalization in the US tends to be a phenomenon
during domestic, not international, phases of trade policy-making.
The Tokyo Round negotiations remind us that these various conditions vary across and
within different international negotiations. For instance, the degree to which the international
negotiations can defuse opposition through off-setting liberalization concessions varies. When
such off-setting concessions are difficult during international negotiations, for whatever reason,
side payments are more likely. And accepting that international phases entail fewer veto points for
protectionist groups, sometimes the opposition to a particular element of liberalization pursued in
international negotiations is more acute, and is backed by political power that is greater, than most.
Thus, sometimes protectionist opposition is so acute and/or its resources so great, that all possible
off-setting concessions are not enough to defuse the political threat to the grander liberalization. In
these cases, desperate times might call for desperate measures, including compensation.
This is what happened in the Tokyo Round history, such that side payments were provided
then and not before. By dint of circumstance more than structural positioning, the domestic
distilling industry had substantial political power to threaten passage of the Tokyo Round
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Agreement. The ISAC's gave the industry a voice that it wouldn't have had before 1975, but the
industry was divided and did not command a predominant presence in terms of employment or
money in any state. Stili, some segments of the industry had close ties to the Chairman Ribicoff of
the Senate Committee, the Senate body most responsible for trade and tax matters. And the
distilling industry's opposition was particularly influential in the context of liberalizers' risk
aversion to a linchpin concession getting blocked or reversed in the Tokyo Round's 1 1th hour.
Finally, side payments became the mechanism for dealing with that "incidentally" powerful
opposition after liberalizers had considered or actually exhausted the various weapons in their
arsenal for defusing or cauterizing protectionist opposition -- including not just rhetoric and giving
protectionists a hearing, but also negotiating off-setting Tokyo Round liberalizations that
compensate protectionist groups for their expected losses.57
If the side payments in the wine gallon dispute make some sense in light of the theory
offered here, it still represents a partial anomaly. Particularly important is that the liquor industry
did not approach the negotiations with an explicitly multi-issue platform. As explained in Chapter
One, the theory is not predictive in an absolute sense, only in relative terms -- some conditions and
historical settings relative to others. Even on these grounds, however, the theory comes up short:
The theory doesn't clearly predict the provision of compensatory side payments in 1979 and the
non-provision of compensation in during the Kennedy Round negotiations, its recent predecessor
episode. The centralization of the distilling industry, and trade policy platform were not much
more favorable in 1979 than was the power-platform of the chemical industry in its ultimately
successful fight to retain the ASP. 58 Moreover, the theory lacks predictive power, in that an
important part of the explanation is very difficult to predict ex ante: other tools for defusing
opposition, especially the pursuit of liberalization concessions that off-set the pain of the opposed
liberalization, came up short. The hope is that the .xpianation offered here, guided by but not
limited to the group-institutional theory, is useful againlst the backdrop of existing accounts of the
case and of compensation generally.
3. The Aftermath: Cycling (Mis)Fortunes of Trade Adjustment Assistance?
The Tokyo Round wine gallon dispute revealed that industry-specific side payments were
still alive and could be provided at the international phase of trade liberalization. But the rest of the
decade and most of the next reaffirmed that side payments tended to be broader in reach and
57 Such a side payment is consistent with one of the hypotheses of Moravcsik 1993 that side payments or issue
linkage are most likely in the end-game of negotiations, and only when off-setting intra-issue exchanges, such as off-
setting liberalization, have been exhausted.
58 In terms of the Power-platform matrix, this means that the liquor industry, like the benzenoid and other chemical
producers opposed to ASP elimination, were characterized by the combination of high power resources and single-
minded platforms -- predicting compromised rather than compensated liberalization. See Figure 3.3.
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centered in domestic phases of US trade liberalization. And that period also showed the fortunes
of side payment politics to be very unstable. Ever since passage of the 1974 Trade Act passed and
the adjustment assistance program was expanded and supposedly improved, the administration of
that program once again fueled criticism and split the polity over whether and how to reform, or to
dump trade adjustment assistance. During the same period, however, domestic distributional
struggles over the general thrust and specific character of the prospective Tokyo Round
liberalizations continued. On a couple of occasions the liberalizers needed to pass legislation to
authorize that liberalization -- first, when the Carter Administration needed to renew the existing
authority to waive countervailing duties if the president saw it in the national interest to do so; and
second, when the Administration sought ratification of the Tokyo Round agreement. Struggles
over these domestic initiatives continued the trend of upwardly-ratcheting adjustment assistance as
the preferred side payment to victims of the proposed legislation and/or the general Tokyo Round
liberalization. This section concludes the chapter with the story of this continued cycling in the
fortunes of adjustment assistance as the primus inter pares in US compensated liberalization.
3.1. Trade Adjustment Assistance: Made-over, Grown-up, and Still Unpopular
Within a few years of emerging from the blocks reformed and expanded in 1974, TAA
again ran into trouble. Like its 1962 predecessor, the culprit was again the program's
implementation, only this time it was success as much as failure that drew fire. With the
substantially loosened eligibility and speeded decision-making procedures, workers and firms
gained much-improved access to adjustment assistance. From the time the new provisions took
effect in the second quarter of 1975, for instance, not only petitions but also the rate at which they
were accepted grew substantially. Within two years, the Labor Department had handed down
rulings on 415 group petitions, covering 137,556 workers, more than quadruple the petition rate
between 1969 when the first TEA petition was decided in the affirmative, and mid-1975 when the
TEA adjustment assistance ended (See US Tariff Commission 1975; and Frank 1977, p.46). Just
as important, of these 415 petitions, 232 petitions covering 69,977 workers were approved, while
183 petitions covering 67,579 workers were denied (N.J. 4/17/76, p.507). This represented an
approval rate of 56%, quite higher than the approval rate of 43% for the period between 1969 and
197559 -- and, of course, much higher than the rate for the whole post-TEA period between 1963
and 1969 when no petitions were approved (US Department of Labor 1976, p.52). In fiscal years
59 This 43% reflects the 48,314 workers of the total 110,640 workers who applied for assistance in that period (US
Department of Labor 1976, p.52).
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1975 to 1981, over 1.3 million workers were certified eligible for TAA benefits -- more than
fifteen times the number between 1962 and 1975 -- at an approval rate around 50%.60
The accelerating rate of petitions reflected how a number of industries were harder hit by
imports and general economic hard times as the 1970s matured. The affected sectors were leather,
shoe, textile and apparel -- the traditional stalwarts of unconditional protectionism. But the auto
industry was also the hardest hit, with major implications for side payment politics, for auto
manufacturers were traditional stalwarts of free trade, and the United Auto Workers was the
persistent champion of adjustment assistance-based compensated liberalization. With the UAW
playing such a role and the industry experiencing successive waves of layoffs for the first time, the
vast majority of petitions and approval rulings on adjustment assistance were for auto workers.
For the entire year of 1976 144,920 workers of all stripes were ruled eligible for assistance. In
one month alone in 1980, when Ford and General Motors employees laid-off together some
178,000 auto workers, all were judged eligible (N.J. 4/17/76, p.507).
As displaced auto workers burdened the TAA program, many worried that it was only a
matter of time before another major manufacturing industry, Steel, would face changes that would
push its already suffering workers and firms to be eligible for adjustment assistance. Although the
Steel industry and individual workers in steel firms already had no trouble showing "substantial
injury," imports had not been rising and so trade could not be shown to have "contributed
importantly" to that suffering. But in 1980 there was some concern that such a judgment might
change. Although steel imports had been declining for some months through early 1980, many
worried that this was due more to domestic recession -- dampening demand generally -- than to
international or domestic industry conditions, meaning that economic recovery would bring huge
import increases. And there was concern that if the ITC ruled against the US Steel Corporation's
anti-dumping complaints against European steel makers, steel imports might increase even more.
So these developments would make it easier for Steel petitioners to meet the "contributed
substantially" criterion, with the result that tens of thousands of steel workers would become
eligible for TAA (NJ 4/5/80, p.554; NJ 5/10/80, p.766).
As if the real and threatened increases in petitions and eligibility rulings was not scary
enough, the late 1970s was also the era of stagflation -- of high unemployment combined with
double-digit inflation. With high unemployment, workers laid off because of trade or anything
else would take longer to get reemployed, and with inflation, supporting those workers in nominal
dollars would grow substantially. So, in fiscal 1976, the average weekly payment in the program
was $48 and workers received benefits for an average of 25.7 weeks. By fiscal 1979, the average
60 The nurmbers were much smaller and grew less substantially for firms. Between mid-1975 and mid-1976, 27
firms, mostly from the shoe industry, had already been certified eligible to apply to the Commerce Department for
benefits, and the Department had already paid out some $6.5 million to five companies. See N.J. 4/17/76, p. 50 7.
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payment had grown by 50 percent to $72 a week, and the average duration of benefits received
rose to 27.7 weeks (NJ 5/10/80, p.766).
The number of firms receiving benefits also went up, but not on the scale of the benefits to
the workers. In the first 2 years under the Trade Act of 1974, 73 firms were certified, and 19
applications for financial assistance were approved, for a total of $19.1 million in loans and loan
guarantees. In addition to the firm assistance, the Commerce Department introduced in 1977 TAA
assistance for entire industries, using the existing authority of the Economic Development
Administration, offering more widespread assistance to the textile, footwear and other industries.
The industry-wide assistance came in the form of a combination of technological studies and export
promotion at the industry level, and loans at the firm level.61
The consequence of this combination of a much higher rate of eligible petitions and
stagflation was obvious: adjustment assistance was costing much more than anticipated or
budgeted. When the program emerged, fattened, from the 1974 congressional session, it was
projected to cost around $335 million a year (See Section 1.4.2.2. above). Spending for the
worker portion of the program, which was about $150 million in fiscal years 1976 and 1977, and
about $260 million in the next 2 years, soared to $1.6 billion in 1980 and $1.4 billion in 1981,
nearly all of it for TRAs. By 1980, the cost overruns had grown dramatically. With continuing
auto industry layoffs, the program was projected to cost $1.1 billion more in FY 1980 and $400
million more in FY 1981 than originally estimated, bringing the total estimated size of the program
to $1.5 billion in 1980 and $800 million in 1981.
The expanded petition and approval rates might have been judged by some to be a measure
of the program's functioning as it ought to, despite the cost overruns they implied, but for others it
was a measure of how the program attracted many more petitioners than expected, and cost much
more than was budgeted. Such growth beyond budget boundaries fueled convictions among many
in the polity that the adjustment assistance program had grown too large and generous for existing
government capacities, whatever the fairness and justness of the program.
The program's implementation was not only a problem in that it was more expensive and
larger than anticipated, but also in that it wasn't accomplishing its stated objectives. Criticisms to
that effect began as early as 1976,62 but became more solid and harsher as a several independent
and apparently unbiased studies revealed a number of problems in the administration of adjustment
assistance. The most influential of these was the General Accounting Office (GAO) review of the
program in January 1980, subject to the 1974 Act's mandate. More critical than expected, its
61 Technical assistance was not a significant part of the benefits, apparently.
62 See, for instance, a series of reports on adjustment assistance program, all of which report unfavorable reviews,
in the National Journal, especially 4/17/76, p.
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findings, coupled with a number of separate assessments, fueled the claims that the program's
largesse was somewhere between unnecessary and counterproductive.
By 1976, to begin with, observers pointed to how the portion of the adjustment assistance
program devoted to helping whole communities was simply not being used, as the Commerce
Department received so few petitions from communities. The modest criticism was that such
communities have "difficulty in assembling the necessary information about the effect of imports
on their economic life," but it was clear that the Department had adequate authority under the
existing legislation to design assistance without such petitions. This made the program vulnerable
to the claim that it was generally designed to do more than it needed to.
Harsher criticism was leveled at the firm assistance program's administration, when critics
claimed that "the [loan guarantee and technical assistance] were little used -- and the firms getting
TAA benefits had not used them to become viable" (OTA 1980, p.32). The firm assistance was
also criticized for the amount of paperwork involved in applying for the program, and resulting
delays. Finally, firms often complained that the interest rates for loans and requirements for
personal repayment guarantees were exceedingly high. The same sorts of complaints could be
heard with reference to the industry-wide category of assistance.
Most of the ire, however, was directed at the most expensive and developed part of the
program, worker adjustment assistance, and in particular the ways in which the program benefits
were distributed and how they affected worker incentives. The GAO reported that many of the
program's assistance benefits, especially its supplements to unemployment called Trade
Readjustment Allowances (TRAs), were being dispensed to eligible workers, particularly auto
workers, who were not laid off permanently, but who in fact returned to work for the same
employer. As a result, they argued, such workers "did not experience substantial economic
hardship as a result of their layoff because unemployment benefits and other resources eased their
economic burden" (GAO, quoted in NJ 5/10/80, p.766). Such workers, the GAO showed,
receive up to 95 percent of their take home pay from a combination of unemployment insurance,
TAAs and company-financed supplemental unemployment benefits (Ibid.).
As for the timing of the benefits, the GAO and others pointed out how most recipients of
the TRAs didn't actually receive their checks until after they returned to work. 50 to 70 percent
were back at work by the time they got their first payment.63 Several factors accounted for the
delays. First, workers were slow to file petitions. Many did not know until months after their
layoff that the program existed; and when they did discover TAA, did not know how to apply.
The US Department of Labor did not try to acquaint workers directly with the program, but urged
the State employment security agencies,which administer TAA through the local employment
services and unemployment insurance offices, to do so. The outreach system did not work well.
63 Corson, et. al. Final Report.
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Most workers who heard about TAA discovered it through their union, co-workers, or the
company -- as a rule, belatedly. Workers and unions typically lost 7 months in getting petitions
filed, and another 2 or 3 months after the workers were certified, often because State agencies
failed to notify them that they were now eligible for benefits. Second, the Labor Department
generally took much longer than the 60 days allowed under the law to process petitions for
certification, mainly because of the backlogs that grew as the number of petitions skyrocketed.
With the additional time it took for State agencies to determine eligibility, the average time it took
before an applicant got his first check was 14 to 16 months after initial certification (Corson et.al.
Final Report,). In other words, these criticisms added up to the worry, reported by the National
Journal in 1980, that the program provided workers "with more money than they need when they
need it the least" (NJ 5/10/80, p.766).
This broad claim dove-tailed with narrower critiques of the program, including critiques
from those expected to be most friendly to it. For instance, Marvin Fooks, Department of Labor
head of the program, pointed out that some workers hurt by imports can be "certified" to receive
benefits and remain eligible for two years. If reemployed in some separate firm or industry after
that initial certification, they will still be able to receive benefits if they get laid off from that new
employer, even if that firm's layoff decisions had nothing to do with trade (N.J. 5/10/80, p.767).
Finally, many took the adjustment assistance program to task for being all about assistance
and not at all about adjustment, some claiming that the program actually discouraged adjustment.
They pointed to how virtually all of the benefits came in the form of compensatory income
supplements rather than adjustment-oriented retraining or relocation assistance. Only 48,000
workers (4 percent of those certified) entered training. About 5,200 got out-of-area job search
assistance and 4,400 relocation assistance; each of these services went to fewer than one-half of
one percent of the certified workers. Thus, contrary to the hopes of many, the program was very
heavily skewed to the compensation rather than the adjustment side of assistance.
The GAO report and a report commission by the Department of Labor (Corson et.al. 1979)
uncovered some of the reasons for this slant, most of which fueled criticism of the program itself,
not just its particular implementation. One of the reasons for this was that workers often did not
know that training and other adjustment services were available, and the reason they didn't know
was partially because the local offices did not push these services since States never got any extra
training or relocation funds for TAA-certified workers (Corson et.al. 1979). Apparently, despite
the provision in the 1974 Trade Act for a TAA trust fund that drew on tariffs, the OMB refused to
set it up, arguing that employment and training services were available under the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act (CETA); but CETA was designed for "disadvantaged workers," and
"applying to CETA for training was both a bureaucratic and psychological hurdle for TAA-eligible
workers" (OTA 1980, p. 25). In fact, in 1981 and 1982, over 80 percent of TAA-certified
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workers in training paid their own tuition and fees. Combined with the claim that TRA benefits
were unnecessarily generous and provided when needed least, this bundle of criticisms made it
easy for a number of pundits to argue that the program was defeating its own adjustment purposes.
With voters and legislators increasingly fed up with accelerating inflation and a government
consistently living beyond its means, and looking for ways to trim government fat, it's not
surprising that all these criticisms made trade adjustment assistance a sitting duck for attack.
Recommendations ranged from fiddling with bureaucratic autonomy, to tightening eligibility and
lowering the generosity of benefits, to dumping the program altogether -- with the latter becoming
louder as the decade came to a close. Labor Secretary Fooks, for instance, proposed that Congress
"give his office authority to withhold benefits from technically eligible beneficiaries whose layoffs
are not the result of rising imports" (N.J. 5/10/80, p.767). In the more reformist middle of this
spectrum, a prominent proposal was to tighten eligibility and benefits so that workers could only
receive TRA benefits after their existing state unemployment insurance ran out, and then only at the
same level of those benefits. Thus, the proposals narrowed the generosity of benefits of the
"regular" and "trade-impacted" unemployed -- proposals after George Shultz's own heart.64
Defenders of the trade adjustment assistance generally, and of the TAA program in
particular, disagreed with various criticisms and recommendations, but had plenty of their own --
generally calling for legislation to improve and expand, not trim, the program. They pointed out
that the GAO analysis was, in the first place, focused on a time and a kind of worker no longer
dominating the pool of trade-impacted and eligible workers looking to the program for relief. In
1980, for instance, a spokes-person for the Michigan Employment Security Commission, which
administered TAA in that state, claimed that "more auto workers than ever are expressing interest in
the program's job training and relocation services -- an indication that they don't expect a future in
the auto industry" (NJ 5/10/80, p.766). That office conducted a survey in early 1980 that found
that among 18,000 laid-off Chrysler workers, "78 percent indicated that they were interested in
being trained for different jobs and 38 percent noted that they were willing to relocate" (Ibid).
The representatives of the United Auto Workers, the strongest proponent and biggest
beneficiary of trade adjustment assistance, went beyond this defense of the program's
administration as possibly bad in the past but good in the future. Among other things, they pointed
out that the level of benefits, and the timing of their provision, were defensible. Even if workers
received their benefits after they returned to work, the UAW argued, it wouldn't be fair to claim
that the provision wasn't needed, since these workers were likely to have incurred significant debts
during their period of unemployment. The TRAs, albeit later in arriving than they should have
been, could write-down this debt (NJ 5/10/80, p.766).
64 And they were, ultimately, as we shall see in Chapter Seven.
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Having defended against the TAA program's critics, however, the UAW and other
proponents of adjustment assistance criticized the modesty of the benefits, the difficulty in
accessing training provisions, and the application procedures. They were particularly concerned
with the eligibility requirements that excluded some trade-dislocated workers from the program.
Most important of these involved workers in independent parts manufacturers hurt indirectly by
competition from imports when their trade-impacted buyer -- the big auto assembly companies.
Under the current 1974 program, only parts producers that were formal subsidiaries of auto
assemblers directly hurt by imports and that provided at least 25 percent of their output to those
assemblers were eligible for benefits.
The recommendations of these TAA supporters, therefore, went mainly in the direction of
looser, broader, and higher assistance. Supporters sought to ease eligibility of dislocated workers
by allowing workers to receive TRAs "if they worked at least 40 of the preceding 104 weeks; the
present requirement is 26 of the preceding 52 weeks" (NJ 5/10/80, p.7 6 7 ).65 The UAW and
others also sought eased eligibility for workers in independent parts plants that provide inputs to
directly trade-impacted assemblers. They proposed to extent coverage to independent suppliers as
well as subsidiaries, and to eliminate the 25 percent requirement.
3.2. Unpopular, Perhaps, But a Side Payment Still
More than in the early years of TAA's non-administration after 1962, the administration of
expanded adjustment assistance divided the polity on how to deal with adjustment assistance. But
this split only says that the program was vulnerable to being cut, and had plenty of enemies. As
for its role in side payment politics, the question is a bit different. It is who among liberalizers and
protectionists wants it cut, and who likes it -- in the context of struggle to deal with the hur an and
political costs of trade liberalization.
In the protectionist coalition, the AFL-CIO stuck by its unconditional protectionist guns,
even moving away from the protectionism/investment policy platform that made outgoing FDI
policies potential side payments, and instead focusing on more straight-forwardly protectionist
legislation, like domestic content laws. On adjustment assistance their position was unchanged:
although not a substitute for protection, it shouldn't be cut because it's better than nothing.
More significantly, the UAW moved closer to the AFL-CIO's position on issues of trade
policy and side payment politics as the decade wound to a close. As the main beneficiaries and
traditional proponents of adjustment assistance, UAW representatives were more strident in their
65 This made sense to auto workers who found themselves in and out of jobs as the auto assembly plants
temporarily laid off some workers, rehired them, and then permanently laid them off, meaning fewer months worked
over the course of a couple of years.
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support and defer e, and had more ideas about how to reform it. But they, too, began towing
their industry's protectionist line in support of countervailing duties, organized marketing
arrangements and the like, all a response to alleged Japanese and European unfair trade practices.
Liberalizers, for their part, were not as disenchanted with adjustment assistance as the labor
movement, though their support was certainly wavering as well. The administration of the
program and the response of labor and other protectionist groups to that administration had several
implications for liberalizers' costs and benefits of supporting adjustment assistance as a
compensatory side payment. First, on the benefit side, the recent years meant that expectations of
the program's political, economic, and moral benefits might be lower in the future than in the past.
Those concerned for the welfare of the victims of liberalization could not expect trade adjustment
assistance to do much, as currently devised, to redress their pain, and even less to do so while also
promoting adjustment into more competitive segments of economic activity.
Judging from recent side payment politics, of greater concern on the benefits side was the
degree to which providing reforms or expansions in side payments would confer significant
political benefits. Here the recent past made liberalizers believe less than their predecessors of
earlier periods in the political effectiveness of improving adjustment assistance -- either in buying
off opposition from organized labor or other segments of the protectionist coalition, or in providing
more symbolic benefits by expressing the limit of what government can do to redress harm.
Unlike the 1974 episode, the UAW still supported adjustment assistance and its improvement in
various ways, but it did not do so with a clear claim that it would support liberalization in
exchange. So the political benefit was not as strong even in the abstract. And since the UAW had
decided to stay officially opposed to the 1974 Trade Reform Act even after the House and Senate
strengthened and reformed trade adjustment assistance in ways suggested by the union -- especially
the creation of community assistance -- liberalizers might reasonably conclude all the more strongly
that further expanding adjustment assistance would be for naught.
Also unlike 1974, and perhaps most importantly, the program's costs and potential
retarding of adjustment meant it came with a pretty hefty price tag. No longer could legislators say
that the program might have dubious benefits but that its very low cost made it worth the
investment as a political insurance policy. For some at least, the insurance premiums were
becoming too high.
Although changing perceptions of TAA's political and ideational costs and benefits made it
less desirable to improve TAA as a compensatory side payment, that is essentially what happened
when the Administration had to go to Congress for authority to negotiate and for ratification of the
Tokyo Round's liberalization. Both of these episodes involved linking adjustment assistance to
liberalization legislation, though in different ways that differed from the straightforward provision
of adjustment assistance as side payment for liberalization. The first grew out of criticisms of the
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TAA's administration, of the Carter Administration's review of the program, and of that
Administration's attempt to renew presidential authority to waive countervailing duties in 1978.
Aware of the early criticisms of the TAA's administration and budget overruns, Carter
ordered a full review of the program by an inter-agency task force soon after he took office in
1977. That task force delivered a review and a series of recommendations for the program's
reform within 90 days, but the Administration proved to be split on the proper direction of reform,
and Carter accepted only some of the recommendations as a result (N.J. 1/21/78, p. I 11). The
changes Carter did approve, judging by Commerce Department's stated recommendations,
included, for firms, increasing expenditures for the program by about $100 million, from the $230
million it cost in fiscal 1977; and providing more technical assistance to trade-impacted firms, and
more money for loans and loan guarantees to such firms, with a higher limit on the amount of the
loans. For workers, proposals were to set up a system that would give workers advance warning
of layoffs would explain to them their adjustment assistance entitlements, so as to shorten the
existing program's slow delivery of benefits; and to give workers more time to file for job search
assistance and relocation allowances (Ibid, p. 111).
In the beginning of 1978, the Carter Administration decided not to pursue legislation for
these adjustment assistance reforms. According to National Journal reports at the time, this post-
ponement was motivated by disagreements within the Administration over whether to make
adjustment assistance at all a legislative priority, and whether the prospective reforms were
appropriate for a program that was still, by the end of 1977, still untested in its current form.
Seeing the changes as significant in their program and budgetary implications, the Administration
decided "to see how the program works in the steel and shoe industries before fundamental
changes are made" (N.J. 1/21/78, p. 111). Having made such a decision, however, the
Administration did detail its general recommendations to Congress.
Other members of Congress took this agenda and, as it were, ran with it. The primary
sponsor was Vanik, who proposed a bill as HR 11711 in early 1978, and in addition to the
Administration's recommended provisions called for more Commerce Department studies of the
conditions in entire industries (CQ Almanac 1978, p.279). The bill emerged from the House Ways
and Means Committee on April 18 and passed without incident by a tidy 262-24 (Ibid., p. 186-H).
The bill then made its way through the Senate, initially without stirring much controversy. The
Senate Finance Committee reported the bill without any significant amendments on October 10th.
It looked destined for smooth final passage, and in that vein an expression of continued interest in
improving adjustment assistance. Although the Tokyo Round liberalization were certainly in the
background, making the adjustment assistance reforms more urgent, more politically acceptable,
there is no evidence that it was motivated clearly and predominantly by desire to defuse opposition
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to developments in those negotiations. For this reason, the initial initiation of the reform cannot be
characterized as real offer of a compensatory side payment.
When the full Senate took up the bill, however, a variety of amendments complicated
passage and made the linkage between liberalization and adjustment assistance reform explicit. The
most important of these was the amendment introduced by William V.Roth (R-Del.) that would
enact the Carter Administration's proposal to extent presidential authority to waive countervailing
duties on some subsidized imports. This proposal was important to the Administration's
deliberations in the Tokyo Round, as negotiations on how to deal with subsidies would require
waiving some of the US's existing countervailing duty provisions, and such waiving in turn
required renewing Congress' authority to do so.
Why Roth attached this particular amendment to the adjustment assistance reforms is not
clear in the history. But among the considerations, no doubt, was the expectation that the
adjustment assistance would facilitate the liberalization. By 1978 it was common knowledge that
the adjustment assistance reforms were desired by legislators interested in showing their concern
for and in off-setting the pain felt by victims of trade liberalization generally, of the Tokyo Round
liberalization in particular, and of waiving countervailing duties more particular still. Showing
concern for and actually redressing the plight of liberalization's victims was especially important in
the context of continued and growing protectionist sentiment in the last hours of the Tokyo Round
negotiations. Apart from the many disputes sparked by individual concessions in those
negotiations, such as the wine gallon concession, this protectionism was manifested most starkly
in Ernest Hollings's (D.-S.C.) attempt to legislate exemption of the textile industry from Tokyo
Round tariff and non-tariff barrier reductions (Ibid., p.280).
Thus, the duty waiver amendment is a situation where the preexistent legislation that will
off-set opposition to a desired liberalization, though not necessarily motivated by that effect,
becomes a targeted vehicle for such liberalization. In this sense, although the provision of the act
and the amendment does not constitute the provision of side payments, it is the compensatory side
payment value of adjustment assistance reform -- its value in defusing political opposition and
redressing potential harm -- that facilitates liberalization. It is, thus, compensated liberalization
without the formal provision of side payments.
Whatever its character, in the end attaching the liberalization to the adjustment assistance
reform did not work, because a number of other Senators sought to attach their own prized
legislative aims as amendments to the TAA reform. Most of these involved improvements in the
social security and welfare system, such as a proposal by Jacob Javits to permit states to adjust
welfare payments when a child eligible under the aid to families with dependent children program
was living with an ineligible adult (CQ Almanac 1978, p.280). The Senate finally approved the
entire legislation, in its Christmas tree form, and the House gave its approval as well, though with
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minor changes. When the Senate finally took up the legislation, the House had adjourned and the
Senate was ready to do the same. With only a few Senators left on the floor, Majority Leader
Robert Byrd (D., W.Va.) decided to let the bill die, despite "a last-minute call...from President
Carter urging passage of the waiver extension" (Ibid). The reason, as one supporter lamented,
was the excessive Christmas tree quality of the bill, though evidently not the linkage between
adjustment assistance and liberalization: "We lost it in the Senate by getting all those family
assistance amendments tied to it" (Ibid., p.279).
Within a year adjustment assistance again found its way onto the legislative docket, this
time more starkly in expectation of major liberalization legislation to ratify the concluded Tokyo
Round. Negotiators had reached final agreement on that Round on April 12, 1979. Since the
1974 authorizing legislation required that Congress ratify the agreement within ninety days of
signing, this set the stage for imminent tabling of ratification legislation. Although the legislation
had to be an up or down vote on the agreement -- no amendments revising the agreement could be
added by either chamber -- the Carter Administration sought to smooth passage of the legislation
by consulting with members of House Ways and Means and Senate Finance well before the April
12th signing of the agreement. This consultation entailed actual collaborative drafting of the
ratification legislation after that signing, with the Administration accepting very modest revisions in
the contours of the agreement where possible. 66
While this drafting was going on, congressman Charles Vanik introduced separate
legislation (HR 1543) calling for substantial expansion and revision of trade adjustment assistance,
changes that encompassed but went beyond the 1978 initiative. The bill introduced some of the
changes and expansions that UAW and other supporters had been calling for, including reforms
that would encourage greater adjustment.67 Altogether, the changes were expected to cost an extra
$177 million in fiscal 1980. The House Ways and Means sent the bill to the floor of the House on
March 20th, and it passed the House floor without incident and by voice vote on May 30th.
66 For instance, the Administration accepted speeding up the procedures by which countervailing duty decisions were
made, a concession to the steel and auto industries. See CQ Almanac 1979, pp.2 9 7- 8.
67 The core provisions were extension of coverage to independent firms that provided parts to trade-impacted
assemblers, independent of what proportion of those firms' products went to the assembler; extension of eligibility
to workers employed 40 of the 104 weeks with the trade-impacted firm immediately preceding layoff, as an
alternative to the existing standard of 26 of 52 weeks; extension of benefits an additional 26 weeks, up to 104 weeks
for workers in retraining programs and those over 60; increased job search and relocation allowances.
The other provisions included the following: establishment of demonstration projects in trade-impacted
areas "to test vouchers as an alternative to encourage worker retraining"; extension of coverage to eligible firms
supplying services, such as trucking, for import-impacted products; provision of technical assistance to firms to help
prepare petitions for assistance and adjustment plans; raise in the ceiling on government share of technical assistance
costs from 75 to 90 percent; lowering of the interest rate on direct loans; raise in ceiling on direct loans from $1 to
$3 million, and on loan guarantees from $3 to $5 million; extending eligibility to workers and firms threatened with
as well as actually suffering dislocation; authorization of labor and commerce secretaries to initiate petitions; and
establishment of industry-wide assistance. See CQ Almanac 1979, pp.327-8, and N.J. 5/10/80, p.76 6 .
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Significantly, this smooth passage took place with the shadow of the liberalization future clearly in
the minds of at least the Ways and Means members.
Before the Senate took action on the adjustment assistance, the Administration, via its
extensive consultation with Senate Finance and House Ways and Means, sent its Tokyo Round
ratification legislation to Congress on June 19th. Entitled the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (HR
4537), the legislation made it though both houses of Congress more quickly and smoothly than
even the great optimists expected. The Ways and Means Committee acted immediately on the bill,
and within two days sent a clean version to the floor, which in turn passed the bill by a lop-sided
vote 395-7 on July 11 th without incident and after two days of "desultory debate" (CQ Almanac
1979, p.298). By the next day, the Senate Finance Committee had unanimously approved the bill
as well. The Senate floor took up the bill on July 19th and after debate more modest than the
House's, the body approved the bill 90-4. All this was faster than an adjustment assistance
champion could blink an eye.
With the major liberalization legislation cleared so quickly through Congress there was not
only too little time for Senate to act immediately after House action on the Vanik adjustment
assistance bill, one of the major incentives for passing the bill -- defusing opposition to the
ratification legislation -- was also removed. So the Senate didn't take up the measure in earnest for
several months, reporting the bill on October 30 with very modest changes in the direction of
lowering its expansion. 68
By then, opposition to the Vanik bill had grown substantially, mainly on budgetary
grounds. Senator Bellman (R.-Oklahoma) proposed three amendments to the program, and
threatened to raise these when and if the Senate took up the bill on the floor. Two of these
amendments had major implications for the generosity and budgetary size of the program.69 The
Carter Administration, for its part, claimed to be generally in favor of the Vanik adjustment
assistance reforms but objected to the increased costs of those reforms, at a time when the program
was already seriously over-budget. On March 14th, 1980, the Administration submitted to
Congress its revised budget, highlighting out increased petitions from auto and other workers
would require an addition $1.1 billion for fiscal 1980 in addition to the $381 million it had already
68 The Finance Committee made two changes. The first was to drop the House provision extending the time
workers could file for benefits. The second dropped the House bill's extension of eligibility to workers employed 40
of 104 weeks previous to layoff, keeping only the existing 26 of 52 weeks standard. See CQ Almanac 1979, p.3 28 .
69 One proposed to tighten eligibility criteria for independent parts producers and service providers dependent on
trade-impacted firms so that only firms that provided at least half of their output to directly trade-impacted companies
would be eligible for assistance. This standard was much tighter than Vanik's proposed loosening so that all
independent firms selling to trade-impacted producers would be eligible, and also tighter than the status quo ante,
which required the independent producer supply at least 25 percent of their product (N.J. 5/10/80, p.767). Such a
change was expected to cut $200 million dollars from the Vanik's version (Ibid). Bellman's other major cut-back
amendment was to require that eligible workers exhaust state unemployment compensation before turning to trade
assistance, and to cut-back TRA benefit levels to equal those of existing unemployment insurance (Ibid., p.766).
305
Burgoon
Chapter Four
requested. The Administration, thus, was not in a generous mood to accept the increases in
Vanik's proposal. The Administration objected particularly to giving benefits to firms that provide
services to companies that were hurt by rising imports. So the Administration supported the
Bellman amendment increasing the proportion of total output that independent parts or service
providers must sell to trade-impacted firms in order to qualify for assistance.
As a result of this general opposition, the Vanik bill lost its steam, and was never taken up
on the Senate floor. And within a year, the House had repudiated its support. The House Ways
and Means Committee met on June 19, 1980 to consider how to meet the congressional budget's
requirement that it cut $2 billion from FY 1981 spending for the programs it controls. Its largest
single savings recommendation was to rescind passage of HR 1543 (N.J. 6/28/80, p. 1069).
Having killed the Vanik expansions of the program, legislators in both the House and
Senate defended the existing TAA against proposals to limit its size and generosity. When the
House took up the FY1980 supplemental appropriations bill (HR 7325) that was to provide the
extra $1.1 billion needed to keep the TAA program running, the House rejected by voice vote an
amendment by Robert H.Michel (R.-Ill) that would have introduced one of the most popular
reforms of the program's critics -- requiring workers laid off because of imports exhaust regular
unemployment benefits before becoming eligible for TRAs (NJ 5/10/80, p.765; NJ 6/28/80,
p. 1069). On the Senate floor, the pattern was similar. When Bellman proposed an amendment to
the supplemental budget bill to save some $438 million by cutting back on the amounts of benefits
to be paid workers through TAA, Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D.-N.Y.) and Donald W.Reigle Jr.
(D.-Mich.) argued that the amendment was out of order in an appropriations bill and the chair ruled
in their favor. Bellman's appeal was tabled 65-28.
Thus, with major trade ratification legislation safely passed and in the past, and with no
significant liberalization in sight, legislation that was likely a proposal to offer compensatory side
payment and compensated liberalization was never provided. Supporters of adjustment assistance,
whatever their trade policy allegiances, had enough power to prevent budget cutters and others
from emasculating the program, but certainly not enough to expand and reform the program.
3.3. Without its Value as a Side Payment During Trade Legislation, a Sitting Duck
Free of its liberalization moorings, the TAA program soon fell victim to significant
reduction and reform by those interested in scaling back its size and generosity, and in redirecting
its focus. The big changes began in 1981, after a year of mounting criticism of the TAA program's
efficacy and budgetary excesses -- the budget for the program was projected to rise to as much as
$2.7 billion in fiscal 1982 -- and, most importantly, after the election of Ronald Reagan.
Especially in its first year, the Reagan Administration sought major change in the federal
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government's budgetary priorities, among other things away from welfare and assistance
programs. As part of its budget for fiscal 1982-83, the Administration requested tightened
eligibility -- from the existing "contributed importantly" to "contributed substantially." 70 It also
sought the requirement that claimants exhaust all unemployment benefits before collecting trade
assistance, with benefit levels lowered to the amount received under UI (CQ Almanac 1981,
p.278). Both these measures mirrored amendments proposed by Bellman in the Senat,- "nd
Michels in the House the previous year.
The Senate Finance and the House Ways and Means Committees accepted the
Administration's recommended changes, but added several of their own. Their proposals were
heavily inspired by the recommendations made in the 1980 GAO report, which had taken TAA for
task for not living up to its aims, especially its goal of facilitating and encouraging adjustment out
of trade-impacted economic activity. The Senate committee report explicitly cited that GAO finding
in explaining its proposals. After the House and Senate versions were combined, the proposed
changes included not only the Administration's cut-backs but also the following: (1) limiting the
duration of benefits to 52 weeks combining unemployment insurance and trade adjustment
assistance; (2) disqualifying from benefits those workers refusing to seek or accept "suitable work"
if prospects of returning to their old line of work were bad; (3) authorizing the secretary of labor to
require workers to accept training or expand their job search after first eight weeks of TAA
eligibility; (4) increasing job search and relocation allowances from a maximum of $500 to $600
for each worker; and (5) eliminating most retroactive "lump-sum payments" by confining the
benefits payments to those weeks of unemployment more than 60 days after workers filed petitions
(CQ Almanac 1981, pp. 107-8). 71 With these changes, the program TAA was to be extended until
September 30, 1983, and altogether amounted to a projected cut of $2.6 billion from the program
for fiscal year 1982-83 (Ibid., p. 107).
Despite some modest opposition to these proposals from adjustment assistance stalwarts,
the cutters won the day. Adjustment assistance supporters in Congress included Daniel Patrick
Moynihan (D NY) and David L Boren (D Okla.) on Senate Finance, and Richard Gephardt (D
Mo.) and James Shannon (D Mass) on Ways and Means. These legislators struggled to retain a
reformed program at higher levels, but were defeated in the general retrenchment. The Senate
Finance and House Ways and Means proposals were ultimately taken up by the House Budget
70 Workers and firms, as of 1974, needed to show that increased imports contributed importantly, meaning
important but not necessarily more than other factors, to their suffering; "contributed substantially." understood to
mean as important but not necessarily more so than any other single cause, was the old standard before 1962 for
escape clause relief, and was the standard that the Nixon administration initially requested for adjustment assistance in
1973.
71 Other provisions were authorizing the secretary of commerce to provide each eligible industry with up to $2
million a year in technical assistance, including industry wide programs to develop new products; and expanding
secretary of labor's responsibility to inform all workers about the program. Ibid.
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committee and its Senate counterpart in deliberations over the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act,
ultimately cleared by Congress as part of the budget reconciliation package, passed July 31st.
The following year, 1982, the Reagan Administration sought to discontinue the trade
adjustment assistance altogether. Having cut billions from the program so that the full 1982 cost
was $143 million -- $118 for firm and worker income assistance and benefits, and another $25
million for retraining and job search services -- the Administration proposed to discontinue all cash
benefits to workers and firms, retaining only the retraining provisions. These retraining provisions
were to be folded into the proposal cosponsored by Dan Quayle (R.-Ind.) and Edward Kennedy
(D.-Mass.) for the Job Training Partnership Act, a substitute for the Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act (CETA).
The outcry against these changes were significant enough to keep the program alive, but
still at its low level of operation. To the Administration proposals, organized labor expressed clear
opposition. Even the AFL-CIO, standing outside the trade policymaking trenches, supported the
program. Federation spokesman Stephen Koplan said that Reagan's plan "is an arbitrary proposal
that has no justification. It shows no compassion for workers injured by US trading policy
through no fault of their own" (N.J. 5/29/82, p.959). UAW representatives, who had by then
gone the way of the AFL-CIO on most trade matters was more explicit about the implications for
trade. Making allusion to the possibility that gutting adjustment assistance might fuel greater
protectionist sympathies, UAW associate counsel Leonard R.Page said "if the 20-year old program
of aid for the victims of trade policy is eliminated, can we expect a return to the trade quotas and
tariffs in effect prior to 1962?" (Ibid., p.958). Whether or not this kind of threat made the
difference, it rang true to at least some legislators. In addition to the legislative supporters who
blocked full retrenchment of the program in 1981, the strongest support for the program came from
Representative Donald Pease (D.-Ohio), who drafted a bill reinstating much of the old adjustment
assistance program, but with more emphasis on training (N.J. 5/29/82, p.959). These supporters
were able to block the Administration's elimination of the program, and succeeded in getting a one-
year extension for adjustment assistance in 1983 and 1984. Soon thereafter, trade liberalization
legislation provided the push that the embattled program needed to do more than stay afloat.
In the years that immediately followed Reagan's curtailment and attempted elimination of
TAA, implementation of the program for workers essentially reflected what the Administration had
hoped for: a drop in certification, drop in the expenditures devoted to the program, and an
increased emphasis on adjustment provisions. The number of workers certified dropped steeply
after 1981. This was due in part to a sharp drop -- from 840,794 in 1980 to 354, 863 in 1981, and
157,549 in 1982 -- in the number of workers applying for benefits, probably a reflection of "a
widespread misapprehension that the program was abolished" (OTA 1980, p. 26). More
important, the percentage of workers approved for certification by the Labor Department declined
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considerably. "Approvals, which had held at about 65 percent through the 1970s and rose above
80 percent in 1980, dropped to 14 and 12 percent" in 1981 and 1982, respectively (OTA 1980, p.
28). Although the stricter eligibility requirements established in the 1981 Act were loosened
somewhat in 1982 (to pre-Reagan de jure standards), the drop in certifications was due to the strict
interpretation of eligibility. According to a GAO report, borderline petitions that would previously
have been approved were rejected (GAO 1982, p.). Moreover, all petitions for 50 or more
workers began to receive special scrutiny, including for some time personal review by the
Assistance Secretary of Labor responsible for the program (Ibid).
At the same time that certification was substantially dropping, the program's adjustment-
oriented provisions took on greater significance relative to the more compensation-oriented
provisions. This was partially due to legislative changes after 1981. When TAA was renewed for
one year in 1982, Congress for the first time earmarked funds for training and relocation
assistance, and thereby eased access of state implementation bodies to adjustment-provision
money. Of some 214,000 workers who were approved for TAA benefits in the 5 years 1982-86, a
total of 139,000 received TRAs and 39,000 entered training. About 9,000 received relocation
assistance and 4,500 got help with out-of-area job search. Although the number of TAA-certified
workers receiving training were no greater than in earlier years, the proportion of those certified
who entered training was much larger -- 18% vs. 4% (OTA 1980, p.30).
The total cost of the TAA for workers, because of the certification and the increased
emphasis on adjustment-provisions, went down considerably. In fiscal year 1982, expenditures
for TAA for workers were $121 million, less than one-tenth the levels of the 2 previous years, and
for the next 3 years dropped still lower, to about $54 to $73 million (Ibid., p.26).
For firms, the story was similar. The Reagan Administration's cutbacks in the TAA's
financial assistance and more modest paring-down of technical assistance was replaced by more
wholesale antipathy to assistance for firms by 1982. Between 1982 and 1985, the trend of de-
emphasizing the financial assistance meant that by 1985 the amount of guaranteed and direct loans
had dropped to level of $3.4 million from an average of $17 million in 1982 and 1983, and
significantly higher before that (Ibid., p.34). The level of technical assistance, however, remained
at around $16 million per year, roughly the level it had been before the 1981 changes.
These changes blunted the strongest pressures for further curtailment of TAA, but they also
deepened disappointment among the beneficiaries of the assistance in the ability of the program to
provide meaningful compensation for the losses of freer trade. In other words, it perpetuated the
cycle of administration, criticism, retrenchment, and rehabilitation in adjustment assistance.
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4. Brief Conclusion: Tenacious Compensated Liberalization or the Last Hurrah?
The period between 1973 and 1982 revealed the tenacity of compensated liberalization
premised upon improving trade adjustment assistance for trade-impacted workers and firms, with
at least one, more industry-specific, side payments during the international phase of the Tokyo
Rund. This pattern provides broad support for the theory of compensated liberalization. In all
cases, the political motivation for providing side payments 3 a way to defuse opposition was
much more important than concern for fairness. And in all cases, that political motivation
highlighted the importance and explanatory limits power resource and platform conditions.
In the struggle for the 1974 Trade Reform Act, the Administration's original side payment
package of welfare, pension, and MNC tax reforms reflected recognition of how adjustment
assistance had lost its favor among protectionists, of the AFL-CIO's previous Burke-Hartke
demands, and of the loose ends of the Administration's past welfare and pension policy initiatives.
In this sense, bargaining history fueled rejection of one side payment form in favor of others that
preexistent trade policymaking agendas suggested might be superior alternatives. When
liberalizers and protectionists roundly rejected this package, rallying instead around the traditional
TAA side payment, the Administration responded pragmatically: stick with the form of payment
already on the agenda and the basis of the UAW's very particular compensated liberalization.
The unusual provision of industry-specific side payments during tie international phase of
liberalization conforms to the political logic theory of compensated liberalization, but only
retrospectively and with more indeterminacy. More than previous international phases, like the
Kennedy Round negotiating, liquor producers enjoyed more access to the negotiators via the new
consultative bodies set up in the 1974 legislation, had leverage toward risk-averse liberalizers bent
on the wine gallon concession, and were particularly influential due to their ties to Senator
Ribicoff, the Senate Finance Committee Chair. More broadly, US trade negotiators only turned to
the use of some side payments when other negotiating and bargaining tactics for defusing such
opposition, even powerful opposition, had been exhausted. Although speculative, these tactics,
particularly the use of off-setting liberalization concessions crafted at the international level, may
have been less effective than previous international phases. The end result was increased political
power and less ability to defuse it through means other than side payments than in the past,
conditions that broadly "predict" the provision of side payments.
Whatever the explanation for the tenacious compensated liberalization, the decade suggests
a basically vicious cycle for adjustment assistance and compensatory side payments generally given
the power and platforms of both protectionists and liberalizers. As the chapter showed, adjustment
assistance had lost much of its luster in the early years of its administration, had been given up on
by a number of liberalizers and protectionists, made the subject of heightened interest by others as
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a way to off-set the pain of the decades various liberalization initiatives. In the corpus of struggle
for freer trade, supporters of the program's improvement won substantial changes and reforms, the
successes as well as the various disappointments of which fueled further criticisms and
retrenchment -- particularly when once and future liberalization initiatives had faded from memory.
But the past problems with the program had narrowed trade policy platforms of many of the most
powerful protectionists, preventing them from wrest significant reforms and expansions of TAA or
related assistance, such as giving the program stronger and more permanent budgetary footing.
Thus, in between successive legislated trade initiatives, the program would see its fortunes
deteriorate, and fall victim at least sometimes to retrenchment initiatives. Then, during
liberalization or protectionist initiatives, such assistance could continue to be a favored
compensatory side payment in the minds of at least some stalwarts noticing that adjustment
assistance had not been given a chance to realize its. full potential -- precisely because of cutting in
the off-season of trade liberalization. But given the lack of a protectionist coalition with the
resources and multi-issue platforms committed to adjustment assistance, the resulting side payment
was likely to lack ambition and budgetary footing, yet would still be expensive and the target of
budget cutters. Such a cycling was sustainable through the 1980s, even as the TAA program was
strengthened, reformed and expanded in the corpus of struggle over the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act.
But even at its best the program fell short of its promise to facilitate and humanize openness.
If we skip over this 1980s continuation of the side payment cycling of TAA, however, we
stumble upon side payment politics that generated starkly more diverse and generous compensated
liberalization. Those politics were marked by significant shifts in the power and platforms of
protectionists and in the dynamics of bargaining between and among liberalizers and protectionists.
Significantly, the shifts took place around and partly because of a trilateral rather than multi-lateral
trade liberalization episode.
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Chapter Five
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was the most controversial and
bitterly contested trade policy initiative in US history, and may well eclipse the Smoot-Hawley
tariff as the most remembered. Never before have so many groups, from so many different
perspectives and with so much intensity, entered the trade policymaking fray. And with the lines
of battle so preposterous -- logging companies standing arm-in-arm with environmentalists; right
wing nativists finding common cause with left wing internationalists -- never has US trade policy
been so entertaining.
Given such intense and eclectic fighting, perhaps it is little surprise that the NAFTA is the
US trade initiative with the richest side payment politics. Never has political struggle over
liberalization spawned so many and so varied compensatory side payments. Not only was there
continued upward-ratcheting and reform of trade adjustment assistance -- this time under the mantle
of a dedicated NAFTA adjustment assistance program -- there was also a flood of new
compensation payments: international institutions to monitor and enforce a limited range of
environmental and labor rights and conditions; large-scale funding for environmental cleanup; a
North American Development Bank to pay for infrastructural, environmental and job projects in
trade-impacted regions; and a bewildering array of pork side payments, such as a textile research
center for one congressman and a couple C-17 military planes for another.
The NAFTA compensation is also memorable because it was not a purely national affair.
Much of the NAFTA compensation, such as the adjustment assistance provisions and the pork,
conformed to the pattern of past US compensation in that it emerged during domestic phases of the
episode and was provided solely by national government institutions. However, the labor and
environmental side agreements -- establishing a series of institutions and programs to monitor and
upgrade labor and environmental conditions that Clinton sought to "repair". his predecessor's
agreement -- were negotiated at the international level and were to be run as supra-national
institutions with some autonomy.
This chapter tells the story of NAFTA as a tale of unprecedented compensated
liberalization. Its focus is on explaining why the negotiations elicited such a wide range of side
payments to so many groups -- more than any previous US liberalization episode -- and why some
of the payments were negotiated and provided at the supranational level. Focusing on the variation
among groups, moreover, the case study also seeks to explain why some groups received more
generous side payments than others, why some got protectionist exemptions instead, and why still
others got no redress at all.
The answer, the history reveals, can again be found largely in the power and platforms of
the bargaining groups. For instance, the unprecedented scale and variety of compensatory side
payments is due in part to the unprecedented breadth and determination of the protectionist coalition
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mobilized to revise or defeat the NAFTA. This implied one of the most powerful protectionist
coalitions that free traders had ever faced, yet not so much as to push Bush and Clinton off the free
trade path.' In the face of such opposition, offers of redress to at least some of the opposition was
necessary to secure passage of the NAFTA at various phases of its negotiation and ratification.
Just as important was the sheer diversity and multi-issue platforms of the groups comprised
by the protectionist coalition. With groups joined in an alliance that somehow bridged their diverse
motivations and past hostilities, it was tempting and possible for liberalizers to identify side deals
that could split the coalition. Most of the important groups in that coalition, moreover, approached
the NAFTA fight with explicitly multi-issue trade policy platforms. Most of the environmental
groups, new to the trade policy game, approached the table explicitly offering to support the
NAFTA conditional upon a variety of policy safeguards -- conditions that easily invited side
payment buy offs. Organized labor, moreover, had inched away from unconditional protectionism
and towards a stance that offered acquiesence conditional upon adequate labor rights institutions
and adjustment assistance. These multi-issue platforms, some explicitly supporting the NAFTA in
exchange for side payments, consistently brought compensation into the bargaining, along-side
protectionist redress. Given the power and platforms of the anti-NAFTA coalition, the NAFTA
case comes as close as any in the US to a best-case scenario for side payment compensation.
The case also offers more mixed news about the propriety of compensation. Actual
effectiveness in humanizing liberalization can only be tentatively addressed since programs set up
as side payments are still unfolding. But the ambition of the redress varied. Environmental
groups, for instance, got new institutions with stronger monitoring and enforcement powers, and
greater resources, than the counterpart institutions provided to Labor. They also received more
funding for cleanup than labor did for retraining and community development. Averaging out the
experiences with different side payment provisions, the provisions offered real relief to many of
liberalization's victims, though less and less systematically than hoped for or than is ideal.
At the same time, the episode contains only a few discernible cases of extortionate or rent-
seeking demands, even once the side payment pork flowed as never before in trade policy-making.
In the most profligate stages of the side payment politics, a few groups clearly exaggerated their
demands and needs to get more from an Administration eager to make deals, and held out their
NAFTA vote for favors even when they saw net benefits to the free trade pact. But the big players
never asked for, or got, side payment packages that were above their own projections of loss or
risk. For instance, organized labor and their congressional champions called for huge adjustment
That they stayed on that path is itself a minor side puzzle, whose answer lies partly in both presidents seeing the
NAFTA as modestly improving the US economy while strongly bolstering the forces of stability in Mexico, and
partly in underestimating the breadth and determination of opposition.
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assistance packages and ambitious labor rights protections -- much more than they actually got --
but these didn't outstrip their own job-loss and race-to-the-bottom fears.
Finally, the political effectiveness of the compensation also varied across groups and stages
of the episode, but again can be seen as having played a significant role in securing the political
support for NAFTA's legislative approval. The environmental compensation consistently split
environmental lobbies, buying active support of some of the largest of these, and providing some
cover for green legislators supportive of the liberalization. The pork benefits also show clear signs
of having won over key votes at a time when the margin of victory was very narrow. Even where
compensation failed to buy support or acquiescence, as with the variety of laborite compensation
provisions, they showed signs of having moderated the opposition of important legislators.
This story of the character, origins, and propriety of NAFTA compensation unfolds in
three sections. The first introduces the NAFTA as a liberalization initiative that was unprecedented
in freeing up trade and investment with a country relatively so undeveloped and poor. The result
was that the proposal threatened sharp distributional costs and competition in regulatory laxity.
This, in turn, promised particularly intense and broad-based conflict that made the NAFTA fight
ripe territory for side payment exchange.
The second section lays out the various societal and governmental groups arrayed against
the NAFTA initiative. This requires describing and unpacking the eclectic coalition that the
NAFTA spawned. In particular, it requires a close look at the evolving trade policy platforms and
political resources of the coalition's main members: organized labor, especially the AFL-CIO and
its constituent unions; environmental groups; industry and agricultural producers; and various
consumer, minority, and religious organizations that also entered the fray. The punch-line, here, is
that the anti-NAFTA coalition was a protectionist force of unprecedented breadth and
determination, and encompassed many important members (labor and environmental groups) with
multi-issue or compensated liberalization trade platforms -- thus revealing the presence of the main
preconditions for side payment provision.
Section three, the chapter's longest and most important, lays out how the NAFTA's side
payment politics unfolded. These politics can be broken down into three stages, with a distinct set
of side payment provisions promised or provided in each: the fight over fast-track authority for the
Bush Administration's negotiation of the original agreement; the succeeding Clinton
Administration's negotiation of supplemental "side" agreements; and the end-game flurry of side
payment politicking in the final weeks and hours of the NAFTA ratification fight. In each section,
we consider the side payment demands and responses, and the political effectiveness of each. A
fourth section concludes, briefly overviewing the origins and propriety of the NAFTA
compensation in light of past US trade episodes and theoretical expectations.
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1. NAFTA Liberalization: An Unprecedented Proposal
The NAFTA initiative grew out of the broader economic liberalization project of Mexico's
ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), begun in 1985 by the PRI's leader, Miguel de la
Madrid and continued by his successor, Carlos Salinas de Gortari. 2 By the end of the decade this
liberalization had begun to bear fruit, with overall GNP, investment and exports growing, and with
unemployment and inflation shrinking. This recovery was based in no small part on increased
trade with the US -- by 1989, 88% of its exports went to the US, and it was the US's third largest
export target and import source -- and heavy FDI from the US, much of it auto and other
manufacturing assembly plants in the Maquiladora region (NJ 9/29/90, p.2325).
In early 1990, Salinas proposed a free trade agreement with the United States in the hopes
of consolidating the neo-liberal trajectory. 3 Such a free trade agreement was only a vague idea at
the time, but offered on the heels of the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement it was expected to be a
thorough-going reduction of barriers to trade and investment: significant lowering or elimination
of tariff and quota barriers, subsidies, preferential procurement policies, and other non-tariff
barriers; and safeguards for investment property rights, and offering foreign investors equal
treatment to their domestic counter-parts.
Such liberalization would constitute more substantial changes in trade and investment
policies and practices for Mexico than for the US. For instance, even after unilateral reductions in
tariffs, Mexico imposed a 20 percent tariff on many imports, high excise taxes on others -- e.g. a
50 percent excise tax on large cars -- and many quotas and other non-tariff barriers -- e.g. a rule
that auto assemblers must balance imports and exports in Mexico.4 Most US tariffs, however,
were between 2 and 5 percent, with the occasional but important exception -- such as a 25 percent
tariff on light trucks -- and other NTBs and investment discrimination were more modest (CQ
Weekly 10/16/93, p.2793). Thus, phased-in reduction in trade and investment barriers and
improved property rights protections would demand more action South of the border than North.
Although US policymakers anticipated the possibility of a US-Mexico initiative -- the 1988
Omnibus legislation explicitly gave presidential authority to negotiate such an agreement -- the
2 The liberalization involved privatizing state monopolies, such as petroleum, deregulating many other industries,
and unilaterally lowering tariffs by more than 50 percent in five years. This project was itself a response to the
massive stagflation and foreign debt Mexico faced by the mid- 1980s, a state of affairs that many in the PRI and
elsewhere blamed on the country's over-regulation and protectionism.
3 For Mexico the payoff of such action would likely be to increase its export market access and provide major new
incentives for US foreign direct and portfolio investment. By tying the economy closer to the US, moreover, such a
free trade agreement would codify, or anchor, the PRI's liberalization reforms to an international agreement -- thus
consolidating the neo-liberal transformation. A generous reading of Salinas's initiative, if his own press was to be
believed, was that this anchoring would also stabilize the economy and promote democratic reform.
' Mexico also had a history of discriminatory regulation of FDI and a history of nationalization.
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Bush Administration was initially reluctant to accept Salinas's offer. Apparently, the president and
his trade advisors were loathe to do anything that might interfere with progress in the on-going
Uruguay Round of GATT. They feared that any action on a US-Mexico agreement would take
time and resources away from the GATT front, and conventional policy wisdom was still that
bilateral free trade areas or other regional preferential arrangements would undermine multilateral
liberalization, though the relationship between bilateralism and multilateralism was widely debated
in economic and political policy circles at the time -- as it continues to be today.
By mid-1990, however, Bush had come around to see a number of significant benefits to
pursuing the free trade accord. The Uruguay Round, by that Spring, had stalled and appeared
unlikely to go anywhere soon. A US-Mexico free trade agreement offered the prospect of keeping
the liberalization train running despite this blockage on the multilateral front, and might even help
jump-start the GATT talks, if only through threat of bilateral agreements circumventing multilateral
free trade. And the Administration wanted to hedge its trade policy bets against regionalism
generally -- with the world divided into European, Asian, and American economic blocs.
Most of all, however, Bush officials recognized the immediate and distant economic
benefits of liberalizing trade and investment with Mexico. With trade and investment barriers
complicating access to the Mexican markets, the liberalization would rapidly increase what was
already the US's third largest export market. And liberalized investment access and improved
property rights protections would safeguard growing FDI in manufacturing and services. The
Maquiladora free trade zone -- established as a loophole to the 1974 Trade Reform Act -- had
already invited an explosion in manufacturing investment, as much $2 billion on assembly plants,
with the number of facilities growing from 120 in 1970 to roughly 2,000 in 1991, employing
roughly 450,000 workers (NJ 4/27/91, p.984).5 The NAFTA promised to protect and expand
such investment opportunities. Such increased trade and investment would particularly help US
multinational enterprises, and would also stabilize neo-liberal economic reform and, possibly,
political quietude under PRI leadership. This would serve the Bush Administration foreign policy
concern with a volatile neighbor's economy and polity. As the NAFTA became increasingly linked
to the neo-liberal, democratic stability in Mexico, partly through Salinas's posturing and promises
to his own polity, this foreign policy goal was to become a major reason why Bush, and Clinton
after him, were such determined NAFTA champions.6
Thus, in June 1990 Bush and Salinas agreed to negotiate a free trade agreement, and on
September 26th, 1990, Bush formally announced to Congress his intention to do so. When Brian
Mulroney's Canadian Conservatives feared that the planned bilateral agreement would undermine
' 35 percent of total US exports to Mexico, and nearly all capital goods exports, went to assembly plants in the
Maquiladora region, for reexport, mainly back into the US (AFL-CIO 1992).
6 As one reporter quipped, the liberalizers in the Bush and Clinton Administrations maintained that "the future of
our economy, of our democracy, of life itself, rested on passage of NAFTA" (in NYT 7/3/93).
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Canadian gains from the US-Canada FTA, his government announced in February 1991 that it,
too, would join the talks. This made the proposed initiative not just a US-Mexican, but a North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a free trade area comprising a $6 trillion dollar market.
Such a NAFTA was an unprecedented proposal in US trade history, for it sought nearly
free trade and investment with a country whose micro and macro-economy was so much less
developed than the US's. Mexico's per capita annual income of $1,760 was dwarfed by the US's
$19,840 and Canada's $16,960. Wages were a fraction of US standards. Average hourly
compensation, including wages and benefits, for US manufacturing workers was $17.10
compared to a Mexican average of $2.61 for all workers, and $1.75 for maquiladora workers in
direct competition with US workers (IPS 1996, p.2). Official minimum wages averaged 70 cents
in most regulated industries, compared with universal US minimum of $4.25 (BLS Report).
US and Mexico were just as different in the laws and regulations that protected and
enforced labor rights and conditions, and environmental standards. Mexico's labor and
environmental regulations were improving unilaterally under Salinas, and were often similar to US
laws and regulations, sometimes stronger. But the willingness and capacity to enforce these laws
were far lower. Lapses in enforcement of environmental impact statements, for instance, were
very common. And even after significant growth, the budget of its Secretaria de Desarrollo
Urbano y Econlogia (SEDUE) -- the national institution for environmental protection monitoring,
enforcement, and cleanup -- was still roughly the size of that for the state of Texas alone (NJ
9/29/90 p.2327; Hufbauer and Schott 1993, pp.9 1-2). Thus, health and safety standards, abuses
of child labor laws, violations of worker rights of association and collective bargaining, were more
widespread than in the US. And enforced environmental standards, such as emissions and waste
treatment regulations, were far below US levels (Ward to Senate Finance, Set. 16,1992).
Proposing to liberalize trade and investment with such an under-developed neighbor had
profound implications for the intensity and scope of domestic political conflict within the US, and
hence for side payment politics. The implications, in fact, went far beyond that suggested by the
anticipated benefits or costs to aggregate growth and employment -- that overall economic effects,
hence conflict, should be muted. The estimates ranged from an optimistic 400,000 net jobs gained
by 1998 (USA*NAFTA) to a pessimistic 550,000 net jobs lost after ten years (EPI 1991). In
between was the most cited Institute of International Economics study predicting a net increase in
GNP of roughly .003 percent and in US employment of 170,000 one year after the NAFTA's
enactment (Hufbauer and Schott 1993, p. 14). 7 These estimates reflected different models for
7 The prediction was that this 170,nC0 figure would be reached by 1995, five years after the NAFTA was first
proposed. Hufbauer and Schott weke writing this estimate in early 1993, and the NAFTA was expected to be in
place by January 1994, implying that the 170,000 figure would be one year after enactment. But their estimates
assumed the NAFTA had important employment effects as soon as the NAFTA idea was announced, let alone
negotiated and enacted (H&S 1993, p. 14).
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predicting trade flows and employment effects, and more importantly, different assumptions about
existence of full employment and foreign direct investment flows and plant relocations. 8 Whatever
the net gains or losses expected, none amounted to much in terms of aggregate US employment
change or GNP. For instance, a gain of .003 percent of GNP and of 170,000 jobs in one year
represented less than the random monthly changes in these indicators (2.5 percent GNP in the last
quarter of 1993; and + or - 217,000 in February 1994) (Conybeare and Zinkula 1996, pp.1-2).
But these aggregate effects masked several anticipated economic effects that spelled real
conflict. First, freeing trade with a developing country threatened to have stronger distributional
effects -- big benefits for some domestic groups and costs for others -- than comparable
liberalization with more similar trading partners.9 Mexico and the US, by virtue of development
and geographic differences, had very different factor endowments: the US was relatively abundant
in capital and land, and relatively scarce in labor, especially less skilled labor; Mexico was the
opposite, with capital and land being the relatively scarce factors and unskilled labor the abundant
factor (Magee 1989, p. 182; Deardorff and Strern 1979, p. 129).'0 Common extensions of standard
trade theory predict that freeing trade between countries with such factor endowments should bring
benefits to US capital and land owners -- in the form of higher prices, profits, and rents -- and
costs to US labor, especially unskilled labor -- in the form of lower wages and unemployment."
US-Mexican free trade, thus, threatened to pose stronger distributional costs than freeing trade
with a more similarly endowed trading partner like Canada.
These strong distributional effects would result from trade alone, without any shifts in
people or investment. But the trade liberalization, the investment protections, and the proximity of
Mexico to the US also predicted some shift in investment as a result of the NAFTA. Predictions
on these flows varied as much or more than predictions about trade.' 2 But the overall distributional
8 The optimistic estimate of 225,0000 net jobs gained by 1999, by the Economic Strategy Institute, was premised
on the presumption of full employment and that "Mexico is not used as an export platform into America" NJ
5/11/91, p.1 116. The Hufbauer and Schott made similar assumptions (H&S 1993). The pessimistic estimate of
550,000 jobs lost in ten years, from an Economic Policy Institute-sponsored study, rested on the assumption that
$44 billion in capital would go from US to Mexico in the same decade (EPI 1991, p.9).
9 Standard trade theory, the Heckscher-Ohlin variant of the theory of comparative advantage, predicts that countries
will trade to take advantage of their differences, each country specializing in and exporting products that make
intensive use of the factors of production in which the country is abundantly endowed, while importing products
intensive in more scarce factors.
"o Therefore, even though the countries traded with eachother for lots of other reasons -- such as to take advantage of
local learning or economies of scale, implying intra-industry trade -- the starkly different factor endowments in the
US vs Mexico implied more inter-industry trade based on comparative advantage.
" The generic prediction of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is that benefits of freer trade go to the owners of
relatively abundant factors as demand for their product rises, while imposing costs to scarce factor owners as demand
for their product drops. How much these costs and benefits flow to entire factors rather than industry-specific
segments depends on how mobile the factors are: the more mobile the more unified the effects within factors,
regardless of whether capital or labor was being used in an import-competing and tradable segment or in an
internationally-competitive or non-tradable segment.
12 Some speculated that much of past investment in Mexico had been designed to circumvent Mexican tariffs, and
that freer trade would reduce the incentive to relocate into Mexico. Others, particularly labor groups which had
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consequences of such liberalization would be in the same direction as the Stolper-Samuelson trade
consequences: US capital should benefit while labor loses.
Quantitative estimates of the combined effects of changed trade and investment flows
varied, though all agreed that in the medium term, it looked hard for unskilled and semi-skilled
labor. The low-end estimates by the Clinton administration expected 22,500 lost jobs in the first
18 months. High-end estimates predicted millions of jobs lost by the end of ten years (EPI 1991).
The most cited and influential IIE estimate predicted between 145,000 and 200,000 jobs lost due to
increased imports between the 1990 NAFTA announcement and 1995, one year after proposed
enactment (Hufbauer and Schott 1993, p. 16).'3 These losses were expected to be concentrated in
manufactures; an unreleased March 1991 Commerce Department study, for instance, projected job
losses of more than 40 percent in some key industries, such as auto parts, steel, shoes and textiles.
And trade economist Edward Leamer offered a pointed prediction capturing how unskilled US
workers, whether or not employed in these import-competing sectors, would generally be the big
losers -- suffering income losses of as much as $1,000 per year, partly as a result of continued
openness and partly as a result of NAFTA liberalization (Learner 1992, p.87, Conybeare 1996,
p.3). Despite disagreements about these projections, most economists, policymakers, and interest
groups anticipated that the NAFTA would have clear and broad winners and losers (Lustig et.al.
1992, passim; Hinajosa-Ojeda and Robinson 1992).
Not only was NAFTA liberalization expected to impose particularly sharp costs on labor as
a factor of production, those costs were expected to fall particularly hard on organized labor. The
industries most likely to be hit hard by NAFTA -- textiles, trucking, steel, and auto assembly --
were also highly unionized sectors of the US economy, and constituted the back-bone of organized
labor and its umbrella political organization, the AFL-CIO. Organizationally as well as
economically, then, the NAFTA's costs in the US were expected to be very concentrated.
Mexico's Third-world status implied not only stronger distributional costs, particularly for
organized labor, but could also be expected to undermine the perceived fairness, and hence
acceptability, of those costs. NAFTA's costs would be the result in part of Mexico's comparative
advantages, which in turn lay partly, obviously not wholly, in its exploitation of labor and
environmental rights, conditions, and laws. As many political commentators and at least one
mainstream economist (Rodrik 1996) have recognized, the distributional costs resulting from this
exploitation could be seen as more unfair than those resulting from more "legitimate," inherent
country differences, existing within broadly held values and legally codified regulations. In other
suffered factory relocations, expected the trade liberalization and property rights protections to allow and safeguard
more FDI in Mexico, thereby leading to shifts in investment from US to Mexico ranging from $12.5 to $46 billion
(EPI 1991; Cypher 1993, p.88).
" As we see below, this estimate was the Bush Administration's benchmark for devising the level of adjustment
assistance it was willing to offer as compensation.
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words, in so far as lax labor and environmental regulations were expected to be the basis upon
which NAFTA imposes stark distributional costs, political conflict could be expected to be harsher
-- even if US standards and regulations were not to be hurt by the liberalization.
But many also feared that these US-Mexican differences in standards and regulations
would give competitive advantages to companies operating in a less regulated and unionized
setting, in turn hurting US competitors or inducing companies to flee the more costly US
production setting for Mexico's. Either through economic necessity or political action, many
observers worried, such a competition in laxity or "race to the bottom" would undermine US
standards and regulations. However speculative these fears, they could not be easily contradicted
by existing empirical studies, only by more optimistic speculation (c.f. Krugman 1993, passim;
Krueger 1996). Since so many groups had come to regard these US conditions, laws, and
regulations as hallmark achievements of US economic and political progress, many groups who
otherwise cared little about trade liberalization were bound to fear the NAFTA. The groups in this
category included unions and environmental organizations, but also social rights groups concerned
with the future of the welfare state, consumer rights advocates concerned with the future of product
health and safety regulations, and human rights organizations concerned about worker rights.
In short, when the Bush Administration agreed to negotiate the NAFTA, it was asking for a
fight. The distributional effects were likely to be more concentrated on organized labor than
previous liberalizations -- fueling particularly intense organized opposition. And the real or
perceived threats to labor and environmental rights, conditions, and regulations -- not to mention
the broader social security system -- was of interest to a range of groups beyond those traditionally
worried about trade, hence a particularly broad organized opposition.
2. Boot-leggers and Baptists: the Anti-NAFTA Coalitions
Consistent with these anticipated divisive economic effects, the NAFTA proposal spawned
the most determined and broad-based protectionist coalition in the history of US trade
policymaking. Over the three-year NAFTA fight, more and more groups from all walks of life and
for all kinds of reasons entered the policymaking fray. Emerging from this fray was a "bootlegger-
and-baptist" coalition comprising groups that were sworn enemies on many issues, but that found
common cause in their fervent desire to reform or defeat the NAFTA. When a North Dakota
journalist saw that the NAFTA had "brought the sugar beet people and the labor folks together...,"
he understated matters by observing that "It's not the sort of coalition of interests that we've come
to expect" (Jacobs, Grand Forks Herald, cited in NJ 10/16/93, p.2472).
This bootlegger-baptist coalition consisted broadly of four groups: (1) labor unions, both
the AFL-CIO and affiliated and independent industry unions; (2) environmentalist organizations,
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including both establishment and more fringe versions; (3) import-competing industries, the most
familiar of the protectionists; and (4) a hodge-podge of consumer, religious, human rights, and
other broad-based interest groups. Groups in each of these categories agitated to defeat or revise
the NAFTA, either acting alone, in regionally-based coalitions, in informal national consultations
and coordination, or in formal NAFTA-dedicated groups (e.g. Citizen's Trade Watch Campaign).
What matters most for side payment pGlitics -- for whether struggle was to yield side
payments, and for whether groups were to receive compensation rather than protectionist redress
or nothing -- are the political resources and trade policy platforms of the coalition groups. The
activity of these groups over the course of the NAFTA fight reveal a picture of their power and
platforms. A number of groups mobilized huge political resources to defeat or retaliate against the
liberalization's passage, implying unprecedented determination and breadth of the protectionist
coalition. And many of the groups at the center of the coalition approached the NAFTA fight with
multi-issue platforms, in some cases platforms explicitly linking acceptance of NAFTA to side
payments. Such a profile suggests very favorable conditions for side payments. And the varying
power resources and platforms differentiating groups suggest which groups were most likely to
receive generous side payments, which protectionist redress alone, and which nothing at all.
2.1. Organized Labor: Furious Fair Trade Protectionism
The largest, most committed, and most powerful players in the anti-NAFTA coalition were
labor unions, including the AFL-CIO and a number of industry-specific unions.14 Since organized
labor had been important protectionist players for more than twenty years and since the projected
distributional consequences suggested they had the most to lose, there's little surprise that these
unions fought to revise or kill the liberalization more passionately than anyone. The nature of their
opposition platform, however, varied over time and across particular unions -- ranging from
unconditional protectionism simply seeking to kill the agreement, to more multi-issue platforms
suggesting acceptance of the NAFTA conditional upon the provision of side payment provisions.
Whatever the platform, moreover, Labor fought harder and mobilized more power resources than it
had ever before on any trade legislation, and more than any other anti-NAFTA group.
14 The most active unions, captured in part by the frequency of their congressional testimony, were the following:
AFL-CIO (25 appearances); UAW (14 appearances); Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU)
(10 appearances); International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) (10 appearances); Teamsters (7
appearances); International Union of Electricians (IUE) (10 appearances); United Steelworkers (8 appearances); the
United Food Workers (UFCW) (4 appearances). CIS 1993, P.L.103-182 Hrgs, pp.333-61.
This count is based on appearances in the 56 House and Senate Hearings indexed in CIS/INDEX 1993; plus
two other major Senate Finance and House Ways and Means hearings not indexed. There were another 30 hearings
held, which were not indexed and that I didn't review. Of these, nine received labor testimony.
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2. 1. Labor's Platform: Partial Move from Unconditional to Conditional Protectionism
The trade policy platforms of the AFL-CIO and other unions engaging the NAFTA fight
varied over time and across unions. From the very outset of the NAFTA proposal, all unions
fervently opposed the liberalization. Mark Anderson, the AFL-CIO's chief trade economist
introduced this basic position early in the fight:
The AFL-CIO views the prospect of such an agreement with considerable
alarm.....Mexico's single comparative advantage is the poverty of its citizens and their
willingness to work for subsistence wages. No matter how productive, US workers
cannot compete with labor costs of less than $1 an hour. A free-trade agreement will only
encourage greater capital outflows from the US, bring about an increase in imports from
Mexico and further harm the US industrial base. (NJ 9/29/90, pp.2326-7).
But this alarmed opposition to the NAFTA wasn't uniform across unions or over the life of the
three-year fight. What union representatives said about NAFTA liberalization in press interviews
and conferences, in House and Senate Hearings testimony, in union-sponsored actions (speeches
and advertising, lobbying), in Labor Advisory Committee reports, and in official union policy
statements (Convention Resolutions), revealed significant differences and changes in the NAFTA
platform that affected how open they were to side payment overtures.
Most unions at the very beginning of that fight, and some unions throughout, simply
continued the unconditional protectionism that had dominated organized labor's trade policy
platform since the 1970s. In this vein, unions tried to kill the agreement without any attempt to
revise or humanize the agreement with any issue linkage. Union representatives opposed the
agreement's liberalization provisions and called for various exemptions and revisions: generally
maintained or heightened tariffs or quotas on a range of agricultural and industrial products; more
stringent rules of origin that would keep the free trade area as much of a fortress as possible; longer
phasing-in of any liberalization; clearer and more generous escape clause relief in the event of
increased imports (import surges); and new duties on products produced by firms that could be
presumed or shown to take advantage of lax labor or environmental regulations ("social tariff").' 5
While demanding such protectionist redress, union representatives sometimes also made
the same side-issue demands mentioned periodically ever since the late 1960s. They continued to
highlight the inadequacy of past assistance and the hopelessness of such assistance to fully mitigate
liberalization's costs, while stating their support for continued adjustment assistance targeted at
'5 These demands were not expressed fully until later in the NAFTA's negotiation, and then only sometimes fully
developed at any one time, by any one labor representative. For a relatively complete list of demands see the
September 1992 preliminary report of the Labor Advisory Committee (LAC 1992, pp. 1-2).
In reports, press, and hearings, protectionist demands for restrictive rules of origin, slow phasing in, partial
or full tariff exemption, were starkest from particular industries: see, for instance, IUE's President Bywater's
testimony, UAW President Bieber's testimony, in Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings 1991 (March 12),
pp.48-62. The AFL-CIO statements provided the most encompassing protectionist statements. See, for example,
AFL-CIO's Donahue Senate Finance 1991 (February 6), pp.31-44; House Ways and Means Feb.21, pp.335-63.
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trade-impacted workers as better than nothing. Sometimes they explicitly demanded using taxes
and regulations to discourage outwaid foreign direct investment. And they sometimes even called
for stepped-up international coordination to promote improved international labor rights and
conditions. Sometimes, union representatives summarized this three-pronged position by calling
for negotiations focused on integration generally rather than only on trade and investment, such as
in this statement by UAW economist Steve Beckman:
Trade should be an element of a development program that is intended to raise living standards,
improve conditions for the vast majority of workers and citizens of all parties concerned, whether it
is the US and Mexico and Canada, or whoever. The focus ought to be development, not trade
(House Public Works Hearings May 8, 1991, p. 113).
But in very few of their multi-issue pronouncements did representatives offer specific
demands on these side issues and in none did they express a willingness to soften their opposition
to freer trade conditional upon government action to address these other issues. In the early
Congressional hearings to consider the proposed NAFTA's virtues and vices, legislators
consistently asked the testifying labor representatives whether they could envision any
circumstances under which they could accept a NAFTA. The exchange between Senator Dodd and
William Bywater, President of the International Union of Electricians, during Senate Foreign
Relations Hearings on Fast Track approval to negotiate a NAFTA, captures the typical response:
Senator Dodd: ...What I hear you saying is that you are opposed to the fast track, but there
is no stated opposition to a free trade agreement with Mexico. Is that correct?
Mr. Bywater: No, I would not say that. Certainly not for my union.
Senator Dodd: You are opposed to a free trade agreement no matter what?
Mr.Bywater: Yes. I think the difference in wages, a 20-to-1 ratio, is just
ridiculous...(Senate Foreign Relations 1991 (March 14), p.59).
Sometimes, union representatives were more conciliatory, but only slightly, expressing a
willingness to see what the agreement would hold before fully casting its judgement, though
without any specifics (see Dubrow's stance in the same hearings). Almost all published statements
on the agreement before early 1993 were unconditionally protectionist, since they say nothing
specific about what provisions might make the NAFTA agreement acceptable or less objectionable.
The labor stance was also unconditionally protectionist in the early stages of the fight in that
the AFL-CIO and most member unions made little effort to gain access to the pro-NAFTA
Administrations to press their case and to discuss details of the agreement. Partly this was the
result of being excluded by the Bush Administration and, to a lesser degree, by even the early
Clinton administration. But both administrations claimed to have received few overtures from
labor to discuss details and to receive more frequent and deeper consultation (Grayson 1995).
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Instead, labor simply thought the initiative should be stopped dead in its tracks. Whether or not
this was wise as a strategic or tactical position, it discouraged side payment provision.
As the NAFTA fight matured, however, the AFL-CIO leaders and some influential member
union leaders softened this unconditional stance in favor of conciliation: offering less opposition to
the liberalization, or even support, conditional upon expanded adjustment assistance, and
institutionalized safeguards for specific labor rights. This shift was part of labor's u it towards a
"fair trade" internationalism, begun in the early 1980s. Several considerations -- continued
deunionization, accelerating globalization in trade and investment, and recognition that
protectionism bought few gains and fed Labor's public image as a rent-seeking "special interest" --
had inspired some union leaders to rethink their legislative and organizing strategy, including their
unconditional protectionist platform. Along with tactical and strategic changes over whom to
collaborate with and how, came a willingness to soften opposition to freer trade conditional upon a
variety of compensation provisions, especially codified protections of international labor rights.
This shift gained momentum in establishing the Caribbean Basin Initiative, revising the OPIC and
renewing Generalized System of Preferences, when unions sought formal protections for labor
rights, including collective bargaining rights, as conditions for preferential market or aid access.'6
With the maturation of the NAFTA fight, this fair trade position seeped into the union
platform, became further developed in the process, and ultimately supplanted the unconditional
position among some union strategists. By the end of the fast track loss, it became clear that
simply pushing to kill the NAFTA initiative was unlikely to succeed and might be symbolically
unwise, and that there might be room for significant changes in and compensation for the
liberalization. Between the fight over Fast Track in the first year of the NAFTA struggle and the
time that Clinton publicly planned to negotiate supplemental accords and offered expansive
retraining assistance, the AFL-CIO and other unions began to offer "constructive" suggestions
about how the NAFTA could be revised or its victims compensated so as to be less objectionable.
This move to a more conciliatory, multi-issue protectionism began when some of the AFL-
CIO affiliates took part in meetings with Canadian and a few Mexican labor, citizen action, and
environmental groups to outline an alternative vision for hemispheric integration and free trade --
based on embedding such integration in upwardly harmonized labor and environmental rights and
standards, and well-funded and stable adjustment assistance for workers and communities (Cowie
1997). It continued when the AFL-CIO leadership prodded the Clinton leadership to consider the
International Labor Organization's basic labor rights -- especially those covering freedom of
association, protection of organizing rights and collective bargaining (Conventions 87 and 98) -- as
an outline of the rights to be monitored and protected (AFL-CIO 1993; Cowie 1997, p.24).
16 The 1988 Omnibus Trade Act, of course, also included successful labor demands to add labor rights to the list of
"unfair trade practices" eligible for sanction under Section 301.
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But the conciliatory position was most prominent when the Clinton Administration came
into office on its campaign promise to negotiate labor and the environment side deals. After
periodic consultations between union officials and Administration representatives, the AFL-CIO
Executive Council formally changed its NAFTA position away from simple opposition, toward a
"wait-and-see" attitude, with softened opposition conditional upon actions on adjustment assistance
and protections for labor rights and conditions -- especially through international machinery to
protect not only health/safety standards, and child labor rights, but also collective bargaining rights
(ILO Conventions 87 and 98) -- on a par with intellectual property rights protections.
The hope was that this linkage would be codified as part of the NA.FTA package of
international agreements and institutions, to ensure a stable source of funding and support for a
previously precarious adjustment assistance and to ensure adequate enforcement of labor rights on
a par with investment protections (Robinson 1995; Cowie 1997). ACTWU President Jack
Sheinkman's testimony to the House Ways and Means captures the more conciliatory positioning:
We're prepared to work with Clinton and the Congress to improve the agreement...
[especially on] the creation of (1) enforcement mechanism for upward harmonization of
labor standards and protections of freedom of worker rights, (2) adequate Trade
Adjustment Assistance, and (3) reforms to assure rights of undocumented Mexican
workers and greater Mexican cooperation to patrol borders....Ourfinal position on NAFTA
depends on progress in these areas. (Ways and Means Trade Subcom. 3/11/93, p.148; my italics).
Significantly, Sheinkman's statement not only identifies the linkable issues but also explicitly
signals willingness to engage the liberalizers to improve details of the agreement, and to the explicit
conditionality between their position on the NAFTA and the provision of the side issues.
Once the side agreements were clearly going to lack the worker rights protections and other
labor-friendly provisions, AFL-CIO representatives resumed their all-out fight against NAFTA's
passage, claiming that the conditions for their support of the NAFTA were not met. To emphasize
their conditional protectionism, however, the banner under which they sought to kill NAFTA had
been reworded in mid-May 1993 from "No NAFTA" to "Not This NAFTA." The most fair-trade
oriented AFL-CIO members co-sponsored and publicized a document released in October 1993 on
the eve of the ratification vote, designed to lay out a detailed alternative NAFTA, one that called for
large-scale adjustment assistance and development aid, and strong international institutions
monitoring and enforcing labor and environmental rights (IPS et.al. 1993). More narrowly, union
leaders consistently attributed their opposition to the failure to secure at the international level
strong institutions to monitor and protect the collective bargaining rights of labor on a part with
intellectual property rights. AFL-CIO Treasury Secretary Thomas Donahue's May 6th testimony
epitomized this focus when he asked supporters of NAFTA to "explain why invention, a labor of
the mind, should be considered more sacrosanct than the labor accomplished by the sweat of the
brow" (Donahue, Senate Commerce, Science and Transport. Committee, May 6, 1993, pp.4-5).
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Labor's embrace of a conciliatory and multi-issue trade policy platform was far from
unanimous and consistent. Different segments of organized labor varied in how much they
departed from the unconditional line. The unions most clearly and actively taking on the
conciliatory fair trade stance were Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU),
United Steelworkers, the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) and, most importantly
and prominently, the AFL-CIO policy elites. A signifi.;ant chunk of Labor, however, stuck with
the unconditional stance, eschewing any conciliatory statements of conditionality and seeking only
to kill the agreement. These included the Teamsters, International Ladies Garment Workers
(ILGW),' 7 the International Union of Electrical workers (IUE), and asundry smaller industry-
specific unions. s' The UAW took a more middle-ground position, sometimes voicing fair trade
themes and co-sponsoring some more explicit conditional platform statements, but usually
portraying the agreement in its various stages as far beyond repair. Since these were the most
active unions in the NAFTA fight, it's fair to say that Labor was modestly but importantly split in
its positioning on the Agreement -- except at the very beginning before the fair trade stance got
further developed, and at the very end when both the unconditional protectionists and the
conditional fair traders wanted to kill "This NAFTA."' 9
Even the unions touting the clearest multi-issue platform, at the most conciliatory
moments of the NAFTA fight, were inconsistent in their proposed platform. In their public
positioning along-side some anti-NAFTA coalition members, especially the nativist isolationists
centered among Perot and Buchanan (Robinson 1995), union representatives were unconditionally
protectionist. And in some of the meetings with administration representatives, union leaders are
said to have wavered between offers of real conciliation and basic unconditional opposition --
suggesting that the latter was the genuine position (interview with Reich 9/10/97). And in some
public fora, representatives would do the same. 20
More importantly, while some union representatives expressed the multi-issue conciliatory
stance in press statements, reports, high-level discussions, and Congressional testimony, in their
dealings with the union rank-and-file other representatives from the same unions generally
17 The ILGW, however, was one of the strongest supporters of more generous and stable trade adjustment assistance.
Along with the other major textile union, ACTWU, their membership had become the largest beneficiary of the
existing TAA program. ILGWU sponsored the 1993 AFL-CIO Convention Resolution No.89 on TAA, calling for
more funding for TRAs, for de-linkage between training and income supplements, and for eligibility of "secondary"
supplier firms. See AFL-CIO Convention Proceedings 1993, p.A47.
18 For instance, the American Flint Glass Workers Union (House Education and Labor, March 30, p.234).
'9 Significantly, it is difficult to predict from the positions of the unions which would be more or less conditional
in their platform. The UAW's unconditional stance might make sense since it arguably had the most to lose and had
a memory of outward FDI to Mexico, but the two major textile unions (ACTWU and ILGW) were modestly split.
The most international unions might be the ones to care most about rights and conditions, but the domestic-oriented
Food Workers were some of the strongest supporters of linkage to labor rights and adjustment assistance.
20 For instance, Thomas Donahue's May 6th Commerce Committee testimony may have focused on the anemic
protections for worker rights, but he then proceeded to lay out more than a dozen protectionist and side issue demands
that went well beyond those listed as the official, more focused AFL-CIO Executive Council platform.
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expressed an unconditional "NO NAFTA" stance. As Cowie 1997 points out, the AFL-CIO and
member unions spent very little time and energy motivating support for the nuanced focus on
institutionalizing international labor rights as part of the NAFTA campaign (p.24-6). This reflects
several factors: that the unions most active in organizing grass-roots support tended to be the more
unconditionally protectionist (e.g. Teamsters); that the phase of grass roots action fell at times
when organized labor was at its most unconditionally protectionist (e.g. very beginning and end of
the NAFTA fight); and that many union organizers believed that the message most likely to
mobilize mass publics and the rank-and-file were bold "No NAFTA" vitriol rather than more
nuanced "Not This NAFTA" conditionality (interview with AFL-CIO's Anderson 5-18-95).
These inconsistencies, together with the shifts over the life of the NAFTA fight and the
split among unions, led many commentators at the time and since to conclude that Labor's fair
trade multi-issue platform was simply a disguise to legitimate its true unconditional protectionism
(Conybeare et.al. 1995 and 1996, Steagall and Jennings 1996, Cowie 1997). Just as likely, the
mixed signals reflect genuine divisions within the labor movement over how to approach trade
issues, and a gradual evolution and popularization of the fair trade approach. The union
representatives towing this approach certainly insist this is the proper interpretation. 2"
The mixed signals, in any event, created ambiguity about what liberalizers could expect to
be the "real" labor position and about whether conditionality promises could be kept. Even the
most committed of the fair trade unionists -- those who publicly stated and defended the AFL-
CIO's willingness to support or dampen opposition to the NAFTA in exchange for strong
institutions to monitor and protect labor rights -- admit that the grass roots momentum generated
behind the "No NAFTA" message might have made it impossible to support a revised NAFTA,
even if Clinton had come through (Anderson and Blackwell, interviews). Administration officials,
for their part, assumed as much (interview with Reich 9/10/97).22
2.1.2. Labor's Power Resources
While the story of Labor's trade policy platform is complicated by splits, inconsistencies,
and change, the story of its power resources is simple: unions mobilized more resources than ever
21 Despite their many differences on details -- such as who in Labor were most and least interested in a conciliatory
position on the NAFTA -- this is the basic consensus of labor's fair trade internationalists, as judged from phone
interviews with Mark Anderson, Pharis Harvey, Steve Beckman, Ron Blackwell.
22 In so far as the mixed messages reflected different platforms for grass-roots mobilization and elite politicking --
different kinds of politics calling for different tactics -- there may have been a tension between two important
preconditions for side payment provision: A conciliatory, multi-issue policy platform might invite access and
improve the final outcome of liberalization, but a simpler, more unconditional protectionism might be necessary to
inspire the rank-and-file union support necessary to maximize the political power Labor needed to be taken seriously.
The unconditional protectionism of some union representatives may also have expressed a tension between
sensing the power to defeat the NAFTA and doing what is necessary to create the best possible NAFTA. Some
unions throughout the fight, and most towards the very end, believed the NAFTA could be defeated AND that no
NAFTA was better than the one that could be passed or revised in the foreseeable future. Hence, stone-wall.
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before on any previous trade, or other, legislative initiative. Such mobilization, of course, was
limited by the general context of Labor's political position vis d vis Bush, Clinton, and
representatives of both parties. In general, continuing decline of union density and membership
spelled increasing marginalization throughout the 1980s.23 And when Bush proposed the NAFTA,
labor unions could be said to have had only meager influence on what the Administration sought
on trade legislation, because of how unimportant they were, indeed opposed to, Bush's electoral
and legislative coalition. With Clinton's election, labor's fortunes substantially brightened, labor
being a major part of the coalitions behind Clinton's candidacy and legislative program. This came
with some access to the policymaking machinery in that Administration, especially the offices of
Robert Reich's Labor Department. Toward certain legislators, moreover, Labor had more
substantial power, particularly in those rust belt legislative districts with high union density -- such
as in Michigan, New York, Ohio.
Against this power back-drop to the NAFTA fight, labor unions trotted out all of the usual
tools for influencing trade legislation, only with greater determination and on a larger scale. This
meant offering frequent and high-profile press statements, in the form of interviews galore but also
Op-Eds and briefing papers through industry-union offices (e.g. IBEW's briefing paper 1992),
AFL-CIO conduits (e.g. AFL-CIO News), and satellite think tanks (e.g. Economic Policy Institute
papers and Institute of Policy Studies papers and press releases). In more formal, elite politics it
meant that unions showed up to give testimony at every possible hearing -- more than thirty
separate hearings devoted to aspects of the NAFTA that legislators deemed relevant to labor
concerns. And it meant personal appeals and lobbying Bush and Clinton Administrations, and all
Senators and Members of Congress, focusing first and foremost on the labor-friendly caucus.
The difference in the NAFTA fight was that Labor stepped up the volume and intensity of
these standard appeals and threats. As the ratification vote approached and all segments of labor
had come together to the basic "kill-This-NAFTA" line -- whether from a formerly conciliatory or
an unconditional protectionism line -- a number of unions made the NAFTA issue the single most,
if not only, litmus test of future union support for Senators and, especially, Members of Congress.
During the October 1993 AFL-CIO Convention, IUE President William Bywater expressed the
most strident position, portraying the NAFTA vote as the sole litmus test of future labor support:
"We've got to ask our congressmen whose side are you on?" If you're on the side of the
multinational corporations [in supporting NAFTA]... we're going to whip your ass and throw you
out of office ....And those that are with us, we should break our ass to see that they're elected...."
23 From a post-War high union density of 31.6 percent in 1955, organized labor had in its fold less than 16.1
percent of the working population by the beginning of the 1990s (Stanley and Niemi 1994, p.190). The AFL-CIO
represented roughly 11 percent of US workers, down from 16.4 percent in '75 (Grayson 1995, p.180). And this drop
involved massive losses for the membership of particular unions. For instance, between 1975 and 1991 United
Steelworkers membership dropped from 1.1 million to 421,000; ILGW from 363,000 to 133,000; machinists from
780,000 to 474,000 (Grayson 1995, p.180).
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(AFL-CIO Convention 1993, p.218).24 AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland assured Clinton and
Congressional Democrats that union support would not ride on the NAFTA vote alone,25 but for
some unions the threats were genuine, and certainly represented stronger threats than in any
previous trade initiative. To those Members most dependent upon union PAC money and support,
of course, the threats mattered hugely; and among the many 1992 freshmen in the House there
were a lot of such dependents.26
Similarly, union representatives also tried to enhance their political power on the NAFTA
vote by signaling that their ability to act in support of future legislation on which unions and
Democrats agreed might be imperiled by NAFTA's passage. AFL-CIO's Lane Kirkland told the
White House that labor had budgeted several million dollars for political activities over the next
year, warning that the money could be used to support care reform or to oppose NAFTA, but not
both (NJ 8/21/93, p.21 12). This is a signaling statement, threatening Clinton to drop NAFTA if
he wants strong support for healthcare. 27
Organized labor also mobilized power resources never before tapped in previous trade
policy campaigns -- or, for that matter, any legislative campaign on any issue. One of the most
important of these resources was rank-and-file action and mass-public sentiment. The AFL-CIO
and many member unions spent huge amounts of money -- figures ranged from $10 to $50 million
in funds -- manpower, and organizational resources to educating and politicizing the rank-and-file
and community citizens on the NAFTA. There were countless union-sponsored rallies and teach-
ins across the country, one of the most ambitious being the Teamsters Union's truck caravan,
called the "Economic Earthquake Express," which traveled the country's communities, shopping
malls, and factories preaching the anti-NAFTA gospel (N.J.; Cowie 1997, p. 12).28
Perhaps more importantly, organized Labor took the unprecedented step of bolstering its
power resources by joining forces with anti-NAFTA groups in other countries and focused on
completely different issues. The cross-border actions included establishing and furthering ties with
other labor unions in Canada, and to a lesser degree Mexico (Robinson 1995, Cowie 1997,
passim). More impressive were the formal and informal ties with non-labor interest groups,
24 Such language at the Convention prompted President Clinton to call organized labor's positioning "strong
arm...muscle-bound tactics." See Section 3.3 below for more on this.
25 On the eve of the ratification vote, Kirkland said of the general parallels between Clinton's and the AFL-CIO's
agendas: "we are and will be his most reliable troops" (LRW 11/17/93, p. 1 103).
26 Of 100 freshmen House members, 63 were Democrats. As Grayson 1995 points out, these first-term Democrats
depended more on contributions from labor PACs in their 1992 victories (44 percent) than did their senior colleagues(31 percent) to raise the average of $239,800 needed to win (Grayson 1995, p.191; using Center for Responsive
Politics figures: reported in Wall Street Journal 10/25/93, p.A22 and total outlays in Stanley and Niemi).
27 It isn't part of Labor's multi-issue trade policy stance, however, since Labor isn't asking for some policy action
on healthcare to off-set the NAFTA liberalization. Instead, it is signaling how hard labor will be able to work for
something on which the liberalizers and the protectionists agree.
28 Grayson 1995 points out that the rank-and-file mobilization had as much to do with Ross Perot's populist
opposition to NAFTA as it did to organized labor's change in political tactics.
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especially members of the environmental lobby (especially the more radical fragments of that
lobby), citizen action, religious and other groups. The most formalized and developed expression
of this collaboration were the Citizen's Trade Watch Campaign and the Americans for Responsible
Trade.29 These and other odd efforts to influence Administration negotiations and Congressional
action on the NAFTA were unprecedented in trade policymaking, and marked important changes in
Labor's political strategy and tactics.30
The conclusion to draw from this discussion of organized labor's platform and power is
that for at least some of the time during the negotiations Labor approached the NAFTA episode
with more political power and with relatively more multi-issue side payments than it had at any
time since the 1962 struggle over the Trade Expansion Act. On the other hand, the demands that
even the most conciliatory unions were attaching as conditions for support of the NAFTA were
ambitious and costly, and some of the attempts to mobilize power resources -- especially the
alliances with isolationist groups, and the grass-roots mobilization -- involved more unconditional
posturing that contradicted the multi-issue, conciliatory stance. The platform messages were
mixed, in other words, from the point of view of inviting side payment bargaining. In any event,
whether labor's power and platform spelled side payment compensation depended on the positions
and power of other groups, and on the dynamics of struggle during the NAFTA fight.
2.2. Environmental Groups
If labor unions were the anti-NAFTA coalition's anchor, the environmental lobbies were its
upstarts. The NAFTA initiative was the first US trade liberalization initiative to inspire determined
and concerted action by environmental groups. And their presence opened a new chapter in US
trade policymaking, changing the character of the trade policy issue to encompass ways of
mitigating and compensating for environmental consequences of liberalization. Most of the
national environmental lobbies and organizations, and many more regional ones, engaged the
NAFTA, and as it turned out, these various groups were openly and strongly split in their
opposition platform. This split ended up being one of the NAFTA episode's oddest side-shows,
and made for particularly rich side payment politics.
29 See discussion below for details on these coalitions.
30 One of the more bizarre attempts involved Labor using its foot-hold on corporations via its pension fund
holdings. In November 1993, the Carpenters and Operating Engineers unions -- whose multibillion-dollar pension
funds had extensive holdings in publicly traded companies -- challenged several companies' public support for the
trade agreement. They proposed, consistent with SEC rules, to have the companies report on their plans for shifting
production to Mexico if NAFTA passes, and on impact of the NAFTA on shareholders, workers, customers,
suppliers and communities in which they do business. This was an attempt to remind some corporations that the
NAFTA might be more trouble than it's worth. See LRW 11/10/93, p. 1062.
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The environmental coalition's trade policy activism had its roots, in terms of organization
and platform, in more narrowly environmental preservation activism during the 1980s. The
National Wildlife Federation, the nation's largest (5.3 million members) and most politically active
environmental group, helped engineer a coalition of environmental groups to agitate for more
attention to sustainable development in World Bank and OPIC loan practices (Bramble and Porter
1992, p.325-36). The Federation leaders began to recognize trade policy, broadly, in the same
light. As Stewart J. Hudson stated, "We have to keep in :..ind that the objective of trade
agreements is not trade but sustainable development." (NJ 4/13/91, p.865).
This conceptual link between environmental concerns and trade became much more
pressing, however, when US environmentalists successfully lobbied the US Congress to legislate
a ban of tuna fish products caught with drift nets known to inadvertently kill dolphins. Mexican
tuna fishermen, many of whom used such nets, formally petitioned the GATT to declare this ban a
trade barrier based on unreasonable production process standards, a violation of GATT norms. In
1988, a GATT arbitration panel ruled in favor of Mexico, nullifying the US ban on dolphin-
unfriendly products. This ruling awakened the environmental movement to how free trade
arrangements could undermine dearly won regulations, and mobilized environmental groups to
press their concerns in future trade initiatives (Robinson 1994, p.678, fn.24. and Schoenbaum
1992). It inspired lobbying for a 1991 bill proposed by Senator Boren calling for tariff action
against those imports that might derive competitive advantage from lower environmental standards
(Conybeare et.al. 1995, p.2 15). The next big liberalization initiative was NAFTA, involving not
only a developing country with lax environmental standards and regulatory powers, but the very
country whose producers used free trade principles to undermine the recent tuna regulation.
All the environmental groups to engage the NAFTA fight approached the liberalization with
similar platforms, the core of which were focused on compensated liberalization, with freer trade
conditioned upon protections against competition in laxity and funding for environmental cleanup.
First, environmental groups feared that liberalization of trade and investment with Mexico would
inspire heightened exports from and investment to Mexico, taking advantage of its lax standards
and regulations, thereby undermining US regulations. To safeguard against such competition in
laxity, environmental groups demanded, as a National Journal writer put it , "some assurance that
the Mexican government will enforce its antipollution regulations when new investment floods
into Mexico..." and wanted the agreement "to hold any new US investors [into Mexico] to
Washington's higher environmental standards" (NJ 2/16/91 p.416).
Similarly, with the ink from the GATT tuna ruling still not fully dry, environmental groups
also worried that Mexico-based corporations could use the free trade agreement to directly
undermine more stringent US regulations by painting them as unfair trade impediments. This fear
was strongest toward the many regulatory areas where state-level regulations were more stringent
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than federal regulations, and yet where federal negotiators might set the NAFTA standard. As the
Sierra Club's MsCloskey stated, "we need an unambiguous statement [by the Administration] that
they won't bring back any treaty that casts doubt on US environmental laws" (NJ 4/13/91, p.865).
The first element of the platform, in other words, called for sustained US environmental
regulations and/or upward harmonization.
Second, environmental groups explicitly made their support for any NAFTA liberalization
conditional upon new funds and policies to clean-up the US-Mexico border where past and future
US outgoing investment was concentrated. Many groups pointed out that the maquiladora region
was soiled by depleted border groundwater supplies, dumped toxic substances, and the drift of
smog to places as far away as the Grand Canyon. As a National Wildlife Federation spokesman
put it, the region is "a case study of what happens when one promotes investment and free trade
without taking into account environmental concerns" (NJ 4/13/91, p.865). To mitigate the
excesses of such damage, all environmental groups engaging the NAFTA sought generous and
institutionalized funding to clean up ground water and toxic emissions, pay for water treatment
facilities, and subsidize anti-pollution changes to production facilities."
In short, the environmentalists' trade policy platform was a compensated liberalization one
in explicitly accepting free trade conditional upon: (1) funding, a clear call for side payment
compensation; and (2) adequate institutional protections to ensure stable US regulatory standards
or upward harmonization -- a combination of protectionist revision and side payment
compensation, depending on the mechanisms for ensuring such safeguards. 32
Although all the NAFTA environmental groups converged upon this basic compensated
liberalization stance, there emerged early in the fight a sharp and stable split in the stances of
different groups, dividing the environmental coalition into two camps: those groups taking a
conciliatory stance, signaling their support for the NAFTA liberalization given Administration
promises and actions; and those groups taking a more skeptical stance, early on signaling that such
promises and actions were insufficient to win their support. The conciliators consisted of six of
the largest national environmental groups, representing more than 7.5 million members: (1) the
National Wildlife Federation; (2) Conservation International; (3) World Wildlife Fund; (4) National
Audubon Society; (5) Enviromnental Defense Fund; and (6) Natural Resources Defense Council.
All these were long-standing national groups, based in Washington D.C. or New York, and with a
"~ This posture comes through in all of the testimony environmental groups offered -to Senate and House
Committees at all the critical decisionmaking junctures of the NAFTA fight. For the pre-Fast track testimony see
House Small Business Committee, Subcommittee on Regulation, Business Opportunities and Energy, Sept.30 1991
(McCloskey of Sierra Club, Emerson of Environmental Defense Fund, Greenwalt of National Wildlife Federation),
pp.104-55; and Blackwelder of Friends of the Earth's testimony before House Rules Committee, Oct.16, 1991, p. 49.
32 Particular groups differed in the priority they attached to these demands, and some offered other demands more
narrowly connected to the group's interest. The National Audobon Society, for instance, linked support in the final
hours of the fight to explicit protections for endangered birds. See below, Section 3.2.3.
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history of establishment ties and to focus on elite, legislative politics. On other environmental
issues they tended to have moderate, conciliatory platforms (NYT 9-16-93, Al).
The skeptics included a number of national groups and hundreds of regional and local
groups, some acting as independents and some as affiliates of national groups (on both sides of the
"skeptic vs. conciliator" aisle).33 The most vocal nationals among these skeptics were: (1) Sierra
Club; (2) Friends of the Earth; (3) Greenpeace; (4) Public Citizen, a national consumer and citizen
rights group often entering the environmentalist fray; (5) Earth Island Institute; and (6) Rainforest
Action Network.34 Compared to the conciliators, these skeptics tended to be less elite-oriented in
their politics and actions -- that is, having fewer contacts with government elites and, for some
skeptics, having less legislative experience -- and more grass-roots oriented. They also tended to
be more radical in their political platforms on other environmental issues.
The differences between the NAFTA platforms of these "skeptics" and "conciliators" was
less about the basic conditions linked to freer trade than about procedural politics. The split was
mainly over the scale and ambition of the revisions and compensation upon which free trade would
be conditioned, though the generality of the position statements suggested that the gap was modest.
Other than asking for stronger and better-funded monitoring and enforcement provisions for
regulatory harmonization and for more clean-up money, the clear policy differences were that the
skeptics wanted more regulation of production process as well as product standards, and a formal
environmental impact statement of the NAFTA.35 More important than such substantive
differences, however, were splits over process and symbolism.
First, they differed in the priority attached to taking a conciliatory line to avoid being called
protectionist. For instance, conciliators bent over backwards to paint themselves as moderates,
willing to compromise, and above all not against free trade. Stewart J.Hudson, legislative rep for
intl programs of the National Wildlife Federation said: "We are not against a trade agreement with
Mexico...What we are against is one that is not structured properly to take into account the
problems it would exacerbate" (NJ 2/16/91, p.4 16). And later that year he repeated that "we are
truly not doing this to kill the agreement....But this is where you have to start in the greening of
trade negotiations" (NJ 4/13/91, p.863). Eric Christensen, project attorney for the NRDC, stated
the position more pointedly: "The question is how do you protect the environment and structure
the system for ferreting out protectionism" (NJ 2/16/91, p.4 16). The skeptic organizations never
emphasized their potential support for freer trade should their various conditions be provided, and
they sometimes even accepted the protectionist label (e.g. Sierra Club testimony in 1993).
3 When the National Audobon Society announced its support for the NAFTA in October 1993, several of the
regional affiliates expressed their split with the parent organization and continued to oppose the liberalization.
4 Other vocal players included Public Interest Research Group, American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals, and the American Humane Society (NYT Sept. 16, p.A20). National Toxics Campaign?**
5 Sponsors of this action were Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, and Public Citizen (CQ Almanac '91 and '93).
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Second, the skeptics and conciliators differed over the priority they attached to inclusion
into negotiations and legislation drafting. By all accounts, conciliator groups fought for and won
substantial inclusion into the process of putting together NAFTA. Early in the fight, National
Wildlife Federation suggested "the creation of an environmental working group among the
negotiators to monitor the environmental implications of various issues under discussion and to
negotiate specific environmental provisions of the pact." And they also called for a panel to deal
with environmental controversies about interpretation or application of the agreement (NJ 4/13/91,
p.865). As NRDC executive director John Adams remembered, by the time the Clinton
administration had negotiated the side agreements, that members of his staff "had spent thousands
of hours participating with Administration officials in the development of the environmental
provisions of the agreement..." (NYT Sept. 15 1993, p.A20). Skeptic environmentalists, in
contrast, did not make such inclusion and participation in the drafting process a high priority,
though the Sierra Club representatives were quite involved in Clinton Administration deliberations
over environmental side provisions. Sierra Club notwithstanding, whether a group was included
or excluded in the NAFTA negotiations positively correlated with how much emphasis a group put
on such inclusion in the early confrontation before negotiations.
Finally, the skeptics and conciliators differed in the ties they were willing to establish with
other members of the anti-NAFTA coalition, especially organized labor. Although the conciliator
environmentalists engaged in a number of consultations with labor, and even expressed common
cause in their conditional opposition to the NAFTA in the early stages of the proposal, they never
formed any formal alliances with Labor or other groups. The skeptic environmentalists, on the
other hand, consistently, more extensively, and more formally engaged Labor and other members
of the anti-NAFTA coalition -- such as in the Citizens Trade Watch Campaign. Their hard line
position, therefore, implies that their own conditionality platform was complicated, made more
ambitious, by their ties to Labor and their demands.
Whatever its basis, this split between the skeptics and conciliator environmental groups
emerged early in the NAFTA fight, and became more visible and bitter as the episode evolved.
When Bush sought Fast Track authority, the platform statements of the respective groups already
marked a modest split, and as the negotiations and side-issue promises evolved under Bush, and
were revised in the supplemental agreements and other deals with Clinton, the split hardened.
By the eve of the ratification fight, the split became an open and bitter breach. Members of
the six supporting environmental groups appeared with V.President Al Gore to voice support for
the NAFTA, freshly revised with the side agreements. Of their departure from the erstwhile allies,
John H.Adams, executive director of the NRDC, towed a very diplomatic line: "I recognize that
this is a complex and difficult issue on which reasonable people with the same values and
objectives can differ" (NYT Sept.15 1993, p.A20). Jay D.Hair, head of National Wildlife
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Federation was a bit less diplomatic, saying the anti-NAFTA environmentalists were "putting their
protectionist polemics ahead of concern for the environment," and had not even "seen the
documents...don't have the facts and are feeding off misinformation" (Ibid). The skeptic
opposition, so accused, were even more strident in their criticisms of the pro-NAFTA six. As part
of their participation with the Citizens Trade Campaign, these groups released a newspaper
advertisement asking, "Why are some 'green' groups so quick to sell off the North American
environment? Maybe they are too cozy with their corporate funders" (Ibid). As a general
coalition, the strength of the environmental coalition and their multi-issue platforms simultaneously
strengthened the anti-NAFTA coalition and laid bare opportunities for side payment buy-offs.
2.3. Industry and Agricultural Protectionists: Mostly the Same-old, Same-old
The last major bloc of the anti-NAFTA coalition, import-competing producers, were
neither new to the trade game nor as fluid in their trade policy stance. Most US industry and
agricultural firms and their organizations supported the NAFTA, and a number of their import-
competing membership expressed only muted opposition to or ambivalence towards the NAFTA.
This reflected how even import-competing groups recognized that Mexican producers weren't the
greatest trade threat relative to other foreign producers, that NAFTA would imply big changes
given already low US tariffs and other NTBs, and that the NAFTA presented significant
investment and export opportunities. However, a number of industry and, especially, agricultural
groups worried about non-American producers exploiting the NAFTA to gain access to the US
market, and some were the high-tariff exceptions to the openness rule, thereby expecting major
increases in US and Mexican competition.
Unlike their labor and environmental counterparts, most of these protectionists approached
the NAFTA fight with platforms narrowly focused on defeating the NAFTA or on gaining
protectionist revision or exemption for their particular interests. The one partial exception here
were the winter fruit and vegetable producers and their champions, who usually took a more multi-
issue stance, albeit not through conciliatory offers to support NAFTA in exchange for accession to
their separate demands. Against the back-drop of this narrow range of protectionisms, the power
resources of some of the producer groups meant that at least some had a politically powerful bite to
match their unconditionally protectionist bark.
2.3.1. Industry: the Modestly Protectionist or Weak Few
Contrary to some expectations at the early stages of the NAFTA, very few industry
representatives expressed unambivalent and vocal opposition to the liberalization. The steel
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industry, for instance, expressed very little opposition during Congressional testimony.36 So, too,
did the auto parts industry." The modesty of these stances reflected uncertainty over NAFTA's
effect on the industries, and a general optimism that expanded export and investment markets
would allow firms to handle or actually move behind any increasing Mexican imports.
Most surprising in the modesty of their stance, however, were the textile and apparel
producers. These two sectors were traditionally protectionist, and unconditionally so, and the
NAFTA could be expected to bring significant changes in view of relatively high tariffs and quotas:
US Textiles (SIC 22) enjoyed 10.7 percent tariff on Mexican imports; Apparel (SIC 23) 18.7
percent (Krugman and Hanson 1993, p.175). But both of the major associations representing
these producers were only modestly engaged in the debate: over more than 56 hearings, the
American Textile Manufacturing Institute testified three times, the National Knitwear and
Sportswear Association did so only twice, as did the American Apparel Manufacturers Association
(CIS/INDEX 1993). And in this testimony, the groups generally towed a modestly protectionist
line that offered support for the NAFTA provided phase-ins were at least a year, that there be snap-
back tariffs in the event of import surges, and that there be rules of origin (especially the fabric-
forward rule) that would keep non-American firms at bay.
The only other producers to take a clear "protect-me-from-NAFTA" stance were politically
marginal: a smattering of rubber and plastic footwear makers; brush manufacturers; and a segment
of the glass and ceramic products industry.3" A few glassware producers were the largest and
most vocal of these. Some glassware already entered the US duty free under GSP, and NAFTA
represented export opportunities in light of the relatively high Mexican tariffs (e.g. Mexican tariffs
on SIC 32 Stone, Clay and Glass were 14.3 percent). So some glassware producers agitated in
favor of NAFTA, conditional on expanded access to Mexico.39 But the average US tariff on SIC
32 products was 8.9 percent, and household glassware tariffs averaged 22 percent (Weintraub in
Lustig et.al. 1992, p. 120). Predictably, then, a couple of producers, such as Libby Glass Co.,
were active in seeking long phase-ins, protection against import surges, and outright exemption
from NAFTA liberalization.40 Such producers were tiny (only a few thousand workers employed)
36 A senior APCO Associates lobbyist predicted that "inevitably, the steel industry will look with some
nervousness on a further increase in Mexican access to the US market" (NJ 9/29/90 p.2327). But with tariffs already
low and export opportunities significant, in 56 hearings steel reps only testified once, supporting NAFTA with
phase-ins and tight rules of origin: American Iron and Steel Institute (Ways and Means 11/10/92, p. 209-48).
3' Auto parts manufacturers were expected to voice opposition early on, but only modestly engaged the NAFTA,
asking for tight rules of origin, investment protections, and some phase-in time. Automotive Parts and Accessories
Association testified to this effect twice (Senate Finance, July 29, 92, p.1 16-28). So did the Motor and Equipment
Manufacturers Association (House Energy and Commerce, March and May 1991 p.298-308).
38 Rubber and Plastic Footwear Manufacturers Association and American Brush Manufacturers Association (House
Ways and Means Feb 1991, pp.482-528).
3 Two glass producers testified basically in favor of the NAFTA. Homer Laughlin China Co. conditioned its
support for the NAFTA on elimination of Mexican flat glass tariffs (House Govt. Operations May 27 1993, p.77-
115). And Anchor Glass Container Co. was basically supportive on similar market-opening conditions. (p.335-63).
4 Libbey Glass testified three times before House and Senate Committees (c.f. House Govt.Operations, May 27,
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and dispersed in the US, implying that their power to threaten or retaliate against the liberalization
was very modest compared to textiles and apparel, or many other industries.
2.3.2. Agriculture: Regionally Concentrated Protectionists
A number of agricultural groups also approached the NAFTA as unconditional
protectionists, and had the political resources to back it up.4' These groups represented a sizable
minority of US agriculture. Many agricultural interests -- even many that enjoyed tariffs, quotas,
and Section 22-related protections -- expected the NAFTA to lower Mexican and Canadian trade
barriers, and to thereby expand exports.42 A minority of traditionally protected agricultural groups,
however, many splitting off from pro-NAFTA counterparts in the same broad sector of agriculture,
feared that NAFTA would undermine their network of protections.43 Even where tariffs to Mexico
and Canada were relatively low, they feared that a free trade precedent might be set that would
inspire more painful liberalization towards other regions (Orden 1994).
The protectionist agricultural groups included some corn and wheat growers, all sugar
producers, peanut farmers, Florida-based citrus, and a Southern winter fruits and vegetable
producers. Grain protectionists included both corn and wheat growers from literally hundreds of
thousands of farms. Both corn and wheat enjoyed relatively little tariff protection, on the order of
three percent. But they benefited from export subsidies, supply restrictions based on acreage
reduction, direct subsidies, and other protections under Section 22 (Orden 1994, p. 13). The
associations representing these producers, the National Farmers' Union (NFU), the American
Corn Growers Association and the National Association of Wheat Growers, feared an end to these
protections. The NAWG claimed to be particularly threatened by competition from Canadian
wheat producers given unfair trade advantages via government subsidies, and therefore sought
either an end to Canadian subsidization or new US export subsidies, as well as a number of phase-
in, tariff snap-backs, and other exemptions (Orden 1994, p.23). The NAWG was particularly
active in pressing its case, appearing before the House and Senate four times (CIS/INDEX
1993, p. 139-68; and House Education and Labor March 30 1992, p.234).
4" The following several paragraphs draw heavily on findings from David Orden's excellent study of agricultural
politics during the NAFTA (Orden 1994). Its information on platforms are tested and further developed by review of
samples of testimony from each of agricultural segment's main representative in House and Senate hearings.
42 Many grain producers, for instance, anticipated to benefit directly from greater access to wheat and corn buyers in
Mexico. Dairy, soybean, and livestock producers expected the same. Cotton producers, on the other hand, didn't
expect so much to benefit directly from expanded exports, but to benefit from higher domestic demand from textile
and apparel producers who would be increasing production to meet new export opportunities that a NAFTA with
tight rules of origin would ensure.
43 For instance, the American Corn Growers Association opposed NAFTA while the National Corn Growers
Association supported liberalization, reflecting a seven year split over the general virtues and vices of free rather than
supply-controlled agriculture. And the California-based fruit and vegetable producers supported the NAFTA, while
their Florida-based counterparts opposed it.
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1993). 44 NAWG also had contacts in USDA and USTR, and one NAWG representative served on
the USTR's Grains and Feed Technical Advisory Committee (Orden p.23-4).
Peanut growers received more Section 22 protection than other oilseed producers,
including a two-tier pricing system that raised the domestic price level above the world price and
provided quotas to keep out imports and subsidies to clear surpluses. The representative
associations sought to protect the two-tier pricing arrangement. They also expressed concern about
illegal trans-shipments through Mexico, even though Mexico was a net importer of US peanuts and
even though the trans-shipment concerns could be mollified through the rules of origin set up in the
NAFTA. The National Peanut Council of America and nine state organizations pressed this
protectionist case through congressional testimony, lobbying, and through USTR's Oilseed
Products Technical Advisory Committee.
Winter fruits and vegetables were some of the most active protectionists, represented by a
network of national and regional associations.45 Trade was especially important for these seasonal
vegetables, and they were not protected by significant tariffs, import quotas or direct payments.
Nonetheless, fruit and vegetable producers, particularly those concentrated in Florida, sought tariff
snapbacks to protect against import surges, similar to those provided under the US-Canada FTA.
The vegetable producers were more ambitious, seeking exemptions from the agreement until
dispar-ties in environmental and labor conditions were eliminated, especially those related to
pesticides. Florida citrus growers, who faced competition more Brazilian more than from Mexican
producers, but feared that the 1980s cold spells would require years for the new plantings to "bear
fruit" (sorry about the pun), and they therefore sought exclusion from the agreement for 20 years.
Finally, the agricultural cabal included Sugar, the poster-child of agricultural protectionism.
Also concentrated in Florida and a couple of other Southern states, sugar producers were protected
by a two-tier tariff-quota, with a tariff-rate quota that allowed imports within that quota to enter at a
low rate and all imports above that quota to enter at a prohibitive tariff rate (80 percent) (Orden
p.9). Mexico's were only a small fraction of imports under that quota system, and given that
system overall imports constituted less than 15 percent of domestic production during '89 and '90
(Ibid). Sugar producers sought guarantees that the NAFTA would not unravel the system. Not
only did they want the NAFTA to include a low quota on Mexican sugar imports, they also sought
safeguards against the chance that consumers would undermine sugar prices by switching to corn
syrup or other substitutes. The associations pressing these demands included national and regional
groups, especially the National and Florida Sugar Cane Leagues (CIS/INDEX 1993).46 As a
4 American Corn Growers Association appeared only once, and the National Farmers' Union three times
(CIS/INDEX 1993).
45 These included United Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Association (three Hearings appearances); the Florida Fruit&
Veg.Ass.(four appearances); Florida Citrus Mutual (one appearance); Texas Citrus and Veg.Assoc.(one appearance).
6 The American Sugar Cane League was the most vocal (two appearances), but also present were the Florida Sugar
Cane league, the American Sugar Beet Growers Association, the Sugar Advisory Committee, the Louisiana Farm
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measure of the lobby's influence, the exec.vice president of the Florida League was appointed to
USTR's agricultural policy advisory committee (Orden 1994, p.23; NJ with Rep.Downey).
In terms of power resources, the most privileged groups were the winter fruit and
vegetables and sugar growers, all of whom were concentrated in two states, Florida and Louisiana,
and more narrowly still in the constituencies of the senior Representatives of that delegation,
especially Tom Lewis. This concentration was greater than that of any other anti-NAFTA producer
group, and this strongly constrained the voting patterns of the 23 member Florida delegation.
2.4. Miscellaneous Protectionists and the Umbrella Associations
Rounding out these pillars of the anti-NAFTA coalition was a smattering of other
consumer, human rights, religious, minority rights, and other groups -- most of which focused as
much on side issues as on protectionist redress. Public Citizen was the most active consumer
group, straddling the environmental and labor planks of the anti-NAFTA coalition. The human
rights groups included, most prominently, the International Labor Rights Education and Research
Fund (ILRERF), which agitated for institutionalized monitoring and protections against child labor
and for worker rights.47 Religious groups, including the Methodist Church, the United Church of
Christ, as well as old lefty stalwarts like the AFSC, sought similar protections, plus adjustment
assistance -- though explicitly to protect non-US workers and standards as much to defend
domestic standards and rights.48 Even the American Federation of Teachers got into the act,
claiming that trade-impacted communities threatened to generate less public revenue for education.
They, too, emphasized the importance of upward harmonization and adjustment assistance.
Key among minority rights groups were African american organizations -- especially Jesse
Jackson's Rainbow Coalition, the National Black Caucus of State Legislators and the African
American Citizen's Coalition on Regional Development -- which were concerned about the
NAFTA's affect on minority businesses, on Caribbean nations through trade diversion, and on
low-skilled workers who were a disproportionately large chunk of the hispanic and black
populations (N.J. 2/6/93, p.352; Conybeare et.al. 1996). 4 9 They focused their attention on side
Bureau Federation, the Rio Grande Valley Sugar Growers, and the Texas Sugarbeet Growers Association -- each of
which made one appearance in Congressional hearings.
47 Representatives of the fund, usually Pharis Harvey, testified before Congress four times, and were key players in
the coalition organizations like the Americans for Responsible Trade.
48 These institutions acted through their congregations, gave individual testimony to congress, and rallied public
opposition. They also participated in religious coalitions such as the United Council of Churches and the
INTERFAITH IMPACT for Justice and Peace (e.g. House Budget Committee, May 14, 1991, p.38-60).
49 The National Journal reported speculation by Clinton Administration sources that some of these black
organizations might be positioning themselves against NAFTA to leverage their candidacy as contractors for the
"inevitable multi-billion dollar retraining program the Administration is likely to provide to gain political support
for free trade" (NJ 2/6/93, p.352.). Such positioning, if a significant motivation, may well represent extortion, in
that their main focus is on the compensation, even if their trade concerns are modest.
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issues, gaining more access and funds for adjustment and community assistance, and on the
safeguarding of environmental and labor standards. Hispanic community groups did the same, but
also called for a development bank that would aid trade-impacted communities.
This diversity of protectionist groups -- with organized labor and environmental groups and
a subset of the producer groups at the center -- articulated and lobbied for their demands partly
through broad associations dedicated to the NAFTA fight. The most important of these were the
Citizens Trade Watch Campaign (CTC) and its sister organization, the Americans for Responsible
Trade (ART). Both groups grew out of organized collaboration from the US-Canada-FTA,
especially the Fair Trade Campaign. In the very early stages of the NAFTA fight -- soon after the
intention to negotiate announced, through the Fast Track fight -- some members of this coalition
pulled together the Mobilization on Development, Trade, Labor and Environment (MODTLE).50
After the Fast Track ended in May 1991, MODTLE groups split up and founded two
organizations to continue the NAFTA fight. The explicitly political lobbying members, such as
Public Citizen, created the Citizens Trade Watch Campaign (CTC) to lobby congress and
administration officials." The remaining MODTLE groups, mainly the smaller organizations
whose charitable status denied them right to lobby, renamed themselves the Alliance for
Responsible Trade (ART). Pharis Harvey of ILRERF was, again, an important player in the
formation and activity of this organization (Robinson 1995, p.678-9). ART spent most of its
efforts developing a common critique and an alternative to the NAFTA and GATT among US,
Canada, and Mexican labor and NGOs.
This split between CTC and ART captured a reasonable division of labor between different
sides of an opposition position -- political pressure for reform and more high-brow articulation of
just alternatives to NAFTA -- but it also apparently reflected personality conflicts and tactic
divisions among the organizers. Most important of the tactical divisions was that the CTC elite
politicking favored joining forces with other anti-NAFTA groups on the right of the pcl9-al
spectrum, particularly the nativist Perot-Buchanan forces, and this in turn implied a mitc
nationalist, sovereignty-based critique of the NAFTA; the ART's more internationalist and
"alternatives-oriented" task, on the other hand, strongly favored developing a more nuanced,
internationalist, and conciliatory focus on cross-border rights, standards, and adjustment
assistance. By design or unintentional consequence, the CTC ended up being generally more
unconditional protectionist than ART.
Both groups, however, backed the pinnacle statement of a NAFTA alternative: A Just and
Sustainable Trade and Development Initiative for North America, released on September 28, 1993.
50 ILRERF activist Pharis Harvey was a key player in this founding. The AFL-CIO was not at this point, though
several member unions were more so (e.g.Food workers, ACTWU).(Robinson 1995, p.678; Ritchie 1992,pp.148-9).
51 Public Citizen's Lori Wallach "figured prominently" in the formation (Robinson 1994, p.678).
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Co-sponsored by ART, CTC, the Mexican Action Network on Free Trade, the Action Network of
Canada, and the Institute of Policy Studies, the proposal sought "to open a new chapter on the
trade debate in N.America," and contained measures similar to the EC's social chapter, including a
sizable amount of structural and development funding for poor countries and a fund for adjustment
assistance for displaced workers. It also outlined a "protocol," again comparable to the ECs Social
Chapter, guaranteeing workers' rights and environmental protections. The money to pay for these
various programs was to come from an across-the-border tax of less than 1 percent (LRW 9/29/93,
p.933). In late September 1993, the same alliance called for creation of a regional development
bank, new efforts to reduce Mexico's foreign debt, a commitment by Mexico to link average
industrial wages to productivity, and a code of conduct for corporations (NJ 10/16/93, p.2474).
The trade policy stance of the umbrella, formal coalition, then, evolved to be more multi-issue
oriented than even the more conciliatory of labor unions and environmental groups.
3. The Fight: Three Phases of Side Payment Politics
Faced with such an array of impassioned opposition, the Bush and then Clinton
Administrations and their pro-NAFTA allies in business and the Congress had their work cut out
for them. Several political hurdles destined to be the veto points of the episode stood between
them and a completed liberalization. Minimally, Bush needed to get congressional authority to
negotiate with the Mexicans and Canadians, via either Fast Track or more constrained authority.
Then there were the negotiations themselves, where domestic pressures could rear their head by
retaliation or threats to ratification. And finally, Congress would need to ratify the result, either
through an up-or-down Fast Track vote, or through a process more open to amendments. With the
1992 elections looming, however, this sequence was further complicated. And when Clinton
made his support for the NAFTA contingent on supplemental negotiations for labor and
environmental safeguards, he opened-up yet another set of veto points.
Both Bush and Clinton, it turned out, were up to the fight. Whatever their differences,
both made passage of the NAFTA liberalization very high legislative and executive priorities. The
Bush Administration portrayed, and maybe saw, the NAFTA as a major test of Bush's foreign
policy and legislative leadership, and as aides were later to say of the rallying of legislative
support, "we've not left much to chance here" (CQ Almanac 1991, p. 119). The Clinton
Administration, for their part, pushed even harder. After a relatively slow start in negotiating and
pushing the liberalization through, Clinton made NAFTA a top legislative priority and test of its
bipartisan virtue. Thomas Foley, 30 year congressional veteran and House Speaker, said of the
President's NAFTA performance that Clinton had "...worked harder...than any president I've seen
on any issue" (quoted in Jennings and Steagall 1996, p.72).
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However different their legislative priorities, tactics and alliances, both Administrations
used the whole gamut of bargaining tools for negotiating and ratifying the NAFTA. They both
used rhetoric, protectionist exemption and revision, and side payments to keep the opposing
coalition as docile and modest as necessary to gain a sometimes minimal margin of victory. And
both Administrations clearly tried to limit the costs of such a margin -- by limiting expenditure of
political capital, money, and compromises of the liberalization.
Most of the resulting political action was targeted at interest groups and legislators rather
than mass publics, though both sides sought to sway public support. The NAFTA coalition had its
advertising campaigns, its teach ins, rallies, and grass-roots organizing as a key part of its strategy
to revise or defeat the initiative. And although the liberalizers were slow to counter this mass
politicking, it too blanketed television with advertisements and even held the occasional pro-
NAFTA rally. Administration officials appealed to the mass public as well, appealing in dozens of
public speeches designed to sway grass-roots feeling, trotting out all the living Presidents and the
vast majority of its most famous economist-experts to support the agreement, or sending Vice
President Gore to debate Ross Perot on prime-time, national television.
As the NAFTA fight unfolded, however, it became clear that public opinion was modestly
though significantly on the side of the anti-NAFTA coalition. In the early days of the fight, when
the issue was low in salience, a significant majority of Americans (76 percent to 15 percent)
thought the NAFTA would be "mostly good" rather than "mostly bad" for the US (Robinson
1994, p.682). In the final hours of the fight, after NAFTA was very salient, the tables had turned,
with a narrow majority of Americans opposing the NAFTA (41 to 35 percent), and a significant
majority of those holding "strongly held" views opposing the agreement (21 percent strongly
opposed, and 7 strongly in favor) (Newhouse&Matthews 1994, p.3 1; Robinson 1994, p.682-3).
With the mass public evenly divided or modestly opposed to NAFTA, liberalizers needed
to target the most activated groups in the anti-NAFTA coalition with the sharper political tools of
redress: protectionist exemptions and revisions, and side payment compensation. And with both
administrations strongly seeking a NAFTA with as much of its liberalization intact as possible, the
side payment politics were at center stage of the NAFTA fight. The result was that compensation
flowed more generously than ever, to more groups, and for the first time included substantial
supranational side payments negotiated during international phases of the struggle.
This flow came in three surges, coinciding with the major veto points of the NAFTA fight:
(1) the Fast Track approval fight and the negotiation of the main NAFTA agreement, between early
1991 and late 1992; (2) the Clinton Administration's campaign promise and actual negotiation of
the supplemental accords for labor, the environment, and import surges, between late 1992 and
September 1993; and (3) the "endgame" fight to secure Congressional ratification of the NAFTA
and its supplemental agreements, between September and November 17th, 1993.
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3.1. Fast Track and the NAFTA Negotiation: Bush's "Action Plan" Compensation Promises
President Bush rang the opening bell of the NAFTA fight when he formally requested Fast
Track negotiating authority in March 1991. The Administration needed Congress to approve such
authority before they could discuss any deals with their Canadian and Mexican counterparts. Fast
Track was to be in place through most of 1991, having been granted as part of the 1988 Omnibus
Trade Bill. And in accordance with the same bill, Fast Track authority would be extended
automatically or another two years if the President so requested, unless either branch of Congress
formally mandated otherwise within 90 days of the President's request. With the President's
March request, therefore, Congress had three months, until June 1991, to decide whether to let
Fast Track ride or to pass legislation delimiting or canceling authority (CQ Almanac 1991).
Bush and his advisors apparently "saw the fast-track as a major test of presidential
authority," but like their liberalizing predecessors, pushing Fast Track was mainly motivated by a
desire for room to bargain as widely for as favorable an agreement as the Administration could get
without congressional interference. As Trade Representative Carla Hills argued, "without fast-
track, a complicated trade agreement could be totally rewritten on Capitol Hill when it's submitted
for congressional approval." Hills and others contended that this would undermine US negotiating
bargaining leverage, because other country representatives simply wouldn't trust US overtures.
Getting Fast Track was going to be no mean trick, however, for several elements of the
anti-NAFTA coalition were already mobilizing to kill or revise it. In a series of public statements,
early congressional hearings, and grass-roots actions, organized labor had already made its then-
unconditional protectionism known. Environmental groups, likewise, had also made their
concerns explicit by early 1991, already revealing the split between the mainstream and more
radical environmentalists. The environmental camps spoke with a single voice on the importance
of preventing the carte blanche of Fast Track from letting environmental issues fall between the
negotiating cracks. Although less visible and active in the early stages, even industrial groups in
the anti-NAFTA coalition voiced their concerns in House and Senate hearings over Fast Track. 52
In contrast to the early activity by anti-NAFTA forces, the NAM, Chamber of Commerce
and other business groups that supported the NAFTA were relatively quiet in pushing for Fast
Track. According to Robert Matsui, D.-Hawaii, this was because they thought it "inconceivable"
that Congress would deny Bush the authority (NJ ?find that cite?).
" Various House committees held a hearings prior to the President's initial Fast Track request, and another eight
hearings between the March request and the May Fast Track vote; the Senate conmmittees held one prior to the request
and three more to address the propriety of Fast Track for NAFTA (CIS/Index Legislative Histories 1993, p.333-41).
Labor and environmental groups appeared much more frequently in those hearings than did producer groups.
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Such an attitude was dangerously optimistic, but several aspects of the Fast Track phase
did, in fact, soften the strength and determination of the anti-NAFTA opposition. First, so soon
after the initial September 1990 announcement of a NAFTA initiative, most of the anti-NAFTA
forces hadn't had time to mobilize and coordinate their various resources. The MODTLE had yet
to be formed, grass roots organizing by labor was just beginning. Second, anti-NAFTA groups
disagreed over whether the Fast Track was the proper phase of the NAFTA negotiations and
legislation to stand and fight, given that the details of the liberalization had yet to be decided.
Whether groups genuinely awaited the outcome before deciding how much to oppose (some
environmental groups) or simply wanted something more meaty to hang their opposition upon
(many unconditional protectionist labor groups), some agreed that it was premature to push too
hard on the Fast Track vote. And third, some anti-NAFTA groups thought Fast Track should go
through because the negotiating authority applied not only to the NAFTA talks but also to the on-
going and generally less controversial GATT/Uruguay Round talks.53
In response to such moderated rumblings from the anti-NAFTA coalition, and in the
aftermath of Bush's triumphant Desert Storm internationalism, the mood in Congress was mixed
but reluctant to stand in the way of foreign policy room-for-maneuver. Most of the Democratic
House and Senate leadership cautiously supported Fast Track extension.54 House Ways and
Means Chair Dan Rostenkowski, House Speaker Thomas Foley, and Senate Majority Leader
Lloyd Bentsen supported the agreement, but were concerned about its future political prospects.
As Rostenkowski put it, "My inclination is to be supportive. But I see the storm brewing out
there." There were plenty of Democrats, however, particularly those close to organized labor,
environmentalists, and import-competing agriculture, who stated their conditional or outright
opposition to Fast Track. Most powerful among these were the rust-belt labor champions Richard
Gephardt, House Majority Leader, and House Whip David Bonior. Despite their deep misgivings
about NAFTA, however, neither saw the Fast Track as the appropriate time to put up the full fight.
They did, however, recommend action. Either as liberalizers sympathetic to the NAFTA
cause or as protectionists hostile to it, these legislators counseled Bush Administration officials to
provide some assurances that the labor, environmental and producer concerns would be addressed
in some way so as to settle the "brewing storm" (N.J.; CQ Weekly Report 5/4/91, p. 1120).
Administration officials were willing to follow such advice, directing appeals to societal
groups that would split the anti-NAFTA coalition. Initially, this meant essentially ignoring and
confronting head-on organized labor, while appeasing environmental groups, especially the more
53 The blanket authorization of Fast Track cut both ways, however, since there were some groups worrying less
about NAFTA than about GATT. Agricultural and textile producers and their legislative champions -- such as wheat
champion Byron Dorgan, D-ND, and textile champion Ernest Hollings, D-SC. -- fall into this camp most clearly.
54 David S.Cloud of CQ Weekly Report noted that "Having already opposed Bush on the use of force in Iraq, many
Democrats fear a vote that would be portrayed as economic isolationism" (CQ Weekly 5/4/91, p. 1120).
347
Burgoon
Chapter Five
conciliatory mainstream groups. Such a tactic was the obvious response to the unconditional
protectionism of Labor, but was also simply in keeping with the tradition of mutual hostility
between Labor and Republican leadership. Whatever the reason, the Bush Administration granted
only a couple of meetings between AFL-CIO representatives and Labor Department and STR
officials. With the exception of these brief discussions -- at which nothing was agreed upon other
than that a yawning gap separated Labor and Bush Administration platformns -- the rule was pure
exclusion (interview with Mark Anderson).
Toward environmental groups, the story was much different. Throughout early 1991
administration officials were wooing environmental groups, hoping to convince them to support
the NAFTA, or at least accept Fast Track authority. The point people for the effort were STR
Carla Hills and EPA Administrator William K.Reilly. Through discussions with a number of
environmental representatives, the Administration tried to assemble a package of safeguards and
environmental cleanup promises that would address the fears and demands of the environmental
lobby. The representatives of that lobby most actively discussing the price of environmental group
support for the Fast Track and NAFTA was Stewart Hudson of the National Wildlife Fund, who
coordinated activity among the mainstream environmental groups. At this stage of the NAFTA
fight, these representatives emphasized the importance of inclusion in the development of NAFTA
legislation, of negotiating positions, and in the negotiations themselves.
The on-going discussions between these representatives and Administration officials
starkly contrasted the generally cool or hostile relations between the Republican Administration and
environmental groups over issues such as EPA regulations and property rights. And as the
wooing unfolded, a number of Administration officials, such as John Sununu, wanted to stick
with tradition and minimize the overtures, fearing too much constraint on free trade prerogatives.
The history of hostility, of course, also made some of the more hard-line environmental groups
unhappy with any conciliation and cozying-up to the enemy.
By late April 1991, the AFL-CIO and other labor groups anticipated that there might be
attempts by the Administration to buy off some of the environmental groups with safeguards and
inclusion. And they openly hoped that the Administration's overtures would either fail or get
overturned by Sununu or other Administration hard-liners (NJ 4/13/91 p.862). As an AFL-CIO
official lamented,
[The Bush people] are doing everything they can to buy off the environmentalists....Hills
is going to tell them anything they want to hear, and they are clearly enamored with being
schmoozed. They don't realize that what is on the table today can be off the table
tomorrow. (NJ 4/13/91, p.862-3)
This sentiment, of course, voiced a mixture of sour grapes over the privileged treatment given
environmental groups, and of cynical disenchantment with liberalizer promises, bourne of decades
of reneging on TAA compensation.
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More extensive than the direct discussions between the Administration and anti-NAFTA
coalition groups were the discussions between Bush's team and congressional representatives.
Throughout the Fast Track fight, House support was much harder to come by than Senate support,
so much of the legislative wooing was focused there, but both chambers got the hard sell. The
Administration's point person in this wooing was Nicholas E. Calio, the chief House lobbyist (CQ
Almanac 1991, p. 119). The deliberations included dozens of meetings between Bush officials,
including the President himself, and the most important leaders and "fence-sitters" in the House
and Senate, especially Rostenkowski, Bentsen, and head-fence-sitter Richard Gephardt.
In the back-and-forth, Congressional leaders consistently recommended that the
Administration do more to allay congressional fears surrounding the pact, fears that reflected
strong feelings from their environmentalist, labor, and producer constituencies. In early March
1991, Bentsen and Rostenkowski wrote to Bush requesting that the Administration table a formal
plan to address these various fears (CQ Almanac 1991, p.119). Gephardt made a similar request
in person and in writing. Substantively, they wanted action partly on environmental concerns --
thereby echoing the demands already being expressed directly by environmental lobbying groups
in their consultations with Bush. In these direct deliberations, the Administration had already
revealed itself to be amenable to such a plan (CQ Almanac 1991, p. 1 19-20; Fox 1995, pp.55-6).
But the House and Senate leadership also prodded Bush to take more action to address the
fears of organized labor, or at least the labor-friendly members of Congress. Gephardt, in
particular, had pushed for such action, calling for a variety of ambitious policies and actions that
basically parroted and embellished upon the AFL-CIO stance: some mix of upward harmonization,
exemptions, safeguards, and major expansion of adjustment assistance. Even the less laborite
leaders like Rostenkowski and Bentsen called for some labor-related action. The action they
recommended the Administration take, as it turned out, was on the lowest-common-denominator
standby of side payment compensation: continued and expanded trade adjustment assistance.
Such action on any trade-focused adjustment assistance would go against the Bush
Administration's hostility to the TAA program. Continuing Reagan's legacy, the Bush
Administration had long sought to kill a welfare training program that they believed had not proven
effective or needed, and that unjustly targeted trade-impacted groups for special treatment.
Bentsen, Rostenkowski and others insisted that the Administration would need to reverse this
stance on TAA and include significant action on TAA as part of some broad package of safeguards
if it wanted to secure sufficient votes for Fast Track (CQ Almanac 1991, p. 119-20).
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3.1.1. Bush's May Ist Action Plan and Reactions
The pressure from the anti-NAFTA coalition and congressional leaders apparently worked.
On May Ist 1991, one month before the Fast Track blocking deadline, the Bush Administration
announced an "Action Plan" designed to address labor and environmental concerns -- a plan that
contained the NAFTA fight's first flurry of side payment compensation. The Action Plan was an
80-page document laced with claims that the agreement wouldn't threaten jobs or the environment.
But at its core was a series of policy promises, mostly general pledges lacking any clear time-
tables." Some of these promises involved protectionist redress in the form of lengthy transition
periods (phase-ins), and a promise not to negotiate lower standards on a variety of labor and
environmental negotiations, maintaining a right to regulate imports violating these maintained
standards. But they also included a few clear side payment commitments:
1. worker adjustment: a promise to work "with Congress to craft a program to provide prompt,
comprehensive and effective services" to those who lose their jobs as a result of NAFTA.
2. labor standards: a pledge that "the Labor Dept. would sign an agreement with the Mexican
government providing for cooperation in occupational health and safety, working
conditions, etc., and cooperation would be enforced.
3. environmental cleanup: a promise to prepare a detailed plan for dealing with the environmental
problems on the border, including funds for cleanup and regulation.
(CQ Weekly Report 5/4/91, pp. 1120-1; Fox 1995, p.56)
The Administration took no immediate action on the job assistance and border cleanup
promises, but it did take immediate, if modest, action on the labor cooperation. On May 3, the US
and Mexico Labor Secretaries signed a memorandum of understanding in May 1991 calling for a
series of comparative studies of labor conditions and laws, designed to lay the ground-work for
bilateral programs to improve conditions (US Department of Labor 1992a, 1992b; LRW 5/8/91).56
Although the policy promises seemed to give labor and environmental concerns equal
billing, the Administration also pledged to accord environmental groups access into the negotiating
process, through consultation procedures like those demanded by mainstream environmentalists.
Bush officials promised no such access to labor groups.
Reactions to this mix of compensation and protectionist redress were mixed, but generally
favorable. The largest and most mainstream environmental groups -- the National Wildlife
Federation, NRDC, National Audubon Society, and the Environmental Defense Fund --
announced their "cautious support" for the negotiations (NYT 5/19/91, p.D17). These groups
" The details of promises are in CQ 1991, p.1 19. Fox 1995, and "Response of the Bush...," International
Environmental Affairs 1991.
56 The agreement explained that "cooperation may be implemented through: (a) exchanges of delegations,
professionals, and specialists, for purposes of studying both labor systems; (b) exchanges of information on
averages, standards, and procedures, including publications and monographs; (c) organization of conferences,
seminars, workshops and meetings; (d) development of collaborative projects; (e) joint research projects; or (f) other
forms of cooperation that may be mutually agreed upon" (quoted in LRW 5/8/91, pp.430-1).
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were particularly pleased with the Administration's promise to include representatives from
environmental organizations on the panels that were to advise STR Carla Hills in the development
and negotiation of the NAFTA talks. The more grass-roots environmentalists, however, were not
so impressed, and kept their distance. As Eric Christensen of the Community Nutrition Institute
said of the Action Plan, "it's a good start, but I don't think it goes far enough to meet our
concerns" (NJ 5/11/91, p.1 115). And J.Michael McCloskey of the Sierra Club simply said: "We
want to assure that when factories are built, that they don't belch out pollution" (Ibid). What
mattered for the Bush Administration from the point of view of garnering votes from environment-
minded legislators was that their Action Plan promises had split the environmental coalition. As an
AFL-CIO official later lamented, "a lot of members have expressed concern about the environment.
This just provides them some cover" (Cunningham to CQ 5/91, p.).
Despite the Administration's general promises to open side action on worker standards and
its reversal on adjustment assistance, the AFL-CIO and member unions remained staunchly and
unconditionally opposed to the NAFTA and Fast Track. In press statements and testimony to a
Senate Hearing on the May Ist Action Plan, AFL-CIO officials said the Plan's promises left out
important safeguards -- such as no promise to link trade to environmental and labor standards as an
explicit part of the proposed negotiations (Lynch of United Steel to House Public Works and
Trans. May 8, p. 100). As for the promises the Action Plan did set out, Labor wasn't impressed.
Of the adjistment assistance promises, these officials were particularly suspicious. Chief
AFL-CIO lobbyist William Cunningham told Senate Finance Committee members that the unions
support a real and expanded TAA but distrusted the Bush Administration's "check is in the mail
mentality" on TAA, a mentality made all the more hollow by how the TAA budget was to budgeted
out of all Bush's recent budgets (Senate Finance, May 7, 1991, p.38). To Cunningham and
others, the adjustment assistance promises were simply a politically expedient response to House
member demands that would probably tighten eligibility, lower benefits and be temporary, and at
best would maintain the TAA at current, insufficient spending levels (Cunningham to House
Budget Comm., May 14, p.42; see also NJ 5/11/91, p.1 115). 5 7 Labor-friendly intellectuals
embellished upon this position in an Economic Policy Institute report, calling the Action Plan
"empty promises based on unrealistically rosy predictions." The report decried how "deft relief is
'off the table'; and adjustment assistance to US workers and questions of labor and environmental
standards will not be regarded as part of the treaty and if treated at all will only be as a reluctant
political concession by the administration" (Faux and Spriggs EPI 1991, p.2).
7 For the similar views of other labor representatives, see testimony to the House Public Works and Transportation
Committee on May 8th, by Leon Lynch of United Steelworkers, Steve Beckman of UAW, and Carmen Papale of
ACTWU (pp. 181-350 passim).
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In view of the Action Plan's "empty promises," AFL-CIO claimed to want legislation
passed that would require the Administration "to return to the negotiating table if Congress's
mandates are not met," the mandates being some formal statement of labor and environmental
conditions (NJ 5/11/91, p. 1115). With this basic goal, the AFL made According made blocking of
Fast Track its highest legislative priority in 1991 (CQ Weekly; AFL-CIO Convention).
Labor's efforts, however, were in vain, for most legislators were swayed by the Action
Plan promises. Quasi-liberalizers in the House and Senate, such as Rostenkowski and Bentsen,
almost immediately after the Action Plan's unveiling came out in favor of the Fast Trade. More
significantly, on May 9th, Richard Gephardt announced his cautious support:
I am prepared to support an extension of fast-track authority for trade treaties. But I do so
with this caveat: If the administration sends to this Congress a trade treaty that trades away
American jobs, or tolerates pollution of the environment or abuse of workers, we can, and
we will, amend it or reject it (CQ Almanac 1991, p.120).
With all its blustering conditionality, Gephardt's support was significant in clearing the way for
Fast Track, since Gephardt was one of Congress' most labor-friendly legislators and most
hawkish trade experts. However, neither the cover of the Action Plan nor of Gephardt's assent
was enough to win some more hardcore legislators, such as Rep. Marcy Kaptur, D-Ohio, with lots
of auto suppliers in her district. Of the Action Plan adjustment assistance promises, she pointed
out that in travels in her district she would tell groups about potential increases in job training funds
and they would respond: "Marcy, where's the job?" (in NJ 11/93). When the House took up
action on the Fast Track issue, it quickly became clear that Kaptur was in the minority.
After a relatively quick review process and a symbolic nod to Labor, the House allowed
Bush's Fast Track to ride. The Ways and Means Committee met May 14 to consider a bill by
Byron L.Dorgan, D-ND, designed to kill Fast Track (HR 101, introduced May 6th).58
Rostenkowski had promised he would get a committee and floor vote on such a request. But the
Committee rejected this resolution by a vote of 9-27 and reported it to the floor "unfavorably by
voice vote." Then also by voice vote it approved a non-binding resolution (H Res 146) sponsored
by Rostenkowski and Gephardt representing a bone to Labor. It stated that Congress could lift the
fast track "if the administration did not keep its promise to include adequate protections for US
workers, industries and the environment" in the negotiations. As Rostenkowski said, "There are
members on both sides of the aisle who want to vote for something satisfying, as much as they
can, labor's demands" (CQ 1991, p.120).
Ways and Means sent both Dorgan's Fast Track "derailer" and t: , Labor bone to the floor
with only a couple of weeks to spare before the June 1st deadline. After a failed attempt to separate
GATT and NAFTA Fast Track, and a few more garnishes, such as Sander Levin's, D-Mich, non-
" Dorgan opposed the fast track because he wanted to retain agricultural subsidies to be reduced under GATT.
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binding call for a progress report on the NAFTA negotiations, the House defeated Dorgan HR 101
on May 23 by a vote of 192-231, and passed the non-binding consolation prize HR 136, 329-85.
Within a day, the Senate followed suit. Bentsen's Finance Committee voted 15-3 to
unfavorably send to the floor S Res 78, a measure sponsored by Ernest Hollings to block GATT
efforts to phase out the Multifiber agreement for textile import quotas. The three supporters of the
blocking motion were Tom Daschle, D-SD, Donald W.Riegle Jr., D-Mich., and Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, D-NY. Riegle offered his own plan to extend fast track for one rather than two years,
and to permit amendments to the agreement in a few areas like labor standards, adjustment
assistance and the environment. But Hollings's resolution couldn't be amended by Senate rules.
He only got 14 co-sponsors for the bill, compared to 37 for a 1990 blocking resolution, but he
vowed to bring it up later in the year as either a stand-alone measure or attached to "a must-pass
bill" (CQ Almanac 1991). And he claimed that Hills was making promises of her own: "The Carla
Hills bazaar opens, and she goes around to my colleagues and says, 'I will take care of you if you
get off that resolution"' (CQ Weekly 3/16/91, p.66 1). Such promises in the air, the Senate easily
rejected the derailing resolution on May 24 by a vote of 36-59.
3.1.2. Negotiating NAFTA, Embellishing Bush's Compensation
The NAFTA talks were formally launched less than a month later, on June 12th in Toronto,
and within a little more than a year the Administration had an ambitious liberalization agreement in
hand. To get that agreement, the Administration faced little direct societal or congressional
intervention, but still negotiated redress to the vocal producer, labor, and environmental opponents
-- partly in the form of protectionist redress and partly in the form of international side payment
compensation designed to fulfil his Action Plan promises. The liberalization ready for ratification,
Bush further embellished upon the Action Plan for labor. Whether societal or legislative leaders in
the anti-NAFTA coalition would buy the compensation, however, was another story, with the
initial responses tepid and with the NAFTA debate taken over by presidential campaign politics.
Once negotiations with Mexican and Canadian officials began in with the Toronto launch in
1991,59 societal groups enjoyed varying access to the negotiations themselves and the US position-
making in those negotiations. Although the secrecy of the international negotiations makes it
difficult to know who was consulted "on the fly," Environmental groups appear to have been
directly consulted by Administration officials the most (NYT 9/15/92, D1); labor and producer
groups the least, though the Labor Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy
59 Negotiations consisted of seven Trilateral Ministerial Oversight meetings, the highest-level negotiations among
the chief negotiators (Hills, Serra Puche, and Wilson), and dozens of sector- or function-specific negotiations
involving lower-level officials (e.g. Energy Working Group or Auto Working Group).
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was a channel for labor to send off regular missives during negotiations (LAC Preliminary Report
9/16/92, p. 1). Indirect access via Congressional hearings were also modest, again with
environmental groups having the most air time. Between June 1991 and the end of international
negotiations in August 1992, Congress held eleven hearings on the on-going talks, all but one in
the House. Five were devoted to addressing environmental concerns, creating a forum for
environmental groups to further agitate for environmental side actions (CIS/INDEX Legislative
Histories, pp.34 1-7). Labor issues, by contrast, aired in only two of those hearings,60 while
agricultural and industrial producers could air their platforms in only one hearing each (Ibid.).6"
In these negotiations, most of the anti-NAFTA coalition members expressed ever-
increasing frustration with the shape of the liberalization and (in)action on environmental and labor
side issues. Thomas Donahue, Owen Bieber, and other labor leaders spoke outside the hearing
context against the paucity of labor safeguards and harmonization, and in the hearings their
underlings (Executive Secretary-Treasurer of Calif. AFL-CIO, and UAW economist Steve
Beckman) did the same. They were joined by the usual cast of radical environmentalists. Anti-
NAFTA agricultural producers expressed anger at the degree of unfolding liberalization. The
exceptions, as usual, were the more circumspect mainstream environmentalists.
As the negotiations unfolded, and the final agreement began to take shape, legislative
skeptics took increasingly hostile positions to the Administration's negotiation. Most vocal and
detailed in laying out protectionist discontent was Richard Gephardt. On July 27, 1992, Gephardt
delivered a NAFTA speech to the Institute for International Economics in which he accused the
Bush Administration for ignoring promises made in the May Ist Action Plan: "as the agreement
moves toward completion it is becoming increasingly apparent that environmental controls worker
adjustment policies....are being omitted from the draft" (CQ 92 p.154; also NJ 8/1/92, p.1787).
In this and subsequent speeches Gephardt outlined for the first time the details of the protections he
wanted in and around the NAFTA, including a massive $22 billion for worker retraining and
regional development along the lines and scale of the EC structural funds (NJ 8/1/92, p.1787),
turning TAA into an entitlement, getting even more moneys to pay for environmental clean-up, and
creating a border tax to pay for the programs.
To give these demands some teeth, Gephardt and Congressman Waxman cosponsored in
the twilight of the international negotiations a non-binding "sense of the Congress" resolution
warning that Congress wouldn't tolerate any pact that weakened health, safety, labor and
60 Both of these were before the House Education and Labor Comm., but were spread over four days -- January 17,
March 28 and 30, and a general labor market hearing on April 24th, all 1992 (CIS/INDEX 1993, pp.342-3).
6' The remaining two hearings were devoted to miscellaneous issues, one on how the negotiations were dealing with
the Mexican Petroleum sector (House Foreign Affairs) and another on customs valuation procedures (House Ways
and Means).
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environmental laws. The bill (H Con Res 246) passed unanimously, 362-0, on August 6th, 1992,
as Bush officials were embroiled in a final flurry of negotiations in Washington (CQ '92, p. 154).
Apparently ignoring Gephardt's "sense of the Congress" resolution, the Bush
Administration's final flurry of negotiations yielded preliminary agreement on the NAFTA less
than a week later, on August 12th, 1992. The final push by Bush was sparked by his need to have
a little something to spice up his presidential candidacy and the Republican national convention in
Houston, to be held the weekend of August 17th. At a San Antonio ceremony on October 7th,
1992, the trade negotiators initialed a final text of the pact, but Bush signed the agreement formally
on December 17th, after the election.
Only then did it become clear both what the NAFTA liberalization really looked like and
what the Administration had chosen to do to address the demands and needs of the anti-NAFTA
opposition. The essence of the 2,000-page liberalization plan was quite simple and ambitious.
Most sectors, including agriculture and services, were to be tariff-free within 10 years of the
NAFTA's enactment, though some sensitive sectors won slightly longer phase-ins. Subsidization
and quota schemes were to be converted immediately to more visible tariff-rate quotas, which were
also to be phased out within 10 or 15 years. Also, Mexico would be granted access to the same
dispute settlement procedures accorded Canada in the FTA, in exchange for significantly reformed
Mexican trade laws in the direction of the US/Canada model for antidumping, escape clause, and
other procedures, and for the administrative transparency in using those procedures. And the US
and Canada won a series of property rights and investment protections. A number of trade-
watchers saw all this as a very significant accomplishment, especially for services and agricultural
liberalization, and for intellectual property rights protections (Hufbauer and Schott 1993, pp.2-6).
The sweep of the liberalization was compromised by the need of US negotiators, as well as
their Canadian and Mexican counterparts, to offer protectionist appeasement to the anti-NAFTA
forces in the respective countries -- in the form of exemptions, phase-ins, rules of origin, and tariff
snap-backs. Complete exemption from the liberalization was part of the redress for only a couple
US groups -- such as "set asides" for minorities, small businesses and other groups in government
procurement; and the Jones Act protections for US flag vessels.62 Virtually all US sectors were
given partial relief, however, through phase-ins of the liberalization, with some more sensitive and
politically influential sectors getting longer phase-ins. The sectors in the US to receive 15 year
rather than 10 year phase ins were glassware, some footwear, ceramic tile, broomcorn brooms,
some watches, and some fruits and vegetables (Hufbauer and Schott 1993, pp.26-7).
Most sectors were also helped by restrictive rules of origin, again with some getting stricter
rules than others. Whereas most sectors were generally covered by an ambiguously worded rule
62 None of these exemptions were as controversial in the negotiations as exemption of Canada's cultural industries
(e.g. T.V. and film) and, more importantly, Mexico's raw energy producers (petroleum, mainly).
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that NAFTA preferences would apply only to products reflecting "substantial transformation" in
North America, textiles/apparel and automobiles got significantly tighter rules: for textiles and
apparel, the rule was "yam forward," requiring most items to be produced from yam in US,
Mexico or Canada before getting the NAFTA blessing; for automobiles and parts, the rule was a
value-added test of 62.5 percent for cars, light trucks, engines and transmissions, and 60 percent
for other vehicles and parts (Ibid).63
Finally, compromise of the liberalization included tariff snap-backs through the
Agreement's Article 801 safeguards. Article 801 allowed reversion to pre-NAFTA tariffs for three
years for most products, four years for most sensitive ones, where NAFTA is "substantial cause of
serious injury or threaten serious injury" (Hufbauer and Schott 1993, 27). Textiles and apparel
producers were granted a looser eligibility test ("serious damage"), and some agricultural products
were allowed to get snap-back relief in the form of tariff rate quotas rather than simple tariffs.
3.1.2.1. Labor and Environmentalist Compensation, and the Same Mixed Response
Other than these various protectionist revisions and exemptions, the international
negotiations elicited some significant side payment compensation, negotiated and partly to be
provided at the international level. And this international action was accompanied by purely
domestic side payment compensation. All of this compensation, in any event, was designed to
fulfil and embellish parts of the Bush Administration's May Ist Action Plan for environmental and
labor groups.
For environmental groups, the administration took two side payment actions.64 The first
was designed to implement the Action Plan promise to devise a border cleanup plan. In February
1992, still the early stages of the NAFTA negotiations, the Administration negotiated the Integrated
Environmental Plan for the Mexican-US Border Area. It was designed to "strengthen the
enforcement of existing environmental laws; reduce pollution through joint initiatives; expand
planning, training, and education programs; and improve mutual understanding of environmental
conditions along the border" (Hufbauer and Schott 1993, p.96). Mexico pledged $460 million for
the plan over three years, and the Bush administration committed $379 million to the plan over
two, including a 1993 allocation of $241 million (USTR 1992, p.14; H&S, p.97). By the end of
1992 the funds had yet to be authorized by Congress.
63 This was significantly tighter rule of origin for autos than the 50 percent standard set for the US-Canada FTA.
6 The Bush Administration also addressed environmentalist concerns through more "protectionist" redress in the
main NAFTA agreement, by explicitly addressing environmental issues in several chapters, most importantly: (1)
allowing protection against goods that violated national sanitary/phytosanitary and a few other measures and
standards; (2) by calling for countries to avoid attracting investment through lowering environmental standards; and
(3) by allowing environmental concerns to be formally included in dispute settlement procedures. See McKenna &
Cuneo 1992.
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As the NAFTA negotiations wound to a close, the Administration faced continued
criticisms that the end of the negotiations would spell an end to the leverage and interest in
oversight and embellishment of cleanup projects. In response, the Bush Administration negotiated
with their Canadian and Mexican counterparts a permanent North American Environmental
Commission "to promote long-term cooperation on improving the environment" (Hufbauer and
Schott, p.98-9). The Commission's establishment was negotiated very late in the proceedings,
and was announced in September 1992, after Bush celebrated preliminary agreement.
In the same eleventh hour, the Bush Administration also took action to create a counterpart
institution for Labor. In September 1992, the Administration negotiated a bilateral agreement with
the Salinas Administration to establish a permanent Consultative Commission on Labor Matters
that would be a forum to develop and implement bilateral initiatives, including a bilateral work
program and consultation over enforcement of national labor law and regulation (Hufbauer and
Schott 1993, p.28). This Commission's creation and plans embellished upon the Administration's
labor cooperation promise made in its Action Plan and modestly acted upon in the Memorandum of
Understanding of May 1991.
Even without clear program details or funding approval, the creation of these two
environmental institutions and the one labor institution represented side payment compensation, for
they were benefits to ostensible victims of liberalization that were separate from the protections
being liberalized. All three programs were, moreover, devised through international stages of the
NAFTA negotiations, and were to be provided by supranational institutions. In these respects,
they were virtually unprecedented in US trade policymaking.
While the negotiations were winding down, Bush also fulfilled one of his Action Plan
compensation promises through more traditional unilateral action on adjustment assistance. On
August 24, 1992, the Administration proposed phasing out two programs for displaced workers --
TAA for trade impacted workers and EDWA for defense and other dislocated workers -- and
replacing them with a single program called ASETS, Advancing Skills through Education and
Training.65 Many details of the program remained to be worked out, but it essentially expanded on
the TAA idea, by providing dislocated workers with vouchers for up to $3,000 redeemable at
colleges and technical institutions, in addition to access to federally-run training programs. The
program also provided for direct payments to laid-off workers who had exhausted unemployment
benefits but had not completed training. Like the 1988 Omnibus revival of TAA, enrollment in
training would be a requirement for such UI supplements.
The Bush Administration proposed to fund ASETS to the tune of $2 billion per year -- $10
billion over five years. This represented a 150 percent increase in training aid for dislocated
workers in the two Labor Department programs, which together had been costing about $750
65 The program was developed beginning in May 1992 by the Department of Labor (LAC 1992, p.5).
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million per year (NJ 10/31/92, p.2498). Of the annual $2 billion ASETS total, $335 million was
set aside for NAFTA-dislocated workers every year ($1.67 billion of the $10 billion in five years),
and up to another $335 million could be used from a discretionary fund if dislocations required
additional spending -- a total of $670 million annually.66 Compared to the existing TAA program
that had been allocated $269 million in FY 1991 and $226 million in FY 1992,67 the new NAFTA-
dedicated total represented a 195 percent increase over FY 1992 in overall adjustment assistance
funding (US Dept.of Labor, 1993, p.1; CQ Almanac 1992, p.652).
But in a few details, the ASETS program would be less generous than the TAA status quo.
Whereas the new program capped training money at $3,000 per person, the old TAA imposed no
such limit, only demanding that training fund demands be "reasonable," and in practice reaching
amounts in excess of $7,000 per year per worker (LAC 1992, p.6). Existing TAA also allowed
easier exemption from the training requirement as a precondition for income supplements (TRAs)
compared to the Bush program. Although the proposal didn't preclude them, a number of other
TAA benefits weren't mentioned in the ASETS proposal, such as relocation and search
allowances, income supplements to defray transportation, living quarters during training, etc.
(Ibid). Despite these potential limitations, coming from the Administration that only a year earlier
had tried to kill off TAA, it was a relatively generous program.
The responses to the NAFTA liberalization and its accompanying array of protectionist and
compensation redress were virtually identical to those following the Fast Track initiative and the
May Ist Action Plan. A number of the largest, most powerful and mainstream environmental
groups came out in favor of the environmental provisions of the NAFTA agreement. Most
important of these provisions was the eleventh-hour creation of the North American Environmental
Commission. Upon the Administration's announcement of the Con~uission, the National Wildlife
Federation, following efforts of the group's trade czar Stewart Hudson, endorsed the NAFTA, the
first major environmental group to do so (NYT 9/15/92, D1). The World Wildlife Federation
followed soon after an intra-group campaign by the chairman Russell E.Train to persuade other
WWF elites to endorse the agreement (Ibid). The National Audubon Society representatives were
officially studying the agreement, but were expected to go along or at least not put up a big fight.
6 The $670 million annual monies implied a ceiling of 300,000 NAFTA-impacted workers that could receive
benefits through ASETS.
It appears that the Bush Administration used the influential Hufbauer and Schott IIE estimates to calculate
their adjustment assistance program. In their 1992 and 1993 estimates they predicted 145,000 workers by 1995 to be
eligible and in need of some adjustment assistance, and accordingly recommended that the Bush Administration
allocate roughly $1.4 billion over five years; in their 1993 post-negotiation book, Hufbauer and Schott praised the
administration plan for going beyond their recommendations and for including the NAFTA assistance provisions in a
more generalized adjustment assistance program (Hufbauer and Schott 1993, p.28; see also NJ 8/1/92, p.1787).
67 In FY 1991, Congress appropriated $71 million for TAA program and administrative costs, and another $198
million for Trade Readjustment Allowances; in FY 1992, it appropriated $72 and $154 million for administrative
and TRA costs, respectively (US Dept. of Labor 1993, p. 1).
358
Burgoon
Chapter Five
On the other hand, the usual enviro-skeptics -- Sierra Club, Greenpeace, Public Citizen and
others -- vocally opposed the agreement, despite the various forms of redress promised and
provided (Ibid). They were joined by the Natural Resources Defense Council, which had been
openly supportive of Fast Track (Ibid; CQ Weekly 5/18/91). This important exception aside, Bush
successfully split the environmental coalition with its package of protections and compensation.
On the other hand, organized labor stuck to the previous Spring's script and was no more
split by the Administration's compensatory policies than it was by its promises. Continuing their
unconditionally protectionist stance, AFL-CIO and member union representatives roundly criticized
the NAFTA and accompanying safeguards. They did so in many press statements, in the Labor
Advisory Committee's Preliminary Report released in mid-September, and in four statements to
Congressional hearings held between September and the year's adjournment. 6" The Labor
Advisory Report gives a good overview of the opposition. It laid out sixteen demands LAC had
pushed before and during negotiations -- including trade-sanction protection of labor rights,
infrastructural funds, environmental protections, tighter rules or origin, and adjustment assistance -
- and claimed that the agreement was a "a complete rejection" of this advice (LAC 1992, pp. 1-2).
About the Administration's side payment compensation -- the Labor Cooperation
Commission and the ASETS -- statements by labor representatives were unconditionally critical.
The Labor Commission was essentially useless, Labor contended, because it didn't include any
credible action on worker rights and conditions. Likewise, labor leaders took the ASETS program
to task for being worse than the TAA status quo, which they claimed was itself sorely below the
more expansive and generous alternative Labor leaders laid out (e.g. Ibid., pp.5-7). For instance,
in his testimony to Ways and Means, Donahue called ASETS "totally inadequate," focusing on
how the program capped training expenditures unlike TAA, and how the $2 billion annual funding
had not yet been backed by any clear funding source (House W&M Sept.22, 1992, p.122). In
other testimony and the LAC report, these criticisms were supplemented by more strident
complaints, such as the IBEW representative's lament that "promises of adjustment assistance is an
old song that our members are sick of hearing..."(House Small Business 12/15/92, p.144). In
short, Labor was threatened by the NAFTA and still not impressed by the compensation.
Anti-NAFTA producer groups praised the agreement's protections as far as they went, but
generally feared that they would be insufficient to safeguard against NAFTA-inspired increases in
Mexican production that could fuel import surges and, in turn, gut their industry. In response,
both industrial and agricultural producers -- especially textiles and apparel, and even more so,
Southern sugar, fruit and vegetables -- demanded more generous tariff snap-backs to safeguard
68 The testimony consisted of AFL-CIO Treasury Secretary Thomas Donahue to the Senate Finance Committee, and
four member union officials (UAW Steve Beckman and Alan Reuther to House Ways and Means and IBEW
economist Robert Wood and AFL-CIO Legislative rep. Cunningham to House Small Business (CIS/INDEX 1993,
pp.347-50).
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against import surges following Mexcian production increases inspired by the liberalization.6 9
They made no other non-protectionist requests, meaning they continued to tow their
unconditionally protectionist line.
Congressional leaders also took positions resembling their May 1991 stances, especially in
the details, but their bottom lines were more ambivalent and opposed to the Bush agreement.
Lloyd Bentsen, on the most sympathetic side of the spectrum, praised the Administration's overall
accomplishments but considered the compensation to Labor as insufficient. He said, for instance,
that the ASETS adjustment assistance had "curbside appeal" but that it lacked credibility since it
had as yet funding source. Much less sympathetic was Richard Gephardt, who had signalled his
opposition during the Summer dispatches. By September and the Agreement's completion, he was
formally opposed to the deal. It is impossible to know how much this Congressional ambivalence
and opposition was motivated by genuine concerns with Bush's NAFTA and how much by
partisan bluster in campaign season. Whatever the reason, Bush's NAFTA was having a harder
time after the negotiations than in the pre-negotiation Fast Track fight. And the posturing and
statements of legislators showed no signs that congressional opposition had been bought-off or
swayed by Bush's compensation package.
Whatever the positions of societal groups and legislators, all bets of getting the agreement
ratified before the November 4th election were off, for the two political parties and the main
candidates were sharply divided over the agreement and accompanying safeguards. This conflict
elevated the NAFTA to a higher level of saliency in the campaign than any trade initiative in this
century. Perot stepped up his unconditionally protectionist line, uttering the most memorable line
of the NAFTA fight, when he predicted "a giant sucking sound" of American jobs heading to low-
wage, lax regulation Mexico. Clinton, for his part, had throughout the campaign tried to straddle
the internationalist and fair trade line on NAFTA, and had by early October laid out a series of
unilateral and negotiated steps that his Presidency would undertake to make NAFTA more fair to
workers and the environment. Bush, of course, tried to position himself as the future-looking
internationalist in contrast to his opponents Clinton and Perot, protectionists beholden to either
organized labor, in Clinton's case, or to nativist hysterics, in Perot's.
In the event, of course, Clinton emerged the victor. When he did, when the Democrats
also retained control of both the House and Senate, and when public support for the NAFTA
reached all-time lows (21 percent), congressional leaders decided to await the new year, the new
president -- and the new side payments -- before acting toward ratification (Orme 1993, p.71).
69 These groups did so in part through association testimony to Congress: industrial and agricultural groups both
got to air their views before House Ways and Means and Senate Finance, each of which held a hearing between
September and January; and agriculture gave further testimony to House Agriculture while industry testified before
House Small Business during the same period (CIS/INDEX 1993, pp.345-50).
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3.2. Clinton and the Compensation Package: Side Agreements Provided and Retraining Signalled
Bill Clinton may have had sympathies to manage trade to ensure trade access and to level
playing fields, but as a free trade internationalist and charter member of the pro-NAFTA
Democratic Leadership Council,70 he was not obviously concerned to pursue international
arrangements to compensate labor and environmentalist "victims" of liberalization. But as a
presidential candidate in 1992, and a victorious one, Clinton was forced by his party and his "core"
constituency to take a position on the NAFTA liberalization that ensured the development of side
payment compensation more generous than Bush's.7"
During the primaries, Clinton sought out a niche within his party as the fair internationalist,
wedged between more pure free-traders like Al Gore and the laborite protectionists like Gephardt
and Jerry Brown. This meant supporting freer trade with Mexico and Canada, but on terms better
for labor and the environment than the Bush Administration had negotiated. Such was a pretty safe
position, given that the 1991 Democratic Party Platform had towed a similar line, saying that in the
NAFTA negotiations
our government must assure that our legitimate concerns about environmental, health and
safety, and labor standards are included. Those American workers whose jobs are affected
must have the benefit of effective adjustment assistance (BNA #134 D-2).
Victorious, Clinton and his party were quickly forced to clarify and make more concrete this
position. When the NAFTA negotiations ended, Clinton said "I will support a free-trade
agreement with Mexico so long as it provides adequate protection for workers, farmers and the
environment on both sides of the border," adding that he intended "to review the details of the
agreement and follow closely the expected congressional hearings on the issue" (CQ Almanac
1992, p. 156). For Bush, as well as for various members of the anti-NAFTA coalition, this wasn't
concrete enough.
On October 4th, 1992, at a speech to North Carolina State University in Raleigh, Clinton
unveiled his concrete compensated liberalization response. Having "read [the NAFTA draft] with
some care," he gave his qualified endorsement of NAFTA, saying that if he were elected he would
seek tougher protections than Bush had negotiated for US jobs, environment and health and safety
standards. He said he was convinced that NAFTA will generate jobs and growth, "if and only if
it's part of a broad-based strategy, and if and only if we address the issues still to be addressed"
(CQ Almanac 1992, p1 56 .). The steps that Clinton outlined would not require renegotiating the
70 The DLC explicitly endorsed the NAFTA without qualifications for labor or environmentalists.
7" To say Clinton's provision of compensation to labor and environmental groups was not an ideological position,
but an expedient response to get political support, for himself and the agreement, is supported by his actions on
more recent Fast Track authority for the expansion of NAFTA in 1997. No longer having to work with a previous
president's "bad agreement," Clinton called for blanket Fast Track authority, rather than authority explicitly bound by
labor or environmental commitments.
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NAFTA text, but would require a combination of measures, some unilateral and others to be
devised in supplemental negotiations. Almost all these were side payment compensation.
The unilateral measures included four policy actions, some of which drew from existing
and broader policy proposals and others which were clearly NAFTA-specific:
1. job training and worker assistance: He promised that he would "spend more than Bush on
retraining workers and undertake more environmental cleanup along the border" (CQ Almanac
1992, p. 1 56 .).
2. environmental cleanup and infrastructural investment: He promised to do more than Bush had
planned to hasten and pay for border cleanup, and to create money for investment on
infrastructure to improve environmental conditions and promote economic development.
3. preserve pesticide standards: To help farmers Clinton said US laws on pesticide residue
should be strictly enforced.
4. control strike-breaker immigration: prevent foreign labor from entering US soil as "strike
breaking replacement workers."
(Federal News Service 1992, p.9).
Of these, the job training plan was actually the most developed, being connected to the Governor's
ambitious proposal to overhaul all federal job-training programs, unveiled in August 1992.72
In the same speech, Clinton proposed to negotiate three "supplemental agreements" before
implementing the original NAFTA pact: one for the environment, one for labor, and one for
import surges. Clinton's environmental agreement was to establish "a US-Mexicon environmental
protection commission empowered to enforce environmental laws on both sides of the border" (CQ
92, p. 156). The governor emphasized that "such a commission would have the power to provide
remedies, including money damages and the legal power to stop pollution" (Ibid). He also pledged
to negotiate an independent labor commission that would "educate, train, develop minimum
standards and have...dispute resolution powers and remedies" (LRW9/22/93,p.922). Denouncing
Bush's Commissions as "too little too late," Clinton insisted that his labor and environmental
commissions would have teeth. In this vein, he promised "I'll negotiate an agreement...that
permits citizens of each country to bring suit in their own courts when they believe their domestic
environmental protections and worker standards aren't being enforced (quoted in Grayson 1995,
p. 131). Finally, Clinton promised to negotiate further protections against "unexpected and
overwhelming surge in imports...which would dislocate a whole sector of the economy so quickly
that there's nothing we could [do] about it to overcome the economic impact" (Ibid).
72 This proposal called for broad-scale retraining programs targeted at the entire work force, rather than the trade-
dislocated, and to be provided through a combination of federal programs and private in-house training. All
employers were to devote 1.5 per cent of payroll to employee training, or pay that amount into a national fund that
would be tapped for worker training (NJ 10/31/92, p.2498).
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3.2.1. Negotiating a Strong Environmental Agreement in Exchange for a Weak Labor Agreement
Upon getting elected, Clinton and his advisors contemplated walking away from the
NAFTA initiative, given the divisiveness of the original NAFTA, the complexities and conflict
(international and domestic) of getting the side agreements and other October 4th promises, and the
Administration's already dense legislative agenda.73 At the insistence and urging of Clinton's new
USTR Mickey Kantor and, later, his new chief of staff David Gergen, the Administration stuck to
its guns. Such a decision was motivated partly by the various diplomatic and economic merits of
the NAFTA with supplemental changes, and partly by the clear value of the liberalization as a tool
to establish Clinton as a bipartisan internationalist. Going with the NAFTA, however, made it all
the more important to fulfil major campaign promises -- compensation promises -- to the important
labor and environmentalist constituencies. And the compensation promises to receive the most
attention and controversy were the proposed supplemental agreements on import surges and,
especially, labor and the environment. 74
Although some members of the anti-NAFTA coalition would have preferred the
Administration to have let the liberalization die altogether, all welcomed the possibility that the
Administration would repair the NAFTA through fulfillment of his side agreement promises. They
differed, however, over what constituted "fulfillment."
The story among environmental groups hadn't changed much. The mainstream and more
radical wings of the environmental lobby still largely agreed on what they wanted, including what
they wanted the Administration to negotiate on the side accord: a trinational (not just bilateral)
environmental commission; an independent secretariat heading that commission; transparency and
public participation in the commission's dispute settlement procedures; preservation of federal and
sub-national environmental laws; and giving individuals standing in domestic courts so they can
agitate for compensation from companies rather than governments; and imposition of trade
sanctions as part of the commission's enforcement; a lot of money for environmental cleanup, such
as through a regional development bank. Some groups, on different sides of the mainstream-
radical divide -- Sierra Club, National Audubon Society, and Defenders of Wildlife -- also called
for upward harmonization of not only product standards but production process standards, such as
tuna fishing methods. This was a more radical demand because it would require re-negotiation of
the main NAFTA text, which focused exclusively on product standards and outlawed trade
sanctions to protect process standards.
" This sub-section on the side agreement negotiations, especially the part on the environmental accord, draws
heavily on William Grayson's account of the labor and environmental side agreements (Grayson 1995, pp. 129-50).
My account also relies on Inside US Trade, New York Times, CQ Weekly and Almanac, National Journal, Labor
Relations Week, and interviews with Robert Reich and Mark Anderson.
74 Since the import-surges side agreement entailed protectionist redress via phase-ins and exemptions, it isn't
compensation and, therefore, doesn't get much attention here.
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Over in the organized labor corner, in contrast, there were some important changes when
Clinton was elected and promised his October 4th compensation package. Although most unions
still would prefer that the NAFTA simply be allowed to die, the leadership of the AFL-CIO and of
several industry unions (e.g. ACTWU and Food Workers) softened their opposition, explicitly
adopting a "wait-and-see" stance, narrowly conditioning their acquiescence of the liberalization
upon the independent and strong trilateral protection of collective bargaining rights." For the
AFL-CIO Executive Council this meant a NAFTA labor commission with an independent
secretariat monitoring and protecting core ILO worker rights -- rights of association and collective
bargaining being the most important to Labor -- through imposition of trade sanctions. Leaders
expressed other demands, such as for more adjustment assistance codified and paid for in the side
agreements, but worker rights protection became an explicit "bottom line" for many (LRW3/17/93,
p.256). Such demands were similar to those of environmentalists, in some respects even narrower.
As discussed above, however, organized labor was not consistent or unanimous in this
shift. Other ramparts of organized labor took a more stridently unconditional stance on the
NAFTA and the side agreements. In February 1993, soon before the negotiations, the Labor
Advisory Council spelled out 21 points of concern, pre-judging the impending side agreement
negotiations as "nothing but window dressing" (NJ 7/31/93, p. 1938). At the March Senate
Finance hearing on the impending side agreement negotiations, moreover, UAW and Teamsters
leaders stuck to their unconditional guns, UAW President Owen Bieber testifying that
"Supplemental agreements are not a substitute for re-negotiation of the agreement as it stands"
(LRW 3/17/93, p.256). Finally, while the AFL-CIO leadership and members struck a more
conciliatory note in the hearings and elsewhere, the rank-and-file was still being mobilized under
the simple No NAFTA banner. So Congress and the Clinton Administration got, for the first time
in the NAFTA fight, mixed messages from Labor.
As comparable as the platforms for environmentalists and laborites might have been, the
Administration dealt with these demands and the October 4th promises very differently. Pre-
negotiation discussion of the Administration's labor and environment side agreement goals and
strategy took several months. In that time, the Administration worked much more closely with
environmental groups than they did with labor representatives, and showed much more willingness
to champion environmentalist demands than those of Labor.
Clinton and USTR Kantor encouraged environmental groups to submit suggestions on
various important negotiating issues throughout the development and negotiation of the side
agreement. This invitation was extended mainly to the mainstream groups like NWF and WWF,
" Some labor analysts and labor-allied groups, such as Pharis Harvey's International Labor Rights Education and
Research Fund (ILRERF), saw in the NAFTA the possibility of a net gain in the improvement of international
monitoring and of labor rights.
364
Burgoon
Chapter Five
but also Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth.7" These groups pushed their various positions
through a variety of channels -- Vice President's office, White House Office of Environmental
Policy; the EPA; the National Security Council, the USTR, and a couple of State Department
representatives (Richard Smith and Counselor Tim Wirth) (Grayson 1995, p. 136). Of the access
accorded to these groups, one State Department official told Grayson: "Not just the presidents but
senior staff members of these NGOs could pick up the phone and call virtually anyone in the
Clinton administration...." (quoted in Ibid, p. 136).
The Administration also invited organized labor to participate in the labor accord
discussions, and to submit proposals on details. Reports on how labor responded to these
invitations differ. Grayson 1995 and other commentators (e.g. Robert Pastor in NYT) contend
that "the AFL-CIO spurned [these] invitations." Through July, according to Grayson, the AFL-
CIO's chief trade economist Mark Anderson attended sessions of the LAC, which had been
monitoring the negotiations, but "demonstrated no interest in crafting a supplemental deal
acceptable either to the three governments or to the business community" (Ibid).
Other accounts suggest more extensive and substantive contact. Labor Secretary Robert
Reich reports having had numerous conversations with AFL-CIO Treasury Secretary Thomas
Donahue and other labor leaders on the side agreements, though not necessarily in the context of
formal LAC or NEC deliberations. Mark Anderson claims that he and Donahue made several trips
to the White House to push their position with Kantor, Reich, and other lower-level officials. 7
Anderson points out, however, that not long into the actual international negotiations it became
clear that Clinton wasn't willing to push for strong sanctions to protect worker rights, and that
AFL-CIO and other leaders withdrew from the fray in order to focus their attention on defeating the
NAFTA. Thus, whether Labor representatives were "serious" in their willingness to discuss
various demands and compromises depends on the eye of the beholder. Behind these different
"eyes," however, were the inconsistent statements of Labor's NAFTA platform, such as Anderson
having different priorities than other AFL-CIO leaders and certainly than the rank-and-file.
Amidst Labor's mixed messages and environmentalists' pleas, some anti-NAFTA
legislators also softened their opposition, and many adopted a "wait-and-see" stance. Most
prominent among these was Richard Gephardt, who had come out against the NAFITA despite
Bush's side payment efforts. With the prospect of Clinton side agreement negotiations, Gephardt
said he would support the NAFTA if the side agreements were strong enough (NJ 7/17/93,
p. 1827). In extensive discussions with the Administration and in various public statements before
76 NYT 9/19/92 and Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth spokespeople claimed, however, to have been accorded
significantly less access than their larger, more mainstream cohort.
77 Labor leaders claimed Kantor was as their strongest ally in the NAFTA fight: "Within the Administration, he is
much more a friend of ours than just about anybody else....He's the principal person in the Administration who has
remembered who the Administration's constituents are" (AFL-CIO official to NJ 8/21/93, p.2071).
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and during negotiations, Gephardt laid out some details: labor and environmental standards would
have to be in place and "have teeth"; and methods for paying for the agreement, the side
agreements, and other transitional expenses would have to be explicitly found.78 If these
provisions emerge from the side agreement negotiations and other Administration actions,
Gephardt insisted, the NAFTA could be pushed through Congress during the impending health-
care debate, but "if the agreement isn't good enough, I'll oppose it" (NJ 7/31/93, p. 1938).
The various societal and legislative platforms registered, the Administration was internally
split over what to pursue on the side agreements. Differences in the level of access enjoyed by the
groups foreshadowed, and possibly influenced, differences in how the internal Administration
fights were resolved. For the environmental agreement, the main controversy was over whether to
demand trade sanctions as a tool of the proposed trilateral commission's enforcement. Kantor's
USTR, the EPA representatives, and Lloyd Bentsen's Department of Treasury supported the use
of such sanctions, with Kantor in particular insisting on such sanctions as necessary to fulfil the
spirit of campaign promises, and to gain environmental group and congressional support for the
NAFTA (Inside US Trade). State Department officials, on the other hand, strenuously argued that
trade sanctions went too far, and would even "run up against serious Constitutional concerns in the
US" (State Dept. paper cited in Grayson, p.134). In the end, Kantor and the environmentalists
won, and the Administration went into the side agreement talks looking for trade sanctions as
enforcement option; independent trilateral commission; and direct NGO access to the commission.
In other words, much of what environmentalists demanded became official negotiating doctrine.
As for the labor side agreement, the official organized labor position fared poorer in
Administration deliberations. Department of Labor representatives, including Reich, and USTR
Kantor pushed for a strong Labor accord, comparable to the one sought for the environment,
including a strong, independent labor commission with monitoring and enforcement powers,
including the power to impose monetary fines, and even trade sanctions, on violators. Everyone
else, including Commerce, Treasury, Small Business, and, of course, State Department officials
strenuously argued otherwise. With such strong division in the background and only modest labor
involvement, Kantor and his negotiating team drew on an NEC report written by Labor Department
economist Jorge Perez-Lopez that outlined minimalist and maximalist positions for a labor accord.
Distilling these positions, the Administration adopted an opening negotiating position focused on
getting: a charter of labor principles; a trinational commission; the promotion of existing labor
standards and laws, improvement in those standards; and some measures to ensure enforcement,
not necessarily including trade sanctions (Grayson 1995, p. 146; LRW 3/17/93, p.256).79 Aside
78 On top of the $3 billion Gephardt claimed would be needed to pay for the main NAFTA, this would mean
"billions of dollars to clean up and protect the environment, to build the border infrastructure [against illegal
immigration] and to retrain our workers and assist business that are adversely affected" (NJ 7/31/93, p. 1938).
79 According to Grayson, this is how the Canadian negotiating team interpreted the US position, reported in "Labor
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from the more modest aims for the labor accord compared to its environment counterpart, the
Administration support for all these labor accord goals was softer than for the environmental goals.
International negotiations of the supplemental agreements began on March 17th and in
Washington, D.C., and unfolded over the Summer at several high-level and numerous other
working group meetings in the three countries.8 o The US delegation presented its positions on the
labor and environmental accords in a series of proposals over the first three sessions in March,
April, and May, respectively. They didn't explicitly call for trade sanctions as part of the
enforcement procedures until the mid-April talks in Mexico. There US chief negotiator Rufus
Yerxa proposed such sanctions for both the labor and environmental commissions, emphasizing
that without "credible and sound commissions and obligations...[NAFTA] will not stand the
scrutiny of the US Congress" (Inside US Trade 4/16/93, pp.3-4; and Grayson 1995, p.137).
The Canadian and Mexican delegations strenuously opposed these proposals for
independent and strong trilateral commissions for environmental and, especially, labor rights.
Both delegations objected to the possibility of groups exploiting the commission's mandates to
legitimate their protectionist demands, and to the threats such commissions would pose to national
sovereignty (LRW 7/14/93, p.676). They also feared that these commissions would hold Mexico
and Canada to higher standards than their European and Asian competitors also vying for access to
the US market -- something particularly objectionable given that the NAFTA had shaped up to be a
preferential trade agreement. Both delegations wanted less independent trilateral commissions,
with less access to NGOs, and fewer monitoring and enforcement powers, and especially not any
trade sanctioning powers (Inside US Trade 5/28/93, p. 1). On the environmental-specific issues,
the Canadian governments particularly objected to US environmentalist proposals to negotiate
minimum production process standards.
All these objections were particularly strong towards the labor commission (NYT 9/19/93,
p. 1). Talk of sanctions, in particular, raised everyone's hackles. Canada's chief negotiator
McKennirey "explained that some 90 percent of Canada's labor force was under provincial
jurisdiction and that it might only not be possible to obtain concurrence of the provinces....," and
anti-NAFTA forces in Ontario and British Columbia "would greet any suggestion that they modify
provincial practices to accommodate Washington as a bad joke" (Grayson 1995, p. 146). Mexico's
opposition was even stronger, even when the US position softened to propose trade sanctions only
as a last resort applied to industries and groups that violated large swaths of de jure labor laws.
Mexican officials knew this would be heartily opposed by Mexico's Confederation of Workers
Agreement Negotiating Report," memo by Canadian government, cited in Inside US Trade 4/2/93, p. 1 and 19).80 The US delegation consisted of the USTR and its head Mickey Kantor and his chief negotiator Rufus Yerxa
directing the negotiations, assisted by Richard J.Smith (deputy assistant secretary of state) and Alan Hecht (acting
assistant administrator of the EPA) for environmental issues, and Lawrence Katz (Labor Department chief economist)
and Donna J.Hrinak (deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs) for labor issues.
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(CTM), the nation-wide, quasi-governmental labor union with close ties to Salinas's PRI. With a
presidential election in the offing (August 1994), Salinas wasn't willing to alienate the CTM. In
fact, the CTM leader sent some of his representatives to some of the related negotiation venues "to
emphasize his hostility to the discussion of such issues as freedom of association, collective
bargaining practices, and the encouragement of autonomous unions" (Grayson 1995, p.147).
Just as the US positions inspired harsh opposition from the Mexicans and Canadians, they
did the same on the domestic front -- from both business associations and Republican legislators.
The Chamber of Commerce called use of trade sanctions a move that could have "profound, and as
yet incalculable consequences as a precedent for all future trade agreements" (quoted in Grayson
1995, p. 140). And on May 27th, seven business associations belonging to the US Alliance for
NAFTA met with the National Economic Council Deputy Director Bowman Cutter. In that
meeting they strongly objected to inclusion of trade sanctions and an independent secretariat for the
commissions, and criticized the Administration for not consulting business groups in preparation
of the Ottowa draft text (Inside US Trade 6/4/93, pp.1-12).8 In addition to these organized salvos
of opposition, Robert Reich reports that informal discussions with NAM, Chamber of Commerce,
and other business leaders revealed unconditional opposition especially to a labor commission that
would impose trade sanctions to protect worker bargaining rights (interview with author).
On May 24th, House Minority Leader Robert H.Michel, R-Ill., and Minority Whip Newt
Gingrich, R-Ga., sent a letter to the President warning that they would not be willing to support a
NAFTA that included "multilateral environmental and labor bureaucracies with little accountability
and sweeping mandates" (quoted in Grayson 1995, p.138; Inside US Trade 5/28/93, p.8). In this
and other dispatches, Bill Archer and other Republicans emphasized that "they would not vote for
the free trade agreement if the side agreements created extensive new international bureaucracies
that would infringe on American sovereignty or burden American companies" (NYT 9/19/93, p.1).
Senator Jesse Helms, R-N.C., expressed his fear more strongly, warning that the environmental
talks threatened to create "an international environmental gestapo" (Grayson 1995, pp. 139-40).
In the face of this flurry of domestic and international opposition, the Administration set its
priorities in favor of pushing harder for a strong environmental accord in exchange for a weaker
labor accord.82 By early August, Administration negotiators extracted an agreement from the
Mexicans to create most of what the Kantor elements of the Administration sought for the
environmental commission, though with a relatively modest trade sanction as the highest penalty
for non-compliance. According to some observers and participants, Mexican officials "reluctantly
8' A business association lobbyist complained that "the side agreements to the NAFTA were...initiated with no
input gotten or asked for from the business community....That has improved as we made our concerns known. But
[Kantor] initially forgot the coalition he is going to need to get NAFTA through Congress" (NJ 8/21/93, p.2071).
82 At a key National Economic Council meeting of the principals, these differences were aired, and apparently Lloyd
Bentson threw his weight on Kantor's side, thus resolving the president to take what was seen as the politically
necessary step to ensure ratification.
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dropped their opposition to trade sanctions several days after [Mexican chief negotiator] Serra
Puche met with Representative Gephardt...," who according to Inside US Trade reporters and
others "emphasized that the sanctions were a sin a qua non for congressional approval" (Grayson
1995, p.141; Inside US Trade 8/13/93, p18). The Mexicans dropped their objections, however,
with an explicit price: that the supplementary labor side agreement be weak.
The Canadians drove an even harder bargain, being more jealous of their sovereignty. Not
only would the labor accord be relatively weak, but environmental or labor sanctions: could only
be determined by Canadian courts, not by trilateral commissions; would apply to provinces as
recommendations, not requirements; and could only go as far as fines, not trade sanctions (CQ
8/14/93, p.22 19). But, again, the labor accord was weaker than the environmental one. As an
Administration official summarized, Canada and Mexico "weren't really willing at the outset to
contemplate trinational...arrangements, but as things moved on, it became clear that people were
more willing to try things out in the environmental area" (quoted in NYT 9/19/93, p.38).
What the official failed to point out was that the domestic cards were stacked the same way:
Business and Republican leaders were willing to try more out in the environment than the labor
area. As one Congressional aide put it, "The environmental provisions of the NAFTA are about as
far as you can push that issue without losing the support of those who fear the economically
deadening hand of regulation" (N.J. 11/20/93, p.2782).
3.2.1.1 The Side Agreements as Compensation
Virtually all the negotiations were complete by mid-August, Clinton unveiled the side
agreements at a signing ceremony on September 14th. Flanked by Carter, Ford, and Bush, and
the written endorsements of all other living presidents, Clinton celebrated the agreements as
"historic" for their unprecedented attention to labor and environmental standards. At their core,
both agreements set up national and international institutions to monitor, discuss, and enforce
existing labor and environmental laws and standards, and to cooperation towards an up-grading in
those laws and standards. Both, in other words, represented internationally-negotiated and
provided side payment compensation.83
It was immediately apparent, however, that the environmental accord was substantially
stronger and more ambitious than its labor counterpart. The environmental accord, the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), founded a Commission on
Environmental Cooperation (CEC) to be staffed by as many as the three countries were willing to
spend. A Council of Environmental Ministers -- the highest level ministers responsible for
environmental issues -- was to meet at least once a year and to oversee all CEC activity. A CEC
83 The details in this sub-section come from the text of the supplemental treaty (President of the US 1993).
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Secretariat would be established to do the nuts-and-bolts work for the Commission, providing
technical, administrative, and operational support to the Council and to whatever other committees
the council might create. The Secretariat, to be located in Canada, was to consider complains from
any NGO or association alleging environmental non-compliance. Finally, it called for a Joint
Public Advisory Committee of five members from each country, which was to meet annually
along-side the Council meetings. This committee was to include NGO representatives and to
advise the council and provide technical assistance to the CEC Secretariat.
Where a "persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce an environmental law" involving
traded goods could be shown to exist in a country, the CEC Secretariat can commission a factual
investigation, unless 2 out of 3 Ministers on the Council say otherwise. NGOs can file
complaints. On the strength of this investigation, the Council can recommend a range of actions,
including some "action plan" for the signatory nation to better enforce some law, and "monetary
enforcement assessment" up to $20 million. If the action plan isn't followed and the fine not paid,
the complaining party can suspend NAFTA tariff benefits.8 4
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) created institutions
parallel to the environmental accord: a trilateral Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC); a
Council of Ministers scheduled to meet yearly; an International Coordinating Secretariat to conduct
daily work of the commission; and fora for private parties to launch investigations and monitor
compliance, the National Administrative Offices (NAOs). But the CLC was limited in size to
fifteen staff members (NYT 9/19/93, p. 1). This implied less administrative, investigative capacity
than the CEC, without any staff ceilig, would have. More significantly, the National
Administrative Offices were not trilateral institutions, but national ones located in each country but
designed to be a forum for investigating practices in the other countries -- to be staffed, funded and
run in any way the country chooses. This implied less oversight and control by non-governmental
actors, like unions, in the investigatory process.
The CLC's enforcement and dispute resolution powers are particularly meager compared to
the environmental accord. The NAALC called for three tiers of investigatory and enforcement
powers, depending on the particular labor rights and standards being violated through some
"persistent pattern or failure to enforce" domestic labor laws.85 In the first tier, involving
workplace health and safety, minimum wage, and child labor laws, complaints may trigger
ministerial consultations, the Secretariat may order an investigation through an ad hoc Evaluation
Committee of Experts (ECEs) only if 2 of 3 Council Ministers agree, and the ECE and ministers
may impose a range of enforcement powers, up to $20 million and, failing that, trade sanctions. In
84 If the Council of Ministers is unable to resolve some dispute, any nation can ask for an arbitration panel, to be
staffed by approved experts, as long as 2 out of 3 ministers give their consent.
85 The only relevant laws are those covering goods traded among NAFTA countries, and countries can only
complain about "mutually recognized labor laws," those for which laws already exist.
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the second tier -- involving alleged non-enforcement of gender inequality in pay, gender or other
discrimination laws, migrant worker protection, forced labor laws, occupational injury payments --
ministers may consult and may order an ECE investigation, but they cannot take any dispute
resolution action. And in the third tier -- covering Labor's most coveted rights to organize,
associate, bargain collectively, and strike -- the only action possible is ministerial consultation.
In sum, the environmental agreement was palpably stronger than its labor counterpart in
terms of size, autonomy, transparency and access, and powers. And neither the environmental nor
the labor agreement provided anything near the protections provided to intellectual property as part
of the main NAFTA agreement. But the creation of these labor and environmental institutions
broadly fulfilled what was arguably the most ambitious, and certainly most unprecedented, of
Clinton's October 4th side payment compensation promises.
3.2.2. The Rest of Clinton's Compensation: Environmental Cleanup and Promised Retraining.
By the September 14th unveiling of the labor and environmental agreements, Clinton had
also taken significant action on his other October 4th compensation promises. Of course, the
supplemental agreement on import surges, unveiled the same day, addressed the concerns of a
variety of vocal anti-NAFTA producer groups, especially agricultural concerns. More
significantly, perhaps, the Clinton Administration had agreed in principle to negotiate along-side
the main environmental accord a bilateral US-Mexico institution to design, administer and finance
for US-Mexico border clean-up and infrastructural improvement. Roughly as expected and
outlined, the resulting institution was unveiled October 27th as the Border Environment
Cooperation Commission (BECC). The BECC was to be overseen by a ten-member board of
directors representing US and Mexican national and state-level environmental public servants, and
advised by an 18-member council of state and local government and NGO representatives.
The money was to come from both private sector sources, from existing governments
(federal, state, and local), and from a newly dedicated North American Development Bank
(NADBank). When the NADBank was finally created -- details were being worked out until the
final days before ratification -- it was to be capitalized by the US and Mexico, each country paying
in equal shares, $225 million for the first four years of paid-in capital, which was then to leverage
roughly $2-2.5 billion in "callable capital" (Inside US Trade Special Report 8/16/93, S-3;
Wash.Post 11/1/93, p.A7).86 Aside the BECC and CEC monies and activity, the US also agreed
to capitalization of the Mexican Conservation Fund, toward which the US promised $20 million, to
aid in "preserving the country's watersheds, forests, and biodiversity" (Fox 1995, p.63;
86 Before ratification, the NADBank's responsibilities were expanded to include development projects and job
training programs for NAFTA-impacted communities as well as environmental cleanup. See Section 3.3.3 below.
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International Trade Reporter 9/15/93, p. 150 2 and 11/3/93, p. 1832). When all was said and done,
the environmental cleanup and safeguard commitments totaled between $4 and 6 billion from the
US (NYT 9/19/93,p.20).87
On the labor side, the only other major October 4th 1992 side payment promise involved
providing sufficient programs and funding to pay for the adjustment of workers dislocated by the
NAFTA. Here, the Administration had not taken any new action, since the adjustment assistance
they had in mind was part of the broader job retraining initiative. Clinton and his underlings were
hostile to the dedicated TAA program, or to any like-program for the NAFTA, mainly because they
believed it complicated the task of determining eligibility and providing services. Not only were
the Labor Department and other administrations against a targeted program, the USTR apparently
refused to even speculate about the possibility of including some retraining initiatives in the
NAFTA enactment legislation (NJ 9/11/93, p.2 2 18).
Like Bush's ASETS plan, then, the Clinton plan was to fold TAA and other training
programs into a single program. More ambitious than the Bush initiative, however, Clinton's
initiative was to encourage assist adjustment "before the trauma of unemployment hits" (Reich
quoted in LRW 9/8/93, p.870). It would also create "one stop shopping" so that "people who
need income support through unemployment insurance for job assessment, job search assistance,
and job training to get it at one place conveniently" (Ibid., p.8 7 1). Labor Department studies and
recommendations estimated that the big program would serve 1.3 million in 1998 and would cost
$3.2 billion, a tripling over the Administration's 1994 budgeted amount of $1.1 billion devoted to
active labor market policies (Ibid). Details of the plan had yet to be worked out, but some
principles to be at the center of the reform, such as one-stop career centers, were already included
in the Administration's FY 1994 Budget.88 Funding was also left undecided, though Reich
rejected the border tax idea pushed by numerous interest groups (AFL-CIO) and legislators
(Sen.William Roth, R-Del) to pay for the program, saying it would simply be a "trade
impediment"; he also rejected an employer tax, saying the Administration "would not propose
anything which in any way deterred employment...." (LRW 9/29/93, p.932).8 9
87 Other sources reported higher totals. Congressional Quarterly estimated that the plans totalled $8 billion, of
which $2 billion is from current US-Mexico programs, $2 billion from multilateral lende:s, and $4 billion from
government loans and guarantees to finance border projects (CQ 10/2/93, p.262 1).
88 In the FY 1994 budget, the Senate and House approved monies to establish one-stop career centers: Senate
provided $50 million for such centers, compared with $42.5 in the House and $150 in the Labor Department's
request (LRW 9/29/93, p.933). Other provisions of the comprehensive approach to get a jump-start in the budget
plans were a national labor market information system -- which the '94 allocation blessed with commissioning a
"thorough review of labor market information needs and existing products" -- and worker profiling -- which the FY
'94 bills both allocated $9 million to achieve.
89 By the Fall of 1993, the Administration had already backed away from the Labor Department plan to demand
employers to devote some percentage of their profits to in-house training or to pay a 1.5 percent employer payroll
tax or training commitment had been jettisoned in the face of fierce opposition. The NAM preferred instead a tax
credit. Others criticized the enforceability of the program (e.g. what if someone's hanging out with a supervisor? is
that training?).
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The Administration signalled its plan to pursue this broader, still unspecified program in the
near future as a way of fulfilling its NAFTA adjustment assistance promise. While the side
agreements were being negotiated, Administration officials insisted that worker dislocation
resulting from the NAFTA would be a tiny proportion of total jobs, no more than 22,500 in the
first 18 months of the program. The planned, more general training initiative, they insisted, would
more than address the adjustment needs of these workers. And they pleaded for patience: The big
plan would be coming soon. A week before the unveiling of the side agreements, Reich told
reporters and the Senate Finance Committee that the proposal for comprehensive training would be
introduced "within the next six weeks" -- in other words, well before Congress adjourned in
December (BNA 9/7/93; LRW 9/29/93, p.932).
3.2.3. Reactions to the Clinton Package
Clinton's compensation and safeguard package successfully split parts of the anti-NAFTA
coalition and softened some opposition -- more so than had Bush's efforts -- but the majority of
that coalition remained as strongly opposed as ever. In the details of such a mixed response there
were only a few surprises.
Clinton's ambitious package of cleanup money and of trinational monitoring and
enforcement institutions successfully split the environmentalist coalition more solidly and widely
than had Bush's 1992 package. On September 15th, two days after the side agreement unveiling,
leaders of six of the largest environmental lobbies actively involved in the debate held a press
conference to announce their support of the NAFTA: (1) the National Wildlife Federation; (2) the
National Audubon Society; (3) Conservation International; (4) World Wildlife Federation; (5)
Environmental Defense Fund; and (6) Natural Resources Defense Council (NYT 9/16/93, p. 1 and
20). Collectively these groups represented more than 7.5 million members. In keeping with the
Administration's desire to symbolize the depth of and draw maximum attention to their
endorsement, these groups appeared together, with Vice President Al Gore at their side. All six
claimed to have "no doubt that approving the trade agreement was better for the environment"
(NYT 9/16/93,p.20). To support this claim, in their various ways the six representatives pointed
to the autonomy, strength and accessibility of the trinational Commission on Economic
Cooperation, and to the various programs and some $4-6 billion promised for border cleanup.
Many of the six, of course, had been actively involved in developing and negotiating these
provisions, working closely with Administration officials. This allowed the groups to shape many
specifics of close interest to their particular constituency. The most extreme example of this
tailoring involved the National Audubon Society. In the few days between conclusion of the side
agreement negotiations and the September 15th press conference, the national representatives of the
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National Audubon Society made the organization's support contingent on a promise from the
Administration that the Western Hemisphere migratory bird treaty would take precedence over
NAFTA. This agreement required that the Administration add the migratory birds agreement to a
list of environmental pacts already protected in the general NAFTA from legal challenges on behalf
of NAFTA liberalization. 90
Most of the six pro-NAFTA environmental groups had been conciliatory and sometimes
supportive of the NAFTA ever since its negotiation was announced by President Bush. All but the
NRDC and Audubon, for instance, had formally come out as cautiously in favor of the agreement
after Bush promised and negotiated his environmental compensation package. But the depth of
support of these groups was significantly stronger in the aftermath of the Clinton package; all are
reported to have actively lobbied congress for NAFTA's passage (Fox 1995). And Clinton's
compensation successfully bought the support of two additional groups Bush's package had failed
to woo: the NRDC, which was formally and publicly against the NAFTA in the Autumn of 1992,
and the National Audubon Society, which had been on the fence during that time. Thus, Clinton's
environmental compensation did buy significant environmentalist support for the liberalization,
important for the vote at least through environmentalist stamps of approval symbolically affecting
mass public and Congressional opinion.
On the other hand, most of the environmental groups that had consistently taken a more
resolute anti-NAFTA stand -- including rejecting Bush's compensation package -- were unswayed
by Clinton's offers. The most prominent of these national groups were still the Sierra Club,
Friends of the Earth, and Greenpeace, accompanied by Ralph Nader's Public Citizen. And they
were joined by, formally, around 300 other local and state-level grass roots groups, including
nearly a dozen of the National Audubon Society's local chapters -- who sharply criticized their
national (NYT 9/15/93, p. 1 and 20).91 The big organization representatives of these hardline
environmental groups fought against the NAFTA in several appearances before House and Senate
hearings devoted to the side agreements and the NAFTA generally, between September and mid-
November. And they sponsored a full-court-press advertising effort, partly subsidized by the
Citizens Trade Watch Campaign, in which they spent as much time excoriating the big NAFTA-
endorsers for "selling out" and being "too cozy with their corporate funders" as they did dissecting
weaknesses in the side agreements (Ibid., p.20).
With the environmental lobby so soundly split, the question was how the side agreements
and job-initiative signaling would affect the nature and determination of Labor's opposition. Even
90 Apparently the Administration didn't need to negotiate this with Canada and Mexico, since the EPA was in the
process of adding the deal to the list after the formal signing of the side agreements.
9' Such intra-group dissension cut both ways, as it turned out, for two experts on the Serra club's economics
committee publicly criticized the national's opposition to NAFTA, claiming the treaty to be a significant
improvement over the status quo ante (NAFTA Notes 9/28/93; and Baker Fox 1995, p.64)
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before the side negotiations were completed, the verdict was in: Labor representatives of all stripes
-- not just the consistently unconditional protectionists like the Teamsters, IBEW, and UAW, but
also the tentative fair traders like ACTWU, the Food Workers, and the AFL-CIO leadership --
made it clear that they were no more appeased by Clinton's compensation package as by Bush's.
Labor spokesmen focused most of their ire on the weak protections for worker rights in the newly-
proposed international Commission on labor; but they also had some angry words about Clinton's
promised retraining compensation, and about other more protectionist redress. They expressed
this opposition in all possible venues, most prominently in a slew of post-side agreement hearings,
and in the AFL-CIO's 20th biennial Convention, held between October 4th and 7th.
Of the side agreements, Labor's appraisal was simple enough. In post-side agreement
Congressional hearings, the main spokesman was Thomas Donahue, sometimes appearing with
Mark Anderson. 92 On September 23 to House Ways and Means, in remarks almost identical to
those before Senate Finance on the 21st, Donahue focused on the new institution's weak
protections of worker rights:
The labor supplemental agreement, rather than advancing labor rights and standards,
actually represents a weakening of existing remedies available under US law. The accord
contains no agreement on or definition of minimal worker rights and standards. Remedies
can only be sought for persistently pcor enforcement of a narrow group of standards, not
for gross violations of labor rights. No remedies are offered for infringements against
workers' rights to free association, to collective bargaining, or to withhold labor through
strikes. (Donahue to Ways and Means 9/23/93, pp.5 17-18)
Mark Anderson embellished the verdict, emphasizing how "we certainly believe that the rights of
workers were short-changed in this agreement, and it is clear that even the imperfect environmental
accord is stronger" (NYT 9/19/93, p.38).93 In addition to testimony and press statements towing
this line, the AFL-CIO Convention's Resolution No. 1 -- a measure of its priority to the unions --
emphasized the Commission's weak protection for collective bargaining rights as the core evil of
the NAFTA (AFL-CIO 1993, p.208-9). 94
In the post-side agreements phase of the NAFTA fight, Labor also criticized the
Administration's retraining promises, and had an alternative plan. In his testimony to Congress
and in press statements, Donahue accused the President of reneging on one of his October 4th
NAFTA pledges by promising rather than providing an ambiguous retraining initiative, one that
92 AFL-CIO's 73-year old President Lane Kirkland also got into the act on occasion. On August 13th, the same day
broad agreement was announced, he lamented that "The side agreements would relegate worker rights and the
environment to commissions with no real enforcement mechanisms, no power to impose trade sanctions and no
effective remedies" (CQ 8/14/93, p.2 2 19).
9' For instance, Anderson zeroed-in on the limit on the CLC's staff: "It is difficult for me to believe that 15 people,
however qualified or energetic they may be, can examine problems across the continent....This sounds like it isn't
going to be much more than an office with a fax machine and some telephones" (Ibid).
94 All Labor criticisms of the side agreement institutions also mentioned problems with the environmental
compensation, such as how the "polluter-pays" principle should have been imposed. And they criticized a variety of
other, more protectionist measures claimed to have been sold short in the supplementary negotiations: Super 301
penalties, tighter rules of origin, more generous tariff snap-backs.
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fails to give NAFTA-dislocated workers special assistance. Such a stance, Donahue insisted,
failed to differentiate "between workers who are displaced by government actions" like NAFTA,
from those laid off "because the dry cleaner closed" (LRW 9/29/93, p.932). And in the October
AFL-CIO Convention, the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) proposed a
Resolution No.89 to keep TAA alive rather than fold it into Clinton's broader retraining, calling
also for more TAA funding, for de-linking a worker's eligibility for TRAs from enrollment in a
training program, and for extending assistance to workers dislocated by plant relocation as well as
import competition (AFL-CIO 1993, p.A47).
But the adjustment assistance issue was, by all accounts, of secondary importance to
Labor's complaints in the post-side agreement phase of the NAFTA fight. Although the TAA
demands were folded into Resolution No. 1, it was low on the list, and in the initial text of the
NAFTA Resolution, adjustment assistance didn't even make it into the list of demands (Ibid.,
pp.227-9). Robert Reich reports that in his discussions with Labor leaders in the post-side
agreement phase of the NAFTA fight, the leaders expressed little interest in beefing up the
adjt.stment assistance provisions as a condition for softened opposition. 95
Having tentatively flirted with a softer position on the NAFTA conditional upon a cluster of
side payments, especially worker rights protections, Labor's full-fledged return to unconditional
protectionism was a blow to Clinton's NAFTA prospects. A major target of its compensation
efforts in the supplemental negotiations had not been bought-off even slightly. In fact, the end of
the side agreements signalled a marked increase in the tenor of Labor's opposition, as the AFL-
CIO and member unions mobilized all their political resources to defeat NAFTA ratification. It was
at this stage, after all, when the IBEW and a few other labor leaders began to hold out the NAFTA
as a single-issue litmus test of support, threatening to "whip the ass" of any Congressman brazen
enough to cross the NAFTA line (AFL-CIO Convention Proceedings).
Whether responding to such threats or to conscience, leading legislative opponents or
fence-sitters soon revealed that Clinton's array of compensation and protectionist redress wasn't
enough to buy their support for NAFTA. For some legisla'ors this was never in question. House
Whip David Bonior, D-Mich., Senator Dorgan, D-N.D., a,_a a number of other House and Senate
members had many months earlier assembled an unwavering and unconditional anti-NAFTA
caucus. Early in the side agreement negotiations, for instance, Bonior said that he didn't think the
NAFTA "can be fixed with the side agreements" and that "I intend to exert every -an.ce of energy I
have to defeat it [NAFTA]..." (NJ 7/17/93, p.1827).96
"' In public conversations, according to Reich, these leaders emphasized that retraining was under-fi- .-,!.d and
politically precarious, and that training without clear demand for jobs wasn't enough. Privately, the ;eaders
'confessed" to Reich that they were also worried that retraining would simply hasten the hollowing of union ranks,
by facilitating exit from unionized into non-unionized jobs (interview with Reich).
96 Similarly, Senator Dorgan, D-ND, expressed his unwavering opposition, focusing on the past and future
"dumping" of durum wheat into his state, and was working with Michigan Senator Carl Levin to collect Democratic
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More relevant were "undecided" legislators who had expressed some willingness to soften
their opposition or actually support the NAFTA with good supplemental agreements and
compensation action. Important among these were the Southern legislators, concentrated in
Florida and Louisiana, who had been interested mainly in wresting more protectionist rules of
origin, exemptions, and tariff snap-backs for agricultural groups. After the supplemental accord
on import surges was announced, these legislators made it clear that not enough was done to
protect their constituencies from the threat of cheap Mexican sugar, fruit and vegetables. As of
September 1993, for instance, the entire Florida delegation in both the House and Senate -- 13
Republicans and 10 Democrats -- remained officially opposed (Orden 1995, p.53). So the
Administration's one purely protectionist side agreement failed to hit its main political target.
Perhaps the most important fence-sitter, however, was the Richard Gephardt, who one
Hill-watcher was sure "[held] at least 25 NAFTA votes in his pocket" (NJ 9/11/93, p.2 2 18). The
Michigan Majority Leader had unambiguously and consistently said that if the side agreements
were strong enough and adjustment assistance programs generous enough he would support the
NAFTA. And he had played an active role in convincing the Mexican delegation to soften their
opposition to the use of trade sanctions as possible penalties against environmental and labor law
non-compliance. The question, of course, was whether the resulting agreement was enough.
Soon after his meeting with Mexico's chief negotiator, Gephardt had already signalled his
dissatisfaction with the side agreements, saying that they didn't come close to resolving his long-
standing concerns: "Although progress has been achieved, the announced side agreement falls
short in important respects, and taken alone, is not supportable. I am not optimistic that these
deficiencies can be successfully resolved" (CQ 8/14/93, p.2 2 19).
On September 21st Gephardt formally announced his opposition to the NAFTA, but it soon
became clear that his opposition had been softened by the Administration's compensation efforts.
In a speech to the National Press Club, he complained that the Administration had not gone far
enough to remedy his various concerns, outlined before and during the side agreement negotiations
-- especially concerns about worker rights and funding for retraining and environmental cleanup
(NJ 10/16/93, p.2473). To a cheering AFL-CIO Convention audience on October 4th, Gephardt
reiterated his anti-NAFTA stance, focusing this time on wages and rights of workers,
environmental disparities, and the lack of resources for retraining and relocation. (AFL-CIO 1993,
pp.77-9). On the retraining compensation, Gephardt spent significant time and energy criticizing
the President's retraining initiative for lacking important substantive details, such as funding
sources, and for being promised in the indefinite future. Instead, joining a number of other voices
in Congress, he wanted adjustment assistance funding and plans to be provided as part of the
signatures for a letter asking Clinton to withdraw from the agreement (Ibid).
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NAFTA package (NJ 9/11/93, p.2218). Gephardt, thus, stood against the NAFTA for not being
accompanied by as much compensation as it could.
The big question, however, was not so much whether Gephardt would oppose the
agreement, but instead how active his opposition would be: "The question is his level of
engagement.....We're hoping that at most he's going to articulate his position and respond if he's
attacked" an anonymous House Democrat said (CQ 9/11/93, p.2373). Bill Richardson, D-NM,a
major pro-NAFTA vote-gatherer, said "If he works against us, then it's over" (Tbid). On this
issue, the news for Clinton was good. Gephardt voiced his opposition to the NAFTA agreement
in a various places, but he did not strongly pressure through personal calls or speeches or other
tactics other Democrats to do the same -- certainly not as vociferously as he had fought for Super
301-like trade legislation in the mid- 1980s. And he did not gripe about or try to derail with the
Administration's attempts to buy further votes with additional promises, and in fact stayed engaged
in asking the Administration for further sweeteners that would make the NAFTA more palatable,
such as more immediate and concrete action on adjustment assistance. Either due to this relatively
passive opposition or to his diminished influence, in any event, Gephardt's opposition did not
spark wholesale opposition from other fence-sitting Democrats, as many had feared (CQ...).
The modesty of Gephardt's opposition partly reflected his partisan loyalty and his
commitment to Clinton's legislative program, but it should be credited in part to the
Administration's various compensation efforts, particularly its international labor and, especially,
environmental institutions. The possibility of further sweeteners in the immediate (adjustment
assistance) or distant future (minimum wage) may also have moderated his opposition. Retro- or
prospectively, then, the compensation provided by the middle of September 1993 can be said to
have made at least a modest difference to Gephardt and others on Capitol Hill.
In sum, we see in the Clinton's side agreements, unilateral side payments, and retraining
promises another compensation package with mixed political effectiveness. Clinton's
compensation clearly failed to push organized labor to soften its hostility to the NAFTA. And
more generally, the array of opposition in Congress made it clear that NAFTA ratification was still
in trouble. As lead pro-NAFTA vote-getter in the House, Robert Matsui, D-Hawaii, had to admit:
"We didn't gain ground from the side agreements, as we had hoped" (NJ 9/18/93, p.2259). But
clearly some ground was gained. The compensation clearly bought and/or deepened the support of
some environmentalists -- most clearly NRDC that hadn't supported with previous compensation.
And it also arguably softened Gephardt's -- and by implication, others' -- opposition.
Finally, it is also significant that the compensation to date had some buy-off effect without
alienating many or any Republicans otherwise committed to the NAFTA. To be sure, there were at
least some groups who's opposition deepened as a result of the side agreements, such as Pat
Buchanan, who said of the side agreements: "If NAFTA passes, the dream of a conservative-
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libertarian counterrevolution, to roll back Big Labor's special interest laws and reverse Congress'
capitulation to the Greens, is gone -- forever" (quoted in CQ 10/16/93, p.2793). How this
truculence translated into votes isn't clear. In general, the Administration was careful enough to
balance such a Republican back-lash against Laborite demands that they didn't lose any or many
votes with the side agreements. Bill Archer, R-Tex, the ranking Republican on Ways and Means
and a chief critic of the labor and environment Commissions, said: "Clearly [the Administration]
could have stepped a step farther [on the side agreements] and lost me" (NYT 9/19/93, p.38).
3.3. The Endgame Compensation
As reactions to the NAFTA compensation rolled-in, it was clear that the compensation
package may have moderated important ramparts of opposition, but that it had not bought enough
legislative support to secure the NAFTA's ratification, planned sometime before December recess.
Many feared and publicly expressed that Clinton had waited too long to begin selling the NAFTA,
signaling softness in his convictions, and giving anti-NAFTA forces time to mobilize and space for
fears to fester. Both the House and Senate were problems, but especially the House. As early as
mid-July, it was clear that the unconditional and "firm" anti-NAFTA caucus was big; Bonior had
gathered 102 House and 7 Senate signatures on a letter urging Clinton to post-pone a NAFTA vote
until after consideration of the health care, since "debate over NAFTA will be difficult and
divisive...and will detract from our efforts to build a broad coalition for health care reform" (NJ
9/19/93, p.2259). Vote counts in the couple of weeks following the side agreement's unveiling
revealed that Bonior's caucus of "firm no's" was only getting bigger.
It was at this point that the Administration's bid to get NAFTA ratified really took off,
consisting of what was one of the most intensive lobbying effort launched by a President and his
cabinet in legislative history. The direct targets of these appeals were no longer societal groups in
the anti-NAFTA coalition, but congressional legislators. White House staff, virtually all cabinet
members, and the President himself, paid hundreds of visits and made thousands of phone calls
cajoling and bargaining with Members of the Senate and the House, and their staffers.97 In this
grand lobbying effort emerged the final flurry of side payment politics in the NAFTA episode.
This lobbying effort used all the usual tools of Presidential influence on trade
policymaking. Rhetorical and symbolic gestures were important parts of the endgame, and came in
a variety of packages: press briefings, congressional testimony, rallies, etc. Some involved
97 The President brought in William Daley, brother of Chicago Mayor Richard Daley, to coordinate the lobbying
effort. In the House, the point people were Robert Matsui, D -Hawaii, a senior member of Ways and Means, and
Bill Richardson, R., who was one of four deputy majority whips and an activist within the 19-member Hispanic
Caucus. For a detailed discussion of the Administration's lobbying organization in the last stages of the NAFTA
fight, see Grayson 1995, pp.199-209.
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singing the praises of various parts of the agreement -- such as Labor Secretary Reich portraying a
recent Mexican wage agreement ("El Pacto") as an expression of "the first fruits of the [Labor side
agreement's] progressive, collaborative approach to labor policy" (Senate Labor/Human Resources
Committee 10/13/93).98 Others involved Administration officials denigrating opposition arguments
--- or the opposition -- the most important example of which was Clinton's "Meet the Press"
appearance at which he condemned Labor for using "real rough-shod, muscle-bound tactics" to
coerce vulnerable legislators to vote against the NAFTA (in Gerstenzag and Healy A-15). Such
rhetoric was very strong stuff, and it incensed Labor representatives who demanded a Presidential
apology,99 while helping to reverse the flagging support from Gingrich and other conservative
Republicans.'00 The most remembered and politically useful rhetorical gesture, however, was the
Gore-Perot debate on November 9th, in which Gore's level-headed defense of the NAFTA and
Perot's crotchety polemics did wonders for the pro-NAFTA cause."o'
At the center of the Administration's lobbying assault, however, was an aggressive
campaign to negotiate a variety of general and targeted redress. These offers of redress came in
three types, distinguished by how concrete, particularistic, and "eleventh-hour" they were: (1)
signaling linkage or wresting actual support for future legislation favored by anti-NAFTA groups
and legislators; (2) providing general benefits attached to the NAFTA enactment legislation, most
significantly adjustment assistance for NAFTA-dislocated workers; and (3) eleventh-hour pork
redress targeting particularistic policies and actions at particular legislators. All of these redress
overtures led to more side payment compensation than protectionist exemption or revision.
98 El Pacto was an October 3rd renewal of the 1994 pact for Stability, Competitiveness and Employment (PECE), a
voluntary Mexican tripartite pact between government, the national labor union, and industry pledging to link
increases in the minimum wage to gains in worker productivity, minus inflation.
99 Teamsters President Ron Carey, whose union was laden by the most corrupt public reputation and had the most
to lose, was the one who called for an apology: the "president's use of the words 'muscle-bound' and 'roughshod'
were an insult to every working man and woman in America. If he had used similar code words to attack civil rights
groups, women's groups, or environmental organizations who oppose NAFTA, he would be strongly condemned by
every member of Congress" (LRW 11/10/93, p.1079-80). AFL-CIO's Donahue called the remarks a "cheap shot,"
adding tat the administration was behind in the vote "and they're reaching desperately to get ahead" (Ibid, p. 1080).
The IBEW's William Bywater, the sharpest-tongued Labor leader, was, uncharacteristically, more defensive:
"What strong arm tactics do we have?....Our members are saying they are not going to vote for any candidate who
takes a stand against our interests and supports NAFTA. That's not arm twisting. That's the democratic process."
(Ibid, p. 1079).
'00 Having wavered in the rallying of Republican votes, Gingrich got moving again, inspired in part by the
President's confrontation and show of bipartisan good feeling. He said of the President's "Meete the Press"
confrontation: "It said to a lot of our guys that, if he's going to take that kind of a risk in taking on labor unions,
how can I turn my back on him?" (CQ 11/20/93, p. 3 175).
t0' Right after the debate, polls showed a significant increase in public support for the NAFTA, reaching at least
temporarily a narrow majority of support (36 to 31 percent).
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3.3.1. Signaling Linkage and Trying for Compensation Promises
Some Administration officials drew attention to and sought support for future or potential
policies that could signal policy action to off-set NAFTA pain. Already, of course, the
Administration had been signaling its intention to introduce sweeping job retraining legislation.
But there were other future-looking compensation signals and overtures separate from the
compensation package Clinton promised in October 1992.
For instance, Administration officials and pro-NAFTA legislators had often signalled how
groups and legislators should support the NAFTA to build political capital among interest groups
and Repuolicans necessary to Clinton's labor and environment-friendly legislative platform.
Robert Matsui , for instance, predicted that Clinton's support for the NAFTA would, as the NJ
paraphrased, "open the door for Republican cooperation on other issues, including health care"
(NJ 7/17/93, p. 1827). James Carville, more pointedly, talked of linking health care and NAFTA:
"With supporting NAFTA comes an obligation to support national health care....We ought to do
something to invest in the people who are going to lose their jobs." Such signaling was no doubt
motivated as much by a desire to build support for healthcare as it was to secure NAFTA support,
but it signalled to anti-NAFTA legislators that the Administration had an important policy that
would mitigate NAFTA's pain (National Journal 8/21/93, p.2 1 12). It's impossible to measure
how much such signaling helped NAFTA's prospects.' 0 2
More explicit and narrowly-focused on buying NAFTA support, officials fished among
anti-NAFTA groups, business, and Congress for possible policy provisions that could be pushed
in the near future (after NAFTA passage) to compensate vocal and powerful NAFTA opponents.
Robert Reich, for instance, knew that organized labor had eschewed the Administration's
compensation package, but he spoke with a variety of labor leaders in search of policies that might
off-set their worries and moderate their opposition. These included more immediate action on
adjustment assistance, in which they showed little or no interest.'0 3 Reich then turned to a
legislative item that he understood organized labor coveted more than any other: fedeial laws to
prohibit permanent replacement of striking union workers. The Labor Secretary approached a
number of business association representatives, including leaders of the National Association of
Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce, to float the following quid pro quo: Labor leaders
agree to try and call off their dogs on the NAFTA, and in exchange NAM, Chamber of Commerce,
etc. agree to soften opposition to such striker replacement legislation. Reich claims that the
102 Other than healthcare and labor market policies (retraining and other welfare provisions), the Administration and
other pro-NAFTA groups signalled little else. There is no evidence, moreover, that they signalled the compensating
effects or possibilities at the state or local level. It was, judging by press accounts and selected interviews, a purely
federal affair.
103 Legislators, however, did. See next section.
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response was immediate and resolute: "they said, 'No way, Jos6" (interview with Reich).
According to Reich, these business association leaders were more opposed to such legislation than
they were in favor of the NAFTA; plus, these leaders figured they could still win without having to
sacrifice such a pound of flesh (Ibid).
It is difficult to even identify these or other possible signaling or support-building to future
policy actions that might serve as compensation, and it is impossible to measure in any detail their
political effectiveness. Such attempts to signal or buy support for future legislation/compensation
probably didn't matter much to the NAFTA struggle. The Reich episode, of course, reveals an
attempt that clearly bore no fruit. Signaling future elements of the Clinton legislative program,
however, may have moderated some opposition in the House and Senate. As the discussion of
Gephardt's post-side agreement stance suggested, the broader signaling may have played a role in
moderating the opposition of some members.
3.3.2. "A Bird in the Hand... ": NAFTA Bridge-program Adjustment Assistance and
Other General Goods
The NAFTA endgame also witnessed the provision of a few redress provisions that were
more than future policy promises but actual parts of the NAFTA enactment legislation: Super 301
protections, NADBank funding for communities, and NAFTA-dedicated adjustment assistance.
The first of these was protectionist revision, the latter two compensation.
The inclusion into NAFTA of Super 301, the one intra-issue protectionism of these three,
had long been part of the platform of the laborite wing of the anti-NAFTA coalition in Congress,
and had long been opposed by many pro-NAFTA forces as overly protectionist. Super 301 was
the controversial heart of the 1988 Omnibus Trade bill's aggressive reciprocity -- calling for
immediate and harsh trade sanctions against trading partners shown to have chronic trade surpluses
with the US and to be engaged in "unfair" trade practices (e.g. dumping, subsidization, poor
treatment of workers). Clinton had endorsed Super 301 during his presidential campaign, but was
reluctant to include it in the NAFTA accord given its potential for abuse by protectionists.
When the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means committees took up the "mock
markup" of the NAFTA enactment legislation in late October, the issue of whether or not to include
the provision was a sticking point. Senator Sam Baucus, D-Mont, long a NAFTA fence-sitter,
explicitly offered his support for NAFTA conditional upon inclusion of Super-301 (NJ 10/16/93,
p.2476). Opposed by enough of the Ways and Means and Finance committee members that they
couldn't agree on a joint recommendation, the committees left it up to the Clinton Administration.
When Clinton submitted his full NAFTA enactment package for up-or-down vote on November
4th, it included Super 301 language. Baucus announced his support for the NAFTA and
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highlighted that inclusion as the key to his vote. There is no evidence that any other House or
Senate legislators were "bought" by this overarching protectionism.
The second general redress included as part of the NAFTA enactment legislation was
creation of a NADBank that would not only fund infrastructural investment to combat border
pollution, but also fund projects outside the border region and for a broader range of community
development and job projects. Originally envisioned as part of the US-Mexico border cleanup
plan, discussed above, the NADBank caught the eye of Rep.Esteban E.Torres, D-CA, a senior
member of the House hispanic caucus. While the NADBank was being crafted, Torres insisted
that some of the NADBank money -- at least $1 billion in loans and loan guarantees -- be made
available for public works projects and job programs in communities that lose jobs as a result of
NAFTA (CQ 10/23/93, p.2863). Torres rounded up a collection of other NAFTA fence-sitters,
mainly from the Hispanic caucus, to join him in this demand. In early October he sent Clinton a
letter "offering to back NAFTA if their demands are met" (CQ 10/2/93, p.2620). According to
various sources, Torres implied that "he could deliver between eight and 12 votes" (Grayson 1995,
p.214; Wash. Post 11/1/93, p.Al).
Clinton apparently liked the idea, and had Bentsen, Tyson, and Reich work with Torres to
negotiate the details. On October 27th Bensten unveiled the NADBank -- with the $450 million in
US and Mexico start-up capital to leverage another $2.5 billion -- to be included as part of the
enactment legislation. The NADBank charter read that 10 percent of its loans be devoted to
community development d la Torres (CQ 10/30/93, p.2950). This implied funding levels
significantly less than Torres's $1 billion, but it was enough to win his support. Torres appeared
with Bentsen at the NADBank unveiling to announce his support for the NAFTA. Having been
lobbied by UAW President Owen Bieber not to be bought, Torres said "[My constituency
members] know I would not deliberately hurt working people....Now I can say there's some relief
in sight" (Wash.Pos 11/1/93, p.A7).
But Administration officials were disappointed to find that the NADBank community
funding didn't also bring over anywhere near the votes it was designed to buy in light of Torres's
posturing. The Hispanic caucus, for instance, stayed mainly in the anti-NAFTA bloc (CQ 11/6/93,
3022). "One man, one bank," lamented on House Democrat (Wash.Post 11/1/93, p.A7). This
was a bit pessimistic, but only a bit. According to House vote-getter Bill Richardson, D -NM, "it
paves the way for two or three others....We're still trying to persuade them" (Ibid, p.3015).
3.3.2.1. NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance
The most ambitious general buy-off written into the NAFTA enactment legislation during
the endgame was a NAFTA-dedicated adjustment assistance program. This compensation grew
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out of Clinton's October 1992 promise to increase adjustment assistance funding for dislocated
workers, and out of the attempts by the Administration to link this promise to its sweeping $3.2
billion job retraining initiative planned later in the legislative season. Richard Gephardt and other
House and Senate members generally liked the idea of such a program, but as mentioned above
they pressured the Administration to provide more concrete action for NAFTA-dislocated workers.
As of late September, however, Administration officials, including the Department of Labor
responsible for the retraining initiatives, still strongly opposed folding any such dedicated
assistance into the NAFTA bill and feverishly promised that its broader initiative would be unveiled
and tabled before Congress' December recess.'0 4
The pressure to create a NAFTA-dedicated program increased as the Administration still
found itself more than a three-dozen votes short of ratification, and as the future of the broad
retraining initiative became increasingly uncertain. Even if the Administration could come through
on its promise to introduce the retraining overhaul before December recess, there was no chance of
enactment before sometime in 1995. But even this was optimistic, since a combination of factors -
- continuing/growing budget constraints, ridicule of past retraining programs, hostility to the
retraining initiative in the key House and Senate committees, and Congress' tendency to defend the
segregation of various pet programs -- all threatened to derail the retraining initiative whenever it
was introduced (Reich interview; NJ 9/11/93, p.22 18). As one astute Congress-watcher said of
the Administration's retraining promises: "Congress and those who bear the brunt of new
competition from Mexico will be forced to trust the Administration's ability to push through a new,
better-financed retraining program early next year -- a dubious prospect at best" (Stokes for NJ
9/11/93, p.2 2 18, italics mine).
Such doubt became the basis of an increasingly active (behind-the-scenes) coalition of
legislators keen on retraining and of those keen on or concerned about humanizing NAFTA.
Given doubt about the retraining program's prospects as stand-alone legislation, legislators and
lobbyists interested in retraining but not so engaged by NAFTA could see the trade legislation as a
chance to get something established. As Michael Aho, then at the Council on Foreign Relations,
pointed out: "For those who are interested in retraining, NAFTA is a legislative vehicle that is
moving" (quoted in Ibid). On the other hand, those who wanted to mitigate the NAFTA
liberalization's harm (e.g. Gephardt) or who simply wanted to do anything that would gather the
marginal "yes" vote on NAFTA (e.g. Matsui and Daley) saw a dedicated adjustment assistance
program as better than a "dubious" retraining promise. Gephardt, apparently, was a lead force
behind such a demand (Stokes in NJ 9/11/93, p.2218; CQ 10/2/93, p.2621; Reich interview). But
'0 The motivation was a combination of not wanting to continue the bureaucratic fragmentation of adjustment
assistance and retraining, with perpetuated fiefdoms supporting such division, and a desire not to let a dedicated
NAFTA program take steam out of the broader initiative (Reich interview).
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he wasn't alone: a House Education and Labor Committee aide said of a dedicated program: "if
we don't do this, NAFTA doesn't stand a chance on the House floor" (Ibid). A bird in the hand,
at least in this case, was preferable to two in the bush.
Administration officials ultimately followed the advice of this Congressional coalition. In
an address to the National Press Club on October 12th, Labor Secretary Reich announced that the
Administration had decided to delay introduction of the comprehensive program, and proposed to
set up a "bridge" NAFTA adjustment assistance program to help those dislocated by NAFTA in the
interim (LRW 10/13/93, p.977). Details of the program, dubbed NAFTA Transitional Adjustment
Assistance, were unveiled by Reich, his Assistant Secretary Douglas Ross, Rufus Yerxa and
others within a week (CQ 10/16/93, p.2792; US Dept.Labor mimeo 10/19/93, pp.1-7). It would
be temporary, in place only until the comprehensive legislation, to be introduced "early next year,"
passed Congress -- as early as January 1995 but certainly by the end of June 1995. Given the
planned kick-in of NAFTA on January 1994, this left roughly an 18 month period during which
the NAFTA Worker Security benefits would be available.
The program would provide adjustment assistance to all workers who lose their jobs
directly or indirectly because of NAFTA-inspired import competition or outward investment.'o5
Workers could apply for NAFTA bridge benefits from their state employment office, with
eligibility determined by the governor and the Department of Labor. If found eligible, employment
offices could then immediately draw on various aspects of existing training programs and funds,
especially Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program and Economic Dislocated Worker
Adjustment Assistance (EDWAA). The benefits included, first, up to 104 weeks of "up-front," or
rapid response, income assistance and readjustment services, including labor market information,
job search and placement assistance, career counseling, testing and assessment. Second, if the
Department of Labor gave its assent, offices could also provide "comprehensive services": up to
78 weeks of job search allowance and relocation assistance, and "long-term skills training
accompanied by income support" (US Dept. of Labor 1993b, pp. 1-2). Officials estimated that the
average eligible worker would receive some $8,000 in benefits.
Administration officials went to great pains to distinguish the NAFTA-bridge programs
from the TAA program, which had recently been heavily criticized in an internal Labor Department
audit -- especially for recklessly waiving the training requirement for income support, for its
lengthy and cumbersome certification and service provision, and for inappropriate training (US
Dept. of Labor 1993c). The NAFTA program, officials stressed, would improve upon these
shortcomings by: (1) requiring all workers. no waiver option, to enroll in a training program by
o05 Not only would "primary" victims of NAFTA be eligible, but so too would "upstream" suppliers and
"downstream" processors ILRW 11/10/93, p.1079). All workers would need to meet the existing TAA eligibility
standard, that NAFTA "contributed importantly" to their job loss.
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the 16th week of their extended UI period; (2) stream-lining certification so that an applicant's state
Governor would have ten days to decide upon "up front" services and the Department of Labor
another 30 days for more comprehensive services; (3) offering immediate access to "up front"
services; and (4) ensuring that training is appropriate, by closely linking training to employer needs
(Ibid, pp.3-5).
Administration officials estimated that such a temporary program would cost $90 million,
$45 million for training and $45 million for income support, over its 18-month life. This estimate
was premised upon the Administration's assumption that no more than 22,500 workers would be
dislocated by NAFTA-inspired import competition or outward investment.'0 6 This estimate
derived from a CBO prediction that NAFTA would dislocate roughly 150,00 workers in its first 10
years (Bureau of National Affairs 1993 No.201, p.AA-1).'0 7
Compared to the existing TAA and Bush's proposed ASETS program, the NAFTA bridge
program was modestly more generous. As a "capped-entitlement," setting an outer limit on what
can be spent on adjustment assistance regardless of per-worker benefits, Clinton's $90 million, 18-
month NAFTA-bridge was in overall money terms less generous than Bush's $335 million per 12
month ASETS program. But beside the existing TAA program as it was expanded under the 1988
Omnibus Trade bill -- capped entitlements totalling $80 million per year for all trade-dislocated
workers -- the NAFTA-bridge program compared favorably. And the per-worker benefits made
available and expected to be provided implied a program that was comparable to the existing TAA
as expanded under the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act, and that was significantly more generous than
Bush's ASETS program.
Initial responses to the proposal in Congress and elsewhere were not particularly
enthusiastic. The release of the Labor Deoartment Inspector General's audit and negative
assessment of the TAA was only just seeping into the press and Congressional hearings when the
Administration tried to sing the NAFTA-bridge program's praises. Within days of the October
13th unveiling, Rep.Collin Peterson, D-Minn., a staunch NAFTA opponent, called for hearings
before his Government Operations Subcommittee to discuss the NAFTA program in light of the
TAA audit. Peterson and others took the program to task, first, for its wildly optimistic
assumptions about NAFTA-inspired job losses -- 150,000 in ten years -- compared to almost all
"respectable" estimates, such as Hufbauer and Schott's influential estimate of 145,000 by the end
of 1995. Second, they criticized the program for its links to the TAA: "The Labor Department is
simply proposing to throw $90 million more down the same rat hole -- now called a 'bridge'
'06 In later testimony Lawrence Katz of the Labor Department gave even lower estimates of the 18 month job
losses: at most 10,000-12,000 through 1995 (CQ 10/23/93, p.2864)
07 A CBO budgeter gave a higher estimate of the program's cost, contending that retraining workers according to the
Administration's benefit package would cost $141 million, and extending it for five years would cost $36 billion
more (CQ 10/23/93, p.2864).
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program -- to meet the Jan. 11994, NAFTA deadline" (BNA 10/20/93, No.201, AA-1). In light
of the weaknesses of the benefits and its modest scale, Peterson jeered "you have to be pretty
callous to try to sell this as a 'full support and assistance' program for displaced workers.....It's a
joke" (CQ 10/23/93, p.2864). Beyond the scorn of a few strong unconditional protectionists, the
bridge program inspired little vocal comment, except from those favorably disposed but concerned
that the bridge was to end after 18 months, willy-nilly, when there was no guarantee that the
broader retraining initiative would get passed by June 1995 (e.g. Gephardt, Riegle, Gibbons).
It was this latter concern that spawned legislative action, as Congress entered its "mock"
mark-up phase to decide what the full NAFTA enactment legislation would look like. During the
Senate Finance mock mark-up, Senator Donald W.Riegle, D-Mich, a strong NAFTA opponent,
got the committee to adopt an amendment extending the NAFTA transitional adjustment assistance
for five years (CQ Almanac, p. 176). In the House, Sam Gibbons, D-Fla, a NAFTA supporter and
chair of the Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee, introduced a TAA NAFTA bridge program bill
(HR 3352) on October 26th. The idea, here, was to strengthen the momentum behind dedicated
NAFTA adjustment assistance were the Administration to back down. Similar sentiment inspired
at least the timing of Lynn C.Woolsey's, D-CA, broad retraining initiative introduced a week
earlier (Washington Times 10/7/93).
When the Administration ultimately introduced its NAFTA enactment legislation on
November 4th, it listened to this pressure. Accompanying the main legislation was the NAFTA
Worker Security Act of 1993 (HR 3450/S 1627) that revised the Trade Act of 1974 to create the
NAIFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance with all the contours proposed and discussed in the
recent weeks. Addressing anxiety over the temporary nature of the bridge program, the bill
explicitly adopted Riegle's Senate Finance amendment by saying that the primary firm employees
"may be eligible for adjustment assistance up until Sept 30, 1998, "if Congress has not adopted a
more comprehensive worker adjustment system by then" (LRW 11/10/93, p.l1079).
As for the political benefits of this NAFTA adjustment assistance, the Administration had
few illusions. Especially given the bad press all retraining initiatives were getting as a result of the
TAA audit, Administration officials knew to expect little: As anonymous Administration officials
told one journalist at the time, the White House "is not counting on its proposal to change many
minds: Those who are inclined to vote against NAFTA are apt to consider the retraining benefits
too paltry to ameliorate what they contend would be widespread job loss" (CQ 10/23093, p.2864).
Reich told reporters, however, that "the plan might be sufficient to solidify votes that the
administration is counting on to support NAFTA" (Ibid). Beyond this solidifying effect, the
interest of various NAFTA opponents in the bridge program, such as Gephardt and Riegle, and the
modesty of their vote-rallying, suggest that the dedicated adjustment assistance may also have
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moderated some opposition. Of course, such is impossible to tell with any accuracy, especially
since by November so many other buy-offs had begun to fly.
3.3.3. Eleventh-hour Pork
Out of eleventh-hour doubts over NAFTA's prospects for ratification emerged the
episode's last and most unusual flurry of redress: pork galore. Despite the already unprecedented
array of compensation and protectionist redress provided and promised by Clinton, the NAFTA
liberalization was still in trouble, at least in the House. 217 votes would mark a majority (given a
seat vacancy), and toward the end of October vote counters of all stripes estimated a modest
advantage for the anti-NAFTA camp, with a lot of "undecideds."10 8 The Administration had only a
month to make up the ground.
Desperate times called for desperate measures. The narrow margin on which the
ratification would stand or fall led the White House and its legislative allies to offer and welcome
requests for an unprecedented array of pork benefits -- protectionist or compensation redress with
benefits confined to a particular legislator or legislators. Clinton met with small groups of
undecided members twice a week, and called on three a day, while cabinet members were
dispatched to focus on all possible votes, especially those "undecideds" that might influence others
(NJ 10/16/93, p.2473; CQ 11/6/93, p.3014). As one lobbyist put it, "It's guerrilla warfare,
district by district" (NJ 10/16/93, p.2473).
The search for subjects of redress was wide open. Benefits could involve Executive
discretion or inclusion in the enactment legislation. It didn't matter whether groups had voiced a
particular demand before or not, and it didn't matter whether possible redress was germane to the
NAFTA or not -- everything would be considered. As one White House official confessed, "we're
so desperate to win votes" that its "'let's make a deal" effort will get down to judgeships and
customs jobs -- whatever we need to do to get votes" (Ibid., p.2476).
This "open-trough" solicitation unleashed a frenzy of pork-barrel politicking not seen in
trade policymaking since the days of Smoot-Hawley. The policies or actions to emerge from this
frenzy number more than two dozen discrete offers, targeted at roughly the same number of
legislators. These are summarized in Table 5.1 below, which outlines the following: the
legislators at whom the pork was targeted in exchange for NAFTA support (almost exclusively
108 By one count, from the Bureau of National Affairs, the count as of November I Ith was the following: 191
House members oppose or ar leaning against NAFTA (122 Democrats and 24 Republicans firm; 32 Dems and 12
Repubs. leaning), compared with 123 members in support or leaning in favor (34 Dems and 65 Repubs firm; 4
Dems and 20 Repubs leaning). Another 112 House members said they hadn't decided. 8 members didn't respond to
the poll (LRW 11/3/93, p.1054).
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Table 5.1:
Pork Promised or Provided by Clinton Administration
House
Representative
E.B.Johnson, D-Tex.
J.J. Pickle, D-Tex.
Glenn English, D-Okla.
Bill Brewster, D-Okla.
Bill Sarpalius, D-Tex.
Larry Combest, R.-Tex
E.Clay Shaw, R-Fla.
David Price, D -NC
Tim Valentine, D.-N.C.
Bob Clement, D.-Tenn.
Bob Smith, R-Ore.
Joel Hefley, R.-Co
Wayne Allard, R-Co
Bob Stump, R-Ariz
Fred Grandy, R.-la.
Neal Smith, D-Ia.
Particularistic
Benefit (Pork)
* Construction of two C- 17 military cargo planes.
* Promise to locate Center for Study of Trade in
Western Hemisphere in district
* Limits on Canadian shipments of durum wheat
for pasta, unless Canadian subsidies lowered.*
* Administration to pressure Mexico to extradite
man suspected of raping Shaw's assistant's niece
* Giving American Airlines two international
routes to London
* Plan to raise grazing fees on federal
lands abandoned by Administration
(In the end, fees rose, but by less than planned)
* Administration pressure on Mex.to speed tariff
reduction on appliances
Kind of Pork:
C, P, or L Cost
C $1.4 billion
$10 million
C loss of millions
in such fees
Porter Goss, R-Fla.
Dan Miller, R-Fla.
Tom Lewis, R-Fla
Harry Johnston, D-Fla
Jim Bacchus, D-Fla
Carrie Meek, D-Fla
Alcee Hastings, D-Fla
Earl Hutto, D-Fla corn
William Jefferson, D-La
Thomas Ewing, R -Ill.
Jennifer Dunn, R.-Wash
Ron Packard, R-Calif.
Sam Johnson, R-Tex
Dennis Hastert, R-Ill
Wayne Allard, R-Colo.
J.Roy Rowland, D-Ga
John Spratt, D-S.C.
W.G.Hefner, D-N.C.
Nathan Deal, D-Ga.
Lewis Payne, D.-Va.
Bill Sarpalius, D-Tex.
* Further protection for winter vegetable growers
(Tariff-snap backs; GATT tariff cuts limited to 15%).
* Construction of Horticultural research center in
Ft.Pierce, Florida.
* Further protection for Louisiana and Florida sugar
growers (corn sweeteners included in quota).**
* Doubling of purchases of fresh tomatoes and new sweet
purchases for school lunch programs.
* Postponement of decertification of methyl bromide for
use as a soil fumigant until the year 2000.
* Reduction of Administration's proposed new tax
on airline and cruise ship passenger fares that
were to fund retraining for NAFTA-displaced
workers.
* Administration to negotiate limits on Canadian
peanut butter imports
* More funding for US Customs to enforce textile
import laws, and $15 million pledge to push for
five more years of US textile protection in GATT
o Same as above, plus district (Danville) to be considered
site for NIST Textile Center in Danville
* Reversal of recommendation to cut helium subsidies P
P
C $16 million in
up-front costs,
P &billions more
in protection
C costs($1.4 bill.
alone for sugar
C deal,says GAO)
C Revenue had
to come from
more regressive
sources
> $15 million
C * $500,000 to
$3 million
* $47 million
Norman Mineta, D-Calif. * Promise to protect cut-flower industry
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Table One Contnued:
Martin Frost, D-Tex. * Pledge to protect glass producers. P
Peter Hoekstra, R-Mich * Promise to protect Michigan asparagus growers P
Ben L.Cardin, D-Md * Pressure on Canada to lower subsidies for Quebec P
chemical plant.
David Hobson, R-Oh * Protection for flat glass and broomcorn P
Hancock, R-Misouri * Offered money to rebuild midwest levees damaged C Up to
Emerson, R-Misouri by floods and that weren't covered by existing programs. $150 million
Floyd H.Flake, D-NY * Promise to locate a Small Business Administration C
pilot program in Queens
C = compensation; P = protectionist revision or exemption; L = accelerated 1;'. ralization
* "End-use" certificates to prevent subsidized wheat reexport of Canadian wheat and barley also targeted at North Dakota
delegation, including Pomeroy, who stayed anti-NAFTA (Orden 1995).
** Some Administration officials estimated that the sugar deal may have bought up to 18 votes in the House, including
Maryland Congressman Cardin (CQ 11/6/93, p.3015).
Sources: Anderson and Silverstein 1993, pp.752-3; Grayson 1995, pp.214-18; Orden 1995, p.55; Jennings and
Steagall 1996, p.72; and various NYT, Wash.Post, Wall Street Journal, CQ, and LRW issues.
House members); the nature of the pork promised or provided; the classification of the pork as
compensation, protectionism, or liberalization; and the approximate cost or value of the pork.'0 9
As Table 5.1 shows, a lot of the pork provided or promised took the form of intra-issue
protectionist redress -- either protectionist exemptions from the NAFTA or from other trade
settings, like the GATT." 0 The NAFTA-related protections required several interchanges by mail,
person, and phone between Clinton Administration officials, especially USTR Kantor, and the.
chief Mexican trade negotiators."' The most costly of these was the array of new protections
given to Sugar and winter fruits and vegetables to win over the Florida and Louisiana delegations.
After the initial NAFTA's better-than-expected agricultural liberalization was rolled back in the side
agreement on import surges, both Sugar and fruit and vegetable growers had still fiercely lobbied
'09 Included in the Table are all pork benefits that made it into various press sources, and all the legislators who
admitted to or were implicated in accepting the buy-off in question. A few are more speculative than others. Not
included in this Table are the various benefits discussed but not provided (see below), or of course any other more
private exchanges.
110 There was also at least some targeted market-opening benefits provided, such as aggressive reciprocity on
Canadian durum wheat subsidies, and accelerated Mexican tariff reductions for win and brandy, flat glass, home
appliances and bedding components -- all extracted by Kantor's initial November 3d letter asking as much. (See
Orden 1995, p.54).
"' The top Mexican trade representatives, Serra Puche and Blanco, shacked-up in D.C. for the last couple weeks
before the vote to make themselves available for such last minute dealing
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for more protection: for fruit and vegetables, quicker and more generous safeguards against import
surges; and for sugar a tighter tariff-quota on Mexican sugar imports, and inclusion of corn syrup
in determination of the quota to discourage substitution of Mexican corn syrup for sugar (Orden
1995, pp.54-56; CQ 10/2/93, p.2620). In the end, Clinton gave them exactly what they wanted.
The sugar roll-back, alone, was expected to cost consumers $1.4 billion annually.
Some of the protectionist pork, however, had nothing to do with the NAFTA. The
Administration promised Florida representatives that the US delegation to the Uruguay Round of
GATT negotiations would not cut tariffs on citrus, fruits and vegetable producers by more than 15
percent. And Representatives with big textile constituencies (in Georgia, North Carolina,
S.Carolina, etc.) were promised that the delegation would push for continuation of the Multi-fibre
Accord for an additional five years over the planned 10-year phase out (CQ 11/20/93, p.3 185).
These pork benefits are rare but important examples of how politicking underlying bilateral free
trade arrangements can undermine multilateral initiatives -- lending some credence to some of the
fears of US trade policy multilateralists.' 12
However, a narrow majority of the pork -- thirteen of the twenty-four pork benefits listed
in Table 5.1 -- took the form of side payment compensation, still particularistic but involving
benefits separate from the protections to be reduced. Some of the side payment compensation was
connected to the pain of the NAFTA. For instance, Florida representatives got promises that the
winter fruit and vegetable producers potentially experiencing some new import competition could
benefit from promises that the US school lunch programs would double purchases of fresh
tomatoes and begin purchasing sweet corn, a new horticultural research station, and continued
certification of an environmentally suspect soil fumigant through the year 2000 (Orden 1995,
pp.55-6). But all standards and rules of germaneness went out the window to get some votes.
Rep E.B.Johnson, D-Tex., got a promise that the Dept. of Defense would purchase an additional
pair of C-17 cargo planes, to the tune of some $1.4 billion. And most fantastic of all, E.Clay
Shaw, R-Fla, traded his vote for an Administration promise to pressure the Mexican government to
extradite a man suspected of raping his assistant's niece (CQ 11/113/93, p.3 106).
With the Administration so openly soliciting votes with pork, it isn't surprising that there
were some abuses. Certainly some of the less germane demands, such as Shaw's extradition
request, involved legislators demanding or getting benefits that did little to help the real victims of
the NAFTA liberalization. Worse and more common abuses of the pork-slinging involved
legislators exaggerating their pain or demands to milk the Administration for as much
compensation or other particularistic redress as they could. Members of the Florida delegation
probably fall into this category, such as Tom Lewis, a senior leader of the delegation and chair of
112 This undermining was not lost on some business leaders who accused the Administration of "cannibalizing" the
GATT talks (NJ 11/20/93, p.2782).
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the Agriculture committee, who said coyly after several benefits were already thrown his way that
""Right now, my vote is no....The door's ajar" (CQ 11/13/93, p.3 107). And C.W.Young, R-Fla,
admitted: "I stayed uncommitted to stir up some interest" (CQ 11/20/93, p.3 179).
And Administration officials also accepted what amounted to extortionate demands from
legislators who had already announced or intimated their support for NAFTA, who lined up at the
trough when they saw so much getting handed out. For example, even after announcing his
support, King, D-NY, got the Administration to intervene to prevent the Army Corps of Engineers
from blocking a prized dredging project in his district, after he reproached Clinton officials: "I
asked for nothing for my vote.....Now you're taking something away from me. You're making me
look like a schmuck" (CQ Almanac 1993, p. 179). And the Administration clearly provided at least
some pork compensation that exceeded anticipated pain or risk to groups -- such as the array of
costly compensation provided to fruit and vegetable producers in Florida (horticultural research,
lunch program, pesticides certification, etc.) that exceeded the pain of the rolled-back liberalization.
These and other abuses invited sharp criticism from mostly anti-NAFTA forces. John
Lewis, D-Ga., huffed that "the people of the 5th Congressional District of Georgia did not send me
here to sell them out for a mess of pottage and 30 pieces of silver" (CQ 11/20/93, p.3 179). Ross
Perot added: "We feel that people in Congress should not be for sale at any price. That makes us
just a true Third World country if that is where we are as a Congress" (NJ 10/9/93, p.2434). Tom
H.Andrews, D-Maine, undecided at the time, said more nobly that "we do a great disservice to this
country when we make this a matter of pork-barrel auctioneering...." (Wash.Post 11/1/93, p.A7).
Some legislators to benefit from the auctioneering defended themselves, such as Glenn
English, D-Okla, who pointed out the obvious: "It's not a question of buying votes...This is the
only way we could have supported the agreement" (CQ 11/20/93, p.3 179). The Administration,
for their part, defended their pork-slinging by pointing to how they had been "saddled" with
Bush's bad agreement, which needed much repair work, and that the Fast Track procedures had
precluded fence-sitters and opponents from using amendments to make the NAFTA liberalization
more palatable (Ibid; and NJ 10/16/93, p.2476)." 3
Through its actions, moreover, the Administration did show at least some restraint and
discretion. For example, the N.Carolina congressional delegation tried to persuade the
Administration to reduce its proposed 75 cents per-pack tax on cigarettes to help finance health
care: "The White House knew all along that's what we wanted, but they pretty much shot that
"' The Fast Track procedures did, indeed, constrain the Administration from using off-settiing liberalization
concessions and, especially, protectionist exemptions once the Treaty was negotiated -- leaving compensation as the
only way to buy-off discontent. In this way the Fast Track legislation supports the more general hypothesis that
Fast Track procedures should yield more frequent and generous compensation packages, at least in the ratification
stages of liberalization episodes.
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down," said Charlie Rose, D.-NC. Clinton officials refused to offer anything of the sort. Eight of
the 12 members of the NC delegation voted for the NAFTA anyway. (CQ 11/20/93, p.3 179).
Abuses notwithstanding, the pork buyoffs did succeed in buying a significant chunk of
votes for the NAFTA that would either have been questionable or definite "no's" in the absence of
the pork. Virtually all those legislators at whom the pork was targeted or part of an explicit vote-
for-pork exchange came through on their promises. Only a few legislators who were witting or
unwitting beneficiaries of the pork provisions voted against, such as members of the North Dakota
delegation who benefited from some of the aggressive reciprocity provisions for durum wheat but
who would not promise, and ultimately didn't, give their support (see Table One) (NJ 10/16/93,
p.2476). The total cost of the votes bought with the pork: roughly $2 billion." 14
3.3.4. NAFTA Passes, but Does this Say Compensation Worked?
As for the overall wisdom of such an investment, the proof of the pudding was at least
partly in the eating. The vote was too close to call even in the last couple days before the House
ratification vote on November 17th, but on that day Clinton and the pro-NAFTA forces
prevailed. •5 After circumscribed debate and no amendments given Fast Track rules, the House
passed the measure by a larger-than-expected margin of 234 to 200. Two days later, the Senate
followed suit, passing the NAFTA by a larger margin, 61 to 38. The vote was, as expected, very
partisan. In the House, 75 percent of the Republicans (132 representatives) voted for the
agreement, more than the total number of Democrat supporters (102), and much more than the
forty percent these Democrats represented of their overall delegation."'
The lines of battle lurking behind this outcome held few surprises. In three separate logit
and probit analyses of the House vote and two of the Senate vote, the statistics confirm the obvious
expectations (Kahane 1996; Conybeare and Zinkula 1996; and Steagall and Jennings 1996).' "
High AFL-CIO ratings, high union density, large union PAC campaign contributions in both
absolute and percentage of overall campaign fund terms, high unemployment, and high density of
industries likely to lose from NAFTA,"' all were statistically significantly and positively correlated
"' This includes only outright expenditures, not producer or consumer distortions of protection, which would
substantially raise the figure.
"'5 BNA and vote counters on both sides of the debate confirmed that there remained 41 undecided votes on
November 15th, two days before the vote: 15-20 Republicans and 21 Democrats.
16 Northern Democrats were more likely to vote no than were Southern Democrats.
"7 Of these, Kahane's analysis is the most comprehensive, testing the effect of industry benefits and losses from
NAFTA, union density, environmental-orientation, immigration levels, export orientation, and union PAC
contributions. Conybeare and Zinkula test for importance of AFL-CIO rating, unemployment levels, union density,
manufacturing density, party orientation, and exports to Mexico. Steagall and Jennings test effects of union PAC
contributions, business PAC contributions, energy PAC contributions, overall PAC contributions as a percentage of
overall campaign finance, and existence or absence of right-to-work laws.
"'8 Kahane, synthesizing the NAFTA evaluation literature, surmise that the expected losers were textiles, apparel,
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with voting "no" on NAFTA ratification. Disproportionate exports to Mexico, export orientation
generally, high concentration of industries expected to gain from NAFTA, 19 and large and
disproportionate business PAC contributions were all statistically significantly correlated with
voting "yes." Slightly less intuitive, given the split among environmentalists, was the finding by
Kahane 1996 that House and Senate legislators to get a high rating from the League of
Conservation Voters, an environmental group that didn't take an official stand on the NAFTA,
were modestly but statistically-significantly more likely to vote "yes" (Kahane 1996, p.405-6).
The vote pattern, unfortunately, holds few clues about the political effectiveness of the
various packages of side payment compensation. The finding that "green-oriented" legislators
tended to support the agreement is modest evidence that splitting the environmental coalition paid
off in votes. Also, that a narrow majority of the 23-member Florida delegation (13 members)
switched their votes to "yes" at the last minute suggests that the compensation it received worked,
though this conclusion is clouded by how much of the redress given that delegation included
protectionism. On the other hand, the tendency of legislators with high union density,
unemployment, and labor PAC contributions to vote no, while not surprising, is evidence that the
compensation targeted at organized labor and its sympathizers didn't pay off, certainly not as
hoped. But correlating generosity of the compensation the legislators received with their voting
systematically underestimates political effectiveness of compensation, since compensation may
only be provided when significant opposition is anticipated, and will be effective if it moderates
opposition as well as if it inspires actual support.120 The big question of whether the NAFTA was
possible with or without the provision of compensation must rely instead on an overview of the
levels of opposition before and after discrete compensation was provided. It is with this evidence
and an overview of the origins and propriety of NAFTA compensation that we conclude.
4. Conclusion: Summarizing the Origins and Propriety of NAFTA's Compensation Riches
After more than three years of side payment politics, two Presidents and their pro-NAFTA
allies finally got their agreement -- and what was US trade history's most compensated of
liberalizations. Of the dozen-plus liberalization episodes considered in this study, none yielded so
much compensation, to so many groups, and in so many packages. By even the crudest of
measures (money actually allocated), the compensation approached an unprecedented $7 billion,
including: environmental cleanup (at least $4 billion over several years), labor and environmental
leather products, furniture, and glass (p.398-400).
"9 These "gainers" were assumed to be non-electrical machinery, rubber, chemicals, and electrical machinery.
120 This is the old problem of omitted variable bias -- where anticipated opposition is the omitted variable. In
previous sections were concrete clues that this bias applies in this particular vote, where compensation only got
targeted at those with at least some opposition, and where compensation targeted at labor interests may not have
inspired support but may have muted opposition.
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international institutions (at least $50 million), NAFTA bridge assistance (at least $90 million for
the first 18 months), and the litany of compensation pork (another $2 billion). The diversity of the
side payments was also unprecedented, including not only job assistance programs but also labor
and environmental monitoring institutions, community development funding, and border
infrastructural projects. Finally, the labor and environmental side agreements also implied
compensation that, more than any previous compensated liberalization, was negotiated during
international phases of the struggle and were to be provided through supra-national institutions.
4.1. Explaining NAFTA's Compensation
This pattern of compensation fuels the central explanatory puzzle that this chapter has tried
to unravel: what explains the unprecedented scale, diversity, breadth, and supranationality of the
NAFTA compensation? The unusual scale, diversity and breadth of the NAFTA compensation can
be reasonably explained by the unprecedented power and diverse platforms of the anti-NAFTA
coalition. The prospect of freeing trade and investment with a country so much poorer and with so
much less environmental and labor protection struck fear in the hearts of a much broader cut of the
American polity than previous liberalizations. From the very outset of the NAFTA episode, these
Figure 5.1
Greater Average Willingness to Exchange More
Compensation Possibilities for Lower Trade Protection in NAFTA Episode
Trade
Protection
L
P(b)
Compensation V
groups rose-up with unprecedented breadth and determination, crafted explicit alliances that
overcame their many differences, and mobilized more political resources than in any previous trade
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campaign. The depth of their political mobilization, moreover, outstripped that of the main pro-
NAFTA constituency, the loose coalition of multinational businesses that were so late to engage
and, while spending modestly more lobbying and advertising money, never had the organizational
or grass-roots reach of the anti-NAFTA forces. The result was that at every major veto point in the
development of the episode -- the Fast Track vote, the '92 election, two international negotiations,
and one ratification vote -- the anti-NAFTA coalition could threaten to kill or strongly retaliate
against the liberalization's passage.
The diversity of the anti-NAFTA coalition's trade policy platforms, at the same time, made
compensation a viable and attractive way of defusing this coalition and still getting liberalization.
The sheer breadth of the bootlegger-baptist coalition implied a diversity of trade policy platforms
that signalled a fragile alliance with lots of side payment subjects, thus inviting liberalizers to
narrowly focus on pleasing one group without having to give-in to the whole. But most of the
major groups in that coalition also engaged the NAFTA with multi-issue and conciliatory
platforms. Environmental lobbies, both mainstream and radical, called for clearly-specified
safeguards, monitoring, border cleanup, and other provisions, along-side some tempering of the
liberalization. Even organized labor, a paragon of unconditional protectionism during the previous
twenty years, tentatively experimented with moderating their opposition in exchange for specific
side conditions -- including strong labor rights protections and monitoring, and, to a lesser extent,
better adjustment assistance. Only the industrial and agricultural producer groups in the anti-
NAFTA coalition were unconditionally protectionist from start to finish.
This confluence of unprecedented power resources of the protectionist coalition with the
diverse trade policy platforms within and across its constituent groups strongly encouraged
bargaining with liberalizers at all the various decision-points to exchange liberalization for various
packages of side payment compensation. Compared to previous initiatives, the averaging of the
protectionist indifference curves in trading-off various compensation possibilities and the various
trade protectionist to be liberalized yields a P(b) with a significantly steeper slope than obtained in
previous episodes, such as the 1974 Trade Reform Act. Figure 5.1 above captures this change.
This confluence of unprecedented power resources of the protectionist coalition with the
diverse trade policy platforms within and across its constituent groups strongly encouraged side
payment compensation. Figure 5.2 below captures a simplified schematic of what the power-
platform conditions predict, a shift among several groups towards more mobilized and generally
higher power resources, and the existence or shift towards multi-issue, conciliatory stances.
Beyond what such simplification suggests, there were so many times and so much need to identify
redress that might split or soften the anti-NAFTA coalition, and there were so many ways to
provide such redress without watering down the liberalization, that the diversity, scale, and breadth
of the compensation makes even primafacie sense.
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The supranationality of NAFTA's side agreement compensation can also be explained in
terms of group power and platforms. As early as the Fast Track confrontation, environmentalist
and, to a lesser extent, labor groups had clearly staked out anti-NAFTA platforms including
demands for some internationally-codified harmonization, monitoring, and protections of
environmental and labor laws and conditions. Both of these platform planks were relatively new in
US trade policymaking. Environmental groups were simply new to the trade policymaking game,
arising partly due to internal developments in the organization and political consciousness of
environmentalism, and partly due to the unprecedented opening to a country with relatively lax de
facto standards. For labor groups, the focus on international labor rights and standards was not
new but was newly emphasized, and can be traced again to the unique conditions with Mexico, and
to re-examined internal trade policy strategy and tactics among some labor leaders. With such
platforms and with such threatening opposition casting a shadow over the impending international
talks, it makes sense that the Bush and Clinton Administrations sought some international
apparatus to mollify these concerns. And it seems likely that such concerns, and hence modest
supranational compensation, are here to stay -- at least for regional liberalization of the Americas.
Just as worthy of explanation as the unusual scale, scope and supranationality of NAFTA's
compensation are the particular compensation packages. Fulfillment of Clinton's campaign
promises on the NAFTA led to an array of both supranational and national compensation for
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Figure 5.3
Indifference Curves of Liberalizers and Protectionists
for the Labor, Environmental and "Pork" Compensation Packages
Trade
Protection
Compensation (Labor Vs. Enviro. Vs. "Pork")
environmentalist and labor segments of the anti-NAFTA coalition. But those packages
significantly differed, with environmental groups getting most of what they demanded while labor
got only faint shadows of what they sought. In the endgame, moreover, Clinton provided two
more general side payment provisions, the dedicated NAFTA adjustment assistance and the
NADBank. And the eleventh-hour pork entailed at least thirteen discrete side payment provisions.
What explains these differences in the particular side payments offered?
Here the group power and platforms provide only part of the answer, as Figure 5.3
suggests. The Figure shows a rough approximation of the respective indifference curves for the
"Labor," "Environmental" and Pork side payment packages. Each of these packages covers a
different cluster of side payment subjects: the "Labor" package including the NAFTA adjustment
assistance and the Labor side agreement institutions; the "Environment" compensation covers
mainly the Environmental side agreement institutions and the much of the NADBank border
cleanup facility; and the "Pork" compensation refers to the flurry of last-minute compensation deals
offered individual legislators. Each of these packages can be understood as crafted through
different sets of bargaining, a discrete game, between a different protectionist group or groups on
the one hand, and the same set of liberalizers (mainly the Clinton Administration and the pro-
NAFTA forces in business and Congress). P(a) captures the indifference curve for organized
labor and L(a) captures the liberalizer indifference curve for the "Labor" compensation package.
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P(b) captures the indifference curve for the environmentalist lobbies, and L(b) the liberalizer
indifference curve for the environmental compensation. Finally, P(c) estimates the indifference
curves for the various societal recipients of the last minute pork, especially the Florida Winter Fruit
and Vegetable groups in society and their legislative champions.
The labor side agreement and retraining promises partly do reflect power and platform
conditions. Organized labor was the power-center of the anti-NAFTA coalition and it showed a
glimmer of conditional acceptance of the NAFTA, focused on internationally-safeguarded labor
rights and adjustment assistance. Clinton officials formally tabled creation of trilateral labor
institution and standards that would have addressed the AFL-CIO's core condition for
acquiescence -- internationally-monitored and protected collective bargaining and other worker
rights, backed by threat of trade sanctions. Labor's less fervent and secondary hope that TAA
would be kept and greatly expanded, rather than consolidated into general assistance, was in
sharper conflict with Administration plans. The very weak institution to result from the side
agreement negotiations rests partly on the temporary and thin commitment of Labor leaders to a
conditional side payment platform; so too does the modest retraining signaling rather than
expansion of TAA. This commitment is captured by the relatively flat P(b) curve, which ensures a
relatively modest pareto space. But the modesty of the labor compensation mainly reflects how a
strong labor institution sparked such fierce opposition from domestic business groups and
Republicans, and from the Canadian and Mexican governments -- together essentially vetoing such
an institution. Hence, L(a) is relatively steep, which in combination with P(a) ensures a still
narrower pareto space.
Conversely, the relative generosity and strength of the environmental compensation,
especially the Commission on Environmental Cooperation and the BECC/NADBank institutions,
reflects not only environmentalists' power and platforms but mainly the less severe clash of their
priorities with big business and Mexico. Environmentalist groups held significant sway among a
variety of legislators, and their unified opposition could well have imperiled plenty of votes. And
the explicitly conciliatory and compensated liberalization position of these groups made buying
support or at least splitting apart the environmentalist bloc with compensation the clear option.
This platform gives rise to a P(b) that is relatively steeper than the Labor indifference curve, and
yields in turn a relatively larger pareto space in Figure 5.3. But environmentalists were far less
powerful than their labor co-conspirators. What made the environmental compensation more
generous was: (1) the relative modesty of environmentalists' demands relative to Labor's in
money and institutional terms, and (2) the less hostile response those demands spawned among
domestic business groups and the Canadian and Mexican delegations. As the negotiation
discussion suggested (Section 3.2.1), both Republican leaders and the Mexican delegations made it
clear that they saw the environmental institutional provisions as the lesser of two evils, and as
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acceptable only if the labor institutions were weak. This propensity among the liberalizers can be
symbolized by the relatively flatter L(b) compared to the L(a) curve for the Labor compensation,
and the flatter L(b) implies a still larger zone of possible agreement. In so far as it is the
positioning of the liberalizers that explains the difference between the environmental and labor
compensation packages, the group-institutional theory comes up short.
The NAFTA bridge adjustment assistance and the NADBank community funds can also be
only partly explained by the power and platforms of anti-NAFTA groups. The bridge adjustment
assistance may have been consistent with Labor's demand for a continued targeted program
attached to the NAFTA package, but by the time the bridge was even considered -- after the
September unveiling of the side agreements -- labor groups had all but dropped their interest in
adjustment assistance in favor of an all-out and uncompensatable attempt to kill ratification. The
demand for such a program, instead, lay in the same constituency that most fervently and
consistently demanded TAA: House and Senate legislators looking for symbolic gestures to show
they want to mitigate liberalization's risks. The same was true of the NADBank, as Torres's own
defense of the compensation made clear (see Section 3.3.2). Legislators in search of "fig leaves"
were the players who mattered here; not their organized constituencies.
Finally, the eleventh-hour pork had even less to do with the power and platforms of
societal groups, again because societal groups had faded from the side payment politics. Power
and platforms mattered, but really only those of the legislators: House members with at least some
influence on other votes and having some willingness to vote "yes" were the ones to get the most
(truly weak and truly unconditional anti-NAFTA legislators got nothing); but no longer did the
compensation reflect the policy platforms of the particular groups being represented by these
legislators. In fact, some societal groups taking unconditional protectionist positions -- captured in
Figure 5.3 by the virtually flat P(c) -- still received compensation. The most important example of
this involved the fruits and vegetable producers in Florida. They received a lot of compensation --
a horticultural research center, continued certification of a pesticide, and school lunch purchases --
yet their associations, the Florida and the United Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Associations, had
always towed an unconditionally protectionist platform focused on rolling back the liberalization.
They got this because Florida legislators, many voting as a bloc, mattered so much to the vote that
the pro-NAFTA legislators and Clinton went searching for anything that would buy the bloc's
support. And the institutional constraint of Fast Track insured that "anything" had to steer clear of
significant protectionist exemptions and towards separate carrots, hence side payments.
The conclusion to draw about the theory of compensation focused on group power and
platforms is not that the theory fails. The power and platforms of the societal protectionists
mattered for the incidence of NAFTA compensation. But they were neither necessary nor
sufficient to the provision of some of the compensation, especially as the episode wound its way to
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its climactic conclusion, in which last minute opposition and a determination to win the necessarily
narrow margin of victory moved the focus of all struggle to legislators and their caprice.
4.2. Did the NAFTA Compensation Work?
Regardless of its origins, what of the propriety of the NAFTA compensation? First, did
the compensation facilitate the NAFTA liberalization? Did it significantly lower opposition to the
liberalization, without raising new quarters of opposition and without inviting abuse and extortion?
These questions have already been addressed through Section Three's discussion of each side
payment package, but here it is worth briefly considering the whole, which is mainly the sum of its
parts. Bush's May 1st compensation defused opposition from some organized societal groups,
especially mainstream environmentalists, but was less effective in securing labor support. Toward
legislators, however, the May 1st package's announcement clearly coincided with a shift in the
position of NAFTA fence-sitters and opponents, such as Gephardt, in favor of Fast Track.
Clinton's October 1992 promises played a role in moving labor's platform to a more compensated
liberalization stance that gave the Administration time and resources to mobilize a stronger pro-
NAFTA coalition. And the actual side agreement and unilateral compensation package secured
stronger support from an even larger chunk of the environmental coalition than had Bush's, and
arguably moderated the opposition from important legislators. The endgame general
compensation, NAFTA bridge assistance and NADBanks, bought few discernible votes, while the
last-minute pork more clearly secured nearly two dozen votes critical to ratification.
The history also shows that the only time compensation threatened to off-set these gains by
sparking opposition not already there was when negotiation of trilateral labor and environmental
Commissions threatened to lose US business association and Republican support for the NAFTA.
As Section 3.2.3 notes, in the end the line they drew in the sand -- in front of a strong labor
institution -- was not crossed. The later pork-slinging was distasteful to many, likewise, but no
legislator admitted or was reported to have voted "no" as a result. Thus, keeping measurement
problems front-and-center, it's fair to say that NAFTA would not have been ratified, or even
negotiated, without at least some of the compensation packages provided.
The history also reveals that NAFTA side payments unleashed few extortionate or rent-
seeking abuses to off-set such a political benefit. As the discussion of the pork-barrel
compensation pointed out, there was some evidence of exaggerated and extortionate demands, but
even here the Administration set plenty of limits on what it provided. The pork, in any event, was
the exception to the rule of NAFTA compensation. Even the most grandiose demands -- such as
Gephardt's and Labor's statements that NAFTA adjustment assistance and environmental
investments could and should cost many billions of dollars -- grew out of pessimistic assessments
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of the NAFTA's distributional consequences. As for most of the compensation provided, some of
the eleventh-hour pork represented presents to extortionists, but the rule of the compensation was
again well short of anticipated pain and risk of the groups at whom it was targeted.
If we try to see the forest for the trees, then, despite the many measurement problems that
cloud our vision, we can weigh the general cost of roughly $7 billion or more in compensation
against the aggregate efficiency benefits of the liberalization it helped secure. With the most recent
estimates running in the range of a net gain of $10 billion per year (NYT 5/20/97; Hufbauer and
Schott 1993, pp.22-24) the compensation was worthwhile in aggregate economic terms. Such a
calculation, of course, leaves out some risks of bureaucratic capture and abuse on the cost side of
the compensation, but even more economic and political benefits via the NAFTA's regional
economic integration and modest international regulation. Assessing the overall propriety of the
NAFTA, however, requires some attention not only to its aggregate but to its distributional costs,
and to whether compensation actually mitigates or off-set those costs.
Did the side payments meaningfully address the real and perceived pain and risks of the
NAFTA liberalization? It is still early to tell if some of the compensation made a difference to the
recipients, especially the trilateral labor and environmental institutions, which are long-range in
their aims and capacities. It is also hard to address the success of compensation to redress NAFTA
harm, since the Mexican currency crisis of the last couple years poses harm on similar groups in
similar directions to NAFTA's distributional costs. A few nuggets of history, however, warrant a
brief word about the performance and help of the labor and environmental Commissions, and of
the NAFTA bridge adjustment assistance.
The trilateral environmental and labor Commissions have been active fora for monitoring
and scrutinizing labor and environmental practices in Mexico AND the US, but to date there have
been few formal consultations, recommendations or safeguarding actions. As of 1996, the
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) had considered three petitions about the
Endangered Species Act, logging laws and migratory waterfowl (Anderson et.al.1996). It rejected
the first two and produced a several formal recommendations on the third, action on which is still
pending. The weaker and more nationally-based institutions set-up under the labor accord have,
ironically, been a bit more active, with the US National Administrative Office (NAO) having
considered three petitions on anti-union actions by Mexican companies, leading in one of these (a
case against Sony Mexico) to the strongest action possible for such "third-tier" rights: ministerial
consultations calling on Mexican labor authorities to meet with management and the illegally fired
workers to "explain the remedies available to the workers" and to coonvene a panel to study "labor
law dealing with union registration" (NAO report 1996; Reuters 6/2/95).121
121 Mexican workers also petitioned their own NAO to review anti-union actions in the United States, by the Sprint
Corporation in California. The petition also led to ministerial consultations and to a formal review of Sprint's
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The compensatory side payments to provide actual funding for assistance and redress -- the
NAFTA bridge adjustment assistance and the NADBank -- have also had modest performance,
though again the facts are limited. When the Administration wasn't able to get its broad retraining
initiative through an increasingly hostile Congress, the NAFTA Transitional program was
extended. And the bird in the hand has certainly proved better than none in the bush: As of 1996
more than 60,000 workers received "comprehensive" benefits, and many more "up front" benefits
(see Section 3.3.2.1). As of November 1995, 46,950 displaced from 334 NAFTA-impacted firms
received the training and income supplement benefits under the comprehensive category (US Labor
Dept. 1996). Since 147 of these firms were certified for benefits due to outward FDI, not import
competition, it appears a significant number of the workers wouldn't have received targeted
assistance if forced to rely on TAA, given the latter's exclusive focus on imports (Ibid). Policy
evaluations are only now being written, but early accounts show that the NAFTA program is
comparable in strengths and limitations to the most recent TAA -- that the program helps workers
adjust and stay employed but doesn't staunch decline in their wages (Corson 1996; NYT 5/11/96).
More subjective measures of how much compensation humanized the NAFTA are mixed.
Many labor and environmental groups see the record of CLC and CEC institutions as living down
to their expectations, though some leaders have worked hard to use and strengthen the
organizations, and applaud their value (e.g. Compa 1996; and interviews with Pharis Harvey and
Mark Anderson). Labor leaders also have had relatively low expectations about the NAFTA
adjustment assistance, not surprising given the disproportionate number of unionized workers to
be displaced and to leave the unionized sector with the help of the assistance. But to those workers
receiving benefits the compensation provides real help they know they couldn't get through
standard JTPA, TAA, and unemployment insurance (NYT 5/11/96).
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Chapter Six
Chapters Two though Five provided a history of side payment politics in US trade
liberalization since 1934. Stripped of its qualifications and twists, the history's basic pattern of
compensation is clear. First, since 1962 bargaining over trade liberalization has sometimes yielded
side payments to the expected victims of liberalization's costs, with significant variation across
episodes and groups in the incidence of side payments. Second, compensation has generally been
less generous in the scale of assistance and the scope of its reach to dislocated groups than
conventional wisdom leads us to expect. Finally, this provision has almost always taken place at
the domestic level, with provisions negotiated in and provided by domestic institutions, and during
domestic stages of bargaining, that is during either extension of presidential negotiating authority
or ratification. In contrast, at the international stage of bargaining, during the negotiation with
different nations, US trade liberalization has usually taken place without any additional side
payments -- the wine gallon episode during the Tokyo Round and the NAFTA tri-lateral labor and
environmental Commissions being significant exceptions. And only with the NAFTA's trilateral
commissions has the administration and financial source of side payments been an
intergovernmental and international institution. In short, compensated liberalization in the US has
been inconsistent in its incidence, modest in its scale and scope, and national rather than supra-
national in the institutions through which compensation was negotiated and provided.
Part Three of this thesis, comprising this chapter and the next, reveals that this pattern
stands in contrast to the post-war history of trade liberalization among West European countries
under the auspices of European Community (now European Union) economic integration. That
history involves the most thorough-going international trade liberalization of the post-war period.
The development of the European Union has strived for and involved much more than simple trade
liberalization, of course -- for instance involving limited harmonization of social policies and
environmental regulations and the significant, if slow and halting, moves towards political and
military integration. But the most far-reaching accomplishments of the European Union in the
forty years since its first tentative steps under the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951
have undoubtedly been in reducing barriers to intra-community tariff and non-tariff barriers to
people, capital, and commercial goods -- commercial policy liberalization. As of 1996, most tariff
and non-tariff barriers to the flow of goods among EU member countries have been eliminated or
harmonized. Plenty of exceptions to this rule remain, such as regulation of agricultural production
and trade, but liberalization within the EC over the course of the last four decades represents
unprecedented commercial opening.
That liberalization has taken place through hundreds of incremental steps overseen by the
European Community's "executive branch" institution, the European Commission, but the most
substantial moves to liberalization have been decided through the water-shed inter-governmental
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negotiations over EC integration: the founding of the ECSC in 1951; the founding of the EEC as
part of the Treaty of Rome in 1958; the expansions of the EC membership in 1973, 1981, and
1986; and the negotiation and implementation of the Single European Act beginning in 1986. At
these critical junctures, various aspects of European integration were negotiated, won and lost, but
economic liberalization was the central component of them all.' Since that time, the successes of
commercial policy integration have opened the way for and encouraged other elements of
integration, most significantly monetary and macroeconomic integration begun with the 1991
Maastricht Treaty.
The history of this internal market liberalization reveals a pattern of compensated
liberalization to emerge from these watershed episodes that is nearly the opposite of the US pattern.
Whereas the US compensated liberalization has been inconsistent, modest, and national, the EC
internal-market history reveals a pattern that is consistent, generous, and supra-national. In every
episode of internal-market liberalization at the center of European Community integration -- from
the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community through negotiation and implementation
of the Single European Act -- bargaining over trade liberalization yielded side payment
compensation. Such compensation was devised through bargaining among national
representatives at the level of EC policy-making, in the Council of Ministers, European
Commission, and especially the inter-governmental European Council. And EC-level institutions
provided the side payments -- through such programs as the ECSC Re-adaptation program that
provided training and housing assistance for trade-impacted coal and steel workers; through early
commitments to harmonize social provision; or through the founding, reform, and successive
expansion of the Structural Funds (the European Social Fund, the European Regional Development
Fund, Cohesion Fund, etc.). In contrast, national level struggle over these internal-market
episodes has taken place with rare and modest provision of side payment compensation.
Accounting for this contrast with US compensated liberalization is the central analytical task
of Part Three of the thesis. This Chapter and the next argue that the differences between US and
EC compensated liberalization can be explained largely by the institutional conditions discussed in
Chapter One: jurisdictional breadth and welfare generosity. The broad jurisdiction of the EC
institutions governing broad European integration, combined with the modesty of welfare
provision at that supranational level, made compensation an easy and attractive tool to buy support
for liberalization. At the same time, the relative generosity of the national welfare policies of EC
member states discouraged compensation during national discussions. This is nearly the opposite
of the US: the supranational setting for US liberalization involves narrow jurisdiction despite
' As we shall see below, for instance, the UK accession in the 1973 enlargement was less a matter of commercial
policy liberalization, since many of the UK-EC barriers to trade were already very low given UK's involvement in
EFTA, than it was a matter of sovereignty over fiscal policy and taxation. But liberalization still mattered, and can
be conceptually separated from the rest of the mix.
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modest welfare provision, hence less compensation; and the domestic setting involves broad
jurisdiction and modest welfare provision, hence more compensation. Thus, the theory predicts
what the history reveals: modest, uneven, and national compensation in the US; more generous,
consistent, and supranational compensation in the EC.
This Chapter considers the history of the first two steps in European integration, the
founding of the ECSC and the EEC, and Chapter Seven considers the rest of the internal-market
liberalization, especially the Second Enlargement between 1981 and 1986, and the Single European
Act between 1986 and 1992. For the ECSC and EEC episodes treated here, the story begins with
recognition of how the integration proposals represented customs union liberalization initiatives
embedded within the integration project. Although the distributional consequences of trade
liberalization were not at the center of the struggle and negotiations over the ECSC -- the issues of
sovereignty and regulation capturing more attention -- almost all the negotiating countries had
groups who resisted the ECSC on grounds that it constituted threatening liberalization. This was
particularly strong in Belgium, but it also applied also in France, Italy, Britain, and even
Luxembourg. The struggle over the EEC episode, in contrast, was focused from the beginning as
much on economic liberalization as any other element of integration, and the concerns about the
costs of liberalization loomed large in the negotiations within and between the large, main
negotiating powers as well as the small. Whereas in the ECSC Belgium was the important player
for side payment politics, in the EEC France and Germany were the big players.
Out of the side payment politics came the provision of several kinds of side payment
compensation. In the ECSC struggle, an extensive and complicated package of safeguards
emerged from the negotiations. This pa&.kage focused especially on replacing national
subsidization provisions with supra-nationally devised and funded subsidization for modernization
and competitive support -- support that was to phase out after a transition period. In addition to
this compensatory exemption, however, the safeguards package also included creation of the first
supra-national adjustment assistance program for workers and firms adjusting to customs union
liberalization. Such a package was, as it turned out, a second-best solution to the economically
vulnerable groups in Belgium and France, and their more dirigiste champions in government -- all
of whom sought more thorough upward-leveling of social conditions, including wages and social
security provision, as compensation for the economic dislocation inherent to the customs union, as
well as for the general integration project.2 Such an ambition, however, faced strong opposition
from the more "laissez faire" German and Dutch delegations of the proposed Community,
culminating in vague and symbolic agreements to promote such equalization.
2 The explicit attempt to link social upward-leveling and harmonization to the pace and form of liberalization is a
necessary condition for such leveling and harmonization to represent a liberalization side payment. Pursuit of such
harmonization outside the context of liberalization is just as relevant, perhaps, to the plight of liberalization's
victims, but it is not a side payment. This chapter will say more on this in the EEC case and the conclusion.
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The struggle for the EEC has a richer side payment history, with extended negotiations
yielding at least two sets of side payments.3 The first was a generalized version of the readaptation
fund established as a side payment under the ECSC, the new one called the European Social Fund.
It was designed to provide funding for industries and their workers who found themselves
dislocated and forced to adjust to the imperatives of the EEC's freer trade. This Fund was the
beginning of the proliferation and expansion of the Structural Funds that were to become the
central focus of side payment politics in subsequent episodes of internal market trade liberalization.
The second was more complicated and with potentially more far-reaching implications for
EC integration: specific, albeit not guaranteed, commitments to harmonize important elements of
social provision. Such harmonization was an explicit part of both the broader integration project --
especially among the more starry-eyed and dirigiste proponents -- and the ECSC commitments to
"equalization of conditions." But in the struggle over the EEC liberalization, such interest in
equalization was more sharply focused than during the ECSC struggle on compensating for the
risks and costs of the liberalization at the center of the integration. And whereas French and.
especially, Belgian attempts to link social harmonization to the degree and pace of ECSC
liberalization had failed -- making it only a shadow of a side payment -- the French demands for
such linkage during the EEC fight was more effective, although still far short of its hopes.
The core analytical task of the chapter is two-fold. It first strives to explain why the ECSC
and EEC liberalization elicited these supra-national side payments, in contrast with the minimum of
such payments devised or provided at the national level and stage of bargaining in the member
states. This cannot be answered well through these two cases alone, because the broad pattern of
consistent side payment provision cannot be established until after the next Chapter reviews the rest
of the EU's internal market liberalization. This Chapter, therefore, only provides a partial
explanation, leaving for the end of Chapter Seven the task for developing a full explanation.
The contrasts between the EEC and ECSC, however, are significant and important, and the
second explanatory task of this chapter is to account for these as well. The most important of these
involves harmonization as a subject of side payment linkage. Why did the EEC liberalization
struggle include more substantial offers to "equalize conditions" through upward-leveling
harmonization, for at least one country, than did the ECSC struggle? The answer, this chapter
explains, lies largely in the significantly broader jurisdiction of the EEC institutional arena
compared to the ECSC arena -- the former being about broader integration, and inclusive of such
issues as atomic energy research and development, multi-sector liberalization, and broader social
integration, not just integration of the coal and steel sectors.
3 The frequently discussed Euratom Agreement, part of the package to emerge as part of the Treaty of Rome, can be
viewed as a third element of side payment compensation -- though one less directed at the costs of the liberalization.
More on this below.
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The rest of the chapter develops these various claims in four broad sections. The first lays
out and explains the side payment politics of the ECSC case between 1950 and 1952. The second
lays out the more complex side payment politics of the European Economic Community. A third
section develops explanations for the pattern of ECSC and EEC compensated liberalization in light
of the group-institutional theory developed in Chapter One. And a final section concludes by
considering the legacies of the ECSC and EEC side payment packages for the future of internal
market liberalization, and for compensated liberalization generally.
1. The European Coal and Steel Community: Compensation Liberalization Beneath Integration
The founding of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 was the first step in a
process of European integration that has developed, at times dramatically, ever since. And it was a
bold first step. The Community called for complete integration of the coal and steel sectors of the
six signatory countries -- Germany, France, Italy, and the Benelux Countries (Belgium,
Netherlands, Luxembourg) -- into a customs union overseen by supra-national and inter-
governmental institutions that were to become the foundation for all subsequent integration and
institution-building in the EU. At the time of its negotiation, the Community was explicitly
designed, loved, and loathed as the first step in a process of broader economic and political
integration, and as a customs union the ECSC sought not only to liberalize trade but to oversee
German de-cartelization and community-wide rationalization of the industry. But it was first and
foremost a customs union trade liberalization. And although the struggle over the ECSC was as
much, or more, about the many questions of national sovereignty it raised, it was also about the
consequences of the liberalization for the plight of potentially uncompetitive workers and firms.
Through that struggle emerged not only a variety of supra-national subsidies and
scheduling delays that eased the process of transition, but also path-breaking compensated
liberalization through the provision of a liberalization side payment via supra-national institutions
and moneys designed to ease and facilitate adaptation of workers and firms to the Community's
liberalization. The provision of this side payment was embedded within and at the margins of the
history of the ECSC, and the program's implementation had an inauspicious beginning that
matched this marginal role. But within the negotiations, it's role mattered, and after the early
implementation the program grew more stable and significant -- to the point that it became a model
for all future EU internal market liberalization and even liberalization struggles in the US.
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1.1. The Schuman Plan as Customs Union Liberalization
The story and explanation of this compensated liberalization begins with the origins of the
Schuman Plan, proposed by the German Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Schuman on May 9th,
1950. 4 The essence of the Plan was encapsulated in the basic proposal:
The French Government proposes that the entire French-German production of coal and
steel be placed under a common "Higher Authority," within the framework of an
organization open to the participation by the other countries of Europe....The solidarity in
production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany
becomes, not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible. (Schuman Declaration;
excerpted in Kitzinger 1967, p.37-8)
And in a few paragraphs, Schuman outlined all of the basic provisions -- for liberalization, supra-
national governance, and safeguards -- that the final ECSC was ultimately to enact. The plan was
to be "the first step in the federation of Europe...." The new High Authority would make
decisions that "will bind France, Germany and other member countries" to secure "the
modernization of production and the improvement of its quality; the supply of coal and steel on
identical terms to the French and to the German markets as well as to the markets of other member
countries; ...the equalization through improvement of the living conditions of the workers in these
industries" (Ibid., pp.38-40). Practically speaking, the center of Schuman's plan was a customs
union, requiring that "at the very outset customs barriers and discriminatory transport rates would
be eliminated" to "ensure the fusion of markets and the expansion of production" (Ibid., p.38).
Crucial for the purposes of this study, Schuman's declaration also stated that "to achieve
these objectives, starting from the very disparate conditions in which the productions of member
countries are at present situated, certain transitional measures will have to be instituted" (quoted in
Kitzinger 1967, p.39). These measures were not spelled out in detail, beyond saying that they
would include "a production and investment plan, compensating machinery for equalizing prices,
and an amortization fund to facilitate the rationalization of production" (Ibid.). In the press
conference, Schuman emphasized that the plan "sought to eliminate fear of dislocation by an
international mechanism that would ease adjustments through subsidies and help finance the
adaptation of capital and labor to the new circumstances" (Diebold 1959, p.14-15; Goormaghtigh
4 The general history of the ECSC has been told a number of times, with several accounts being quite detailed and
theoretically informed. The most detailed and analytical histories in English are Diebold 1959, Haas 1958, Lister
1960, Milward 1984, Milward 1992, Goormaghtigh 1955, Griffiths 1988, Arter 1993, Zurcher 1957. On the
general negotiations, the Treaty, and early implementation, Diebold is particularly useful; on the general economic
background, and the Belgian negotiating dynamics Milward's 1992 work is the best.
None of the histories, however, focus on side payment politics, and in fact the elements of the history
relevant to those politics are scattered across these different and sometimes conflicting historical accounts,
particularly regarding the origins and negotiation of liberalization exemptions and side payments. The account
offered here draws on all of the above histories, and also on original texts of speeches and working paper drafts, as
well as some official Community documents, especially the annual High Authority General Reports on the
Activities of the Community, and the special HA Reports.
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1955, p.350). At the very outset of the proposed customs union integration, then, Schuman
proposed the provision of liberalization side payments, since subsidies focused on financing
adaptation to new circumstances would be clearly directed at, among others, those dislocated by
the lowering of trade barriers, and as a new "international mechanism" designed for this purpose
would be separate from the core protections being liberalized.5
As for origins, the professional and ideological ambitions of Monnet and Schuman
undoubtedly played a role in the genesis of the Schuman plan. More than most trade liberalization
initiatives, however, Schuman's proposal, including transitional measures that were to be the
blueprint for compensation and liberalization side payments, reflected an attempt to deal with a
complicated admixture of political and economic problems and came on the heels of a variety of
failed initiatives to deal with those problems. The most important political problems that the
Schuman Plan addressed concerned containment of German imperial and war-making capacities,
and consolidation of Europe within the West bloc for the Cold War.6 And for Germany, the
political benefits of the Plan were strong and simple: concrete recognition of its rebirth as an
autonomous, sovereign member of the European community of nations.
5 Schuman's proposal is widely remembered as having been conceived within the French Economic Planning
Commission (Commisariate G6ndral du Plan), headed by Jean Monnet, and to have made its way to French foreign
policy through a quite centralized, secretive process. It is said to have emerged from meeting between Monnet and
Professor Paul Reuter, which took place in April 1950, and to have been developed and drafted in memo form by
Monnet and two of his "close collaborators" at the Commissariat, Etienne Hirsch and Pierre Uri (Yondorf 1965,
p.886). With the drafts written, Monnet is said to have sold it to Schuman's chief of staff Bernard Clappier, and to
have given a memo outlining the proposal on April 29th with the request that it get Schuman's attention. Schuman
then acted on the plan after orchestrating approval from the Cabinet -- secretly enough to inspire the label of
subsequent historians that the plan represented a "conspiracy" (Yondorf 1965, p.887).
Having told Monnet he would act on the plan, Foreign Minister Schuman, first informally and quietly on
May 3, and then formally on May 8, brought the plan before Cabinet members. Even though Bidault was said to
have been skeptical of the plan, the swiftness and secrecy in which it had developed allowed Schuman and his cabinet
colleagues (especially Ren6 Mayer and Ren6 Pleven) to get approval without much debate (Yondorf 1965, p.887).
Some historians claim that Schuman's Foreign Ministry exerted a strong hand in developing the details and
rushing its proposal (Milward 1984).
For instance, the Schuman plan grew out of an attempt to improve upon the 1949 International Ruhr Authority,
that governed production, sale, and export of the Ruhr's steel and coal production. The Schuman Plan was a means
to address these challenges because it would give Germany predominant control and sovereignty over its Ruhr, but
govern the region's important coal and steel economy with a supra-national authority that would help keep Germany
tightly within the Western bloc and influence.
Expansion of the union into other areas of economic and political life would not only appeal to the world
government enthusiasms of Schuman, Monnet and other internationalists, but would consolidate the integration and
containing of Germany within the Western bloc. Coal and steel markets being a good start, not because they were
the easiest (newer industries would be much simpler given intra-industry nature of trade), but because of the strategic
importance of the sectors, the fact that the sectors were already clearly regional in character -- cutting across
international borders -- and because their economic centrality would create pressures to expand the community to
other sectors. The latter was what some have referred to as "the internal dynamism of the Schuman Plan"
(Goormaghtigh 1955, p.348). Such dynamism, at least Goormaghtigh's interpretation, fueled the functionalist
"spillover" arguments of the integrationist school in the later work of Haas, Lindberg, and others.
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Important economic conditions and considerations also underlay the Schuman Plan, though
historians disagree on how much these mattered compared to the political conditions.7 Most
broadly, the trade liberalization embedded within the plan for customs union appealed to
competitive industrialists in France and elsewhere, eager at the prospect of a unified market of
nearly 160 million consumers. And Monnet, Schuman and others, also recognized the standard
classical economic virtues of removing trade barriers between the "artificially" divided production
facilities in the various states to form a customs union -- "rational location of industry, greater
productivity, lower prices, and higher standards of living" -- the standard allocative efficiency
motivation for free trade (Goormaghtigh 1955, p.347). But fears of supply shortages and surplus
capacity probably loomed larger in the minds of planners like Monnet and Schuman.8 Although
economic forecasts suggested that the post-war coal shortage was abating, there was still concern
that there be adequate supplies of coal to support continued steel growth, fuel, and rearmament. In
Steel, the French had the opposite concern, having recently invested to expand steel-making
capacity using public investment, absorbing some 30 percent of Monnet Plan funds (Milward
1984, pp.).9 Coinciding this expansion in Steel production, however, was growing concern that
global and regional demand would not grow to absorb the increased output.' 0 Thus, the French
were increasingly interested in a variety of plans for dealing with this potential surplus capacity,
through a combination of planning and expanded access to export markets.
The Schuman plan promised a reasonable solution to these problems, better than the mixed
success and high costs that had greeted recent and distant attempts to find such solutions.
Cartelization was widely feared, especially by the United States, and this put strong pressure on
the planners that international cartelization be minimized. And such a plan in any even flew in the
face of ambition to de-cartelize and de-concentrate German production. Trade liberalization in the
interest of expanding export markets, on the other hand, had met with very limited success under
the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), with countries willing to reduce
' Diebold 1959, Goormaghtigh 1955, and others tend to see the economic conditions as second-tier causes, whereas
Milward 1984, 1992 brings these causes to the forefront: "The true origins of the European Community are
economic and social. There were other diplomatic arrangements by which an effort could have been made to bind
West Germany to western Europe. The only ones with any chance of success were those which found the point of
intersection with the successful pursuit of the national economic advantage of all parties" (Milward 1992, p.xi; see
also Chapter 1 and 2, passim).
' France had long been unable to domestically mine and process sufficient amounts of coking coal and coke for its
steel production, and had long been dependent on the German coal industry for that reason. This dependence, of
course, was France's economic motivation for greater control over German Ruhr production, added to the political
motivation it publicly emphasized.
Q By early 1950, the steel mill expansion included work on two new "continuous wide-strip mills being built"
(Diebold 1959, p. 17).
0o A report of the Economic Commission for Europe (within the UN) expressed concern that "whereas coal had been
in short supply and had hampered steel production, it was becoming more abundant in 1949, and some feared the
consequences of a glut unless some regulatory machinery were set up" (Goormaghtigh 1955, p.347; Diebold 1959,
p. 19; UN Doc. E/ECE/112, December 1949).
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somewhat tariff rates, but very limited reductions in quotas, but not deeply and not other non-tariff
barriers (Diebold 1959, p.14). The Schuman Plan explicitly distanced itself from any cartelization,
and through general integration and the creation of a supra-national High Authority offered the
prospect are more thorough-going liberalization.
As for the transitional measures explicitly referred to in the Schuman Plan, the historical
record tells us little. They were, in all likelihood, in the original Monnet drafts. Part of the
motivation, no doubt, was the general recognition that the political viability of such far-reaching
forays into national sovereignty, and deep cuts in national trade barriers, required some kind of
safeguards -- some combination of transition delays, exemptions, and compensatory assistance.
And in this case, it is impossible to know how much the Schuman, Monnet or the other
"conspirators" in the Commisariat and Foreign Ministry sought to ease transition for the victims of
liberalization and how much for victims of potential conflicts between the dictates of the supra-
national entity and national governments or industry -- conflicts which could well manifest
themselves as market-opening dislocation.
In any event, as many historians have pointed out and as the subsequent political struggles
were to focus on, Monnet and his Commisariat associates who drafted most if not all of the
Schuman plan were champions of dirigisme, of planning to take account of market-failures broadly
construed. This was reflected in the commitment to upwardly-level the working conditions and
pay of workers in the proposed customs union, and presumably also in the commitment to
compensate victims of adjustment to the customs union. There is circumstantial evidence,
therefore, that the proposed assistance was, at least in its genesis, motivated by ideological concern
for human welfare or a theory of the economy, as well as by political expediency.
1.2. Initial Country Reactions: Fear of Liberalization Among the Concentrated Few,
Fear of Supra-national Authority Among the Concentrated Many
Schuman's announcement immediately sparked interest throughout Europe and in the US.
This interest was very soon put to the test when the French government showed that it was going
to act on Schuman's proposal. On May 25th the French government officially invited all other
West European governments to take part in a conference in Paris to negotiate a treaty along the
lines of Schuman's May 9th memo. The invitation emphasized that participating countries need
attend only if they accept ahead of time the principles of that memo -- including the pooling control
of coal and steel under a "High Authority whose decisions will bind" the governments. This pre-
commitment, it turns out, was a tall order in view of the mixed reaction the Plan sparked within
Europe. Among the government representatives, industry and labor groups, and others in the
different European countries, reaction ranged from immediate excitement, to ambivalence, to
antipathy. These responses focused as much on the supra-national orientation of the Plan as proto-
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political and economic integration as it did on the implications of economic liberalization and
planning in the customs union. Concern for the costs of liberalization was important in the
reactions within a number of countries, however, and in Belgium it was central.
In France, support was not automatic, even though its Economic Planning Commission
and Foreign Ministry were the main actors behind the proposal. French industrialists, including
those in the Coal and Steel industries, were "reticent" about the plan. Their lack of enthusiasm lay
mainly in fear of Monnet's by-then well known dirigisme that would encroach upon their
autonomy. But they welcomed the prospect of expanded markets, better and more stable coal
supplies, and greater economic stability via Franco-German cooperation. The non-communist
unions were unambiguously in favor of the plan, for the same reasons that the industrialists were
ambivalent. There was some French concern among some industrialists, that the customs union
might result in painful dislocation (Diebold 1959, p.66). This was particularly the worry of the
owners and political representatives of a number of coal briquetting plants on the Atlantic coast that
had grown dependent on French subsidies used to reduce the cost of coking coal that they
processed (Diebold 1959, p. 196-7). Government officials were strongly in favor, as was one of
the most powerful and mainstream political parties, Schuman's MRP (Mouvement R6publicain
Populaire)." The socialists SFIO were originally very opposed, but ultimately split, with their
interest in industrial planning and Franco-German accommodation balanced against their concerns
focused very much on the threats Schuman's plan posed to small producers and to vulnerable
workers (Haas 1958, p. 115-7). Such concern was muted, however, and easily overwhelmed by
enthusiasm with the political and economic benefits that the French-based proposal offered.
In Germany, the plan was received with a little bit more ambivalence on the part of some
groups, though here again the enthusiasm won the day. Probably more than the French
industrialists and government officials, their German counterparts feared the potential dirigisme at
which the Plan hinted, and German steel and coal producers also dreaded the de-cartelization and
de-concentration that the French idea of customs union would entail. But the former fear was
speculative and could be dealt with in the negotiations, and the latter threat would persist regardless
of German participation in the negotiations. The non-communist unions, also like their French
counterparts, were very supportive of the plan on economic grounds. And all German actors,
especially government officials, recognized the major political virtues the plan offered for a
rehabilitation of German autonomy and sovereignty. Adenauer and other government officials
" Others were more hostile, most stridently the Communists and the Gaullist RPF (Rassemblement du Peuple
Frangais). See next case study for more on the French party system and trade liberalization and integration.
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had, in fact, had recently floated a number of proposals for steel, coal, and general economic
integration. Their participation in the negotiations, therefore, was also a shoe-in." 2
Britain was the most reluctant of the European powers right from the start. Analysis of the
debate within Britain over the proposal is well beyond the scope of this study, especially since they
ultimately decided to sit out the negotiations. The important facts of the British response,
however, are that the Schuman plan was widely debated in government circles and Parliament, that
the Attlee government received significant pressure from the US to take part in the negotiations,
and that debate focused very much on the issue of sovereignty. Government officials,
industrialists, and even union groups, feared the encroachment of the High Authority on British
autonomy in such important sectors as coal and steel, let along upon the many other political and
economic affairs the French plan explicitly sought to integrate under that authority. This concern
dove-tailed with the expected dirigisme of that Authority, suggesting that there would be strong
conflicts between the plans of British government officials or industrialists on the one hand, and
the High Authority on the other. Straight-forward concerns for the dislocation associated with
customs union liberalization did not appear to enter into the picture at all.
Italy and the Benelux Countries were quick to agree to participate in the negotiations. The
day after Schuman announced his Plan, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Carlo
Sforza, announced that the Italian government would participate in the negotiations (Goormaghtigh
1955, p.352). In subsequent weeks, however, the government added that the ECSC "would be
expected to guarantee Italy the successful completion of the Snigaglia steel reorganization plan,"
which implied temporary exemption from the common market formula (Haas 1958, p.248). This
demand was to cause some trouble in the subsequent negotiations. In any event, there was not
concern for its coal industry, yet he competitive condition of its mines, nine-tenths of which were
produced at Sulcis in southwestern Sardinia, suggested that there would be some significant
dislocation through customs union. According to Diebold 1959, the output per worker of the
mines remained "the lowest in the Community," that the quality of the coal "limited its uses," were
run by a government-owned corporation that had consistently lost money, and was very important
to the high-unemployment economy of Sardinia (p.2 16). The customs union would lower costs
and transportation prices that could threaten these Sardinian collieries. These considerations did
not become a factor, however, until later in the negotiations.
In the Netherlands and Belgium the rapid agreement to participate masked a variety of
concerns about the propriety of surrendering sovereignty to the High Authority and for the
economic implications of the Customs Union that Authority would oversee -- especially in
12 Since the Federal Republic of Germany had not yet been granted full autonomy, this participation needed to be
cleared by the Allied High Commission. This go-ahead came the day before the French released the general
invitation, with the Commission's authorization to negotiate directly with the FRG (Goormaghtigh 1955, p.352).
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Belgium. As small countries unable to row very far against the economic tide of the German and
French economies, they had little economic choice once the negotiations seemed likely to go
through. And on political grounds, the potential for Franco-German accommodation and lasting
peace was a very strong reason to support the Plan.
The Netherlands and Belgium, however, expressed real concern that the supra-national
powers of the High Authority might be too undemocratic and excessive -- concerns with dirigisme
aside. And the Netherlands was concerned that its fledgling Steel plant, recently established with
the help of a lot of public assistance, would not fare well in the new customs union. This was
partly a fear of the uncertain adjustments that might take place via the custom union liberalization,
but also by the fact that the Plan would in all likelihood be dominated by the interests of French and
German producers, who might see the small and insignificant Dutch presence as a threat. Because
of such considerations, the Dutch hedged their acceptance of the French invitation to take part in
the negotiations, agreeing to take part "without any engagement on its part regarding subsequent
membership in the Community" (Goormaghtigh 1955, p.352).
1.2.1. Belgium's Non-competitive Coal
Although Belgium was even quicker to agree to participate in the negotiations than the
Netherlands, announcing its participation two days after the invitation was made public, its coal
industry was destined to face the most dramatic adjustment by virtue of the custoks union." The
Belgian coal industry was concentrated in the Southwest in the Borinage in the southwest, the
Kempen in the West, with less substantial concessions in the Charleroi-Sambre and Liege regions.
For decades Belgian coal mines were -ome of the highest-cost producers in Europe. Even after
post-war recovery, Belgian coal producers faced high wages and low productivity that made them
below other countries in productivity and higher in costs. Table 6.1 summarizes the situation:
Table 6. 1.
Belgian Coal Production as a Percentage of Other ECSC Countries and the Saar
Belgium as Output Labor Costs Operating Average
percent of: per per per ton Expenses Pithead
manshift manshift produced per ton Price
France 92 114 124 150 137
Germany* 65 133 206 178 173
Saar 73 126 174 165 142
Netherlands 49 166 347 --- ---
* not including the Saar
Source: Diebold 1959, p. 201.
'~ The best, most detailed account of the position of the Belgian Coal industry is Milward 1992, Chapter Three,
pp.46-113. See also Diebold 1959, pp.200-203.
418
Burgoon
Chapter Six
Some of the productivity problems were intrinsic to the mines, such as dep shafts, "thin and
crooked seams," causing higher costs for transportation and ventilation (Ibid., p.200). But some
of the other problems involved less fixed capital investment, like overage equipment. There had
been inadequate investment between the wars, and "price equalization schemes and other
arrangements...retarded the development of new fields and preserved many small companies that
lacked resources for modernization" (Diebold 1959, p.200-201). These problems were
particularly acute in the Southern coal fields, especially the Borinage.
Despite the poor competitive position of these mines, producers and unions had long been
in a strong political position to win government support. The mines were the predominant in a
number of regions. In the Borinage, for instance, the 64,800 people recorded as being in
employment in the Borinage in 1957, 23,000 worked in the coal industry, and this didn't include
the some 5,000 people working in the metallurgical industries completely dependent on coal
(Milward 1992, pp.47-8). Even though it was long cliear that adjustment out of Borinage mining
might be necessary, the miners were unlikely to find other kinds of work in the home region, and
the miners were reluctant to move to the Campine mining areas that might have been able to absorb
the migration because the Campine was Flemish-speaking while the Borinage was French speaking
(Diebold 1959, p.202). And the position of the Belgian unions also strongly militated against any
closures, "not merely as employment policy but also as generally symbolic of the great national
gains which labour had won since liberation" (Milward 1992, p.63). As Diebold summarized the
political situation, "coal was deeply involved in Belgian politics and played a key role in the
balance of forces among parties, classes, regions, ideologies.... The pattern was complex but for
the most part inhibited drastic action" (Diebold 1959, p.202).
In response to such a pattern, the Belgian government responded with substantial
protection. Since 1947, the government had "provided a variety of subsidies, grants-in-aid for
investment, and credits for re-equipment to improve productivity" (Diebold 1959, pp.2 0 1-2). Of
the Marshall Plan money the Belgian government had received, almost 80 percent went to the coal
industry, coming to over $24 million in 1959 dollars between April 1948 and the end of 1956
(Ibid. p.202). Although this investment had fueled some improvement in the productivity of the
mines, Belgium was so far behind its potential common market competitors that on the eve of the
Schuman Plan's negotiation, it was still in a very poor competitive position. And Belgium's
regulated coal industry was destined for conflict with Schuman Plan principles: "Subsidized output
and wages, no imports until domestic output had beern sold, subsidized exports, and subsidized
domestic sales to consumers such as electricity producers who might otherwise have moved more
quickly away from coal" (Milward 1992, p.63). Milward's understatement is apt: "this was a
policy mixture which appeared absolutely incompatible with a common market" (Ibid.). There was
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every reason to anticipate substantial closures, layoffs, and adjustment once and if the common
market required Belgian producers to compete with the Germans.
Despite this pattern, the Belgian government announced on May 27th that it would
participate in the Paris negotiations. The government officials, other than sensing that they had
little choice but to follow the region's Great powers, was apparently motivated to support the
negotiations mainly by the dramatic political benefits of a lasting peace between Germany and
France (Milward 1988, 1992; Diebold 1955; Haas 1958; Zurcher 1959). There is also some
indication that they believed that between the promised transitional measures and the proposed
High Authority's dirigiste planning, Belgian mining concessions might not have to shut down or
adjust at any expense -- either political or financial -- to the industrialists, unions or government.
When negotiations opened in Paris in June, however, it very quickly became clear that this
was not to be the case. And the premise of its participation -- that it accepted the principles begin
Schuman's plan for a common market -- weakened its ability to defend the interests of its coal
industry in the negotiations, prompting a Belgian delegate in the Ministry of Economic Affairs to
call the situation "madness" (Francois Vinck quoted in Milward 1992, p.64). As Milward asserts,
"had Belgium understood in advance the nature and contents of the working document which was
to be drawn up by Monnet and his associates as the sole initial base for the negotiations, it would
'in all probability' have taken the same attitude as the United Kingdom and refused to negotiate
from that basis" (Milward 1992, p.64).
1.3. The Paris Negotiations: An ECSC at the Price of Safeguards and Side Payments
The Conference opened in Paris on June 20th, 1950, with a series of intermittent sessions,
and lasted until the initialing by the head negotiators of the basic agreement on march 19, 1951,
and the signing by the Foreign Ministers of the ECSC Treaty in Paris on April 18th, 1951. Each
country was represented by multi-person delegations that included a high-level diplomat or
economic minister as delegation head, such as Monnet for France and Walter Hallstein for
Germany, as well as civil servants from the relevant branches of administration and representatives
from industry and labor. The Belgian delegation, for instance, was headed by a Foreign Ministry
diplomat Maximilian Suetens, flanked by civil servants, including Vinck, the Ministry of Economic
representative, and two prominent industrialists, Pierre van der Rest from the steel industry and
Pierre Deville from the coal industry, a man with immediate economic interest in the fate of the
southern mines (see Milward 1992, p.66).
The actual conference sessions were conducted "in absolute secrecy from national
parliaments, the press and the public," with the actual talks "carried out by expert civil servants,
not by diplomats or ministers," and with technical ministers (e.g. transport, economics)
420
Burgoon
Chapter Six
"deliberately excluded from the talks" and instructions from government "lacking or general in
nature" (Haas 1958, p.25 1). All this would suggest fertile ground for honest and open political
exchange, with room for political exchanges of many stripes, unfettered by the constraints of the
home office or constituency biases.' 4 But later historical study suggests that there was plenty of
room for such constraint, during the frequent periods when the actual talks were not in session if
not through closer ties between the negotiators and interested "outsiders" than Haas's account
suggests. In addition to the day-to-day involvement of those in and close to the delegation, as the
negotiations evolved there was plenty of communication and negotiation within the domestic polity
more generally, especially involving high members of government and coal and steel industry
representatives in the respective countries (c.f. Griffiths 1988, passim; Milward 1992, pp.55-75).
The talks were guided by a working paper by Monnet that elaborated on the themes of
Schuman's May 9th press conference and memo. And with this as a working document, the real
negotiations -- including lots of "hard bargaining" -- began. The focus of that bargaining was
foreshadowed by the early statements and rumblings within the negotiating six countries and
Britain. The degree and form of High Authority powers in view of its encroachment upon national
sovereignty was a major issue throughout the talks, with the Dutch and Belgian delegations taking
the most vocal stand against the "dictatorial" powers of the High Authority. Early in the
negotiations Monnet proposed setting up a more democratically selected Assembly as a check on
the Authority's power, but the Benelux countries insisted also on an enlarged High Authority to
decentralize its power, on emphasizing the European Court's counter-veiling powers, and on the
creation of an intergovernmental Council of Ministers with more far-reaching powers (Milward
1984, 1992; Haas 1958, pp.249-50; Goormaghtigh 1955).
Also significant at various junctures in the talks was controversy over the form of planning
that should characterize the ECSC customs union, including the degree of de-cartelization, and
harmonization of working conditions and social welfare. Partially because the Administrations of
the non-French six feared Monnet's dirigisme, the customs union was not laden with any
constraining or detailed planning criteria and goals, harmonization of social conditions was
basically dumped, and de-cartelization w-.s modzst and forced through at the last minute with US
pressure."5 Thus, any fears of a kind of "supra-national Socialism," proved unwarranted
(Diebold, p.64). On the contrary, the High Authority was to "intervene as little as possible with
the decisions of firms and governments," and the move towards the common market entailed more
'~ With Schuman as his source, Haas says that "the hard bargaining was kept to a minimum while the delegations
in a real sense sought to elaborate a common scheme based on accepted first principles" (Haas 1958, p. 25 1).
" On the planning and price-control negotiations, see Diebold 1959, p.64; on the social welfare and upward-leveling
negotiations see Milward 1992, p.69, and Griffiths 1988, p.40; and on the de-cartelization, see especially Milward
1992, pp.77-83, and Diebold 1959, p. 72.
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than anything an extensive lowering of tariff and non-tariff barriers within the Community, and the
harmonization of external barriers (Haas 1958, p.249). 16
As important as these issues were to the negotiations, most historians agree that some of
the most protracted and divisive issues, or series, of issues in the negotiations involved not the
degree of the trade liberalization at the center of the customs union, but the terms of conformity and
the transition period to that liberalization. As Diebold reports, "drafting the terms of the convention
containing the rules that were to apply during the five-year transitional period proved to be one of
the hardest tasks of the conferences." (p.66). Discussion of these issues actually took longer --
the latter part of the summer and most of the fall -- and was more difficult than creation of the
Community's supra-national decision-making and implementation organs. It was over these issues
that the bargaining elicited the ECSC's various safeguards, exemptions, transitional allowances --
and liberalization side payments.
Struggles over these issues arose as soon as it became clear at the outset of the negotiations
the degree of liberalization and market adjustment within the customs union Monnet and others had
in mind would require. As Monnet's working paper and early presentations in the negotiations
made clear, the customs union was to entail rapid and complete removal of tariffs, quotas, and a
whole variety of non-tariff barriers, including transportation rates, subsidies, investment programs
and the like. At the same time, the working paper and presentations also explicitly referred to
provisions for social upward-leveling and for transitional safeguards, suggesting that a lot could be
done to off-set these costs. So between the scale of adjustment and dislocation proposed, and the
explicit commitment to providing safeguards and potential issue linkage through social provision
guarantees, there was plenty to discuss.
A number of delegations sought to limit the degree, form, and timing of their countries'
participation in the customs union in light of the potential customs union dislocation. The French
delegation, under Monnet, not only was interested in a more dirigiste, socialist customs union but
also expressed the more limited need to guarantee the safety of their weaker coal and steel
producers should dislocation occur. Toward both ends, they tried to support, early and
unsuccessfully, the more dirigiste interpretation of the customs union -- especially the upward
leveling in wages, taxes and social security. These provisions were strongly opposed by a variety
of delegations, especially Germany's and Holland's, and France and Monnet had to settle for a
skeletal commitment to social equality -- "a severe concession extracted from the fathers of the
ECSC" (Haas, p.245). The French were more successful, however, in promoting the various
16 See the next section, below, for a brief summary of the nature and degree of trade liberalization agreed upon.
When pressed to raise their already unified and low tariffs toward third countries to the levels in France, Italy or
Germany, the Benelux countries resisted and "obtained the right to retain their rates, but undertook to levy a
countervailing duty to prevent re-exportation of steel to other ECSC countries" (Haas 1958, p.249; High Authority
1953, p.26)
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Transitional measures laid out in the Monnet working paper. These included temporary "non-
discrimination" (i.e. less price discrimination) and, more significantly, the right to gain High
Authority subsidization and readjustment allowances for job training, reinvestment, etc. (Haas
1958, p.245). These provisions from the original paper made their way "in essence" to the final
version of the Treaty (Ibid).
The Italian and Luxembourg delegations also sought safeguards from the pain of
liberalization. The Italian delegation sought various protections and exclusions for its Snigaglia
Plan, and after threatening to withdraw from the negotiations, was assured the right to retain tariffs
on steel and coke for the five-year transition phase (Ibid.,p.249). Less the Luxembourg delegation
than its Premier Joseph Bech also entered the safeguarding fray, calling for insertion of "a special
safeguarding clause" in the Convention on Transitional Provisions and on a wide interpretation of
the ECJ's powers, giving "a right of appeal to the Court every tinie the interests of the workers are
adversely affected by a decision of the High Authority" (Blech quoted in Haas 1958, p.250).
By all accounts, however, the most vocal and forceful demanders of extensive safeguards
in the Transitional Convention to the customs union's marketization was the Belgian delegation
(Goormaghtigh 1955, Haas 1958; Milward 1984, 1992, Diebold 1959; Griffiths 1988).' 7 Once
the consequences of various proposals for their economy became clear to industry, government,
and the negotiating delegation, deliberations were very heated and divisive, and the Belgians
explicitly and credibly made their participation in the negotiations and the ECSC customs union
contingent upon a series of safeguards. Although many of the proposals were initially framed in
Monnet's initial working paper, it was primarily negotiations on this basis that the provisions on
the Transitional Convention, including the side payment provisions, were hammered-out in details.
Early in the negotiations, Monnet outlined his plan for a simple price structure in which the
Authority would set a maximum and a minimum coal price and the mines were left free to compete
between those bounds. According to Milward, underlying this principle was the expectation and
intention that Belgian coal output should be reduced by about 5 million tons a year to make room
for an equivalent volume of German coal to be exported to Belgian markets. In 1950, Milward
reports, 19.2 million tons were mined in southern coalfields from 157 pits, and 8.1 million was
mined in Kempen from only 11 pits (Milward 1992, p.56). So of a total production level of 27
million tons, such a reduction was substantial, more than 18 percent in the first year alone, and a
reduction of 92 percent by the end of the transition period.' As violent as it seemed, such a
proposal was not simply a reflection of planning to compensate German negotiators for the various
17 The next several paragraphs on the Belgian-fueled bargaining draws heavily on Milward 1992, pp.50-85.
"' Diebold 1959 reports High Authority statistics that suggested the proposed cuts were not quite as deep. He
reports that in 1952, Belgium produced about 30.4 metric tons of coal and 6.4 tons of coke. See Diebold 1959,
p.118.
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economic costs it would have to bear during the transition; it was actually a Belgian-friendly
prediction of the effect actual disparities in the market price of German vs. Belgian coal."9
Whether a planning goal or market artifact, such massive adjustment was flatly rejected by
the coal industry and many government officials, forcing strong opposition from the Belgian
negotiators. When the Dutch chief negotiator Dirk Spierenburg expressed the same concerns about
the threat to sovereignty posed by a "dictatorial" High Authority, the Belgian delegation realized
tt at they could leave the negotiating on this organizational issue safely in Dutch hands, allowing
them to focus their attention on the economic issues "and on repelling the threat to their coal
industry" (Milward 1992, p.65). Their strategy followed two stages, not unlike the position of the
French delegation led by Monnet.
The first line of defense for the Belgian delegation was to join Monnet's voice in favor of a
more dirigiste customs union in which the High Authority not only oversaw removal of barriers to
trade between the member countries but in which it also promoted and enforced an equalization
through upward-leveling in the wages, taxes and social security contributions of the member
countries -- to either an average community level or, preferably, to Belgium's level above that
average. Such a plan would still require a significant transition period during which Belgian
producers would be outside the customs union market until the upward leveling was complete.
But such an ambitious plan was forcefully opposed by the German and Dutch delegations, whom
resisted the dirigisme as well as the obvious implication it would have for the competitive
advantage the productive German and Dutch producers enjoyed in a common market (Milward
1992, p.69; Griffiths 1988, p.40).
Having failed at Plan A, the delegation was forced through continuous industry and
government pressure to pursue Plan B: "If wages elsewhere could not be forced up, the best
available outcome was likely to be a transition period in which Belgian mines would improve
productivity so that prices, in spite of higher wages, came closer to those elsewhere" (Milward,
p.69). The government had already committed itself to such a privatization scheme in 1949, at its
own expense. So the prospect of getting the Supranational authority to do the same was attractive
to the negotiators. The government also reasoned that "Supranational authority might well
dissipate political opposition to mine closures or restructuring which would otherwise have been
focused entirely on national government" -- both the costs of the financing and the blame. But the
key issue was how long the transitional period would be -- some Belgian representatives and
'9 Using OECD statistics, Milward calculated that the wholesale coal price in the Federal Republic in 1950 was
$7.10 per ton, and the average sale price in Belgium the same year was $14.07 per ton. A significant rail journey
added some 50 percent to the price of a tonne of Ruhr coal, bringing its delivery price in most of Belgium to roughly
$8.52. There was some question about whether German production would or could expand enough, within such a
cost disparity, to absorb the planned reductions in the Belgian market. Such a massive disparity prompts Milward to
conclude that Monnet's already violent reduction plan actually looked to be "more of an attempt at a political
compromise than the full acceptance of the economic rationale of a common market" (Milward 1992, p.68).
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partisans wanted it to be permanent -- what the High Authority subsidization level would be, what
kind of provisions would be involved in the subsidization, and of course, who would pay?
On these questions, the German delegation initially took the position that Belgium should
simply be left out of the ECSC customs union, and then softened its position at French prodding
and general recognition that early opening of the ECSC, with all its symbolic political benefits,
would require a compromise (Diebold 1959, p.66). Toward that end, Walter Hallstein, the head of
the German delegation, overtly recognized the need to grant a subsidization "above the level to
which the Belgian government had been intending to reduce in autumn 1949" as the only way to
achieve an agreement (Milward 1992, p.69). And the Germans were prepared "from an early state
to accept that they themselves would pay" (Ibid., p.70). Their conditions for such an agreement
were that the subsidization be "confined to the length of the necessary transition period, and...that
it was degressive...(Ibid.). As Milward points out, the German delegation was likely only willing
to "penalize their own coal-mining industry with the pdrdquation levy" because the Treaty of Paris
was the first treaty in which the Federal Republic was offered equality of status as a negotiating
partner, an equality which was to be continued into the constitution of the ECSC (p.72).
The questions of when, how, for how long, and at whose expense the Belgian coal
industry would be supported by High Authority programs were dealt with primarily in a subsidiary
negotiation between one of the Belgian Economics Ministry delegates, Francoise Vinck, and one of
Monnet's Planning Commission deputies, Etienne Hirsch (Milward 1992, pp.70-77). While these
negotiations proceeded, the coal industry representatives and their sometimes steel industry allies,
banded together with a number of Belgian political party operatives, of both chauvinist and
mainstream stripes, to protest any acceptance of the common market adjustment.
The compromise on which Vinck and Hirsch agreed, focused more on adjustment
subsidization, albeit phased and temporary, that represented exemption, than on the readjustment
measures in the Monnet paper that represented compensation separate from the core provisions
being liberalized. For the duration of the agreement, Belgian coal production was not to fall by
more than 3 percent a year if Community production was stable or increased (Diebold 1959, p.203;
Milward 1992, p. 72-3).20 During a five year transition period, more importantly, Belgian
production would receive international subsidization of several forms. This aid was to come from
a matching of Belgian government funds and funds from the High Authority, drawn from a special
levy on coal sold by low cost producers, which practically speaking meant German and Dutch
collieries, mainly the Germans. The general subsidy was designed to fund "a rather drastic
program of readaptation" through productivity-enhancing investment and rationalization,
essentially at the discretion of the firms receiving the funds. The plan assumed that Belgian
20 If Community production decreased in a given year, the 3 percent was to apply to Belgian production "as reduced
by the coefficient of the decline in total Community production" (Diebold 1959, p.203).
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adjustment would draw on discretionary subsidization and, importantly, on the Monnet-proposed
readaptation funds for retraining and relocation of workers expected to lose their jobs through pit
closings and restructuring. 2' How all this was ultimately implemented is another matter. 22
This Vinck-Hirsch agreement, however generous and unusual, was met with continued
hostility or skepticism in the Belgian polity, especially the coal producers. These producers were
particularly concerned that the five-year transition period during which subsidization would be
granted would be too short to allow adaptation, and when pressed they basically wanted the
possibility of permanent subsidization. The coal producers were the most extreme in taking such a
position, but they found sympathetic ears among various parties and government officials,
including the Belgian Prime Minister van Zeeland. These groups continued to table proposals for
further safeguards, with van Zeeland joining the Luxembourg demands for a safeguard clause that
would allow "possible separation of the Belgian market from the common market" through trade
barriers, not just during the transition period but also for two years afterwards (Diebold 1959,
p.203; Milward 1992, pp.72-74). More significantly, perhaps, the Belgian delegation also
negotiated a further clause that would allow the government to provide subsidization for a further
three-year transition (beyond the initial five) but without payments from the High Authority.
With such series of special exemptions, transitions, and side payment provisions, the
dispute between among the various governments, especially Belgium, over the terms of the ECSC
liberalization and transition were completed. The negotiations concluded on March 19th, 1951,
with the initialing of the Treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community, and the
Convention containing the Transitional Provisions. After a meeting of foreign ministers to iron out
procedural details not pertaining to the safeguards -- instead concerning issues like how large the
High Authority ought to be, the method of choosing it, the voting in the council of Ministers, the
allocation of seats in the Common Assembly, etc. -- the Ministers signed the Treaty on April 18,
1951, clearing the way for submission to parliaments of the six member countries for ratification.
1.3.1 The Treaty of Paris: Supra-national Compensated Liberalization Through the ECSC Treaty
and Transition Convention
The Treaty of Paris that emerged from these negotiations included the "Treaty constituting
the European Coal and Steel Community" and its three Annexes defining basic terms, the three
Protocols supporting that Treaty, and the "Convention on Transition Provisions" (Goormaghtigh
1955, pp.356-360).23 All of the Treaty provisions, except those in the Convention, 24 were to be
2" This readaptation money was to come from general ECSC coffers, flush with revenues from the general ECSC
tax on producers, ranging from .5 and .9 percent of coal and steel produced, and not to rise above one percent.22 See discussion in the section on "implementation" below for brief overview.
23 Goormaghtigh provides a very distilled summary of the provisions. For the full text, see American Journal of
International Law 1952.
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binding for 50 years -- an eternity in the time horizons of most governments. Much of the text of
the Treaty and Protocols -- befitting the basic import of the Community -- lay in outlining the basic
organization, and competencies (including borrowing and taxation powers) of the new supra-
national institutions -- the High Authority, the Council of Ministers, the Community Assembly, the
European Court of Justice, and the Consultative Commission. These were designed to oversee the
coal and steel union and explicitly to serve as templates for further community integration should
the member countries so choose, and with the exception of the Consultative body they did just that.
The policy substance of the Treaty, however, focused on regulation of coal and steel
sectors. The basic mission of was "to contribute to the expansion of the economy, the
development of employment and the improvement of the standard of living in the participating
countries through the creation, in harmony with the general economy of the member States, of a
common market..." (Article 2) (Diebold 1959, p.79). And there was autonomy and authority
vested in the High Authority and other Community institutions to achieve these general goals.
But in the details it was clear that the basic modus operandi for achieving the ECSC
economic goals was sweeping trade liberalization. Article 4 of the Treaty stipulated the basic,
sweeping liberalization mandate: "import and export duties, or taxes with an equivalent effect, and
quantitative restrictions on the movement of coal and steel, are recognized to be incompatible with
the common market for coal and steel, and are, therefore, abolished and prohibited within the
Community..." (Diebold 1959, p. 139). Also prohibited were subsidies "or state assistance...in
any form whatsoever" (Diebold, 1959, p.194). And as laid out in the principle of Article 70, "if
the common market is to rest on equality, then...there can be no discriminatory transport rates, no
special charges that have effects like those of tariffs...(Diebold 1959, p.154).
The real reason that the Treaty promoted liberalization, rather than customs union
regulation, was that the Treaty did not replace of these liberalization provisions with re-regulation
or social organization . On the grand scale of social regulatory possibility, Monnet's general
dirigisme and social democratic enthusiasm behind "social equalization" within the community was
defeated, and all that was left was "a statement of principle in favour of equalization
unaccompanied by any supranational powers to achieve it" (Haas, p.245). Beyond this,
moreover, there was also mostly the opposite of the cartel agreements that some had also feared.
There was de-cartelization, especially relevant to German industrial combines tying steel and coal
production. The High Authority was authorized "to limit outputs in times of surplus and allocate
supplies in times of shortage...," but price fixing was to be used "only in special circumstances"
and to be decided by the Authority (Diebold 1959, p.80). In short, the customs union may have
created an ambitious international organization with substantial policymaking competencies, and
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may have been the prototype for the general EEC project toward a federated political and economic
union. But in 1951 it was first and foremost trade liberalization.
The Convention on Transitional Provisions (CTP) revealed this to be compensated
liberalization. This Convention was the product of bargaining during the Paris negotiations in
which a variety of countries pressed for safeguards against the dislocation imposed by
liberalization and other custom union adjustments. It was also explicitly premised on the idea that
the ECSC should match "the promise that change would take place with the assurance that it would
not take place with such rapidity as to cause serious hardship" (Diebold 1959, p.406). The
provisions of the Transition Convention set up to two transitional periods: "a preparatory period
from the entry into force of the Treaty to the creation of the common market, and a transitional
period of five years extending from the creation of the common market for coal (Goormaghtigh
1955, p.375). After these transitional periods full participation would be expected of the states and
any adjustment or departures from Community rules would be decided by the High Authority and
other Community institutions. As for provisions, the first period was simply a time when the
ECSC institutions were being set up and details ironed out, and countries were permitted to retain
their industry protections. The second transition period involved more complicated, and much
more significant assurances involving supra-national competencies.
Some of these assurances provided for a series of phased-in participation, subsidization,
and escape clauses, that in the theory of compensated liberalization represented some combination
of delay, exemption, and revision of the liberalization. Within this category, some of the
safeguards were stated generally and applied to all members of the Community. For instance, the
CTP included, as a reflection of Luxembourg's and Belgiums negotiating, a general escape clause
that would allow countries to re-introduce tariffs and other protections under conditions of
"manifest crisis." Another reflected negotiating mainly by the French, Belgian and Italian
delegations, and stipulated that the High Authority "may temporarily authorize the continuation of
certain national subsidies and permit inter-coal basin compensation systems in order to avoid
unemployment and production dislocation (CTP, Sections 11 and 24; quoted in Haas 1958, p.85).
Some of the most substantial safeguarding provisions, however, were targeted at the
particular vulnerabilities in the coal industries of member countries, especially Italy and Belgium.
As the negotiations suggested, Belgium's ailing coal industry received the most extensive and
generous treatment, as the negotiations suggested. In addition to the general safeguard provisions
and readjustment allowances their negotiating stance helped create, the industry was to receive
special treatment through three subsidization schemes, two to permit its coal to be sold
competitively to Belgian steel producers and to buyers in within and without the ECSC (covered in
CTP Sections 25, 26, and 27), and another, the "general subsidies," to adapt the production "so
that it would be competitive, without special help by the end of the transitional period" (Diebold
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1959, p.203; Haas 1958, p.250).25 The general subsidies were by far the larger, and involved the
High Authority setting maximum prices for Belgian coal "somewhat below the previous levels,"
then calculating "what price would be needed to give producers the receipts they formerly had"
(Diebold 1959, p.206). The subsidy would make up the difference, and at the outset was to
average 29 Belgian francs ($.58) per ton (Milward 1992, p.71).
Belgium's insistence of extensive coverage cleared the way for special treatment of Italy's
coal problem. Italy won a special exemption from the customs union reach during the five year
transition period. Whereas all member countries, Belgium included, were to immediately and
completely eliminate most tariff and quota barriers, Italy was permitted to reduce steel tariffs
gradually. The CTP also provided that for two years the High Authority could give subsidies to
the Sulcis mines in Sardinia "in order that they may be able, pending completion of the investment
operations now under way, to face competition within the common market" (CTP Section 27,
quoted in Diebold 1959, p.2 16).
Both of these subsidy packages were to be initiated, administered, and partially financed by
national governments, according to the principle of "additionality." The idea behind such a
principle was obvious: especially as long as the High Authority lacks competencies to even
formulate investment programs, national governments know best what is needed and what is
possible in their own industrial societies; and requiring funds be dispensed only on a matching
basis ensures that nations have a stake in the success of the adjustment subsidies (i.e. redresses
problems of moral hazard).
But half or more of the financing was to be overseen and decided by the High Authority
and to be paid for out of the special coal levy, called a "compensation levy." The levy system
resulted from the Vinck-Hirsch agreements for Belgium, and was to be imposed on the producers
"of those countries whose average costs are less than the weighted average of the Community," at
a rate that was not to exceed 1.5 percent of receipts per ton of coal sold and was to decline by a .3
percent rate annually (Section 25, quoted in Diebold 1959, pp.203-4; see also Haas 1958, p.87).
The producers who met this standard were German and Dutch, but mainly German.26
These provisions may have represented exemption and revision from the reach of customs
union liberalization, but unlike most of the exemptions and revisions emerging from political
struggles over liberalization in the United States, these subsidization schemes represented classical
"compensation." The subsidization of nations was to be ended, at least dejure, and to be replaced
by a new scheme overseen and mostly funded by a new supra-national ECSC institution; and the
subsidization was, unlike the national schemes, explicitly and formally to phase out over five
25 See Diebold 1959, pp.203-205 and Milward pp.69-72 for description of the details of the "special" and "general"
subsidies.
26 In fact, the Dutch were exempted by June 1957. See below for a summary of the financing scheme.
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years, at the end of which the liberalization would more fully take hold. And since Germany was
the country whose coal production was mostly likely to benefit from the customs union
liberalization of trade with Belgium, this was precisely the kind of compensation that economists
idealize in welfare economics models of pareto efficiency: the big and concentrated winners
compensating the big losers, to that everyone in the s. stem, in "society" gains. Since the
provisions were not separate from the core provisions of liberalization, however, they may have
been compensation, but they were not compensatory side payments.
However, some of the "innovative measures" of the ECSC, encoded in the Convention on
Transition Provisions, were side payments -- in the form of the adjustment assistance measures in
the Treaty's Readaptation Fund. The Fund was part of the transition measures in the memo
Schuman introduced, in Monnet's working paper, and entered into the negotiations by several
delegations, including France, Belgium, and Italy. It was to provide help for two kinds of
adjustment problems posed by the ECSC. First, Section 23 said that the fund should be used "if
the consequences of the introduction of the common market oblige certain enterprises or parts of
enterprises to cease or to change their activities..." (quoted in Diebold 1959, p.405). Second,
Article 56 said that the fund should be used when "new methods or equipment are introduced on
such a scale as to lead to an exceptionally large reduction in labour requirements...making it
especially difficult...to re-employ the workers discharged..." (Ibid., footnote 1).
The Readjustment assistance was to be provided to both firms and workers struggling
according to these general criteria for the duration of the five-year transitional period, and for
another two years "if the Council of Ministers agrees" (Diebold 1959, p.405). Dislocated firms
could be given loans "either for readaptation or to undertake new activities that will employ the
discharged workers," and if the new activity was outside coal or steel the Council of Ministers had
to give its approval. Workers were to be helped by grants that were "to tide them over periods of
temporary unemployment and adjustment to new jobs, to provide resettlement allowances if they
move, and to give them technical retraining if that is necessary" (Diebold 1959, p.406; see also
Frank 1977, p.). In implementing the use of Readaptation Fund to assist adjustment, however, the
High Authority was to have flexibility outside of even these broad parameters to decide with
national governments what kinds of particular provisions, such as retirement funds or housing,
would be most suitable (Frank 1977, p. 126). The money for the Readaptiation assistance was to
come from the High Authority's general revenue sources, which were to come from the ECSC's
borrowing and its taxation powers.27
27 The ECSC tax, the first supra-national tax, was on the coal and steel producers in the Community, including
those officially ailing and receiving subsidization, readjustment allowances, and other kinds of special treatment.
The tax was not to exceed "one percent of the value of the coal and steel produced in the Community unless the
Council of Ministers agrees to a higher rate by a two-thirds majority" (Diebold 1959, p.3 16).
430
Burgoon
Chapter Six
As with the exemption compensation, the principle of additionality applied to the
Readaptation Funds. Thus, national governments were expected to propose, administer, and
implement the various adjustment assistance programs supported under the Readjustment Fund,
though the High Authority had powers to review, suggest reform, and decide how much to fund
the programs. And national governments were expected to match the High Authority's aid, though
more than the subsidization this was seen as less firm. The Council of Ministers could decide to
"exempt it from this obligation" (Diebold 1959, p.406; Haas 1958, p.92).
The Readjustment Funds represented a path-breaking side payment. It came more than a
decade before the US adjustment assistance program, which we saw in Chapter Two was patterned
after the ECSC Funds, and set up the program on a supra-national level. It was also more open-
ended and generous in its funding, but was to be implemented under the competencies and matched
funding commitments from national government agencies. Both funds were side payments,
because they offered assistance separate from the core subsidies and protections to be reduced
under the customs union's thorough-going liberalization. The Section 23 funds were the most
clearly focused on the victims of actual liberalization, and hence were the more obvious side
payments, but the Section 23 and Article 56 programs were proposed and discussed as a package -
- and consistently targeted at the groups concerned that the marketized setting following
liberalization would impose unreasonable economic costs and adjustments. Thus, the adjustment
assistance not only represented compensation, but also liberalization side payments.
1.4. The Ratification Debates: No Domestic-level Side Payments
Before the ECSC customs union and Transition provisions could be initiated, all six
member countries had to ratify the Treaty of Paris. In the end, ratification passed by large margins
in all countries, as summarized in Table 6.2. But the unprecedented economic liberalization and
diminution of sovereign authority entailed in that Treaty sparked substantial debate in all the polity,
and opened a variety of "veto points" in which the national-level pursuit of the liberalization could
yield further revisions and riders to the ratification legislation --including the provision of further,
national-level side payments. None of the ratification struggles, however, gave rise to any such
side payments. On the other hand, the supra-national side payments negotiated at during the Treaty
negotiations appeared to have defused domestic opposition only modestly during the struggles,
taking a back-seat to the grander political benefits provided and to the compensatory exemptions
and revisions embedded in the Transition Convention. 28
28 The information on the ratification debates on which these basic conclusions are based is limited. The main
secondary sources on which I rely are Goormaghtigh 1955, Diebold 1959, Haas 1959, Milward 1988, Zurcher 1959.
Better, more detailed, review of the history might unearth the provision of some more informal liberalization side
payments, or evidence that the supra-national side payments were politically effective.
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The countries whose ratification struggle gave rise to policy promises and legislative riders
as part of the enactment legislation did not focus on the problems and risks of economic
liberalization. France is the most important, if complicated, example.29 The French ratification
debate was divisive -- the Assembly vote being the closest thing to a close vote among the 13 votes
in the six member countries -- but focused mainly on concerns by partisans and industrialists that
delegation of so much sovereign authority over coal and steel to ECSC institutions was excessive
diminution of sovereignty, and threatened German domination. The focus on economic issues,
voiced mainly by coal and steel producers and other industrialists, was less intense and tended to
Table 6.2.
Parliamentary Approval of the Treaty of Paris
Date
1951
June 27
October 31
November 30
December 13
1952
January 11
February 1
February 5
February 19
March 17
April 1
May 13
June 11
June 17
Country Body
Germany
Netherlands
France
France
Germany
Germany
Belgium
Netherlands
Italy
France
Luxembourg
Belgium
Italy
Bundesrat-First Reading
Second Chamber
Conseil Economique (Advisory)
Assemblee Nationale
Bundestag
Bundesrat--Final Reading
S6nat
First Chamber
Senate
Conseil de la R6publique
Chambre des D6put6s
Chambre des Repr6sentants
Chamber of Deputies
Vote (Abstentions)
26-17
62-6 (1)
111-15(29)
377-233
232-143 (3)
unanimous
102-4 (58)
36-2
148-97
182-32
47-4
165-13 (13)
265-98
Source: Diebold 1959, p.83 and Zurcher 1959, p.
focus as much on avoiding supra-national dirigisme. There was some concern that German
competition in steel would hurt French producers, leading to unemployment, pressure on wages
and prices, bankruptcies, etc., "though it was not often put so bluntly" (Diebold 1959, p.89).
After a three-day debate the Assembly adopted authorizing legislation that included several
riders. These included promises to continue to carry out Monnet plan investments in the coal
29 German ratification depended on the provision of some new promises, but none were targeted at concerns for any
dislocation that might accompany customs union liberalization. Instead they were targeted at the costs of special
payments to be provided to the losers, to de-cartelization, and to sovereignty compromises -- such as removing the
International Ruhr Authority, adequate organization for the export of coal (Goormaghtigh 1955, p.38 1). As
Milward's account suggests, the key issue in that ratification was the competing roles of the escalating Cold War
versus the ECSC as methods for international recognition of new German sovereignty. In the context of the Korea
War and push for rearmament, the German's might see the costs of the Schuman plan too large, and the main virtue
of the plan for Germany -- recognition -- as obviated by US interest in waging the Cold War. In the end, the US
support was crucial to getting the Germans to choose the Schuman path to sovereign recognition first, rearmament
later (Milward 1992, pp.72-74).
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mines, the presentation of new steel rationalization plans, and the provision of special assistance
consistent with Article 67 of the ECSC Treaty (Goormaghtigh 1955, p.379-80). The first three of
these provisions were simply consistent with and pursuant to the transition-period provisions laid
out in the Transition Convention. The other two, come closer to new provisions that would be
national-level side payments: guaranteeing equal treatment to private steel producers in the terms of
government loans provided to coal, and pursuing negotiations with other interested governments
toward "canalizing the Moselle river between Thionville and Coblenz" (Ibid.). The first of these is
a side payment only if the loans were newly proposed, rather than an amplification of the Treaty
regime or the old Monnet plan, and the history is insufficient to answer this question. The second
is clearly a side payment. It is not, however, a clear liberalization side payment. It was a part of
the older and muted dirigiste focuses of the High Authority's activities, geared to a number of
groups, industries and constituencies, only some of whom include the industrial groups that might
be concerned with the customs union dislocation (Haas 1958, p.246). And even these groups,
according to the Haas, Diebold and Goormaghtigh accounts, were focused more on broader
sovereignty and dirigisme issues than they were on dislocation (c.f. Haas 1958, pp. 116-19).
In the countries whose ratification struggles focused most closely and divisively on the
potential dislocation of customs union liberalization, the story is less ambiguous: there were no
significant riders or policy promises made to off-set the risks of liberalization. In Belgium, some
of the struggle focused on the overlapping issues of sovereignty and the dangers of dirigisme, but
most intensively on fears of dislocation in the coal mines. The coal industry was unanimously
opposed to the Treaty, explicitly claiming that the Transition safeguards were insufficient to
remedy their adjustment burden. They demanded more international or domestic aid. In this claim
they were joined by the Socialists in the Senate, who "wanted a reorganization law for the coal
mines before going into the Community" (Diebold 1959, p. 106). This is the closest the fight came
to actually demanding a rider relevant to liberalization side payments. And the closest it came to
providing such a rider was the "...the emphasis placed by Parliament on the modernization of the
collieries as a condition for ratifying the Treaty" (Haas 1958, p.250; he quotes Rachine, p.93).
But this was simply an amplification of the terms of the Transition Convention, whereas the
industry wanted much more protection guarantees.
These groups, however, were drowned-out in the political debate by the many voices
among other industrialists (including steel industry representatives) who explained how the Treaty
provided tremendous long term economic and political benefits for Belgium; how the problems of
the coal industry would exist with or without the customs union; and, most importantly, on how
the Transition provisions were very generous and promised to do as much or more than the
government could do to help the industry on its own (Ibid., pp.106-7; Goormaghtigh 386-88). As
a result, the Treaty passed by a large majority (163-13, with 13 abstentions).
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In Italy, finally, the story was similar, except that the most vocal opponents on economic
dislocation grounds were steel industry representatives. Since Italian steel costs were high, and
since the Transition Convention did not promise any special subsidization on a par with the coal
industry, including the Sulcis mines, steel representatives feared competition from foreign steel.
The special phasing-in of tariff reductions had been targeted at precisely this fear, as had the special
agreement with France to promise cheap supply of iron ore from North Africa, and the producers
acknowledged these benefits and safeguards. But they clamored for more and extended protection.
In asking for further safeguards, the steel producers were joined by the major industrial
association, Confindustria, which came out against the Treaty and called for a variety of new
provisions, including High Authority arrangements for steel like those offered coal and for
extension of the foreign aid to coal (Diebold 1959, pp. 108-110). These opponents were countered
by some industrialists, the unions, and most elements of the major parties who saw substantial
political and economic benefits of "long term European cooperation" (Ibid). Heading this coalition
was Alcide De Gasperi, who "gave assurances that the government would help if any interests
were damaged" (Ibid., p.108). But he did not spell out these assurances in policy terms or in solid
enough promise that they can be construed as riders to the legislation, let alone liberalization side
payments. And the strength of the pro-ECSC coalition was such that, like Belgium, it passed
without difficulty (148-97 in the Senate; 265-98 in the Chamber of Deputies, see Table 8.2 above).
1.5. Implementation of ECSC Adjustment Assistance, 1952-1959: From Shaky Beginning to
Stable and Beneficial Maturity
On July 25, 1952, two days after Luxembourg was the last member country to ratify, the
ECSC Treaty entered force; within a month the High Authority started its operations; and most
importantly, the official creation of the common market in coal, iron ore, and scrap iron began on
February 10, 1953, and that of steel began on May 1, 1953 (Goormaghtigh 1955, p.389). 30
Along side implementation of the Community's tariff and non-tariff barrier liberalization and of the
oversight by supra-national institutions, the High Authority also implemented the Transition
Convention provisions, including its subsidization and readjustment fund assistance. The
implementation of the latter, the readjustment fund that represented the core liberalization side
payment provided as part of the Treaty, had a slow start but became an important element of
30 Assessing the implementatior of the liberalization, its degree and effectiveness, is beyond the scope of this study.
It is fair to say, however, that the accomplishments were substantial. Tariffs and quotas were removed according to
schedule, and within several years, so too were Italy's. Many non-tariff barriers, including transportation rates, were
harmonized or eliminated. By 1958, after only five years since the ECSC took effect, intra-ECSC trade in steel had
increased by 157 percent and steel output by 65 percent (Arter 1993, p.127). For general effects, see Diebold 1959,
and for effects on specialization and growth, Adler 1967.
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European Community compensated liberalization -- important both in its aid to victims of
liberalization and in its effectiveness in defusing opposition to new or retained liberalization. 31
In the first two years of the ECSC's operation, the Readjustment allowances lay dormant,
with countries slow to apply for assistance for adjustments clearly called for by ECSC
liberalization. In those years, the High Authority also turned down some of the early proposals
from the French and Italian governments on a variety of grounds -- either that the proposals were
for adjustment only loosely connected to conformity with the customs union, that the program of
assistance was ill-formulated, or that it had costs that the national government would not match.
The first proposal, by the French government for reimbursement to the government for
unemployment payments made to 150 coal miners in the Loire region, was typical. This request
was rejected by the High Authority, which regarded it "as not a special contribution of the sort
called for by the Treaty" (High Authority, April 1954, p.166; Diebold 1959, p.406, fn.3).
The first major use of the Readjustment Funds was also something of a disappointment. It
came in response to another French government application in 1953, asking for help in relocating
some 5,000 workers expected to be released over five years from mines in C6vannes, Aquitaine,
and Provence that had increased productivity and imports of Community foreign coal along the
coast.32 It was believed that most of these workers could be absorbed in the Lorraine mines, but
this would be costly relocation. After "rather long" negotiations, the High Authority and the
French government agreed on a set of provisions to offer a special indemnity as well as
transportation and an extra day's vacation and pay to any workers volunteering to relocate (Diebold
1959, p.406). They also promised housing and maintenance of worker's pension rights and job
classification. Although this was a promising and classical task for the Readjustment program, it
turned out to be a major disappointment, with only about 500 workers agreeing to make the
transition before administrators gave up on the attempt to encourage their transition with the
program provisions. The reasons were many, including reluctance to relocate to a new culture and
climate, the different and higher-paced work conditions in the Lorraine mines, uncertainties and
disappointments with the housing promises. But the experience revealed, as some High Authority
officials learned, the difficulty of facilitating labor market adjustment even when the cluster of
carrots were clearly, effectively, and generously offered.
The largest request for and eventual provision of Readjustment aid came only several
months later, in December 1953, and the experience was again mixed. The Italian government
sought assistance for more than 8,000 steelworkers laid off when firms speeded up their
3~ Since Diebold 1959's history of the ECSC, there have been few detailed historical attempts to assess the
implementation of its provisions, including the readjustment funds. The brief account offered here draws on Diebold
1959, Haas 1958, and on High Authority Reports for subsequent years.
32 Diebold provides a nice summary of this case. He also provides a more simple case study of the High Authority's
use of readjustment funds to assist in the relocation of dislocated steelworkers. See Diebold 1959, pp.406-12.
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modernization to face the common market. Trade unions and the High Authority encouraged
Rome to submit requests for readaptation aid, but the Italian government was concerned that its
request not "created a group of 'privileged unemployed,' entitled to more public aid than the bulk
of Italy's jobless," numbering some 2 million at the time (Haas 1958, p.252). As Diebold pointed
out, "favoritism might have political repercussions; the government could not afford to pay
allowances to everyone" (Diebold 1959, p.416). Since the government also found it politically
costly and economically foolish to forego the readjustment benefits, it sought to solve its dilemma
by getting the High Authority to provide aid in the context of a major adjustment program directed
at a variety of industrial employers, wherein employers would promise to hire at least 50 percent of
their new workers from the 9,000 or so dislocated steelworkers (Ibid., p.4 16). The High
Authority refused this plan, since it didn't guarantee any particular benefits to the workers, and
because the plan was generally lacking in Administrative details, and offered equivalent assistance
directly to the workers, including housing assistance.33
As the negotiations between the government over the terms of the assistance groaned on,
the efficacy of the assistance to the dislocated workers declined. The High Authority and the
Italian government eventually agreed on a plan whereby steelworkers who had lost their jobs
between the opening of the common market and May 1, 1956 "were to receive grants at degressive
rates for periods up to 15 months of unemployment," while those who were forced to relocate
"would be paid transportation expenses and a dislocation allowance" (Diebold 1959, p.417). The
actual provision of this assistance was further delayed by the failure of the Parliament to enact the
Italian share of the appropriations (Haas 1958, p.252). So, by the time the readjustment assistance
came through it was "a belated supplementary social security grant rather than as a means of
promoting adaptation" (Diebold 1959, p.4 17).
Through the experience with the early Italian and French cases, the High Authority
gradually loosened its eligibility requirements and more commonly got Council of Ministers
approval to waive the national matching requirement. Table 6.3. summarizes the results of its
activities, in terms of the rough number of workers assisted and money spent. The Table shows
that by far the most money and workers assisted in the first decade were in the Italian steel mills.
Perhaps the most important applications of the readjustment funds in the first decade of operation,
however, are not captured by the numbers in this Table.
They lay instead in the use of the funds along side the politically divisive reductions in
Transition Convention subsidization in Belgium and Italy. The Belgium case is exemplary. After
the first quarter of 1955, the Belgium export subsidies were dropped, leading Belgian exports to
" In their counter-proposal, the High Authority also got the Council of Ministers in July 1955 to waive the
Convention requirement that the Italian government match the readjustment funds. See Diebold 1959, p.416, fn. 18,
and High Authority 1955.
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drop sharply, though for the year stayed above the 1954 rate. (High Authority 1957; Diebold
1959, p.205). In the same year, in June 1955, a commission consisting of High Authority and
Belgian government officials decided on more dislocating reductions in the general subsidy. This
included ending subsidies on some kinds of coal -- such as Li6ge anthracite that was competitive
without subsidization -- and this lowered by one third the amount of coal subject to the Vinck-
Hirsch subsidization schema. It also reduced subsidization to some firms thought to be
Table 6.3.
Activities Under the Readaptation Fund, 1952-February 1958
Requests Requests Funds Workers
Country Received Granted Allocated Benefited
France 12 8 $2,500,000+ roughly 3,500
Italy 2 2 $6,500,000+ roughly 13,200*
Belgium 1 1 $1,500,000+ 1,100+t
Germany 1 ? ? 2,100 (1,800)
15 11 $12,000,000+ 18,600+tt
* This includes the Haas 10,000 plus the 1,700 steelworkers granted relief in 1957
and miscellaneous others, reported in Diebold 1959, p.4 1 8.
t This figure does not include some 5,000 other Belgian workers that had not yet
received, but had been approved, adaptation assistance.
tt This figure includes only those workers covered as of February 1958, and does
not include the approved adaptation grants that could affect another 6,500
workers
Sources: High Authority 1958; Haas 1958, p.93.; Diebold 1959, pp.406-18
competitive at lower rates. At the same time, the plan called for increased subsidies for re-
equipment and improvement of certain pits and the closing of nine others -- all by the end 1958.
To compensate for and assuage the problems faced by the dislocated workers, the High
authority agreed to provide readaptation funds for retraining and relocation, particularly for the
workers thrown out of work from the closed pits. In providing these funds, moreover, the
Authority waived the usual requirement that the Belgium government match the funding. The
workers affected were expected to number 1,100 (less than .8 percent of total coal employment in
Belgium). This de-subsidization with readjustment assistance predictably raised vocal opposition
from the employers of the pits to be closed, though less from the workers -- some of whom could
expect to be relocated to other mines without the help of the High Authority and others whom
could expect to receive the benefits to be provided by the High Authority's readjustment fund.
In the context of the de-subsidization and quick waiver of the matching requirement, this
application of the readjustment funds was a side payment, even though the broader readjustment
provisions and the de-subsidization were planned in the initial Transition Convention. It also
appears to have been an effective side payment, both economically for the dislocated workers, and
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politically for those in the High Authority, some in Belgium, and for more competitive Community
producers who wanted to peacefully implement the de-subsidization. 34
Perhaps because of this promising and political role, the Readaptation fund was extended
indefinitely when the Transition convention expired in 1957, and is in continued and large-scale
application today. In the intervening years, the use of the readjustment program has gone beyond
simple readjustment for relocation and tide-over allowances, to include a variety of other
mechanisms for supporting labor dislocated by Community operation, including funding of job-
retraining centers, housing construction,35 and early retirement incentives. In Germany, for
instance, many workers were displaced by loss of their entitlement to concessionary coal as part of
continued Community liberalization. For these workers, the European Commission (the successor
to the High Authority) made available "lump-sum payments...to those workers who had not yet
reached the compulsory age for retirement but were eligible for pensions" (Frank 1977, pp. 125-6).
The size and inventiveness of the readjustment program has grown as the coal and steel
industries have declined, and as membership in the EU has grown. The long post-war boom
tapered through the crisis of the 1970s and the international economy has modernized and grown in
the degree of competition in all sectors, changes that have brought continued structural problems of
the coal and steel industries, the readjustment program has been busy. In 1974 alone nearly $40
million was disbursed under the ECSC readaptation program to workers in Belgium, France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom (ECSC et.al. 1975, p.122; see also Frank 1977, p.126). And
in more recent years, as these problems have continued, membership in the EU has grown to
include countries and regions with major and ailing coal and steel industries -- e.g. East German
LSnder, Portugal, Spain. Since 1980, the readjustment provisions contributed over 3 billion ECU
and has benefited some 800,000 ECSC workers (p.3).
Today's program reflects the greater and more inventive needs posed by the expanded and
more intractable demand for assistance that accompanies such change. Since detailed review, or
even summary, is beyond the scope of this study, a thumb-nail sketch will have to suffice. In
1993, the Readjustment Aid was offered under the same broad eligibility, additionality, and
implementation criteria established in the original Transition Convention's Article 56, but
commitments by then were divided under three programs: traditional aid, supplementary steel
measures and supplementary coal measures.
3 The Italian government also got the High Authority to support coal mine adjustment in Carabosarda mine, as part
of the de-subsidization schemes that the Authority pushed the mines, labor, and government to accept. HA, Report,
April 1957, p.18 1.
3 The housing construction grew to be a particularly large and unanticipated focus of the High Authority's
adjustment activities, though it funded and administered these activities through discretionary monies as well as
readaptation funds. See Haas 1958, p., for some information on the scale of the program. Significantly for the
theory and subject of this study, the housing went to a variety of countries, and did not seem to correlate closely
with the aggrieved condition of particular regions or countries.
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In 1993, a total of 137,770 workers were given assistance under these three programs. 36
75,531 ECSC workers were deemed eligible and helped under the traditional aid program --
43,449 to steel workers and 32,032 coal workers -- with total financing granted to the tune of
182.3 million ECU and actual dispensations averaging 2,414 ECU per worker (CEC 1994, pp.15-
17). Under the supplementary steel measures -- set up for the anticipated 130,000 jobs expected to
be lost (60,000) or transferred (70,000) as a result of price collapses following transitions of the
East bloc and other developments -- 23,856 workers were granted aid, with a budget of 60 million
ECU (CEC 1994, p. 18). Under the ECSC supplementary measures to coal miners, set up as a
complement to the Community RECHAR initiative, 36,384 ex-miners were judged eligible for aid,
within a budget of 50 million ECU (Ibid., p.24). Under all three of these programs, the specific
provisions include a range of provisions: severance payments, retirement benefits, benefit-in-kind,
social security contributions, tide-over allowances, wage make-up payments to compensate for
lower salaries, out-placement search costs, mobility/transfer expenses, training organizational
costs, income support during training, end of training bonus, and self-employment grants (CEC
1994, p.28).37 In other words, this is a large, diversified program for providing social assistance.
2. The European Economic Community: Compensated Liberalization via Social
Harmonization and Supra-national Adjustment Assistance
Soon after the ECSC was signed, with its liberalization phasing in and its supranational
institutions just beginning to establish their footing, the integration project hobbled-forth through
the push to establish a common defense policy under the European Defense Community (EDC) and
for a common democratic entity that was its companion, under the European Political Community
(EPC). These initiatives ended in defeat in 1954, but out of their ashes grew the successful
creation of two new Communities: the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), together created through the Treaties of Rome in 1958.
The Euratom called for common regulation and development of all peaceful atomic energy among
the six ECSC member countries. And the EEC called for the systematic and supra-nationally-
supervised reduction of all tariff and non-tariff barriers between the member countries, and the
creation of a common external trade policy. Together with the ECSC, the creation of these two
new communities composed what have ever since been called the European Communities -- or
more colloquially, the European Community. Since the EEC was by far the more politically
36 This number aggregates the figures for the workers to be covered under the respective Readaptation programs, as
listed in the 1994 EC Report on Readjustment. That report does not confirm whether a given worker can benefit
from both "traditional aid" and from one of the "supplementary measures," so it doesn't rule out double-counting.
3 The general break-down in the actual percentage of total assistance these various kinds of assistance constitute,
ECSC 1993 reports the following: Early retirement (coal), 8.51%; early retirement (steel), 15.71%; unemployment,
10.44%, external redeployment, 11.40%; internal transfer 35.26%; vocational training, 19.41%. See EC 1994, p.6.
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momentous achievement under the Treaties of Rome, the second major step towards European
integration turns out, like the first, to have been a major trade liberalization initiative.
Unlike the political struggle for the ECSC, however, the fight for the EEC was from the
beginning focused on the various risks and costs of trade liberalization as much or more as on the
delegation of sovereign powers to international entities. Also unlike the ECSC struggle, the EEC
focus on economic dislocation was not fueled by demands and concerns of one of the smaller
member states -- as it was by Belgium's ailing coal industry -- but by a coalition of the member
countries, first and foremost France, but also Belgium and Italy. As a result of these differences, it
should come as little surprise that side payment politics were at the center rather than the margin of
struggle over the founding of the EEC and the 1958 consolidation of European integration. And it
should also come as little surprise that out of these politics came a couple of substantial
liberalization side payments, with far-reaching historical implications for the future of EU
compensated liberalization.
2.1. The Origins of EEC Liberalization: The Beyen Plan and European Integration
Just as the side payment history of the ECSC had its origins in the earliest formulations of
the Schuman Plan of 1950, such history of the EEC has its origins in a different plan -- this one
called the Beyen Plan. Unlike the Schuman Plan, this one is named after its true author and
champion, the Dutch Foreign Minister Jan Willem Beyen. The Beyen Plan proposed far-reaching
tariff and non-tariff liberalization under supranational European auspices, and in even its early
formulations also proposed proto-adjustment assistance provisions. With recent historiography
summarizing recently opened archival material, assessment of its origins can rely more on
interpretation of actual events than on conjecture. It is appropriate, therefore, to delve into a little
more detail on the origins of the Beyen plan than we did into the Schuman plan. 38
The Beyen Plan grew out of the complexities of post-ECSC European integration. Even
though the ECSC had formally and practically committed the member countries to increased
economic integration via expansion of the customs union to other sectors, the French economy had
by then taken a slightly protectionist turn and the defense and political projects were enough
political work as it was. So trade liberalization was no longer a part of Monnet's and the ECSC's
38 Griffiths and Milward 1985 is particularly good on the early origins and negotiations over the Beyen Plan, and
Milward 1992 on the later origins. The other main histories -- e.g. Haas 1958, Diebold 1959, Zurcher 1960, etc. --
offer scant details of the Plan, other than its later development after the Messina Conference.
The account offered here borrows heavily from all these, but also relies somewhat on some of the original
texts, especially reports found in the Archive of the Ministerie van Bvitenlandse Zaken 1953. I thank Nicole van de
Laar for translating some of these materials from the Dutch.
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immediate attempts to further integration. 39 Instead, in the immediate aftermath of the ECSC's
founding, the integration project was tied to the fortunes of the European Defense Community and
European Political Community, both of which had been spear-headed by the French and Italian
integrationists in and out of the ECSC (Zurcher 1960, pp.81-107).40
For the Netherlands, such a basis of integration had little to offer. The ECSC itself offered
the Dutch relatively little economically, since the Dutch mining and steel industries were so small
and competitive. As for the EDC, the Dutch had agreed only with great reluctance to participate in
the October 1951 discussions to create a European army -- and then only after significant US,
French and German prodding; and it accepted the European Defense Community only as a last
resort recognition that there was no other way for an effective land defense of the Netherlands
(Griffiths and Milward 1985, p. 1). The EPC was even less attractive, and they agreed to
participate in discussions to define its role and scope only because it was necessary to manage the
common defense project (Ibid.).
But the European integration project, aside from offering benefits through long term
political stability and peace, also promised to be the best avenue for pursuing something that really
was of first-order importance to the Netherlands: commercial policy liberalization. The Dutch
economy was among the world's most trade dependent, with foreign commodity trade, most of it
with other West European countries, accounting for more than thirty percent of its national income.
The country's future economic prosperity and stability, at least in the minds of its leaders, lay in
retaining access to cheap inputs and in expanding export markets in Europe, including markets not
only for manufactured goods and services, but also agricultural products. Yet, the various avenues
for promoting such expanded trade had borne little fruit of late, and held little promise for the
immediate or distant future. The multilateral GATT negotiations had accomplished little for Dutch
economic interests.41 The OEEC, the principal Europe-wide framework for negotiating trade
liberalization, offered only a little more hope, even though it was a forum for developed European
states with which Holland already extensively traded. 42
3 This represented something of a policy reversal by the French. They were the original supporters of the general
customs union, as they had been of ECSC and other EU initiatives (EPC, EDC, Euratom). They initially proposed
customs union in the January 1946 with the Belelux-France "Agreement on Mutual Economic Consultation"
(Milward 1992, p. 174). And they proposed it further to the Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC)
in 1947, basically pursuant to Marshall Aid eligibility. Within CEEC there was a "study group for a European
Custom's Union" which "never got further than a bland examination of the technical aspects of tariffs" (Milward
1984, pp.232ff.).
40 For histories and description of the EDC and EPC projects, see Zurcher 1960, Chapters Eight through Ten.
41 In the recent 1951 Torquay conference, the ambitious proposals for all members to accept tariff reduction had met
strong and intransigent opposition from the many developing countries that participated in the GATT framework.
Since their participation was a regular fixture of GATT, any such proposals for significantly reducing tariffs were
"more or less doomed to failure" (Griffiths and Milward 1985, p.2).
42 In June 1950, Foreign Minister Stikker had proposed to the body a plan to reduce both tariffs and quantitative
restrictions, and had been prepared for this purpose "to concede a marginally greater degree of executive and
managerial power to the Executive Committee and the Council of OEEC, particularly in order to provide
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In comparison to these options, working to expand the ECSC appeared to be the best game
in town for liberalization. To be sure, the Dutch hadn't had much to gain from the existing sectoral
approach, and with a membership limited to the six members of "Little Europe" there was
continued danger that the French would dominate the Community body -- pushing either in a
protectionist and/or into an excessively dirigiste direction. But unlike the other institutions, it
already had standing institutions for monitoring, enforcing, and making automatic and self-
fulfilling commitments toward trade liberalization -- whether limited to tariff reductions or more
thorough-going liberalization as had been applied to coal and steel. Moreover, the Dutch had more
bargaining power, in fact power beyond its actual relative economic position, in the ECSC
decision-making structures than it did in either the OEEC or GATT (Griffiths and Milward 1935,
p.5). Thus, some expansion of the ECSC offered the best hope for liberalization. This was
particularly true in the current climate in which various countries sought expansion of the
Community's competency, and expected the EDC to be governed by institutions less powerful and
interventionist than the High Authority, making a Community-based liberalization less fearsome.
(Ibid., p.6). The Dutch could use this momentum for and benign orientation of continued
integration to leverage its trade liberalization goals.
At the same time that they would use the integration project as vehicles for its liberalization,
the Dutch also saw adding the general liberalization project to the integration project as a way of
improving the EDC and EPC projects, as political and defense projects. The reasoning, here, as
Milward persuasively argues, was that the Dutch had by the early 1950s redefined their own sense
of security as going beyond the defense of their land-mass and towards their own economic
integration with Germany and the rest of Europe, and as a strong economy. They had, in short,
expanded their own definition of security (Milward 1992, p. 173ff.).
2.1.1. The Beyen Plan: Compensated Liberalization via Supranational Readjustment Assistance
Re-fashioning the EDC and EPC complex to include the liberalization project had to be
done before the foreign ministers' meeting in Luxembourg, however, because of momentum to
close the books on the former proposals one way or the other. It was at this point that Jan Willem
'compensations' from a common monetary fund to governments whose industries were particularly damaged by this
process" (Ibid, p. 1). Despite the willingness to accept supranational provision of such liberalization side payments,
however, the Italian and, to a quieter extent, the French governments strongly opposed the liberalization. Given the
preference of these countries to retain either tariffs or quantitative restrictions, prospects for more liberalization in the
immediate future within the OEEC didn't look any better. Italian proposals to lower intra-European tariffs towards
creation of a preferential tariff zone in West Europe might help the Dutch if negotiated quickly, but would do
nothing about quota restrictions, might violate GAIT rules even if quotas were included in the preferential reduction,
and would not likely help open outlets for Dutch agricultural products because of the tendency for all the European
countries (including, especially, Germany) to exempt agriculture (Ibid.; Milward 1992, p.).
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Beyen entered the picture.43 Beyen more than Luns and others in the cabinet realized that the best
option for Dutch defense, political, and economic interests was to insert the liberalization program
into the impending discussions of the EPC. And with the Luxembourg foreign ministers meeting
upon him, without full cabinet go-ahead he got the other ministers to agree to "lay down, if they
were capable of agreement, economic guidelines for the future activity of a Political Community"
(Griffiths and Milward 1985, p.9).44
With this as one of his first acts as foreign minister, Beyen's second was to devise a
particular plan for such activity, in particular a plan to liberalize trade under the auspices of the
Political Community being developed. After the state commission set up to review Dutch
European policy handed down its findings in October -- among other things concluding that
Holland should make its participation in the EDC contingent upon "satisfactory progress on the
economic front" (i.e. trade liberalization of some kind) -- Beyen developed plans of what would
constitute such progress. He proposed that the eventual goal should be the creation of a customs
union, since attacking all barriers to trade, including all external tariff and non-tariff barriers,
would be politically futile. Such a customs union, moreover, would need to directed by some
supranational authority, and should begin in those sectors most restricted by commercial barriers.
Crucially, however, he believed that the liberalization "would have to be attained in stages
as and when improvements in the separate national economic situations allowed. If it were
implemented at once economic disturbances would produce a resurgence of protection" (Griffiths
and Milward 1985, p. 10). This was the extent of detail in the first salvo of Beyen's plan, as he
was simply proposing that the Dutch cabinet set up a commission with him at the helm to work out
the details. But even in their generalities, it was clear that Beyen's plan was closely focused on
anticipating political opposition and doing what was necessary to defuse, avoid, or channel it.
By the time of the next foreign ministers meeting in Rome in February 1953, the Beyen
Plan was fully formed. The most controversial element in his plan was that the proposed customs
union was no longer to be left fully in control of supranational authorities, but was instead to be
directed by a particular target date and timetable specified in the treaty (Ibid., p. 11). As for the
particular barriers to be reduced, his plan also proposed that behind a common external tariff and
tariff reductions the treaty would also need to lay out a program for "removing quantitative trade
13 He and Joseph Luns were appointed as joint foreign ministers to replace Stikker after the general election, with
Beyen in charge of multilateral relations and Luns of Benelux affairs (Griffiths and Milward 1985, p.6).
" He proposed in a general way economic reforms to keep the liberalization card alive, even though a Dutch state
commission had only just been set up in August to advise the government of the whole issue of European
integration. His proposal was to get the proposed ad hoc Assembly (proposed by the Italian to test-run and devise
the form EPC ought to take) to consider the economic issues in addition to the political foundations for an EPC.
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restrictions, transport monopolies and discriminations and barriers to invisible transactions"
(Ibid.). Thus, he proposed much more than tariff liberalization.45
Embellishing on his original acknowledgment of the politically divisive dislocation that
liberalization would provoke, Beyen also proposed that the supranational Community should also
"administer a series of safety clauses under fixed values" (Ibid.). Most importantly for this study,
finally, Beyen proposed adjustment assistance that counts as proto-side payments to the potential
victims of liberalization. To ease and facilitate adjustment, Griffiths and Milward report, "the
familiar idea from 1950 of a 'European Fund' was resurrected, to be deployed by the Community
in cases where there were 'fundamental difficulties"' (Ibid). By resurrected, they are referring to
the proposal 1y Stikker in his liberalization proposals to the OEEC, not to the Monnet/Schuman
proposals for a readjustment fund with the ECSC liberalization. But the basic proposals to supra-
nationally fund adjustment for workers and firms were the same. In this case, however, Beyen's
background, initial proposals, clear cognizance of the plight of Stikker's earlier problems with
OEEC liberalization suggest that what he had in mind doing what was politically necessary to get
through the liberalization, not dirigiste notions of what was optimal for welfare.
Important for the side payment politics of what was to follow, Beyen's plan did not include
any talk of policy harmonization of social, wage, fiscal or monetary policies as part of the customs
union or move to the common market. His plan instead focused first and foremost on the
reductions of tariffs and a few other non-tariff barriers within a specific time table and target date
encoded in the Treaty, reductions that would be the major and first step towards a true common
market. Beyen and the Dutch government were not interested at the time in pursuing policy
harmonization as part of that common market, neither harmonization of the monetary and currency
policies that some within the Dutch cabinet would need attention, nor any upward-leveling in
wages, welfare and social conditions. For Beyen and many Dutch officials, there was a long-term
interest in such harmonization, but not as a way of off-setting the pain of liberalization or as a
means to defuse political opposition through such off-setting, but instead as the substance of
liberalization. Disparities in social and monetary conditions were, after all, distorting of trade
patterns, for instance by making high wage countries produce more expensive products. The main
reason for excluding any harmonization in Beyen's plan, however, was that doing so would
"make the treaty unacceptably complex" and slow the process of liberalization which was the Dutch
government and industry's main motivation for backing the plan (Milward 1992, p. 189).
Behind this position, however, was something stronger. Harmonization was not just
objectionable for the complex negotiations it would entail, it would also entail supra-national
intervention and competencies, and would inspire calls for upward-leveling of social conditions, as
45 The Plan also called for regulation of the Community's relationship with non-members from the start in the
treaty's terms.
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had come from the Belgians, and to a lesser extent from the French, in the fight over the ECSC.
Such upward-leveling would entail more supra-national intervention and competency -- something
the Dutch were uncomfortable with on sovereignty grounds -- and would also entail a dirigisme
that, like the Germans, they feared would be inflationary and constraining of capitalist maneuver.
With its parameters set on what and how to liberalize and on how to defuse potential
opposition -- safeguards and adjustment assistance rather than harmonization -- the plan and its
sweeteners were very soon to be put to its first test, since Beyen very soon unveiled his plan to the
Rome foreign minister's meeting in Rome. The participants at the meeting had to decide whether
or not the EPC proposals should be "weighed down" with additional protocols of any kind, let
alone ambitious economic liberalization proposals. The issue was how the various publics, interest
groups and parliamentary actors would receive such a baroque package. This issue was
particularly important in French parliament, which was becoming increasingly divided on the
integration issues, but it applied to all the member countries. For his part, Beyen claimed that "it
was doubtful if a parliamentary majority for ratification could be found in the Netherlands without
including in the treaty a proposition for a common market" (Ibid, p. 11). Whether or not this was
true, it was a claim that set the terms of further discussions over the EPC and the first stage of
negotiations for a customs union that was ultimately to yield the EEC. Understanding those and all
subsequent negotiations on the Beyen plan and the EEC requires an overview of the basic
perspectives within the member countries on the Beyen trade liberalization proposals.
2.2. Country Positions: Demands for Safeguards and Side Payments Abound
When Beyen and the Dutch were attempting to insert their customs union trade
liberalization into the EPC and EDC integration project, there were a variety of issues at stake
beyond such liberalization. And this colored the perspective of all the countries, more accurately
many of the most influential state and societal groups within all the countries, in the subsequent
negotiations over Beyen's trade liberalization proposals. But the liberalization proposed inspired
direct interest and controversy in the countries even when his memo was first released in December
1952. And as the liberalization project increasingly moved to the center of the integration process,
after the EDC and EPC initiatives went down in flames, these controversies became more intense
and engaged the most important players in the Community negotiators.
Throughout the negotiations, both when liberalization was a side bar and then later at the
center, the reaction in different countries included clear and explicit demands for safeguards,
including what constituted liberalization side payments beyond Beyen's proposed sweeteners.
Most country representatives to the negotiations, sometimes reflecting sentiments of vocal societal
groups and sometimes acting more autonomously, took the position that the Beyen plan customs
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union liberalization would not be economically or politically workable without more
harmonization, more common policies, on a variety of microeconomic and macroecconomic
conditions. But the countries had very different ideas about what other kinds of coordination or
linkage were necessary and why, and it was in those differences that lay some of the most
intractable and divisive struggles over the Beyen Plan and the EEC provisions it later spawned.
After a very brief summary of the compensated liberalization stances of Belgium and Italy, the
stance on such liberalization of the two Community big guys deserve slightly more attention.4 6
The Belgian reaction to the plan for general customs union liberalization was a less acute
repeat of its ECSC performance. Even though the preferential trade access they enjoyed to the
Dutch market as part of the Benelux free trade area would be threatened by the wider Beyen
customs union, the Belgians favored trade liberalization for the kinds of reasons that motivated
their main small-country partner and progenitor of the plan. Soon after the plan was unveiled and
throughout the negotiations prime minister van Zeeland and his foreign and economics ministries
were officially on-board with Beyen's aggressive tariff and non-tariff cutting. But at various
stages in the negotiation over the cutting, the Belgian delegation stated it did not provide for
enough harmonization, both as the substance of reducing non-tariff barriers to trade, AND to
prevent excessive dislocation, hence, demands for protection in Belgium or elsewhere. The
harmonization they had in mind included institutions to ensure currency convertibility and the free
movement of capital throughout West Europe, movement which they believed in the long run could
and would reduce disparities in income and social conditions across West Europe.
Beyond such harmonization, however, Belgium was a high cost producer in general, with
a higher level of wages and welfare payments than most of their trading partners, and most
workable plans for monetary coordination would presumably threaten this position -- maybe not
lowest common denominator adjustment, but presumably somewhere between the lowest and the
highest denominator. Thus, they also wanted the customs union to explicitly move towards
harmonization of social policies that would ensure some upward-leveling to the level of Belgian
wages and conditions (see Milward 1992, p. 189,fn.87). Such a position, of course, was similar
to their "plan A" in the ECSC negotiations discussed above. But with the liberalization being
46 In addition to the national groups in state and society, the advent of the ECSC also created supra-national actors
who had and acted on their perceived interests in greater High Authority, Assembly and general supra-national
competencies. Among their pleas were those relevant to side payment politics. In March 1956, when the struggle
over Beyen Plan liberalization was at its height, the High Authority and Assembly representatives and integrationist
champions "cautioned governments not to repeat the 'mistakes' of the ECSC Treaty in its subordination of labour
and welfare policy to free trade and economic expansion, and to be ready for supranational planning measures in
easing the adjustment to competitive conditions" (Haas, p. 110, fn. to October 1955). This was noted in march 29th
1956.
Contrary to the hopes of those supporting the functionalist integrationist view that these actors mattered,
there is no evidence that their statements provided anything but window-dressing to the real action among and within
nation-states. Monnet and Spaak, in their non-governmental capacities are the exception to this rule.
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general rather than sector-specific, and with the talk of the customs union being extended to
countries well beyond "Little Europe," the plan was renewed.
The Italians were generally in favor of Beyen customs union liberalization, but were the
most consistent supporters of the readjustment assistance and other safeguards. Underlying its
concern with such safeguards was that Italy represented one of the lesser developed and
competitive of the ECSC six in many industrial and agricultural sectors, and because it had a
particularly acute regional disparity problem with its Mezzagiorno region, the least developed
region in the ECSC Six. Part of the Italian government strategy for ensuring consideration for the
effects of the Beyen plan on this region was to push for a broad commitment to help promote its
development. But a bigger part was to focus on particular provisions and insist that the Common
Market "include a positive European labour policy, a European re-adaptation fund, a European
investment fund to aid such schemes as the Italian Vanoni Development Plan...." (Haas 1958,
p.275). At no point in the negotiations, however, did they take a stand explicitly conditioning their
support for the customs union liberalization on the provision of such assistance. Counterfactually,
they might have been more hesitant to support the agreement if such provisions were not included,
but as we shall see, France and other countries ensured that this counterfactual was never tested.
2.2.1. France: In a Country Divided, Social Harmonization as the Price of Liberalization
The position and evolution of the French polity on the Beyen Plan liberalization was as
important to EEC side payment politics as it was divided. Through the five year period spanning
Beyen's initial proposal and the signing of the Treaties of Rome, the French government fell three
times, and with each successive regime came a very different stance on the entire integration project
and on the role of Beyen's customs union liberalization in that project. These shifts, of course,
were underlain by serious divisions within the French polity -- ranging from integrationist
enthusiasm and support for free trade centered in the Christian Democratic MRP; to more guarded
support for the interventionist project providing it supply adequate protections to economic
dislocation and social conditions, as developed gradually in the socialist SFIO, and IRP; to
vehement and unqualified opposition to the integrationist "threat," centered in the Gaullist RPF.47
47 At the time of the Beyen Plan the French Assembly and party politics were organized by seven parties or standing
coalitions of parties. The largest party in terms of votes in parliament, was also the most hostile to the
integrationist project: the Gaullists with 121 seats. The second largest party in terms of seats (107 seats in 1953-
55), however, was Robert Schuman's MRP (Mouvement R6publicain Populaire), the only party for which European
integration was "the unanimously accepted first principle of modern politics" (Haas 1958, p. 1 15). At the time of
Beyen's proposal they were in government coalition with the Guallists, the RPF (Rassemblement du Peuple
Frangais).
In between there was the Socialist Party (SFIO), the second or third largest party depending on the year (in
1953, number three with 103 seats; in 1955, number one with 150) (Ibid., p.156-7). The party had opposed the
ECSC, but was generally split, and under Guy Mollet's leadership was in the process of undergoing a shift on the
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Among the most stable and influential "middle" in industry and government interested and
involved in the international negotiations, the Plan's liberalization was a threat to the competitive
position of French industry and social welfare conditions, and was a distant second-best vehicle
for European integration. Out of this position, in turn, sprung strong French demands that the
customs union liberalization be accompanied by supranationally-implemented safeguards and social
harmonization. The latter of these demands was at the center of the EEC's side payment politics.
Even though France had led the push for Europe-wide customs union liberalization, such a
position became politically untenable as the country's balance of payments position worsened in
the late 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s. As the payments position fluctuated, there was
some debate among economists and, in a more limited way, in the cabinet about why there had
been a virtual stagnation of exports. 48 At stake in this dispute was the recognition that Germany
represented by far the best prospect for increasing French exports. France's trade with its African
and Asian empire consisted of more low-value-added goods and had, in any event, not grown
substantially in recent years. Trade with Germany, however, grew significantly more
substantially, and showed no signs of slowing down. Thus, where the old post-war French spirit
behind liberalization had sagged in recent years, it was not as bad as before.
Liberalization under the auspices of "Little Europe" organization, moreover, could be one
of the least costly routes toward liberalization. As a customs union it would focus on liberalization
in the areas where growth was most promising, while potentially allowing some protection from
third countries, and through any decision-making under supra-national institutions France
commanded substantial influence in shaping safeguards, exemptions, etc. Milward 1992
summarizes the government's position as an increasing recognition that France "needed to emerge
from the protectionist womb, and the Community offered the least painful way" (p.204). A
French delegate chose a different metaphor in expressing his country's openness to economic
proposals like Beyen's: "We are emerging from the circle of protectionism" (quoted in Griffiths
and Milward 1985, p.34).
integration and liberalization projects, moving to support integration, and liberalization, with upward harmonization
and other safeguards. In taking such a potentially compensated liberalization stance, the SFIO was sometimes joined
by the majority of the rightist Independent Republicans and Peasants, who had become in the successful aftermath of
ECSC increasingly supportive of further integration, including that involving trade liberalization. Plenty of these
Republicans, however, were ambivalent about liberalization on grounds that competition would hurt French
industry, due to the latter's higher social costs. Throughout the period under review, they commanded, 91 seats,
tying for the fourth largest Parliamentary presence).
The party system was rounded out by a substantial showing of the strongly anti-integrationist and anti-
liberalization Communists and, increasingly similarly inclined Radicals, under M. Mend6s-France and Edgar Faure(Radicals Ren6 Mayer, Pldven, and Maurice Faure were more defensive of integration) (Haas 1958. pp.121-23).
After January 1956, this overall distribution of seats was to change dramatically, with significant implications for
compensated liberalization. See below.
4s Among the various positions in the ensuring debate was the arguments by some that it was due to an overvalued
currency and by others that it was due to protectionism, causing output costs to rise faster than those of its
competitors (Milward 1992, p.204).
448
Burgoon
Chapter Six
On the other hand, such liberalization within Community auspices as the Beyen Plan
proposed raised important two important issues for France, both with the implication that political
opposition would be substantial. First, any substantial reduction in tariffs, let alone quotas and
other non-tariff barriers, would be economically dislocating in a number of the country's less
competitive manufacturing sectors as German manufactured goods could gain freer access.
Second, France needed to retain its continued economic ties with its "franc area" colonial network
in Africa and Asia, and a customs union of just "Little Europe" would threaten these ties, yet a
fully expanded area might bring in other European powers that would further exacerbate the
potential dislocation of liberalization. These considerations ensured that the liberalization would
come with some real political costs and risks, whatever strategy the government pursued to deal
with them.
Such political costs and risks of liberalization were problems on their own, but they were
particularly troublesome to the French given that the liberalization was being pursued as part of
European integration. For those who really wanted liberalization this was fine, since the
Community institutions, at least if Beyen's Plan got through, would be more certain to yield
concrete results and able to lock-in those results. But to many others it could threaten the
integration project writ-large. Throughout the French polity, that project was considerably more
divisive an issue than was liberalization, with some groups seeing the Union as an indispensable
method of containing Germany and organizing the economy, and with others seeing it as a
principal threat to national autonomy and integrity.
In this context, liberalization was, at worst, a clear liability for the integration cause, and at
best a second-best vehicle for it. When the Beyen Plan was an addendum to the inter-ministerial
discussions of the EPC, the Plan simply got in the way of completing and securing French
Assembly approval of the EPC and EDC, which were already divisive and politically precarious
initiatives. And when those initiatives did, in the event, die, French integrationists placed their
intergrationist bets on a different horse, the Euratom project. This project, mainly Jean Monnet's
baby, called for the supra-national regulation of all peaceful atomic energy production. Among its
many advantages from the French point of view, what area of economic or political activity most
justified invasion on the sovereignty of nations as the industry related to mass destruction,
requiring massive scientific investment and control, and just beginning to be looked at by nations.
To the Gaullists and other less anti-europeanists, Euratom was the least objectionable vehicle for
integration. And adding a much more politically divisive and risky trade liberalization to the mix
might unravel that integration.
As a result of this mix of motivations, the French strategy for dealing with the Beyen Plan
proposals had several elements. As long as the EDC and EPC integration initiatives were alive and
being developed, the French sought to simply delay or water-down any significant trade
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liberalization initiatives such as Beyen's. When the liberalization initiative became more at the
center of the integrationist project, mainly by the initiative of other countries and by the failures of
the EDC/EPC, the next strategy was to ensure that the various risks and costs -- both political and
economic -- of customs union liberalization be minimized or compensated for. Minimizing the
costs motivated the negotiators to seek certain exemptions, delays or phasing in of the
liberalization, and revision of the treaty to be less dislocating as far as the liberalization went. Of
the latter, the most dramatic initiative was to demand that France be granted special treatment in
letting its franc area trading partners be granted preferences and access to the customs union.
Much more important for the politics of side payments, and for the developments of the
Beyen plan, the French negotiators also revived their traditional demands for upward-leveling in
the social and wage conditions of the Community members. There was, of course, by early 1953,
a significant tradition of such French demands. During the original Monnet/Schuman plan there
was a commitment to pursuing such harmonization towards an "equalization of conditions," and
during the ECSC negotiations the French pressed for significant action on such conditions -- in the
direction of upward leveling -- thus giving strength to the similar demands from the more
economically defensive Belgian delegation.
After the ECSC was established, moreover, the French delegation and government
harangued the Council of Ministers with arguments that significant disparities in wage levels across
the member states demanded some upward leveling or at least compensation. For instance, in
January 1953, the French ECSC delegation showed statistics "revealing" that wages were between
15 and 20 percent higher in France than in Germany, and that the disparity was even higher if
wages included fringe benefits that were part of general "social conditions" -- in particular, family
allowances, worker housing, etc. (Haas 1958, pp.270-1, fn.68).49
Before the negotiations over the Beyen Plan liberalization, this support for upward leveling
harmonization had a combination of motivations. These included, of course, the general dirigiste
goals of planners like Monnet and others in the Planning Commission. They also included the
desire to retain cohesion of the community members as a necessary condition for integration.
Perhaps less than the Dutch, moreover, they saw harmonization of some kind, not necessarily
'9 The disparities, of course, were disputed by the German representatives and, as Haas point out, "are by no means
to be taken as factually established" (Haas 1958, p.271).
French and German Social Costs
as a percentage of Pure Wages
France Germany
Total Kinds of Aid 79% 53%
Family Allowances 18% 2%
Worker Housing 16% 5%
Source: Etudes et Documents (January 1953), pp.52-54;
cited in Haas 1958, p.271fn.68).
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upward leveling, as the substance of non-tariff barrier reduction. As upward leveling, finally, the
demands for harmonization also reflected at least some concern to provide safeguards or
compensation to off-set the costs of the liberalization proposed or being implemented by the
ECSC. At the time, however, this last motivation was certainly not discernibly stronger than the
others, certainly compared to the Belgians, whose ECSC demands were motivated by providing
some safeguards or compensation to off-set the costs of the proposed liberalization.
In the struggle over the Beyen plan, however, not only did all of the various motivations
for upward-leveling harmonization apply, but the last one -- as a method of off-setting the costs of
trade liberalization -- loomed substantially larger. Such a claim is difficult to prove, but there is
some general evidence, and the narrative below will suggest more. First, the French consistently
demanded upward leveling, never any harmonization that would entail planned reductions in the
conditions or wages of the French industries. As a July 28, 1955 dispatch expressing the opinion
of trade association manufacturers in Usine Nouvelle, France must be sure that the partners
involved in the integration and liberalization narrow their different starting positions, "otherwise,
we risk the impairment of the vitality of the socially most advanced countries (July 28, 1955;
quoted in Haas 1958, p. 192).
Second and more importantly, the French industrialists speaking-up during the customs
union discussion, not only called for safeguards and delays, but also for policy harmonization.
And these demands did not come from competitive industries wanting lowering of non-tariff
barriers. Instead they came from the Chamber of Commerce generally, and most vocally from the
most regulated, high-wage industries -- and high cost industries -- who anticipated a serious
competitive threat from the lower cost German manufacturers, especially autos and steel (Haas
1958, p. 192-3). These high-cost producers explicitly stated their concern as a fear "of higher
French export prices...due to higher wages and social charges...." and predicted "chaos and
suffering if France is compelled to eliminate her tariffs without having first obtained the
equalisation of taxes and social charges" (Haas 1958, p. 192). And finally, the negotiators
continually used language and made demands in ways and with timing that suggest mainly a
concern to off-set the costs of the proposed customs union liberalization. 50
This distinction between the different motivations for the harmonization proposals matters,
of course, because at issue is whether harmonization demands represent calls for liberalization side
payment or something else. As the narrative reveals, the discussion of harmonization upward-
leveling during negotiations over the Beyen Plan were of liberalization side payments. As it turns
out, the harmonization proposals tabled as compensation for tariff reductions were at the center of
the liberalization struggle, not just of the side payment politics. And the reason is because of
Germany's position on the Beyen Plan.
50 See Section 2.4. below for details.
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2.2.2. The Germans: Beyen Plan as Second-best Path to Liberalization and Political Union
For the German polity and delegation the Beyen Plan was only slightly more desirable than
it was for the French. Of course, the positions of specific groups and representatives varied and
evolved, but the position boiled down to this: whereas in France the liberalization was the least
painful path for basically unwanted liberalization and a second-best path to integration, for the
Germans it was a second-best plan for both trade liberalization and European integration. Once
other countries made their reactions to the liberalization plan known, moreover, the German
concerns on both of these counts deepened.
With Germany's post war political history, general trade openness was probably a political
necessity, but it's basic industrial structure also suggested that broad-based, but selective, trade
liberalization was highly desirable. Germany's trade was mainly within Western Europe, more
than 60 percent of its exports in the early 1950s and growing, though a great deal of this trade was
with countries outside the EPC and EDC, and later EEC discussions, including Denmark,
Switzerland, and the U.K. (Milward 1992, pp. 196-7). The main trade benefit of the customs
union proposal was that it promised to improve access to the French and Italian markets. These
two countries only accounted for 13.15 percent of the total increase in value of German exports,
only one percent more than much smaller economies like Denmark, and yet they were much larger
markets (Ibid., p. 197). As for the industry profile, for many of its internationally competitive
manufacturing industries, especially machine tools and other capital goods, Beyen plan trade
liberalization was desirable. But for others, such as cement, woolens, and cars, it wasn't clear
what a customs union would hold, and for cotton textiles and agriculture, further trade
liberalization was thought "to be dangerous" (Ibid, p. 199). The various segments of industry were
not politically active in trying to influence government response to the Beyen plan, but the
Bundesverband Deutschen industrie (BDI) generally favored the customs union, but sought to
ensure that it grow and lead to real liberalization (ibid., p.200).
Within Adenaur's governmental cabinet, where the Beyen Plan was discussed as early as
February 20, 1953 -- the positions took account of this general economic position. As general
trade policy, the plan for customs union liberalization offered substantial benefits, especially in the
increased access to French and Italian markets it promised. But these benefits had to weighed
against the opportunity cost of pursuing a customs union that included, likely, only six European
trading partners, when Germany's trading ambit was much larger and other liberalization avenues
might suffer. This was particularly true if the external tariff were high, and so much of the
German concerns focused on what this external barrier would be, and on ensuring openness to
non-members. Also compared to the other trade fora, such as GATT, German ministers feared
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that the customs union liberalization would require significant reductions in German protection of
its vulnerable agriculture.
Most important for the side payment politics at the center of the negotiations, however, at
least a few members of the Ministries of the Economy and Finance were interested in policy
harmonization, but certainly not of the kind sought by Belgium, and later, France. Especially early
in the discussions of the Beyen plan, some ministers were interested in linking the customs union
framework and development to some kind of macroeconomic coordination. Finance minister Fritz
Schaeffer, for one, saw it "as a genuine possibility," and believed further that for a customs union
to be politically and economically feasible the members "would have to agree on a codex of
international rules covering far more issues than tariff reductions and the removal of non tariff
barriers" (Milward 1992, p. 199). What he had in mind, here, was that these other rules would be
necessary to minimize, or forbid, inflationary policies." Herein lay some overlap with at least the
Belgian interest in macropolicy harmonization.
Neither Schaeffer nor the other Germans, however, wanted anything to do with the kind of
extensive and far-reaching social policy harmonization that the Belgians and French wanted linked
to the customs union as a way of safeguarding the higher social conditions in their countries. The
various negotiators and Ministry officials, including Adenauer, opposed such linkage for reasons
similar to, but going beyond, the Dutch reasoning. The various statements and positions to be
revealed in the negotiations stated that the linkage would entail excessive supra-nationalist
governmental intervention that would be doomed to fail more than national regulation -- "the larger
the plane, the more difficult to grasp the total economic structure...and the more tragic will be the
results " (Erhard 1954, p. 120; quoted in Haas 1958, p.277). Beyond the general perils of supra-
nationalism, the linkage would tie German and other economics ministries to the whimsy of
inflationary and irresponsible practices, and they would remove a source of some commercial
competitive advantage (Haas 1958, p.277). Although most of the negotiators on the German
delegation have felt this way, by far the most active and influential of those to oppose the linkage
was the Minister of the Economy, Ludwig Erhard. Much more laissez-faire than many of his
counterparts in the French ministry, he responded to French proposals for such linkage by flatly
opposing "any treaty which would internationalize the increases in welfare to which both French
and German governments were committed" (Milward 1992, p.2 13). As we shall see in the
summary of the negotiations, Erhard was the key German player in negotiating the side payment
package ultimately to emerge from the EEC struggles.
5~ It should be said that the influential Ministry of Economy, Ludwig Erhard, currency convertibility needed to be a
priority linked to tariff liberalization, but beyond this was skeptical if not hostile to the idea of any further
macroeconomic coordination, even that directed at ruling out inflation.
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If these considerations made the Beyen Plan a distant second-best approach to trade
liberalization, German negotiators saw it was also the second-best approach for European
integration. Such integration was an unambiguous political virtue for Germany, promising
consolidation of the supra-national equality granted Germany under the ECSC. The EDC and EPC
were clear first-best vehicles for consolidating that integration -- being so clearly about High
Politics. The customs union vehicle, on the other hand, was clearly not about High politics, and
had ambiguous implications for the plight of EDC and EPC. The main worry was that the Beyen
proposals might be an obstacle to getting the EDC treaty up, ratified, and running, both because it
would take lots of time to negotiate and write-into the existing Treaty the kind of liberalization
details and schedules Beyen proposed, and because the economic clauses might imperil political
acceptance of the thing in the country where acceptance was most precarious -- France.
On the other hand, the liberalization proposal had some benefits, both for the EDC/EPC
route to integration, and as the center of such integration once that first-best strategy died. The
economic integration, it was thought, was general and might not spark as much opposition in the
various member countries, and the push by some countries for more harmonization as a side
payment to off-set the risks of the liberalization might have a good political side effect: such
harmonization "would be a stronger incentive to create another supranational authority where the
Federal Republic would gain a further measure of equality" (Milward 1992, p. 197). Finally,
domestic-politically, the integration via Euratom -- the main alternative vehicle for integration
developed in parallel with the Beyen customs union -- was more of a dog than was integration via a
common market, at least among industrialists.
Thus, in Germany's reaction to the Beyen Plan liberalization, we have, like the other
countries, a repeat of their ECSC performance. Modest, second-best economic benefits at best --
with a willingness to offer substantial economic concessions to bargaining partners -- with interest
and action fueled mainly by much more unambiguous gains in the political arena. As we shall see,
however, there were real limits to how much the Germans, at least Erhard, would compromise --
with major implications for compensated liberalization.
2.3. The Negotiations, Part One: The Beyen Plan in the Ill-fated EPC Negotiations
It took some time, however, before negotiations over the Beyen Plan revealed these limits.
For nearly two years after Beyen first formally introduced his Plan to the foreign ministers at their
Rome meeting in February 1953, these negotiations bore little fruit, and in fact shrouded the many
differences among "Little Europe's" polities and delegations over trade liberalization. The reason
is that all discussions of the Beyen plan liberalization was tied-up, and wrapped-up, in struggles
over the European Defense Community (EDC) and European Political Community (EPC).
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By the time of the Rome foreign minister's meeting, most of the member-country
parliaments had already or were on their way to passing the EDC Treaty, which the member
country delegations had been signed in 1951. France was the exception, and the fragility of the
MDP and Gaullist coalition government and its parliamentary divisions over the issue of integration
suggested that the vote was going to be close -- and it was looking worse and worse by the day.
While everyone bit their nails and waited, and tried to influence the vote, the ministerial and
supporting delegations spent much of their time discussing the elements of the EPC treaty, which
was to set up the supra-national parliamentary and executive institutions to govern the common
defense policy that would need to be devised should the EDC pass.
As for the economic liberalization project Beyen sought to inject into this EPC discussion,
only the Dutch delegation really pushed to have a concrete set of economic or customs union
proposals be part of the EPC treaty. Within a range of opinions about all constitutional and
economic matters, all of the other negotiating delegations were most interested in focusing on and
ensuring passage of a minimalist EPC program. Such a program would entail ironing out the
many constitutional, and organizational questions, and for the substance of what the resulting
government should do would begin by integrating oversight of the EDC and the ECSC. The
economic liberalization issues might be major initiatives in the long term, but they were not crucial
to the success of the EPC, and they would simply distract from and delay the EPC project, since
the economic issues would require so much negotiation, even if the countries were in the same
ball-park. And finally, most of the delegations recognized that the economic liberalization
initiatives in Beyen's plan could tip the French Assembly balance in favor of the Gaullists, thereby
making all of their EPC and EDC effort for naught.
At the level of generalities, however, the foreign ministers meetings yielded enough
agreement on the Beyen Plan to keep the idea of a customs union alive in the EPC discussions. At
the initial Rome meeting, the Belgian and Italian delegations supported Beyen's basic Plan, and his
position that the economic customs union clauses would need to be a part of the EPC Treaty to
satisfy enough Parliamentary majorities. And the conference communique tasked the ad hoc
Assembly being set up to consider Beyen's Plan and develop their results in the Draft Treaty they
were to draw up. That Assemble ad hoc did so, handing over its results to the next minister's
meeting in March, and then pronouncing it at the foreign minister's May meeting in Paris (Griffiths
and Milward 1985, p.13).
In addition to the details on the size, division of power, and procedures for the supra-
national institutions, the Treaty stipulated that the proposed European Community be "endowed in
the Draft Treaty with economic powers which would make possible a progressive development
towards a common market" (quoted in Griffiths and Milward 1985, p.13). Of the specific
provisions proposed, moreover, the Treaty called for the creation of a readjustment fund, along the
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lines of the ECSC readaptation fund, to safeguard against excessive dislocation (Ibid). But the
liberalization was only to be accomplished via measures proposed by the Executive, and approved
by unanimous Council of Ministers vote and by a majority of the two Parliamentary Chambers.
More problematic was the Assembld statement that the "Treaty does not...contain any obligatory
provisions concerning economic integration, and the safeguards foreseen are such that if they are
exploited they would make impossible any substantial progress" towards the liberalization
proposed (Ibid). In other words, only a general agreement was possible; beyond that, the
Assembld representatives ran into to trouble.
The same was true in subsequent ministerial and working group deliberations. In so far as
specifics were discussed, in fact, there was apparent convergence on the idea that the tariff
reductions at the center of the Beyen Plan would have to be accompanied by other common policies
through harmonization. Thus, the German delegations argued that the customs union necessitated
that "monetary and financial harmonization...be treated on an equal footing with the elimination of
trade barriers" (Griffiths and Milward 1985, p.23). In these arguments, the Germans were
consistently joined by the Belgian delegation, and to some extent also by the Italian delegation. 52
The French, for their part, were happy to discuss the details of such harmonization, but only as a
delaying tactic while they awaited final fiddling with the EPC constitutional provisions and,
hopefully, EDC approval. Of course, such generally worded sentiments on harmonization,
without any real detailed commitments in sight, masked the real controversy that lay just beneath
the surface of the agreement.
When the negotiations seemed headed toward these demands for common policies in other
areas, Beyen and others in the delegation (e.g.J.Linthorst Homan, the chief negotiator) were
interested in making concessions in that direction to get the details of the liberalization onto paper.
Such a willingness was foreshadowed by recommendations of the Dutch Commission report that
Beyen had called for in his initial cabinet statements of the Plan. That report supported the thrust
of Beyen's designs, but declared that "the opening of frontiers is almost impossible as long as a
certain measure of coordination has not been achieved in the areas of general economic, financial,
monetary and social policy" (Griffiths and Milward 1985, p. 13). 53 Since the ministerial and study
group discussions were suggesting the necessity of the same kind of harmonization, Beyen and his
negotiators became increasingly convinced that the existing safeguards in the Plan and Treaty, and
the elements of liberalization would require something more.
52 The latter "pleaded for economic policy coordination as the only way to cope with a programme of automatic
tariff reductions," arguing that the new European EPC should have powers by itself to make laws on policy
coordination (Milward 1992, p. 190; see fnote 91).
5 This case for harmonization, not surprisingly, focused as much on removing barriers to trade as on ensuring that
liberalization was not too costly for the victims.
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In their attempts to adjust the Dutch position, however, the negotiators came up against
strong and rigid opposition in the Dutch cabinet, principally from Prime Minister Drees, that any
movement in position would suggest that broad harmonization and liberalization principles were
enough, that automaticity would not be necessary from the Dutch point of view. This, in turn,
would allow the other delegations to accept only symbolic commitments. And to Drees, this was
unfathomable: "Even if the French only want a head-dress for the ECSC and the EDC, the
Netherlands should still say no, in view of the fact that we should not be prepared to surrender part
of our sovereignty for the creation of an empty husk." (in Griffiths and Milward 1985, p.28).
Before any details on harmonization or any other part of the Beyen proposal went much
further, however, the French Assembly rejected the EDC Treaty on August 31st, 1954.' 4 Just as
the Germans and French delegations had most feared, the debate in the Assembly included plenty
of talk of the problems associated with negotiating and accepting common market integration that
the Beyen plan had explicitly placed on the EPC agenda (NYT Nov.19, 1956, p.22-4?). And,
interestingly, the government's own attempt to increase the ECSC Council of Minister's attention
on the problems of equalization of conditions through upward-leveling harmonization may have
somewhat back-fired. The French delegation, as we saw above, presented to the ECSC statistics
showing how much higher its social costs were than its competitors as a way to encourage the
High Authority and the Council of Ministers to accept greater competency and commitment to
social harmonization (Haas 1958). Whether the arguments mattered or not, opponents of the EDC
and EPC in the Assembly used these statistics and arguments against the integrationists, suggesting
that the EPC and EDC were steps in the direction of dangerous customs union liberalization
(Milward 1992, p.203). And with the Beyen plan firmly, if ambiguously, on the EPC plate, such
scare tactics were more believable.55
Whatever the origins of the EDC defeat, the consequences for customs union liberalization
were clear. Since the EPC's main raison de'tre lay in providing a governing structure for that
54 Here was the vote break-down:
Total Yes No Abstain
Gaullists 121 16 83 -
Independents&Peasants 91 45 22 -
Radicals (RGR, UDSR&RDA) 91 41 44 3
MRP 85 80 2 4
SFIO 107 50 53 1
Communists arnd Progressives 103 - 99 -
Others* 48 32 16 1
TOTAL 646 264 319 12
* Others include members without party affiliation and Overseas Independents.
Source: Haas 1958, pp. 156-7.
55 The liberalization subject was not, however, at the center of the discussions, but rather a side-bar to the main
issue of sovereignty. And in so far as it was, there was no further discussion of liberalization side payments other
than those about the facts of different social levels and of French frustration in getting the Authority or Ministers to
take up such harmonization.
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Community, all the work on the constitutional provisions sank with EDC. And for the time being,
so did the Beyen Plan trade liberalization.
2.4. The Negotiations, Part Two: From Apparent Doom to Messina
The French parliament's rejection of the EDC may have immediately taken the wind out of
Beyen's sails, but ironically the rejection was also his Plan's savior -- and a key factor ensuring
that its liberalization evolved towards more generous compensated liberalization. The rejection of
the EDC wiped the slate of European integration clean, leaving the Beyen plan liberalization as one
of the only and most developed subjects of discussion that could be a vehicle for reviving the
integration project. The rejection also highlighted the precarious position of the integration and
liberalization in domestic polities, especially France's, and underscored the importance of crafting
integration or liberalization packages that could pass ratification muster. With these twin
developments, side payment politics moved to the center of the struggle over liberalization and over
the whole European integration project.
In the immediate aftermath of the French Parliament's rejection of EDC, the liberalization
project lay dormant. For all groups interested in integration and liberalization, the lesson of the
rejection was that no significant integration initiative -- whether or not the common market
proposals were a part of that initiative -- had to wait until more congenial political winds were
blowing through the French parliament and government. The Mend6s-France coalition
government with its Gaullist RPF buttress still predominated, and although there was a real sense
that the coalition couldn't hold too much longer, it was still very much in control. Beyen,
evidently, decided that his own liberalization initiative would have to wait at least until the Prime
Minster responsible for letting the EDC go down was out of office (Milward 1992, p. 193). The
Germans and others, however, were more hesitant still. Everyone chose to wait it out.
The integration project moved forward almost immediately, however, through policy
initiatives some distance from customs union liberalization. Most of the action took place in Jean
Monnet's corner. Immediately after the Parliament's action, Monnet resigned his Presidency of the
ECSC High Authority in protest and in an attempt to drum-up support and sympathy for the cause
of "Europe." When he wasn't re-nominated for a second term, he carried on his crusade from
outside supra-national or national government, with the founding of his Action League, and
extensive collaboration with fellow integrationists like Paul-Henri Spaak (Yondorf 1965, pp.885-
90). Before this founding, Monnet had already decided on common regulation of peaceful nuclear
and other forms of electricity production as the most promising vehicle for restarting the integration
project -- what was to become called the Euratom project. Spaak, for his part, placed his bets on
the transportation sector. Both "vehicles" for integration carried forward the ECSC sector-based
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planning approach to developing "Little Europe" -- more so, in fact, than ECSC. Within a year,
the collaboration between Monnet and Spaak had matured to the point that they were ready to
peddle their wares. Like Beyen, however, they were waiting for the French political climate to
improve (Haas 1958, p.260-70).
Some improvement came with the fall of the Mend6s-France government in February 1955.
The new Prime Minister, Edgar Faure, also a "radical socialist," was generally skeptical of the
integration project, and was just as tied down by the Gaullists as his predecessor. But he was new
blood, was modestly more interested in the common market and integration projects than Mend6s-
France, and had signaled desire to keep the projects alive through his foreign minister Antoine
Pinay. This gave Beyen, Monnet and others some incentive to move on their respective
liberalization and integration initiatives. For Spaak and Monnet it meant sending off to the ECSC
foreign ministers their proposals to act on either the Euratom or common transportation projects.
For Beyen, it meant moving immediately on a new, more flexible version of his customs
union plan, and approaching the Dutch cabinet for permission to promote it internationally
(Milward 1992, p.193; Zurcher 1959, p.95?). The new Plan contained the same focus on general,
explicitly scheduled, and binding tariff and other barrier reductions, to be enforced by an executive
body like the High Authority. But the proposal explicitly took account of the treacherous political
straights it would have to navigate in France, and not only re-inserted provisions for a
Readjustment Fund, but also wrote-in a special transition period that would delay the adjustment
that French government firms would have to endure in conformance with the Treaty (Ibid.).
Although the Dutch cabinet included skeptics like Prime Minister Drees, whom thought the
liberalization would not bear fruit and be worth the sweat, it gave its approval to the new Plan.
The next step for Beyen was to get the Belgian and Luxembourg ministers on board the
new liberalization initiative, so that Holland could approach the rest of the ECSC six with a
common Benelux front. The other ministers had to agree, however, to take on Beyen's proposal
in the midst of alternative vehicles for integration and avenues for liberalization. Only a matter of
days before Beyen made his pitch, the same ministers had received notice of the Monnet/Spaak
initiatives, suggesting alternative integration vehicles. And between the fall of EDC and the Beyen
pitch day, some within the Belgian foreign ministry -- importantly, not at Spaak's initiative or with
his particular approval -- had devised an alternative liberalization avenue, a Europe-wide plan to
lower tariffs and potentially other barriers, sans agriculture, through treaty agreement.
The Benelux ministers decided on a compromise that kept all the initiatives alive, but put
the most momentum behind an even more politically conscious version of Beyen's common market
proposal. They decided to support scaled-down versions of the Monnet/Spaak proposals, with
more emphasis on joint research, regulation and coordination and less emphasis on joint-
production and funding policy. On trade liberalization, the Ministers agreed that Beyen's customs
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union for the ECSC Six was the right place to begin, and accepted that tariff reductions at a scale
and on a time-line explicitly delineated in a treaty governing the first phase be the foundation of that
beginning. But they also wanted the tariff-cutting automaticity to be the first step towards a
common market, including a general plan for harmonizing a range of macro- and micro-economic
policies (Milward 1992, p. 195). And they also rubber-stamped Beyen's plan to keep and
emphasize the European Fund adjustment assistance, and to be open to delayed application of the
customs union to France. Thus, the Benelux position proposed Beyen's original customs union
liberalization with an explicitly open door to negotiation on a completely new vehicle of integration,
the Euratom, as well as to safeguards, delays, harmonization, and adjustment assistance.
After the Benelux Ministers sent the other ECSC foreign ministers a statement outlining
their basic proposal to pursue both the revised-Monnet/Spaak initiatives AND the revised-Beyen
liberalization, the Six agreed to consider the Benelux proposal at the forthcoming Messina foreign
ministers conference in May 1955. The deliberations in this meeting centered on whether to pursue
the Euratom and/or the customs union liberalization, and if the latter, what should the safeguards
and parameters of the liberalization be. In turn, these discussions turned on questions of the
politically possible as well as desirable.
The French representatives emphasized such questions, imploring the ministers at the
meeting "that they must consider not what they should do, but what they could do without the
French government having to face a debate in the Chamber" (Coulson 1955, p.4; quoted in
Milward 1992, p.2 10). What the French delegation thought could be done, it turned out, was
pursue the Euratom. This proposal was the least objectionable to the Gaullists, whereas trade
liberalization still could be expected to run-up against more resistance -- from the majority of
industrial and agricultural groups skeptical or afraid of customs union and from the Gaullists who
would see the liberalization integration as the worse of two integration evils. Taking this position
as well was Monnet, who to Spaak repeatedly "insisted that his own [Euratom] was the only viable
political way forward, because given opinion inside the French government, there was no point in
Beyen's challenging French protectionism" (Milward 1992, p. 194).56
Other delegations, however, were more skeptical of the virtues and sure of the vices of the
Euratom, and took the opposite view of France's, though recognized the political exigencies of
doing so. The Benelux delegation, as their earlier meetings had revealed, were interested in only
very modest versions of the Euratom. In taking this position they were joined by the German
delegation, which saw the called-for regulation as potentially too intrusive, again too laced with the
kind of Monnet planning they had successfully minimized in the ECSC discussions. The Euratom
56 A number of French government officials, however, were also themselves supportive of ending its infatuation
with protectionism, even though a number of industrial and agricultural groups were opposed. Such a tension not
only focused attention on issue linkage, safeguards, and other tactics, but also the decision to consult with the
industry and agriculture groups as little as possible (Milward 1992, p.208).
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regulation of atomic energy was more appropriate than community regulation of transportation, but
neither was in and of itself a winner. Trade liberalization, on the other hand, offered more obvious
benefits. For the Germans, however, the main goal was to get integration going as quickly as
possible to secure the many high politics political benefits any integration vehicle provided. And
so for them, the main issue was which vehicle was likely to bear the most fruit and to
simultaneously gain the approval of the other delegations and secure passage of the French
Parliament. In this vein, the key decision at Messina came at a session on May 22nd when a show
of hands at a meeting of ministers to gauge whether the Beyen or Euratom routes was most
preferred suggested to the Germans that the Beyen plan would be the better vehicle for foreign
policy goals than would be Euratom (Milward 1992, p.20 1). This quickly created a dynamic
where the other delegations were willing to keep pursuing the Euratom initiative, but only along-
side the Beyen trade liberalization (Kitzinger 1967, p.69-70).
As a result, the Messina meeting culminated in a decision to refer both the Euratom and the
Beyen plan liberalization to an ad hoc committee under Spaak's leadership to study and take further
action (Kitzinger 1967, p.69). In such a situation, the French had no choice but to vote along with
the rest of the delegations, even though it dreaded the liberalization material. This Messina
compromise set the agenda for the Spaak Committee and subsequent ministerial meetings on
integration. Recent historiography disputes the view that the Messina conference was such an
important event for the history of European integration, and takes the position that rather than "re-
launching Europe," the meeting was simply a continuation of a long series of ministerial meetings
on the cluster of issues involved in the integration project (Milward 1992, pp. 195-6).
For the politics of side payments, however, Messina's principal development --that France
and German agreed to the Benelux plan's parallel pursuit of Euratom and Beyen plan liberalization
-- was major. It pushed into the center of the integration negotiations discussion of provisions that
constituted liberalization side payments to the victims of trade liberalization. First, it put the French
delegation into a position where their favored route to integration, favored because they believed it
would be necessary to secure the French Assembly's ratification of any package of integration,
required acceptance of the liberalization provisions. This, of course, is issue linkage. The flip side
of the coin, moreover, is that as the other delegations made clear that they wanted to go forward
with the Beyen plan liberalization, the French delegation was put in a position that they had to push
the Euratom as a condition for their support of the liberalization -- and doing so was recognizing
that the Euratom's inclusion into the overall integration package would be necessary to get the
support of some groups in the French polity to accept such a package even though it called for
substantial trade liberalization. This, in other words, is a large-scale liberalization side payment, as
well as issue linkage.
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Second and more directly of importance to compensated liberalization, the continued
pursuit of trade liberalization as the main vehicle of ECSC-Six action heightened for all involved,
not just the French delegation, the importance of packaging that liberalization so that it would be
acceptable to the French ratifiers. This included, of course, the willingness to continue pursuing
the Euratom. But it also thrust into the center of negotiations a variety of other safeguards, del; ,ys,
exemptions, adjustment assistance and other provisions that represented liberalization side
payments. Principal among these was harmonization through the upward-leveling of some
common economic policies that affected the competitive position of French industries.
2.5. Negotiations, Part Three: From Messina to EEC Compensated Liberalization
Spaak Committee deliberations consolidated the compromises at which the Messina
conference hinted, and brought negotiations to a head over liberalization side payments. During
the study group negotiations, the Dutch delegation continued to press its demands that the first
round of liberalization, whatever its length and even if it focused mainly on tariffs, be irreversible,
scheduled, and written into the integration treaty. In very little time it became clear that the German
and all other delegations, save France, supported this basic automaticity. Also soon into the
negotiations it became clear that the various delegations were not going to accept any movement on
the Euratom without significant common market action. The German delegation had some
concerns about whether the external tariff would be appropriately low, and on whether there would
be a parallel move to dollar convertibility for W.European currencies (Milward 1992, p.20 1). But
most of the negotiations involved moving towards clearer and more irreversible customs union
liberalization as the heart of any integration effort.
To these trends in the Spaak deliberations, the French delegation reacted in two ways. The
first was to essentially delay for time, and discourage any clear movement on the liberalization
front, in the hopes that the results would become ambiguous and less politically fractious. This,
some historians and participants have noted, was the essence of "the French view," where the
French delegation would say that "while the common market was quite possibly desirable in the
long run, it was essential that it should not give rise to any ideological conflict....," and that this
underscored "the importance of going slow on this front, and contenting themselves with long and
patient studies concerning wages, social benefits, protection of industries, etc." (Pineau quoted in
Milward 1992, p.21 1).
As the other Spaak delegations moved closer and more insistently to clear and specific tariff
reductions written into the treaty and to seeing such reductions as the price of any other integration
action, the simple delay tactic had to give way to another French reaction. Spear-headed by the
delegation's leader Olivier Wormser, the French delegation stated that they would only commit to
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go through the first stage of the proposed tariff cuts, with the right to withdraw if it was not
working and if there was not adequate harmonization on social costs to level disparities in wages,
social benefits, manufacturing costs and other conditions. This kind of exemption and
harmonization was completely unacceptable to some of the delegations, especially the German, all
of whom saw it as a rejection of the basic idea of automaticity at the center of Beyen's plan, and
some of whom (the Germans and the Dutch) thought that disparities in wages and other social
benefits and conditions would and should be eliminated through market exchange rather than
government fiat.
When the Spaak committee delivered its report to the conference of foreign ministers in
Venice in May 1956, these positions hardened. The report recommended action on both the
Euratom and common market fronts, and in the latter it recommended scheduling for the first-
round move to the market binding and irreversible tariff cuts, with the first round to take around
four years (Zurcher 1958, p. 135-7). At the Venice meeting, the other delegations went beyond the
report in making it clear that such automatic moves to a common was a necessary condition for
their negotiating also on Euratom.
The French position, solidifying and embellishing what Wormser had initially stated in
Spaak deliberations, was equally firm, if not as simple. France would accept inter-governmental
discussions on such a common market proposal, but insisted that (1) harmonization be achieved to
level disparities in manufacturing costs before the end of the first four-year stage; (2) that it could
keep its temporary export subsidies and import surcharges until prices, wages and manufacturing
costs had been sufficiently harmonized; and (3) that it could reject any agreement that would not
offer escape from further automatic stages of tariff reduction after the initial four-year stage (Ibid.,
p.2 1 1). Of these positions, the most important was the first. "It was only on the basis of this
understanding [that harmonization be central to the first stage of reductions] that France entered
into the inter-governmental negotiations on the Spaak report" (Milward 1992, p.21 1). With shades
of the old "French View," the delegation went so far as to say the first stage of tariff cuts ought to
be defined in terms of cutting and harmonization objectives rather than a period of time.
At the Venice meeting, the other delegations accepted that the customs union would need to
pursue some harmonization during the first phase of tariff cutting, with some countries happy to do
so -- though for completely different reasons (e.g. seeing macroeconomic harmonization as
precondition and substance of liberalization, rather than as off-setting costs of tariff cutting). They
also accepted the idea that temporary export subsidies and import surcharges be maintained
pending such harmonization, but insisted that the treaty have written provisions with a "schedule
and method" of harmonization and of reducing the subsidies and surcharges. The French saw this
as too confining, particularly threatening to the French franc.
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This Venice meeting set the basic agenda for the rest of the negotiations: what exemption
and harmonization safeguards would France have to be granted in order for it to accept the tariff
cutting regimen. Whether and how far the ECSC-Six would move towards tariff and non-tariff
barrier liberalization rested on exemptions, transition delays, and harmonization. In the theory of
compensated liberalization most of these represented exemption or revision demands, but the
harmonization proposals represented demands for liberalization side payments, because they were
clearly designed not as the substance of liberalization and not as an integration end unto itself --
though these motivations were present to some extent -- but mainly to compensate or off-set the
costs of the proposed tariff-cutting. As Milward 1992 observes:
Had something weaker been possible [weaker than the multi-round tariff cuts being
considered by the Spaak committee], or had it been possible for France to commit itself
only to the first four-year stage and then, if it wished, withdraw, the fears that the tax,
social security and wage burden on French manufacturing costs would remain much higher
than in Germany would not have had to be translated into demands for prior harmonization
and these into the beginnings of a European Community social policy. (p.2 10)
In short, the automaticity of the proposed tariff-cutting, the Euratom-customs union linkage, and
the tangle of France's domestic politics conspired to hold the future of the EEC and Euratom
hostage to the provision or promise of side payments.
By January 1956 the outcome of the French elections pushed the negotiations more solidly
in this corner. The election saw major losses for the Gaullist RPF (from 121 to 22 seats in the
Assembly) and modest losses for the socialist SFIO (107 to 95) and the MRP (85 to 73 seats). It
also saw major gains for the communists (103 to 150) and the Poujade protest movement (52
elected), and modest gains for the Independents and peasant satellites (91 to 95 seats) (Haas 1958,
p. 157). The governing coalition to emerge from this shift was a coalition of the MRP and the
Socialists. Although these changes made some observers worried that the integration and
liberalization project was lost -- in part because the Poujade movement was even more hostile to the
project than the Gaullist RPF and in part because the SFIO had wavered and split on integration --
it actually boded well. The SFIO leader Mollet was the new Prime Minister, and he had become
supportive of the common market in its integration guise, and the MRP were even more so, and the
integration project have been "one plank of a possible agreement" within the governing coalition
(Milward 1992, p.210; Haas 1958, p.273).
More important for side payment politics, the emergence of the Left and of the SFIO in
particular into the position of government meant greater dependence of socialist votes, and this in
turn "increased the strength of the demands for harmonization, for a treaty which would solidify
French welfare gains, rather than endanger them in a direct manufacturing competition with
Germany" (Milward 1992, pp.2 10- 1 1). Mollet himself pushed this theme, as in his speech to the
National Assembly: "The government is resolved to set up a [General Common Market in Europe]
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in a way that will ensure necessary transitions and adaptations and prevent competition from being
corrupted by disparities in the various taxation and social security systems," and such measures
"have to be taken to protect the worker from all the risks which might result from the elimination of
frontiers" (Mollet, quoted in Haas 1958, p.274).
For the next six months after the Venice meeting in May 1956, then, the liberalization
negotiations focused on a variety of disputes, including how to deal with France's African franc
zone trading partners and the relative power of the supranational institutions governing the customs
union, but harmonization was central. Apparently, the French government under Mollet had
decided that the customs union liberalization treaty should be signed and sent to Parliament, but
that "reasonable show of public concession by the others on the issue of harmonization" would be
necessary to win ratification (Milward 1992, p.212; see also Urwin 1995, p.77-85?).
As for specifics, France's particular demands for the harmonization of wages and social
costs focused on leveling, mostly upwardly-leveling, three costs: the work week; equal pay for the
sexes; and holiday pay. The first stemmed from the observation that, for a variety of reasons, the
French working week was only forty hours, compared to forty-eight in Belgium and Germany
(Milward 1992, p.2 12). The harmonization demand was that "the working week in manufacturing
in the common market should be standardized, at least as far as the basis of calculating pay was
concerned, and that overtime payment rates should also be standardized" (Ibid.).57 The second
demand stemmed from France's claim that they had equal pay for men and women, whereas their
European trading partners showed women's pay averaging only 60-65 percent of men's. Thus,
the harmonization demand was that all countries should, like France, regulate if not successfully
establish, equal pay for men and women. And the third demand stemmed from France's claim that
its employers paid higher paid holiday benefits to their employees, and so the harmonization
demand was that other ECSC countries pay the same amount as France.
A number of delegations had problems with these various demands, but the German
delegation was the most consistently and strongly opposed, and the minister of economic Erhard
was positively volatile in his opposition. The particular harmonization demands would not have
required much adjustment for the Germans. For instance, differences in overtime and holiday pay
in France and Germany did not amount to significant cost increases for German employers in the
context of overall manufacturing costs. And Milward 1992 points out that the employers might
expect domestic pressures to push for such increases in any event (p.2 13). But any demanded
upward leveling would, ironically, threaten the hallowed principle of free collective bargaining,
and be opposed even by the unions. More than this, however, Erhard and others feared wage
57 According to Milward 1992, this demand grew out of specific grievances about cost disparities that the French
auto industry expressed to an inter-ministerial commission reviewing trade policy for the OEEC arena. If this is
true, than this stand of the harmonization demands has a particular industry interest-group source, rather than a
general negotiating platform devised by the trade delegation.
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increases in Germany, and were opposed to the kind of upward leveling harmonization France
proposed on a variety of general ideological grounds, such as the anti-inflationary, anti-dirigiste
bias discussed above.
The most intense struggle over the French demands took place on October 21-22, 1956,
two days set aside for the ministers to reach agreement on harmonization. Before the meetings, the
French had moderated their proposal. Rather than demanding that all the specific harmonization
demands be met in the first four-year tariff cutting period, they demanded that the other countries
agree to legislate for equal pay for the sexes within a couple years of the treaty's signature, and that
they devise "a method of harmonizing working hours and overtime payments, as well as holidays
with pay, by the end of the first stage of tariff removal," which was to last four years altogether
(Milward 1992, p.213). Only if the other countries successfully harmonized these elements would
France have to advance to the second stage of automatic liberalization. And in the second and
subsequent stages, in any event, member states should equalize wages before final achievement of
the tariff-free customs union. Devising a method in the first stage for some equalization, of
course, did not mean actually achieving harmonization, and therein lay the generosity in the new
French proposal. They saw it as steering clear of the toes of German collective bargaining rights.
This compromise proposal, however, did not make the October sessions resolve the issues
as hoped. Two of France's three demands were resolved simply. All the delegations agreed to
promise to legislate equal pay for the sexes, and a study presented to the delegations revealed that
arrangements for paid holidays over an entire working year were roughly equal in the different
countries (Ibid, p.2 14). The demand that overtime payment be standardized on the basis of
France's forty-hour work week was the only remaining hurdle. The French emphasized that they
would have the right to refuse moving to the second round of tariff cutting if the such
standardization was not agreed upon by the end of the first round. This demand violated the
principle of irreversibility that Beyen and others held dear, but Erhard was the main opponent.
Although he had been refused permission by the delegations to attend the harmonization sessions,
he attended, vehemently opposed the French harmonization demands, and when negotiations
seemed to stall, portrayed the talks as deadlocked to the press (Ibid). With this counter-productive
antic, the meetings ended with the harmonization issue unresolved, and the liberalization package
on hold.
That hold was lifted when the Prime Minister Mollet and Chancellor Adenauer stepped in.
Amidst a swirl of world events like the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the Suez crisis that
highlighted the importance of the integration project, they met on November 6, 1956, intent on
resolving what they saw as trivialities standing in the way of a politically grand agreement.
Although the conciliation was mutual, when it came to the harmonization side payment provisions
France got almost everything it wanted, and Adenauer reversed Erhard's recalcitrance. In
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subsequent inter-governmental meetings, moreover, remaining issues other than harmonization
were also resolved quickly, and usually in France's favor, including the degree of supra-national
powers created to oversee the liberalization and the treatment of the African franc zone countries
(Zurcher 1958, p. 135-8). The exclusion of agriculture from the Treaty provisions, and the
commitment to deal with it later was a more mixed bag for France. In the end, France's general
political strength and importance among the ECSC negotiating countries, and its domestic-political
vulnerability, extracted substantial exemptions, revisions, and side payments from the other
countries that were generally more accepting of the EEC liberalization.
2.5.1. The EEC Agreement. Compensated Liberalization Through European Social Fund and
Wage Policy Harmonization
When Germany agreed to the French position, the other delegations quickly fell-in with the
Franco-German line, even though the Dutch and others were unhappy at the special treatment
France was being accorded in order to win quick agreement. Within three months, the deals were
done, and in March 1957, the countries signed the Treaties of Rome establishing the Euratom
Community (the First Treaty) and the European Economic Community (the Second Treaty).
The core of the EEC was an ambitious liberalization regimen following Beyen's basic focus
on irreversibility and automaticity (Zurcher 1958, p. 136). The tariffs were to be reduced in stages
to establish the customs union, and at each stage tariff reductions would be automatically applied
according to the schedule laid down in the Treaty. The first stage was to last either four or five
years, the exact length being left unclear to accommodate the French. But this first stage would
require all member countries to reduce tariffs by 10 percent, plus a special provision to reduce all
those tariff posts over 25 percent. After the first stage, the second stage would involve reductions
of an additional 30 percent within a second four-year period, followed by arinual reductions of 10
percent for all subsequent years. The method for calculating these reductions was to average the
tariffs on groups of commodities, weighted by the value of imports of other member states. The
formula had the effect of forcing the first and deepest cuts on the highest tariffs (Hine 1985, p.4).
The common external tariff was to established by averaging the tariffs member countries
currently imposed on "third-party" countries, with the national tariffs calculated to be the lower of
most recent duty before treaty ratification or the mean of the previous three years. If the mean
departed from a particular member country's national tariff by more than 15 percent, the reductions
by those countries could be less, according to a set number for particular sectors -- raw materials
having the lowest duty floor (10-15 percent), and finished products the highest (35-40 percent).
Quotas were also targeted for reduction in the treaty, though without the same clarity and
detail. After the first 10 percent tariff cut, member countries were not to create new quotas on
intra-EEC trade, existing quotas were to be applied according to a most-favored nation principle
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within the EEC by 1959. The remaining quotas were also to be increased uniformly cut, though at
a rate and scale left unstated and to be discussed in the Council of Ministers and EEC Commission.
The depth, automaticity, and irreversibility of these tariff and quota cuts were well beyond
anything the member countries had been able to achieve in other trade policymaking arenas. So it
is fair to say that the liberalization commitments were very substantial.
The EEC Treaty and informal arrangements, however, also called for substantial
safeguards and side payments, more for France than the other signatories. The major safeguards
lay in the decision-making terms of the supra-national institutions created to oversee the various
stages of tariff and other barrier reductions. At France's insistence, the Council of Ministers had
authority to set the terms and pace of moving beyond the first stage of tariff cutting -- by unanimity
for the first four or five years, and then if more time had elapsed by qualified majority vote.
France was also exempted from the automaticity of the Treaty's application to its temporary export
subsidies and import taxes; it would be expected to eliminate its temporary import taxes and export
subsidies, and would have to consult periodically with the other delegations in the Council of
Ministers on progress toward this elimination, but it would not be held to a fixed time limits.
Most important for this study, France also won a liberalization side payment through its
upward-leveling harmonization demands. France could delay its tariff reductions at the end of the
first stage if there was not effective standardization of overtime regulations it could not "be shown
that pay increases elsewhere had been faster than in France" (Milward 1992, p.2 15). This
included accepting that overtime hours and rates should be similar to those in France in 1956. This
was a side payment, rather than simple harmonization, because in the Treaty and in the bargaining
France had tied the harmonization demands as compensating for the pain of the proposed tariff-
cutting liberalization, a kind of liberalization different than that of harmonization leveling.
Finally, the Second Treaty of Rome also created a liberalization side.payment for all its
signatories in the establishment of the European Social Fund, but mainly at the behest of the Italian
delegation, which was concerned that EEC liberalization would exacerbate the problems of its
Mezzagiorno region.58 This establishment was far and away less controversial than the
harmonization side payment to France, and was in fact in the liberalization treaty from Beyen's first
permutation of the Plan. According to Article 123 of the EEC Treaty, the ESF was designed "to
improve employment opportunities for workers in the internal market and to contribute thereby to
raising the standard of living" (Common Market Law Reports 1992, p.659). In particular, it
sought "to facilitate their adaptation to industrial changes and to changes in production systems in
particular through vocational training and retraining" (Ibid). The fund was, thus, directed only at
58 Since Tsoukalis 1993 claims that the ESF and the European Investment Bank (EIB) were, together, offered to
appease these Italian concerns, the EIB may also represent side payment compensation. There is no confirmation of
this claim, however, in the more detailed histories of the negotiations.
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workers, whereas its ECSC readaptation fund counterpart was also directed at trade-impacted
firms. The Treaty also stipulated that the ESF was to be administered by the Commission, the
successor to the High Authority, with the advice of a consultative committee of representatives of
governments, trade unions and employers' organizations (Article 124, Ibid, p.660). Funding and
implementation, however, were to be left to the Council of Ministers, subject to rules of qualified
majority voting established in Article 189c (Ibid, p.660 and pp.696-7). The scale and details of the
adjustment assistance, therefore, was not really known at the time of signing.
2.6. The Ratification: No National-level Side Payments, No Problems
The signing of the Second Treaty did not end the fight for the EEC, since only three years
earlier the French Assembly had in one negative ratification vote, made all the months of
negotiations and the ratification of the EDC in all other states moot. When the six delegation
signed the two treaties, therefore, almost all of the member government, especially Germany's,
insisted on awaiting the outcome of the French Assembly's ratification fight before moving to
ratify themselves (Zurcher 1958, p. 142). 59
Such fears were, in the event, unfounded. The National Assembly's ratification came
swiftly and easily in July 1957 by a vote of 341 to 235 (Council of Europe News, p.4).60 The
opponents consisted of around nineteen Mend6s-France Radicals, the Communites, the Poujadists,
and a number of Gaullist RPFers and Right wing Independents (NYT, July 10, 1957). Some of
the debate focused on the grand politics of European integration, as captured by Maurince Faure's
invocation: "Well, there are not four Great Powers, there are two; America and Russia. There will
be a third by the end of the century: China. It depends on you whether there will be a fourth:
Europe" (Camps 1964, p.88). But the concern that the Common Market would cause economic
dislocation among those less able to compete in a tariff-free customs union was the major focus of
the Parliament's discussions at all stages of the negotiating (ECSC Bulletin 1957, p. 1).
Throughout the development of the Beyen Plan negotiations -- in their Messina, Spaak
report, and post-Spaak permutations -- members of the French National Assembly kept close tabs
on the state of progress and made a variety of demands for safeguards and side payments. Like the
fight over the ECSC, moreover, they passed resolutions before and after the Treaty of Rome
pressing these demands. On January 22, 1957, for instance, the Assembly adopted a non-binding
59 For this reason, this section on ratification only discusses the French story. The other member countries ratified
the Treaties without incident, most acting after the French. The German Bundestag acted on July 6th, only four days
before the French Assembly, when passage by the latter seemed secured. The Bundesrat followed on July 19th. Here
are the other passage dates: Italian Nenni on July 30th (311-144); Belgium's Senate on November 28th (134-2);
Luxembourg's parliament (46-3); the Netherlands upper chamber on December 4th. See Zurcher 1958, p. 145.
6 On July 24th, the Council of the Republic also voted approval of the Treaties, 222-70. See Council of Europe
News 1957, p.4.
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resolution saying that the draft treaty of the EEC met "the essential interests of the French
economy" and would be acceptable, provided that the government, before signature, got a variety
of specific benefits that went beyond the existing draft. These included, among other things,
harmonization of social security payments and "a national investment policy designed to strengthen
and prepare France for participation in the common market" (quoted in Haas 1958, p.124). Such
resolutions and other actions, although non-binding, were designed to influence the international
deliberations by signaling Parliament's willingness to ratify existing Treaty provisions.
Unlike the ECSC ratification fight, however, the Assembly never attached any riders to its
passage of the liberalization, not a single policy that either watered down or called for side
payments on which French compliance with the international agreement was made conditional.
After passage of the Treaty of Rome, member countries continued the proliferating use of
industrial subsidies and other kinds of state aid to industry, aid that might be construed as side
payment compensation even though it didn't emerge from explicit struggle over the EEC
implementation or other deepening of the EC liberalization. State aids did help the victims of the
internal market liberalization, but the timing (before as well as after ECSC and EEC) and targeting
of these subsidies (to "national champions" not vulnerable to competition as well as to "lame
ducks"), the parallel growth of such subsidies in non-EEC countries, all suggest that their
motivations were distinct from that liberalization. And since the Treaty of Rome (Articles 92 and
93) mandated all countries to apply for and receive Commission approval for state aid roughly
above 100,000 ECU, much of this state aid which was not Commission-approved represents
protectionist exemption rather than side payment compensation.6'
This did not mean that the national-level parliamentary institutions were not involved in the
side payment politics of the EEC liberalization, it simply meant that their activity was no longer
focused on providing and demanding safeguards, revisions, exemptions, and side payments at the
national level. Instead, their activity, whether the resolutions were binding or non-binding, was
focused on influencing the international level of negotiations, and internationally-funded and
administered policies and actions that could be the subjects of exchange, including side payment
exchange. As Haas 1958 observed of the January 1957 non-binding resolution:
While supporting the principle of EEC, the French politicians nevertheless managed to link
with the agreement the special protective devices to which they remain attached: like the
Independent Republicans, they merely transferred them from the national to the European
level. (p.124, italics mine)
Haas made this statement as a small piece of evidence for his functionalist, spill-over perspective,
one mechanism of which was the creation of new capacities at the international level that gave
groups at both the domestic and international levels of policymaking incentives to further take
61 Chapter Seven will discuss the evolution of such state aids and the reasons most do not represent side payment
compensation.
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advantage or and expand supranationalism. For this study, it should be seen as a small piece of
evidence of how the existence of a supranational European institution capable of funding
adjustment assistance and providing other kinds of policy goods will tend to obviate the need, and
discourage domestic and international actors from agitating for side payments and other safeguards
at the national level. In other words, this is dynamic illustration of the "displacement effect" that
can account for some of the broad differences between the US and European patterns side payment
provision at the international-level and stage of liberalization vs. the national level and stage.
2.7. Implementing the ESF and Harmonization Side Payments
Before turning to explanation, a brief word on implementation of the EEC's two main
liberalization side payments is in order.62 The Social Fund was operational as of roughly 1962,
and enjoyed some notable successes in the 1960s (Petaccio 1971, p.250). It ended up being set up
along the lines of the ECSC re-adaptation fund, in its focus on financing job retraining and
resettlement projects, and in following the principle of additionality. Thus, the ESF mainly acted
"as a clearing house" through which reimbursemenlts were channeled by member governments to
public bodies which sponsored manpower retraining and resettlement projects (Ibid, p.2 5 1). And
the ESF monies covered 50 percent of the project costs and financing that national entities incurred
in their implementation.
Between 1960 and 1968, nearly one million people (959,258) received benefits from such
Social Fund activities. Of the total requested monies, 95 percent were approved by the
Commission, totaling more than $80 million in 1968 dollars (CEC 1969; cited in Petaccio 1971,
p.254). This means that more than $160 million were spent on retraining and resettlement
programs, co-funded and implemented at the national level. The largest applicant and recipient
country was Italy, receiving more than $27 million ESF funds to assist 543,347 workers in the
period. The next largest was Germany, with $22 million to assist 287,404 workers. France was a
close third in funding, $21 million, but a distant third in workers assisted, 109,090 (Ibid).
As early as 1965, however, the program was criticized for a several inadequacies, such as
problems in reimbursement procedures, sluggish distribution of payments, and poor coordination
between different manpower projects (Ibid., p.252ff.). These criticisms motivated the
Commission to propose and the Council of Ministers to enact a general reform in the ESF, among
other things de-emphasizing isolated projects in favor of more community-oriented programs.
62 Unlike the ECSC Readaptation Fund, the ESF has a history at the center of subsequent EU side payment politics.
Thus, it isn't necessary to provide an overview of its long-term implementation, through to the present, as was
appropriate for the ECSC Fund. Chapters Nine and Ten provide some of that later history.
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The harmonization mandates to benefit French producers, on the other hand, proved to be
less significant in actual policy outcomes -- though as we shall see in subsequent chapters, very
significant in future bargaining. The same French auto and other manufacturing industry groups
that had pushed successive French governments to push for upward-leveling harmonization to
compensate for tariff cuts did little subsequently to monitor and continue the harmonization. As
Milward 1992 points out, the Mollet-Adenauer agreement on how to deal with the harmonization as
compensation provided that French firms could petition for certain safeguards to be provided by
France or the High Authority if German overtime hours and rates were not "equalizing." But these
firms submitted no such petitions, opting instead to collaborate more closely, perhaps because of
EU incentives, with their fellow German and French producers, to regulate production and sales
(Milward 1992, p.2 16). In any event, the years following EEC's creation were major expansion
years for German industry, with union bargaining and political pressure leading to a substantial
sharing of the wealth in the form of increased wages and welfare benefits. How much this was
inspired by the EEC imperative to harmonize to appease France needs to be answered elsewhere.
Here the history suggests that the harmonization side payments may have played a role, though
given the changed focus of French industry groups the payments probably mattered less than
independent developments in German industrial relations.
3. Explaining ECSC and EEC Supra-national Compensated Liberalization
The first decade of European internal-market liberalization under the mantle of European
integration represented consistent and supra-national compensated liberalization. In both the ECSC
and EEC episodes, compensation emerged from the bargaining at the inter-governmental level,
with assistance to be overseen by supra-national institutions, whereas bargaining during domestic
phases of the episodes yielded little or no such compensation. Within this similarity between the
cases, however, were important differences between the ECSC and EEC, especially in the
substance of the compensation provided. The case histories of these chapters, thus, raise two
explanatory questions. How can we explain the contrast between supra-national compensation and
the virtual absence of domestic compensation shared by both cases? And how can we explain their
differences? We can answer both these questions by explaining the pattern of compensated
liberalization of each episode in turn.
3.1. Explaining ECSC Supranational Side Payments
The struggle over the ECSC revolved mainly around the unprecedented delegation of
sovereign competencies to the High Authority and other European-level institutions, trade
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liberalization at the center of the customs union also loomed large. To contend with the economic
and political dislocation such liberalization might cause, the bargaining over the ECSC
liberalization focused initially and unsuccessfully on some broader labor market harmonization,
under the mantle of "equalization of conditions." But ultimately it elicited a variety of less
ambitious safeguards and side payments, embodied in the Transitionary Provisions.
A variety of other conditions played a role in facilitating political support and sustainability
of the customs union liberalization, such as the strong and sustained post-war economic boom that
sustained demand for coal and, especially, steel, not to mention the exigencies of the Cold War.
But the details of the bargaining history suggest that the Transition Provisions mattered. As
Diebold 1959 points out, "if there had been no safeguards against dislocation, the Treaty would
have been less acceptable in the first place and would have generated more opposition as its effects
were felt" (p. 195). And for Belgium, in particular, they were crucial -- "at the center of Beglium's
acceptance" (Ibid., p.67-8).
In the short term, the transitionary subsidization schemes that constituted compensatory
exemption were by fa;: the largest and most important of the Transition Provisions. The
subsidization compensation was massive compared to the Readaptation Fund in the first several
years, with the latter not doing anything or spending a penny until the late 1950s. And during the
negotiations and most of the transition period, Belgian negotiators and interest groups, as well as
other vulnerable groups in France and Italy, focused more on subsidy compensation than on the
Readaptation Provisions. But whereas the subsidization schemes faded soon after the Transition
Period, the Readaptation Fund blossomed from a marginal and shaky program of co-funding
assistance, to a major and stable initiative that played an important role in compensating for and
politically facilitating the gradual removal of the subsidization. And it continues to play an
important role in facilitating adjustment in declining sectors like steel and coal, in the European
Union regions most vulnerable to creative destruction, helping to fund and administer a wide array
of provisions for dislocated workers and firms, including retraining and relocation.
Meanwhile, the ECSC case revealed tha: despite substantial domestic political ferment, and
some domestic-parliamentary activity during the international negotiations, there were virtually no
side payment promises made or provided at the national level of stage of liberalization. And in the
ratification phase of the domestic-parliamentary activity, only the French Assembly made promises
that represented anything akin to exeimption or side payments -- in the form of the Moselle Canal
commitment to manufacturing groups and their legislative champions. All of the other six member
countries negotiated and ratified the ECSC with plenty of domestic activity, but most of that was
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activity directed at the international-level proceedings and not a single payment or exemption
provided at the domestic level.63
What explains this contrast within the ECSC? The case history points to the role played by
the initial planners of the ECSC, Schuman and, especially, Monnet, who devised a customs union
proposal that from its earliest iterations included plans for safeguards and transitional delays --
including readaptation programs at the supra-national level. Such adjustment assistance reflected
some combination of Monnet's general dirigisme and anticipation of the political problems that
economic dislocation can pose to the customs union and integration projects.
But the history of the case's bargaining phases points to the role played by powerful and
insistent domestic-groups in Belgium and Italy, and to some extent in France, fearing the
dislocation of the customs union liberalization. These groups were strong enough and vocal
enough that their demands were felt by national-level legislators and executive-branch leaders who
directed their delegations to safeguard against the perceived threats. These demands, in turn,
ensured that the adjustment assistance provisions that may have been Monnet's flight of fancy,
became a serious and substantial part of the High Authority's competencies.
The platforms of various national interest groups, and more clearly those of their national
delegation representatives in the inter-governmental negotiations, were consistently and explicitly
focused on issues separate from the liberalization within the ECSC. For instance, Belgian
industrialists, labor, and government officials pressured their delegation to seek a variety of
harmonized labor market, and welfare standards, including subsidization of such standards to level
the playing field, to off-set the costs of the liberalization. With the exception of the Moselle canal
demands in France, however, the active groups involved in the domestic phases of negotiations
approached bargaining with substantially narrower platforms than did the national delegations
during the international phases of the negotiations.
These contrasting power-platform conditions, however, were grounded in the institutional
setting within which bargaining took place. 64 Since the ECSC was explicitly and contentiously
intended as the first step in broad economic and political integration, the groups came to the
bargaining table with the hope and expectation that a variety of issues would be part of the
coordinated activity -- along side, and indeed part of, the trade liberalization. The inter-
governmental discussions over ECSC, in short, involved broad jurisdictional breadth of the
negotiating arena, and this breadth in turn encouraged the national delegations and national interest
groups to approach supra-national phases of the episode with broader platforms. And whatever
63 Chapter Seven, again, discusses the proliferation of various state aids to industry that grew in the early post-war
period and grew and proliferated into the 1980s. See also discussion below on founding of the EEC.
6 The explanatory role of institutional conditions in this ECSC case preview the importance of institutional
conditions in fostering the broad pattern of side payment politics in the EC vs. US. See Chapter Seven, in
particular the discussion at the end of that chapter (Section 4), for further and more detailed discussion of what
explains the differences between the US and EC patterns of compensated liberalization.
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the stated platforms, the breadth fostered greater willingness to link protection with side deals.
This strongly encouraged side payment compensation during the inter-governmental deliberations,
with a focus on supra-national compensation. 65
Figure 6.1
Liberalizer-biased and Protectionist-biased Delegations
During Supra-national Phases of ECSC Episode Compared to
Liberalizer and Protectionist Coalitions in Domestic/National Phases
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At the same time, the ECSC High Authority obviously did not have significant preexistent
welfare provision, in contrast to the national-level political economies. This made the provision of
special welfare assistance at the supra-national level acceptable as well as relatively easy, whereas
at the national level the preexistent welfare states may have obviated the demand for special
assistance for the particular liberalization, and certainly implied that soecial assistance would clash
with the political necessity and normative goal of solidarism and equal treatment in the domestic
welfare state. The early resistance in Italy to use re-adaptation funding at all, out of concern that it
would inspire rumblings from non-coal and steel groups, shows the latter dynamic in action. And
it arose when the supra-national funding covered only half, not all of the costs of the relocation and
readjustment program Italy sought to implement.
65 The inter-governmental bargaining arena had other institutional characteristics that encouraged supra-national side
payments. That the ECSC was the beginning of a larger project also had the effect of lengthening the shadow of the
future and making the provision of the various safeguard provisions important to provide and implement in order to
retain continued political support for the broader economic and political integration. And the bargainers sought also
to set-up supranational policymaking capacities that made it easier for liberalizers in one country to buy-off
opposition in another. In addition to these advantages of the integration project, the negotiating arrangements in
Paris limited the number of actors who were engaged in the bargaining, allowing a clear and politically less-
compromised, exchange of information and ideas about potential issue linkages.
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Thus, the institutional characteristics of the national and supra-national settings encouraged
supra-national side payment compensation during the inter-governmental negotiations and
discouraged national compensation during domestic negotiations. This contrast in the national and
supra-national bargaining dynamics that underlay the ECSC liberalization can be roughly captured
in Edgeworth terms in Figure 6.1 above. The broad jurisdiction of the nascent integration project,
combined with the paucity of welfare at the supra-national setting, gave marginal countries
significant political influence in the inter-governmental deliberations and encouraged all the
negotiating delegations -- whether sympathetic with the liberalizer or protectionist camp -- to
approach the negotiations willing to trade-off liberalization and other benefits. This is reflected in
the relatively steep P(a) and relatively flat L(a) curves for the national delegations and groups
arrayed in the respective camps -- Belgian, French, and Italian delegations largely on the
protectionist side of the aisle, and the German and Benelux delegations largely on the liberalizer
side; and with sub-national groups broadly aligning themselves with either the protectionist or
liberalizer position, sometimes in contrast to the broad position taken by their national delegation.
The relatively broad jurisdiction but generous welfare provision characterizing the domestic
setting, however, combined with the displacement effect of providing supra-national compensation
underlie the tendency of the domestic-bargain partisans to approach with relatively narrower
platforms -- disinterested in welfare side payments and more focused on getting supplementary
assistance at the supra-national level.66 This can be captured by the relatively flat P(b) and
relatively steep-sloped L(b) -- and the resulting narrow zone of possible agreement that would
entail side payment compensation.
3.2. Explaining EEC Supranational Side Payments
In contrast to the ECSC Treaty of Paris, the founding of the EEC in the Second Treaty of
Rome was from the beginning most prominently a trade liberalization initiative, though it was also
explicitly and importantly seen as a vehicle for broader integration. And also in contrast to the
ECSC experience, the trade liberalization at the center of the EEC caused less concern about supra-
national oversight than it did about how the tariff reductions would lead to excessive and politically
unacceptable dislocation for workers and firms unable to compete in the low-tariff customs union.
A number of country delegations, pushed or backed by industrial and other interest groups in their
domestic polities, sought to negotiate a variety of exemptions, delays, revisions, and other
safeguards to limit or off-set the political and economic risks the Beyen plan tariff-cutting implied.
66 For a given country, the status-quo ante is the same, so the two different bargaining environments share the same
starting point.
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France was by far the most vocal and dominant among these, but Italy and Belgium, and even
Germany expressed the importance of safeguarding against excessive cost.
Most importantly, unlike the ECSC, the central political compromises resolving the
conflicts over EEC liberalization involved providing side payments. Granting exemptions from the
reach of the Beyen plan was important at various stages in the negotiations, such as the early and
almost consensual decision to exclude agriculture from the reach of the foreseeable tariff-cutting
phases. Revision of that plan at various stages was also important to the negotiated outcome, as
with the late and controversial decisions -- to appease France -- to make the move to the second
stage of tariff-cutting subject to unanimous decision in the Council of Ministers and to grant
customs union inclusion and assistance to France's African franc-zone trading partners. But
central to the resolution of the conflict between the groups most gung-ho about the liberalization --
Germany and the Benelux countries -- and those fearing its costs -- especially France, but also Italy
-- was the provision of grand issue linkage, supranational adjustment assistance, and
harmonization all of which constituted liberalization side payments.
The grand issue linkage was that between the Euratom and the EEC, with Germany and
Benelux demanding the EEC before accepting Euratom and with France negotiating on the EEC to
get the Euratom. Both issues were on the agend-, and it was clear that France would not negotiate
on the EEC, and might not have its Parliament pass any integration legislation, if the Euratom were
not part of the package -- even though the Euratom offered few benefits to those concerned about
the economic costs of liberalization. The existence of such grand issue linkage involving the major
powers, France and Germany, as well as the minor ones, conflicts with the expectation of some
EU scholars (e.g. Moravcsik 1993) who hypothesize that issue linkages across such conceptual
distance will tend to involve more marginal issues and more marginal states.
The founding of the European Social Fund was more relevant to the groups fearing
dislocation due to EEC trade liberalization (and more consistent with convention expectations
among EU scholars). It was an idea similar to the readaptation funds provided as part of the
ECSC, even though the ESF was to provide retraining and relocation benefits for workers, and no
benefits for firms. Like the ECSC Re-adaptation program, however, the ESF was consistently
kept in the package at the behest a country concerned about the effects of trade liberalization, in this
case Italy worried about its Mezzagiorno. The programmatic similarity became crisper as the ESF
was implemented according to similar principles of additionality and explicitly borrowed from the
ECSC fund experience in its implementation. As important as the ESF may have been in providing
benefits in the immediate aftermath of the EEC and well into the future, it was not a central part of
the core compromise between France and Germany that made the final Treaty possible.
That distinction went to the wage and social benefits harmonization that the French
managed to wrest from the German delegation, ultimately requiring the intervention of respective
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countries' heads of state. The harmonization entailed promises by member countries to upwardly
level wage laws and standards to French levels -- to establish equal pay laws, to increase overtime
and holiday pay, to compensate for disparities in working hours. Such harmonization represents a
side payment because it was offered not as the substance of liberalization, and not as a general
commitment to integration and common standards, but first and foremost as compensation for the
tariff-cutting French industry had to grudgingly endure. As a liberalization side payment, the
provision of such harmonization stands in contrast to the inability of the Belgian government and
delegation, with support of the French delegation, to extract parallel upward-leveling
harmonization in its fight to mitigate and compensate for the costs of the ECSC liberalization.
All of these side payments were supra-national side payments, negotiated at the
international level and to be provided supranationally. They stand in contrast to the absence of any
such side payments -- or for that matter other tactics for defusing political opposition such as
revision or exemption -- at the domestic level and stage. As with the ECSC, there was ample
involvement by domestic political actors and broad influence of domestic institutions, but this
activity was focused on influencing the exchanges and provisions at the international level.
Comparing the French ratification fight over ECSC with that over the EEC highlights that
difference: the provision of riders in the former and nothing in the latter.
What explains this pattern of provision and the contrasts with the ECSC? As with the
ECSC, the broad array of side payment provision is consistent with the institutional advantages of
EC policymaking, combined with meager supra-national welfare state development -- all in contrast
with substantial national-level welfare provision. In the EEC, in fact, there were greater and more
institutional advantages than there were with the ECSC negotiations. The maintenance of a forum
in which the delegations could exchange information freely about disparate issues was probably
important, as was the way the integration project increased the importance of fulfilling exchange
commitments, fulfilling a cohesion imperative, in order to maintain goodwill in subsequent
development of that integration. Similarly and also like the ECSC, the groups and countries
expecting to win the most from the liberalization were able to easily use proposed-supra-national
competencies to compensate the losers, even if they resided in other countries. Most important,
however, the Beyen plan liberalization was pursued in the context of the EC project of economic
and political union, by definition meaning that many more issues were on the negotiating table than
would customarily be the case in trade liberalization discussions. This factor, alone, is the key to
understanding the Euratom as a side payment. But it also applies to the ESF and harmonization,
with a common market and not a simple customs union being the long term goal.
With the provision of harmonization to compensate France for tariff cuts, this condition
was critical. Harmonization was a central and ambitious part of the long-term goal of economic
union, toward which the EEC was to head. Even before harmonization was being discussed as a
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possible side payment to buy off French opposition to the automaticity of tariff cuts, the country
delegations were interested in bringing it into the negotiating arena, either as part of the planning
conception of integration, or more minimally as the substance of liberalization. Such preexistence
made it easy for liberalizers and protectionists to seize on the upward-leveling as a way to buy off
opposition to tariff cutting, even when these motivations for harmonization had to be set aside.
And these motivations might have made some of the negotiating delegations more willing to use
harmonization as a side payment in the tariff-cutting discussions, if they thought it would make it
easier to inject harmonization as part of non-tariff barrier cutting or as planning integration in
subsequent development of the EC.
The advantages the EC institutions offered to the possibilities of providing side payments
through issue linkage also help explain why the liberalization side payments were provided at the
international and not the national level of policy provision and stage of negotiation. As with the
ECSC case, the disparity between EC-level welfare provision and national welfare provision was
still massive -- especially and most obviously since the ECSC readaptation fund was not even to
apply to dislocation in other sectors of the new customs union. And the national-level provision
may still have obviated the need for and increased the political risks of providing special welfare
assistance to the victims of the EEC, rather than the victims of technological innovation or some
other economic disturbance.
Thus, the main factors that explain the scale of supranational compensation and the
absence, or virtual absence, of national/domestic compensation is the coincidence of broad
jurisdiction and modest welfare provision at the supranational level, and broad jurisdiction and
generous welfare provision at the national level.67
Beyond these broad conditions, the power conditions and, to some extent, the transaction
cost conditions were more favorable for the provision of liberalization side payments in the EEC
case than in the ECSC case. France was much more powerful a player than was Belgium, the
principal champion of safeguards in the ECSC fight. And the French parliament's recent rejection
of the EDC made strengthened its demands at the bargaining table by making France's claim that
special treatment of a variety of forms was necessary to secure ratification a credible one --- in the
ways now familiar to students of two-level games. Unlike the ECSC, moreover, the integration
project entailed more issues in the fight for EEC -- political integration, the atomic energy
provision, more serious discussion of harmonization of macro- and micro-economic policies, etc. -
- than was true in the fight for ECSC. These differences were particularly important for the
provision of the Euratom and the upward-leveling harmonization in the EEC case, and the absence
of such grand issue linkage or harmonization in the ECSC case.
67 Again, see Chapter Seven, in particular the discussion at the end of that chapter (Section 4), for further and more
detailed discussion of the explanation.
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Figure 6.2
Liberalizer-biased and Protectionist-biased Delegations
During Supra-national Phases of EEC Episode Compared to
Liberalizer and Protectionist Coalitions in Domestic/National Phases
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Figure 6.2 graphically captures the way the institutional conditions, especially jurisdictional
breadth and welfare provision, encouraged supra-national compensation and discouraged national
compensation. The broader jurisdiction of the EEC compared to the ECSC arena supported more
linkable issues, and greater opportunities and greater willingness to trade lower protection for some
kind of side payment provision -- hence the flatter L(a) and steeper P(a) than L(b) and P(b)
respectively. Through displacement and the existence of relatively more generous welfare
provision, however, the national bargain was still likely to be more constrained -- hence a repeat of
the pattern in Figure 6.1 for the ECSC of relatively steeper L(c) and flatter P(c).
4. Conclusion: The Legacies of Supra-national Adjustment Assistance and Harmonization for
Future Internal Market Liberalization
The side payment politics of the ECSC and EEC compensated liberalization had important
implications for the future side payment politics of the European Union. Two deserve mention by
way of conclusion. The first is that the implementation and provision of side payments provided in
the ECSC and the EEC affected the propensity to provide similar such side payments in subsequent
rounds of EC internal market liberalization, just as the provision and implementation of the US
trade adjustment assistance program affected future provision of such assistance and of side
payments generally in US trade policymaking. In the development of the internal market,
however, the legacy was more benign than that of the US TAA. This was particularly true of the
two supra-national adjustment assistance programs created, the ECSC Re-adaptation fund and the
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EEC European Social Fund. Although both of these programs had slow starts in their
implementation, they won some significant successes in at least mitigating some of the pain of
liberalization, and in some case also played a significant role in promoting and facilitating actual
adjustment to new areas of economic activity. These successes made the future expansion and
provision of new adjustment assistance programs as the internal market developed more attractive,
as we shall see in the next chapter.
The provision of the harmonization as compensated to off-set the pain of tariff
liberalization, however, has a more mixed legacy. Some commentators writing at the time of the
EEC's and noting France's ability to wrest from the other delegations a significant commitment to
upwardly harmonize wage policies, expected that future negotiations towards European Union
would elicit more extensive and more common demands for harmonization as part of the
integration project. Haas 1958, for instance, conjectured that the industries who pushed the
French negotiating team to demand the wage policy harmonization would likely move on to new
issues, again as part of his functionalist spillover expectation: "The compromise on the question of
social charges will induce French industry to accept the common market as it accepted ECSC. In
the process, however, it will demand that Germany grant equalisation of taxes and employers'
contributions as proof of its 'faith in Europe,'..." (p. 192). As it turned out, such harmonization
didn't become as central a part of the subsequent development of the European Union. It did not
continue to be a subject of side payment linkage, as Chapter Nine describes and explains. And it
did not become a commonly pursued goal unto itself or a subject of trade liberalization, especially
after the Single European Act's decision to follow the principle of mutual recognition rather than
harmonization as the route to dealing with most non-tariff barriers. Why this was so is beyond the
scope of this study, let alone this chapter.
It is worth pointing out now, however, that the tariff and quota liberalization project at the
center of most European Community activity for its first two decades represented the period when
upward-leveling harmonization of social provision and other conditions had the best chances of
becoming a part of the EU integration project. During these years, harmonization had a variety of
motivations, including harmonization as the substance of trade liberalization and as a way of
integrating into a common market, a social capitalism. But it also was and could be motivated by
its usefulness as a simple side payment bargaining tool -- to compensate for the costs of tariff and
quota liberalization, liberalization of policy protections distinct from the social provisions that
might be harmonized. As a bargaining tool, a buy-off device, harmonization had stronger political
chances of becoming a part of the integration agreements -- particularly biased toward the
economies with more generous social welfare conditions, since they are likely to be the countries
that will use such conditions as an excuse for higher tariff and non-tariff barriers. As the next
Chapter shows and explains, however, this was not to be.
481
Burgoon

Chapter Seven:
Structural Fund Side Payments from the Enlargements
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Chapter Seven
The 35 years since the EEC's founding has seen on-again, off-again growth in the breadth
and depth of economic, political and security community. As the community has grown from six
to nine, and then from nine to twelve, the focus of integration activity has in the last ten years
increasingly shifted from trade liberalization towards monetary union, and political and defense
community. But that shift reflects the remarkable successes in internal market trade liberalization.
In fact, up until the 1990s, much of the integration story after 1958 -- from the enlargements to the
Single European Act -- was still a story of trade liberalization.
As with the founding of the ECSC and EEC, it has also been a story of compensated
liberalization. Every major agreement to lower tariff and non-tariff barriers has been accompanied
by continued use and expansion of the supra-national adjustment assistance programs created in
1951 and 1958, and by the creation and expansion of regional assistance programs set up in major
part to off-set the risks of the liberalization. Collectively, these supra-national funds and programs
are referred to as the "structural funds." The Structural Funds include (1) the European Social
Fund (ESF), to assist displaced workers in the EEC; (2) the European Regional Development Fund
(ERDF), to address regional disparities and founded in 1975 through extended negotiations over
Britain's 1973 accession; (3) the "Guidance" Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and
Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), to assist firm and worker adjustment as part of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP); and since 1991 (4) the Cohesion Fund, devoted to funding large-scale
environmental and transportation/infrastructure projects.' Each of the EC liberalization episodes
since 1958 has yielded some substantial use or expansion of one or all of these structural funds as
liberalization side payments, increasingly the only subject of such compensation.
As with the ECSC and EEC compensated liberalization, this compensation was supra-
national in its negotiation and provision, and contrasts with the lack of such liberalization side
payments both at the national, especially ratification, stage of the liberalization, and at the national-
level of public policy provision. The domestic disputes about joining or accepting new members
into the customs union and about lowering trade protection among existing EC members have
yielded continuous threat to the scope and character of the liberalization, but has done so almost
exclusively at the international level and stage, rather than the national level and stage. And at the
latter, the struggles yielded few if any liberalization side payments -- even if we consider the use of
state aids to industry and agriculture throughout the development of the internal market.
This Chapter finishes the story of Europe's internal market compensated liberalization, via
supra-national structural funds rather than domestic side payment compensation. The core
The structural funds support a variety of programs that should be seen as extensions of the funds, including the
Integrated Mediterranean Programs (IMPs), created through negotiations over the second, Iberian Enlargement, and
discussed in detail in Section 2 of this Chapter. The ECSC Re-adaptation fund, though providing funding and
benefits for labor marekt programs that are identical to the ESF funds, are usually treated separately -- conceptually,
politically and administratively -- from the structural funds.
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explanatory puzzle of the chapter remains that of the entire Part Three, namely what accounts for
the consistent supra-national side payment provision, in contrast with the absence of such
provision at the national level aod stage, and with the modesty and shakiness of US compensated
liberalization? A more complete answer to that question than provided in Chapter Six is now
possible through this chapter's history of the rest of EC internal market liberalization.
But the post-1958 history of EC internal market compensated liberalization raises a couple
of other, somewhat puzzling, empirical patterns that also deserve explanation. The first is that the
structural funds became increasingly the prime subject of side payment compensation during the
internal market trade liberalization -- and, in fact, continues to be the prime subject with monetary
union and other major initiatives at the center of the integration project -- whereas other kinds of
linkage became less so. Beyond explaining "why structural funds and not someLhing eL,-_?," the
history needs to explain why those subjects provided in the past became eclipsed by structural
funds. Most important of the former is the harmonization of government and industrial relations
practices as compensation to off-set the risks of liberalization of other protections -- as France had
successfully demanded in the creation of the EEC. Although Haas 1958 and many others
speculated thai harmonization would become more common and intractable in EC negotiations --
whether or not as part of side payment linkage -- successive episodes of EC liberalization included
little policy harmonization. Not only was harmonization no longer made the subject of side
payment linkage to compensate for liberalization of other protections, it was also dropped as the
main mechanism, or substance, of non-tariff barrier liberalization, in favor of mutual recognition.
This chapter tries to explain this trend, in contrast to the side payment rise of the structural funds.
Second, the history also exhibits significant increases in the generosity and ambition of the
structural fund side payment compensated. In the first enlargement, for instance, there was
provision of existing ESF and EAGGF relief to the new entrants as compensation for the risks of
the EC liberalization, but there was no creation of a new policy of assistance or of any other side
payment to address liberalization risks. The significant creation of the ERDF during that episode
was certainly a side payment, but not to compensate for liberalization. The second enlargement,
however, not only provided for provision of assistance under the existing structural fund
programs, but also called for substantial new provisions and funding for new entrants and for the
status-qua EC members having to "absorb" those new entrants. And finally, the establishment of
the Single European Act and the Delors I Package linked to that Act called for and provided the
most substantial liberalization side payment package of all the cases, through the doubling and
restructuring of the structural funds.
Finally, the last case of compensated liberalization, SEA-Structural Fund Reform, began a
trend that has persisted in EC policy-making since: the fund side payments were promised in very
general language at the time the agreement was internationally agreed-upon, but were not devised,
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funded or implemented until years later. During the interim there were pressures to
opportunistically leave such promises unfulfilled, since liberalization had already been initiated
and, in many cases, ratified. Yet the liberalizers agreed to fulfill the side payment promises already
made. The acceptance and fulfillment of such a side payment well after and in a separate policy-
making decision from the liberalization initiative stands in contrast to the US history, such as the
Nixon-Schultz side payment package offered to and rejected by organized labor in the 1974 Trade
Reform Act -- discussed in Chapter Four. It also contrasts with previous EC history, in which the
consistent side payment compensation was consummated at the time of the liberalization episode.
What explains all these contrasts -- consistent and more generous supranational side payment
compensation in contrast to national level and stage of liberalization; the narrowing focus on
structural funds, and the increasing generosity and patience of those funds as side payments?
This Chapter's answer draws on and illustrates the theory of compensated liberalization and
its focus on institutions and group power and platforms. In the penultimate section, moreover, the
Chapter competes the propositions derived from the literature on EC policy-making explicitly
focused on side payment politics against those derived from the theory of compensated
liberalization. Much more than the attention given the side payment politics in the ECSC and the
EEC, the literature on the European Community and on side payments generally has directed
substantial attention on the development of the structural funds as side payments for states or
groups expecting to suffer from the integration process, especially moves to the internal market.
That literature provides a number of useful insights that can help explain the various patterns of
compensated liberalization in the post-EEC internal market. But the Chapter in general, and
Section Four in particular, tries to show how and why the theory of compensated liberalization
explains more and more completely the post-EEC side payment developments.
The Chapter makes this case through its account of the three main cases of internal market
liberalization since 1958, divided into four sections. The first is the Second Enlargement cases, the
enlargement to include Greece in 1981, and the Iberian enlargement to include Portugal and Spain
in 1985. The second and most section focuses on the linked negotiations over the Single European
Act in 1986 and the 1988 Structural Funds reform, the former being the ambitious initiative to
remove all remaining non-tariff and tariff barriers to internal market trade by the end of 1992. The
SEA receives the most attention, mainly because its side payment politics were more complicated
and important. 2 Following the case studies is a brief section on the development and use of state
aids during development of the EU. Here the focus is on why such aids provided assistance to the
losers of liberalization but were generally not side payment compensation. The fourth section
2 But also because the enlargement case studies rely almost wholly on secondary sources, which are also less
developed than those on the SEA; 1nd because the availability of primary source information on the latter is better,
or at least more readily available, than that on the enlargements.
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develops an explanation of the internal market developments, and of the contrast between EC and
US compensated liberalization. A fifth section briefly concludes.
1. The Second Enlargement: Compensated Liberalization via Integrated Mediterranean Programs
In June 1975, the same month that the British public voted to confirm Britain's continued
participation in the Common Market, the Greek government submitted its application to join the
European Economic Community. Within two years the governments for Portugal, in March 1977,
and for Spain, in July 1977, followed suit. For the polities of all three applicant countries, the
motivations to join the Community were as politically grand as those for Germany and France to
begin the ECSC and EEC. All three applicant countries had recently emerged from the yoke
authoritarian rule, had embarked on ambitious plans for political and economic modernization, and
saw the EEC and the European community project writ-large as a way to announce, anchor, and
consolidate this transformation.
But as with the EEC and ECSC, the main vehicle for such heady transformative objectives
was joining the EEC customs union, at core nothing more or less than thorough-going trade
liberalization. Prior to application, all three countries had established trade agreements with the
EEC Nine that had already established, albeit to varying degrees, trade liberalization. Greece and
Portugal, in fact, nominally had industrial free trade with the EEC. though there were important
exceptions involving sensitive industries in all countries involved. But substantial tariff, quota and
other non-tariff barriers remained to trade between the EEC Nine and all three applicant countries,
and all three countries in any event remained completely outside the highly regulated Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP). The entry into full European Community membership meant an
elimination of many of these barriers and incorporation into the CAP arrangements -- all of which
constituted trade liberalization more dramatic than the earlier agreements had established.
Much more than the First Enlargement of the EEC, this liberalization was expected to
impose major uneven distributional consequences on both the EEC Nine and on the applicant
countries -- consequences that fueled sharp controversy within and among the applicant and
member countries. That Greek and Iberian accession would do so was obvious to everyone and
was fore-ordained by the most aggregate of statistics. The three applicant countries, for instance,
had per capita incomes well below the EC average, despite rapid industrialization that narrowed the
gap. 3 And the combined populations of the new entrants would raise the EEC population from 260
million to 320 million (Deubner 1980, p.230; Hine 1985, p.146). This combination of being poor
3 In 1978, Deubner 1980 reports, here was the per capita GDP of the three, compared to the other EC nine (in
U.S.$1,000): Greece (2.8), Portugal (1.7), Spain (3.1), Denmark (9.0), Germany (8.4), Belgium (8.1), Netherlands
(7.7), France (7.2), U.K. (4.4), Italy (3.5), and Ireland (2.9) (p.230, fn.3).
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and populous meant that substantial trade opening was destined to pose problems. As it turned
out, the liberalization posed more problems for agriculture than for industry, but the liberalization
provoked widely recognized and serious adjustment risks in a number of applicant and EC Nine
countries in both sectors.
Deciding how to deal with these risks were at the center of all three accession negotiations,
and to the sustainability of Greece's participation in the EEC. The resulting accession agreements
for all three countries entailed a variety of safeguards, transitional delays, and exemptions, but also
reform of established adjustment assistance and regional assistance provisions as well as the
creation of new provisions -- targeted more generously at the EC Nine members and Greece rather
than at the Iberian applicants. The adjustment and regional assistance represented substantial
liberalization side payments -- significantly more generous and substantial than those provided
during the First Enlargement. Also more than the First Enlargement, these liberalization side
payments were central to Greece's sustained membership in the EEC customs union, and to the
acceptance of the Iberian enlargement.
The question for this section, of course, is, why were significant liberalization side
payments provided to the entrants and the EC members, why was the assistance more generous
towards the latter (plus Greece), all in contrast to the absence of side payments at the domestic
level? The answers lie in the inter-twined side payment politics of all three applicant-country
negotiations, and in the conditions affecting protector-power and transaction costs underlying those
politics. Since Greece's negotiations took place and were initially resolved two years before the
Iberian accession, the history of those politics begins with Greece.
1.1. Greece: Modest Compensated Liberalization, Followed by Demands for More
Greek accession to the EEC was initially an un-controversial and uncomplicated affair.
Having recently emerged from the authoritarian interregnum under the Junta of Colonels who had
taken power in April 1967, the Greek government leadership was strongly interested in EEC
membership. Most interested, perhaps, was the leader first to replace the Junta in 1974 -- the
Greek Prime Minister and, after May 1980, President, Karamanlis. Karamanlis was active in
lobbying his own government for Greek application and acceptance to the Community and, after
the formal application for membership in 1975, was equally active in lobbying the EEC Nine, then
'Ten, in Brussels (Arter 1993, p.193). Given the recent political history, the EEC Nine were hard-
pressed to accept the application (Ibid., Hine 1985, p. 148).
They were all the more so since Greek-EEC relations had long been developing towards
Greek membership in the Community, under its apprenticeship status following signing of the
Association Agreement in 1961. Through this Agreement, Greece and the EEC members had
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accepted considerable trade liberalizatior , vith the Greek government agreeing to cut its tariffs on
EEC imports in half, while the EEC granted Greek manufactures duty-free access to the EEC
market. The Agreement also called for associated membership into other EEC institutions,
including agricultural policy harmonization and trade, though this harmonization was never really
achieved (Hine 1985, p.147). Thus, when domestic and international negotiations over the Greek
application for entry commenced, the trade liberalization process was already well underway.
There was, however, considerable trade liberalization implicit in the EEC membership, via
continued tariff-lowering and new quota elimination by Greece, and via full entry into the CAP by
the EEC. Moreover, Greek trade barriers toward third countries were higher on average than the
Common Customs Tariff (CCT) levels that it would have to accept upon accession.
And this trade liberalization posed modest adjustment problems for some segments of
Greek industry and for a few segments of EEC agriculture. The Greek industries most likely to
suffer from the new EEC competition were transport equipment, electrical and mechanical
engineering industries (Hine 1985, p. 151; Tsoukalis 1981, p. 100). On the other hand, Greek
agricultural producers were very competitive in some foodstuffs, especially peaches and tomatoes,
and these products were expected to threaten EEC producers. Beyond these particular worries,
however, both the EEC and especially the Greek government and industry worried about the broad
need for structural reform in the Greek economy. After a considerable boom during the 1950s, the
economy had slowed during the Junta years, with rising unemployment, inflation, and defense
expenditures, and with very little investment, especially in productivity-enhancing product or
production processes (most was in "property") (Arter 1993, p. 194). And much of the industrial
sector comprised small and medium-sized enterprises with low productivity and little investment or
expansion capital (Hine 1985, p.147; Arter 1993, p.194).
With these expected distributional consequences, the Greek delegation sought a variety of
safeguards to promote such adjustment and to help the vulnerable industries in the transition. The
EEC countries, meanwhile, were basically un-threatened by the accession, with the modest
exception of the tomato and pea-h segments of agriculture. As a result, negotiations over
accession were uneventful, and on January 1, 1981, the Treaty of Accession had been signed to
grant Greece full EEC membership -- with an agreement that reflected the respective concerns.
.1.1.1. Greece's Initial Accession Agreement: Meager Side Payment Compensation
The resulting accession agreement called for considerable trade liberalization beyond that
already accepted as part of the Association Agreement. Greece was to conform to the guidelines of
full EEC membership, including the following: abolish its remaining customs duties on EEC
goods; align its external tariffs with the Common Customs Tariff (CCT); participate in the EEC's
Generalized Scheme of Preferences; end its import deposit scheme; and remove quotas on EEC
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imports. The EEC, for its part, agreea to "eliminate its few remaining tariffs on Greek steel
exports ... and to extend the CAP to Greek agriculture" (Hine 1985, p. 147).
To safeguard against excessive dislocation and to take account of Greece's various
industrial and agricultural adjustment problems, the accession agreement also called for a number
of safeguards. Most importantly, the trade liberalization that both Greece and the member
countries were to absorb was to be phased in over a transition period. Greece's quotas were to be
eliminated immediately, but its import deposit scheme was to be phased out over three years, by
1984, and its tariff reductions were to be phased in over five years, by 1986. The five year
transition period, apparently, simply built on the precedent set by the First Enlargement's free trade
transition period. The EEC, meanwhile, would phase in reductions of its steel tariffs by the end of
the same five year transition period, as would most of the agricultural trade under CAP. In
tomatoes and peaches, however, the EEC producers would have a longer transition period to
adjust: seven rather than five years (Hine 1985, p.48-9; Tsoukalis 1981, p. 101).
In addition to the transition delays, Greece was also to be granted adjustment assistance and
regional development assistance under the various structural funds, including the "Guidance"
section of the EAGGF, the ERDF and the ESF (Hine 1985, p. 148). Since these funds were not
part of the provisions being liberalized -- the Guarantee section of the EAGGF, being the most
contentious part of the CAP, was a part of the liberalization -- and since they were directed at
redressing some of the general adjustment problems Greece would face in its entry to EEC customs
union, they represent liberalization side payments. The amount of money was uncertain, but
together with the European Budget funds that Greece was to receive through the EAGGF
Guarantee section, the new member was to become a net recipient of funds from the European
Budget, to the tune of 120 million in 1981, 600 million ECU in 1982, and an anticipated 800
million ECU in 1983 (1985 ECU) (Ibid).
In the ratification fight, the Greek parties were bitterly divided, but Karamanlis's New
Democracy party secured approval without having to resort to rider promises and legislation,
althorgh he did make general predictions and commitments. The Socialist Party (PASOK), under
Andreas Papandreou was the main opposition to the pro-Europe New Democracy Party; it had
gained 25 percent of the vote in 1977 (Arter 1993, p.194). PASOK was joined by the Communist
party opposing the Treaty of Accession as well as Greece's participation in NATO, which Greece
had joined in 1952. When Karamanlis sought ratification of the Treaty of Accession in June 1979,
both PASOK and the Communists boycotted the parliamentary vote. This, of course, considerably
eased the procedural ratification. And it obviated the need or demand for rider legislation. Still,
Karamanlis acknowledged the need for structural adjustment to deal with the new membership, and
claimed "that considerable effort would be necessary to modernize Greek industry, overhaul a
relatively inefficient agricultural sector and transform public and private administration..." (Arter
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1993, p.194). This was as close as the parliamentary divide came to eliciting safeguards or side
payments at the national level.
1.1.2. Trouble Inspires Proposals for the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes
It was only after Greece's accession to EEC membership in 1981, however, that the real
political problems arose. In October 1981, PASOK unexpectedly won a majority at the polls,
bringing a new anti-EC government into power. The new Prime Minister Popandreau demanded
re-negotiation of Greece's terms of entry to the Community, and threatened to hold a referendum
on membership altogether. Before Popandreau acted on this threat, his government broke EEC
rules, and restricted trade through "a general control of agricultural imports, especially of livestock
products" (Commission of the European Communities4 1983a, p.24; in Hine 1985, p.148).
The threats of departure from the EEC and the derogation of customs union rules was
accompanied on March 19, 1982, by a slightly more conciliatory Greek government memo
claiming that EEC membership was making economic growth, recovery, and adjustment more
difficult, and calling "for a special effort of solidarity from the side of its new partners" (De Witte,
p.20). In particular, the memo asked the other EEC members to grant "increased financial aid and
a temporary derogation for Greece from Community competition rules (e.g. on state aids,
including export aids for small and medium sized firms)(CEC1982,p.90;quoted inHine'85,p. 148).
The European Commission argued that a solution "could be achieved within the framework
of EEC rules," and released within a year a series of proposals designed to address Greece's
various adjustment problems through further structural fund assistance, and through the creation of
a new cluster of regional assistance policies called Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs).
The former were outlined in a set of proposals in a March 29, 1983 Commission Report Greece in
the Community: Assessment and Proposals (CEC 1983b). The report acknowledged the "severe
difficulties faced by Greece" but also pointed out that many were endemic to Greece's raeent
political economic history, not to EC membership, and also pointed out that some of the problems
were caused by the general economic crisis to which all EC members had to adjust. Having stated
this, however, the report called for immediate action through existing structural fund assistance to
help Greece, including aid for irrigation and other infrastructural projects.
The Integrated Mediterranean Programmes proposal, on the other hand, called for more
long-term adjustment assistance. The IMP ideas had been long part of the Commission's reform
of existing regional policies, and was informed by the same ideas about integration and about
programmatic rather than ad hoc regional assistance that was soon to drive the 1984 ERDF
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reform.5 These proposals were give new or accelerated force, however, when Greece tabled its
thinly-veiled threats to pull out of or violate the EEC customs union unless further assistance could
be provided by the Cornmission.
Thus, on March 23, 1983, almost a weeK before releasing its specifically Greek assistance,
the Commission released proposals for the Integrated Mediterranean Programs (CEC 1983a). The
IMPs would "implement in a coordinated way over a limited period of seven years Community
ac..lons to facilitate the structural adjustment" of the Mediterranean regions of the Community
(Yannopoulos 1989, p.289). The particular programs were to include a wide anay of activities,
including human resource development, relocation and cessation of production, rationalization
investment, and other measures to assist agricultural, forestry, fishery industries, as well as
general infrastnrctural and labor market conditions in the EEC. And they were to be funded out of
a variety of sources, including the European Investment Bank and the existing structural funds, as
well as new budgetary allocations. Making special mention of the Greek situation, the report
forecast that the IMP assistance would cost the European Budget of 2542 million ECU,
substantially more than the original net benefits to envisaged at the time of Greece's original
accession (CEC 1983b; quoted in Hine 1985, p.148).
If the IMP proposals had been passed as proposed by the Council of Ministers, it would
have represented a liberalization side payment to compensate Greece for its EEC customs union
adjustment. By then, however, the Council's attention was focused on handling the Spanish and
Portuguese applications for EEC membership. That may have prevented them from taking fast
action on the IMP on Greece's behalf, but it ultimately fue!ed turther support for the IMP
proposals as compensation for the substantial dislocation to some French, Italian, and Greek
agricultural producers expected to suffei from the Iberian Enlargement. As a result, the IMP's
were rapidly being caught up in political struggles that had them double-timing as side payment
compensation for Greece's new membership adjustments, and as side payment compensation for
Greece, together with France and Italy, for the adjustment costs of Iberian accession.
1.2. Iberian Enlargement: Compensated Liberalization for Status-quo and Applicant Countries
Unlike Greece's accession politics, the Iberian enlargement sparked sharp distributional
conflict from the start. The broad political and economic circumstances of the Spanish and
Portuguese applications were similar to Greece's in that all the Iberian countries were also recently
emerging from authoritarian rule and undergoing substantial economic transformation. In fact, the
5 The idea of "progra-mme" rather than "project" was introduced in the 1984 Regulation in Article 7 as "series of
consistent multiannual measures directly serving Community objectives and the implementation of Community
policies" (quoted in De Witte, p.12). The idea of "integrated" services was proposed under Article 34 of the ERDF
reform: "investments and measures...which form part of an integrated development approach, for example, in the
form of integrated operations or programmes, may be accorded a priority treatment" (quoted in De Witte, p. 14-5).
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transformations for Portugal and Spain were more dramatic than for Greece, given the more
sustained, economically-closed and autarchic governance under Spain's Franco, and Portugal's
Salazar and Caetano. As with the Greek application, most observers were certain that the EEC
wouli have to arcept the Iberian membership, at least in some form. But unlike Greece, the
Iberian enlargement threatened much more substantial economic dislocation for both the EC Nine
and the applicants, by virtue of the degree of liberalization membership would entail and the
industrial and agricultural profile of the applicants -- especially Spain.
Before Spain and Portugal joined Greece in lodging respective applications for EC
membership, they too had entered into trade liberalization arrangements with the Community.
Along with its fellow EFTA states, Portugal had signed an industrial free-trade agreement with the
Community in 1972, with the result that by July 1977 Portuguese industrial exports enjoyed free
access to the Community, except for a few products that were particularly "sensitive" in the EEC,
such as textiles and steel (Arter 1993, pp.192-3). And the Portuguese, for their part, allowed
virtually free access to the industrial imports from the EEC. Although not part of the EFTA
countries and having eschewed a proposal from the Community for an EFTA-like industrial free
trade agreement, Spain in 1970 had signed a preferential trade agreement wi'h the EC Six, resulting
in a 25 percent reduction in Spanish tariffs on EC products and a 60 percent reduction in
Community tariffs on Spanish industria' products. At least in industrial products, therefore,
liberali7ation was already well afoot.
Unlike the Greek accession, however, the Iberian accession promised more substantial
trade liberalization, particularly for Spanish-EC trade. Although the 1970 agreement had eased
trade substantially, the EEC's industrial tariffs on Spanish products were still almost half of the
Common External Tariff, averaging beiween 3-4 percent as average nominal customs duties (Hine
1989, p.8). Spanish tariffs on EC products were even higher despite its 25 percent cuts in 1970,
with some tariffs as high as 23 percent as average customs duties, and the average duties being
above 10 percent (Ibid). For Spain, the adjustment to the EEC membership was to be exacerbated
by the fact that its tariffs on industrial products from third countries was substantially higher than
the EEC Common Customs Tariff, with the former averaging around 17 percent and the iatter
averaging around 6 percent (Ibid). In part because of the tradition of such protection hampering
Spanish trade, Spain was by far the least open to industrial trade of any EC member. 6 Spanish
accession was expected to require elimination of all trade barriers between the Iberiwi and EC
countries, constituting an absolute drop of more than 10 percent of nominal customs duties on
Spanish imports from both the EC and third countries (Jbid, p.8). Both Spain and Portugal,
" In 1986, v el' after accession, Spanish imports of mar 'ifactured goods for that year were only 11 per.ent of Spain's
GDP, Italy's 14.4 percent being the next lowest. On expurts, Spain exported an equivalent of 10.9 percent of GDP
compared with the EC average of 21.7 percent (Hine 1989, p.7).
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meanwhile, had been fully excluded from the CAP, and had never even nominally negotiated some
incorporation -- as had Greece.
In turn, the liberalization of these remaining barriers to EC-Iberian industrial trade znd of
full incorporation into the CAP promised substantial dislocation for both EC member states and for
the Iberian applicants. Agricultural liberaiization was expected to cause the biggest problems, but
industria: trade also threatened major risks. Again, the major problem in both industry and
agriculture was Spanish accession.
Lowered barriers to trade in industrial products was expected to pose serious problems for
both the EC and Spain because, unlike Greece and Portugal, Spain was a large producer in a
number of industries that competed directly with EC producers. Spain was particularly worried
about electrical appliances, industrial and agricultural machinery, office equlpment and chemical
products (Tsoukalis 1981, p. 100). But they also faced new and substantial competition from
Portugal's low-cost textile and clothing products (Hine 1989, p.13; Ashoff 1980, pp.300-2). The
EEC members, for their part, were concerned that Spain's industrial strength lay principally in old,
labor-intensive industries that were already in decline in the EC -- including textiles, shoes, ship-
building and steel (Eussner 1983, passim). Spanish accession would exacerbate the EEC
industries' already arduous adjustment challenges (Bienefeld 1982, pp. 109-111: Hine 1989, p. 12-
3; Eussner 1983). On the whole, however, Spain's worries on industrial competition from the EC
was greater than EC worries about Spanish industriai competition.
The opposite pattern of dislocation nsk applied to the prospect of increased EC-Iberian
agricultural trade. The large proportion of the Spanish population was still engaged in agriculture,
roughly 17 percent overall and substantially higher than that in some regions (Ritson 1982, p.92;
Hine 1989, p. 16). The country's agricultural output, moreover, represented about 16.5 percent of
the ',C Ten's (including Greece) total agricultural output (Ritson 1982, p.92). This production
was in products that competed with those produced in the EC's Mediterranean zore, concentrated
in Italy, Southern France, and Greece. In general, the competition posed by the Spanish accession
threatened to dislocate small producers in these regions, which had few economic alternatives that
could absorb the adjustment. But the CAP operated differently depending on the particular
product, and this affected the particular adjustment problem that Iberian accession posed to both the
applicant and member populations.
Iberian inclusioli into the CAP posed two kinds of problems for EEC Ten members,
economic dislocation and budget problems. Fruits and vegetabies was one area that the Spanish
agricultural producers were particularly strong, and this was the area likely to pose the most
dislocation among the EC Ten. Since these are perishable products, the EC CAP was generally set
at a relatively low, close-to-market-clearing, price, since the EC would have to pay for and destroy
most of what didn't cltar. Instead, the CAP system prior to Iberlad accession protected the EC
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price mainly by imposing customs duties and reference prices at the border. Removing such
prctections, in turn, meant that low-cost Spanish producers would no longer have to observe the
reference prices, would be free to enter the EC market, and would significantly depress the EC
price -- thereby displacing meny producers in Southern France, Italy and Greece, "as well as those
producing under glass in the Netherlands and elsewhere" (Hine 1989, p. 16-7).
Other agricultural products like wine and olive oil, meanwhile, posed a budgetary problem
for the EEC Ten. Wine, olive oil, and other less perishable products were supported under the
CAP through price supports more than through border controls. Prices on these products had been
set at a high rate through the "guarantee section" of the EAGGF that would sometimes require
substantial Community buying for surplus disposal -- geperally in the form of export subsidies.
This already imposed a controversial burden on the guarantee section of the EAGGF and, hence,
on the EC budget. With Spain and Portugal producers already being very large and competitive in
wine and olive oil, the producers would have strong incentives o even increase production to take
advantage of the existing CAP price. This, of course, would further burden the European Budget
(Ritson 1982, pp. 105-6).
Although the EEC Ten had the most to fear from dislocation and budgetary adjustment as a
result of increased agricultural trade, the Spanish and Portuguese farmers also had something to
fear (Rodriguez 1983, p. 2 14-16). For instance, Spanish milk and dairy production, concentrated
in Spain's northwest, operated at substantially higher cost than the large farm combines dominating
EEC dairy. The result v'as that the Spanish and Fortuguese dairy producers could be expected to
have to compete within the EEC at lower CAP prices, leading to substantial adjustment and
dislocation. This was expected to be a particularly onerous burden because there were so few
work and production alternatives in these regions.
1.2.1. The Iberian Enlargement Negotiations: Greece's Clear iMP Conditionality
With this array of off-setting agricultural and industrial risks for the EC Ten and the Iberian
applicants, the negotiations over the Iberiqn enlargement were substantially more drawn out and
contentious than those for Greek accession. The negotiations oegan in 1979, but only after France
got over its 1981 threat to slow dow- the enlargement process altogether did the delegations get to
grips with the key details of accession, and this was not to happen until 1984 (Arter 1993, p. 197).
The accession negotiations focused on a variety of issues, ranging from traditional
concerns to protect national sovereignty, to regulation of labor migration, to participation in
NATO, to the compensatory arrangements fcr non-member Mediterranean countries likely to suffer
the preferential treatment promised to the Iberian countries.7 Dominating the negotiations,
7 The European Commission produced reports analyzirg and proposing solutions to a variety of these as the
negotiations evolved. See, for instance, the report on how to deal with the non-member Mediterranean trading
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however, were the issues posed by the aforementioned risks of the trade liberalization: (1) how to
curb the additional costs to the Budget resulting from extension of the CAP to applicant countries;
(2) how to "balance the claims of the EEC and the applicants for a rapid transition to free trade
where their industries are strong and for a lo.,g period of adjustment where their industries are
weak"; and (3) how to ensure that the livelihood of farmers in southern France and Italy, and
throughout Greece, would not be undermined by a flood of low-cost produce f:om Spain (Ibid).
In discussing all these issue the delegations focused on liberalization side payments as well as
exemption and revision safeguards, but it was on safeguarding the vulnerable farm groups of the
EC Ten that side payment politics proved to be central.
The parameters of the negotiations to address the three major issues were influenced by the
tenms of accession established under the First Enlargement and the recent Greek enlargement. This
meant that some transition period would be necessary, roughly five years, during which
liberalization would be phased in. It also meant that the various vulnerable groups in the acceding
and member countries would be offered some structural fund assistance. During the roughly five
years of debate over Iberian accession, the issue was really only how long and in what form the
transition periods ought to be, how generous and long-term should structural fund assistance be,
and what other safeguards beyond these would be necessary or acceptable.
Not surprisingly, the respective delegations negotiating over these various safeguards with
strong and often conflicting demands. In general, the Italian, French and Greek delegations
strongly pushed for long transition delays, exemptions, and safeguards for their Southern
agriculture, and for much shorter and front-loaded transition periods and safeguards for Spain's
industrial products. The Spanish and Portuguese pushed for the opposite: longer delays and
benefits in industrial product tariff liberalization and shorter delays in agricultural liberalization
implicit in CAP inclusion.
Of the particular provisions that the delegations sought going beyond the basic transitions
and structural fund assistance. the most dramatic was the demand by the French, Italian, and Greek
delegations for special assistance through the Integrated Mediterranean programs to compensate for
the threat of Spanish agricultural competiti i. From early on in the negotiations, the French and
Italian delegations had called for various structural fund assistance, but when the Commission
tabled the IMP proposal in the context of Greece's derogation of EC rules and pleas for
Community Assistance, their attention shifted to support for the IMP program in particular. As
soon as Gre,.e was a participant in the Iberian Accession negotiations, however, it suddenly had
two reasons to lobby for the IMP, its own general reluctance and the Spanish agricultural threat.
In the end, Greece became the key champion of the IMP program in the accession negotiations.
partners in EC Comm'ssion 1984, including proposals for compensating these countries through preferential trade
and adjustment policy measures (pp. 102-38).
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The key turning point in the accession negotiations took place between September and
December 1984 at the Dublin Summit of EC Ministers. By that time, the Enlargement negotiations
were focused on two broad issues involving Spanish accession: whether Spain would fully agree
to participate as part of NATO and whether sufficient safeguards could be devised to alleviate the
potential dislocation Mediterranean agricultural groups in the face of Spanish competition. The
Dublin Summit was called expressly to discuss the EC and NATO negotiations with Spain, and at
the meeting there was "certainly recognition of the need to act decisively to assist [Spanish
President] Gonzalez in his task of convincing his party to support continuing NATO membership.
It was accordingly agreed to present a comprehensive package that would provide for definite
Spanish entry into the Community" (Arter 1993, p.198).
With the problems faced by the Mediterranean member countries, the price of such a
package became the IMP proposals. In December during the Dublin meetings, Greece
"threatened...to veto the new Southern enlargement of the Community until such as it received a
formal guarantee from its Community partners that the Integrated Mediteirtanean Programmes
would be launched" (De Witte 1990, p. 19).8 To this clear conditionality, making the IMP
proposals a very explicit liberalization side payment package, the other EC Ten members
apparently got the message. At the next meeting of the European Council in Brussels, on March
30th, 1985, agreement on the main terms of the IMP scheme was reached, and in April the
Commission submitted a revised and less ambitious proposal for the specific funding and
parameters of the scheme. The Council of Ministers contemporaneously negotiated the details of
this proposal and the details of Spanish and Portuguese accession (Urwin 1992, pp.207-8). And
within months, both the accession and the IMPs were established, the Iberian Accession Treaty
signed on June 12, 1985, and the Council Regulation 2088/85 setting up the IMPs implemented on
July 23, 1985 (CEC 1985; De Witte 1990, p.19).
1.2.2. The Accession as Compensated Liberalization: Adjustment and Regional Assistance for the
Applicants, IMPs for the EC Ten
The package of agreements defining the terms of the Iberian Enlargement generally split the
difference between the respective demands of the Iberian applicants and the EC Ten, but the Ten
basically got the better deal. This was true in aMl aspects of the benefits -- the transitions periods,
the pace of reductions, the extra exemptions, and the various forms of regional and adjustment
assistance that constituted the side payment compensation. Thus, it was compensated liberalization
8 See also Arter 1993, who argues that "Greece...made the Integrated Mediterranean programmes set out by the
European Council in March 1985 a sina qua non of Spanish and Portuguese entry" (p. 194). And also Urwin 1992,
pp.207-8, and Marks 1992, p. 199, for general recognition that the IMPs constituted side payments "to offset the
increased agricultural competition that was bound to result from the inclusion of Spain and Portugal in the
Community" (Marks 1992, p.199).
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for everyone, but the liberalization for certain members of the EC Ten was more compensated. To
see how, it's easiest to separate the industrial from the agricultural compensated liberalization.
The industrial trade liberalization provided safeguards mainly in the form of transition
periods. Spain and Portugal had asked for a ten year delay in view of how much industrial
liberalization it was to accept and in view of the agricultural delays. The EC Ten generally wanted
much fewer, and the precedent, hence focal point, was a five year transition period. The
compromise struck was for a seven year delay, meaning that by January 1, 1993, all quotas and
tariffs would disappear on EC-Iberian trade. The delegations also compromised over the pace at
which cuts would be phased in, with Spain wanting them delayed until the last minute of the
transition and the EC Ten wanting them front loaded: the agreement split the difference in that
Spain would reduce its tariffs on autos and open a tariff quota instead, within three years, and on
all manufactures tariff reductions would be phased in and modestly front loaded (Hine 1989,
p. 14).9 Industrial tariffs on non-member countries were to be aligned with the CCT following the
same schedule, but special arrangements applied to Spain and Portugal's adoption of the EC
preferential arrangements, such the GSP and the Lom6 Convention. And in addition to the tariff
reductions, other quota and a few other non-tariff barriers, such as Spain's import levy tax, were
to also be eliminated, phased out over several years via expanding quota amounts. The phasing
out of quotas on EC imports was to move substantially faster than that for third country imports.
The EC tariff and quota reductions on manufacturing products from the Iberian entrants
was to follow the same basic time table as the entrants. But there were two exceptions where the
producer groups obtained special treatment: clothing and textiles, and iron and steel. For the
former, EC Ten could retain "a mixture of administrative and quota controls...during the
transitional period" -- seven years (Hine 1989, p.15). For iron and steel, Spain would carry out a
three-year restructuring program along the lines of similar restructuring in the Ten, restructuring
that would substantially reduce rolled steel capacity (not to exceed 18 mill. tons). During this
restructuring, the EC could retain its quantitative restrictions (Ibid).
Beyond the delays and phasing-in of the tariff and quota reductions, Spain and Portugal in
particular also received some special exemptions from the reach of the liberalization. For some
period of time, for instance, Spain could establish new quotas to replace lowered tariffs on selected
Portuguese manufactures, including some types of textiles and clothing. They could also monitor
imports of pulp, paper, iron and steel, and set up new barriers should the threat of dislocation be
too great. The latter was to follow the general safeguard clause in the Accession Treaty (Article
379) that granted escape to both the entrants and the member countries. The clause stipulated that,
9 Within the first year, tariffs were to be reduced, as a percentage of the base duties, by 90%, by another 77% the
following year, another 62.5% the next, and successively lowered by decreasing percentages, until they were zeroed
out by January 1993 (Hine 1989, p. 14).
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should there be "difficulties which are serious and liable to persist in any sector of the economy or
which could bring about a serious deterioration in the economy of an area," trade restrictions could
be re-imposed during the transitional period (quoted in Hine 1989, p. 15).
Finally, Spain and Portugal were to receive a variety of kinds of financial assistance from
the three EC structural funds, including the European Social Fund, the European Regional
Development Fund, and the Guidance section of the EAGGF. The amounts promised were not
clear, but they were to be phased out in any event within a few years into the transition period.
Importantly, none of this funding and assistance was to take the form of Integrated Mediterranean
Program assistance, even though such assistance was funded and administered in part by the
existing structural funds.
In agriculture, the compensated liberalization was substantially more generous, and it was
directed almost exclusively at the EC Ten. First, the liberalization itself was to be phased in
significantly more slowly than the industrial tariff reductions, and was therefore consistent with EC
Ten desires. Spain and Portugal would be gradually integrated into the CAP, with establishment
of variable import levies, export subsidies, tariffs, and intervention buying set up immediately.
But the actual alignment of prices toward CAP levels was to phased in, generally over a period of 7
years -- like the industrial tariff reductions. But fruit and vegetable products were to phased in
more slowly -- over 10 years, with the first 4 keeping price differences frozen i la pre accession,
and with some reference pricing in place throughout the transition (Hine 1989, p. 18). Olive oil,
similarly, would be phased in over 10 years, with a 5 year freeze in price alignment.
In addition to this slower phasing, the EC Ten would also be allowed to monitor
agricultural trade in a range of products, with the right to suspend imports immediately if price
ceilings were violated, and with the general Article 379 safeguard clause in place in any event.
And even before the accession agreement was signed, the agricultural producers in the EC Ten
managed to get several hitherto uncontrolled products brought under price control and support
under the CAP. In short, there was significant new or "hair-trigger" exemption.
Most generous and significant for side payment politics, however, was that the accession
was to be accompanied by a series of regional and adjustment assistance programs to the EC Ten,
particularly the Mediterranean regions of those Ten -- southern France, southern Italy, and Greece.
These went well beyond the regional and adjustment assistance compensation provided to the
Iberian entrants for either industrial or agricultural dislocation. Some of the assistance was to be
provided under the Guidance section of the CAP's EAGGF. This included the EC's farm
structural reform program that was designed to provide financial assistance to farmers wishing to
modemize and readjust their operations, or to quit farming altogether. That same section was also
to provide "less favored areas" throughout the EC Ten with "compensatory allowances" for
various agricultural products, usually "headage" payments on livestock (Hine 1989, p.1 9). More
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ambitiously, the Guidance Fund was also to support a variety of other infrastructural 3chemes in
the region, such as contributing to the costs of drainage projects (Ibid). All of these represent
liberalization side payments because they were directed at helping those countries and peoples
within countries expected to suffer from the Enlargement's new competition, and because the
provisions were separate fiom the CAP provisions being liberalized.
Most ambitious as accompanying provisions, however, was the Integrated Mediterr, .n
Programs that the Greeks especially, but the French and Italians also had demanded as
compensation for the Spanish agricultural competition that the liberalization promised. Like the
Commission's original, March 1983 proposal, the program would focus on three-to-seven year
programmes rather than discrete projects, and would integrate a variety of services focusing on
improving conditions in a variety of sectors intensive in the EC Ten Mediterranean region, as well
as on infrastructural and general training and research investments (Yannopoulos 198., p.288-9).
As it was instituted, the IMPs were to be established and run for seven years with a total budget of
6.6 million ECU, with half of the money (3.3 billion ECU) to fund agricultural renewal projects in
the EC-Ten, 5.8 percent (383 mill.ECU) for forestry, 5.4 percent (356 mill.) for fisheries, 21.2
percent (1.4 billion) for "non-agricultural development", and 17.6 percent (1.2 billion) for general
infrastructure, training and research (Yannopoulos 1989, p.289-90; De Witte 1990, pp.2 1-2).
The particular focus of these various programs and the level of EC supra-national
institutional involvement they entailed varied. For instance, under the agricultural measures, it
included restructuring and rationalization measures for selected products like wine, table grapes
and olive oil -- generally toward more productive production and higher value-added segments of
the product categories. The non-agricultural sector spending, on the other hand aime i to create
new jobs "with the purpose of offsetting job losses in agriculture," by encouraging creation and
expansion of small and medium-sized enterprises in craft industries that were upstream and down
stream of agriculture, and in rural tourism (Yannopoulos 1989, p.2 9 1). Consistent with the
established additionality principle, national government were supposed to co-fund many of the
programs and to implement them. In general Community participation was through "investment
subsidies or subsidies for training and research and development, as well as in the form of income
support or compensatory allowances to farmers" (Yannopoulos 1989, p.290).
As for the distribution in the spending and raising of the 6.6 billion ECU budget, IMP
funds were to be distributed roughly evenly between the EC Ten Mediterranean states to have
pushed for the IMP scheme. About 2 billion ECU was to go to Greece, 4 billion French Francs to
France, and 150 billion lire for Italy. None of the money was to go to Spain or Portugal, even
though they expected to sustain agricultural adjustment problems as well as the vulnerable
members of the EC Ten. On the revenue side of 6.6 billion ECU budget, 4.1 billion was to come
from the Community budget (1.6 billion from additional spending; 2.5 billion from existing
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ERDF, ESF and guidance Section of the EAGGF Structural funds). The remaining money was to
come from the European Investment Bank loans and related instruments (Yannopoulos '89,p.290).
1.2.3. With Nothing Else Provided at Home
The provision of IMP and other structural fund side payment compensation, as well as a
variety of other transitional safeguards, contrasts with the relative quiet on the domestic front.
Both the Portuguese and Spanish polities were broadly supportive of the EC membership, on a
variety of economic and political grounds, and the concerns with the distributional costs of the
liberalization and with the terms of accession never spilled over into significant domestic debate.
Despite the Portuguese socialist and interventionist tradition, the Socialist ruling party in control
during the latter and most contentious years of the international negotiations was strongly
supportive of the accession, regardless of the various terms being batted around the negotiating
table (Arter 1993, p.195-6). All the major and mainstream Spanish political parties, meanwhile,
had been strongly behind EC accession from the beginning -- more unified in this respect than any
of the Second Enlargement applicant party systems (Ibid, p. 196). Never, in other words, was
there a need to provide special legislative benefits to buy off powerful, or vulnerable opposition.
In the EC Ten, meanwhile, there was never any need for domestic legislative action. And
even when political controversy at the international level was particularly shrill, there was never
any autonomous, legislative or executive activity threatening to exempt or revise the liberalization,
or to provide side payments to the losers -- beyond what was being supported at the EC-level.
1.3. Implementing the IMP Side Payment Compensation
The early implementation of the IMP consolidated its multiple roles as regional
redistributive policy, regional development, trade adjustment assistance, and crass political side
payment compensation. Within a few years of the IMP's 1985 enactment, the programmes had
been set up in the three recipient countries, several in France and Greece and one in the Molise
region of Italy (CEC 1988a). When the actual projects within the programmes were set up and the
actual moneys spent, the priorities differed somewhat from the Commission's proposal.
Agricultural adaptation was the highest priorities only in the French IMPs, consuming 38.4 percent
of its IMP allotment, whereas the Greek IMPs allocated only 16.5 percent of its moneys to this role
(only the third highest priority), and the Italian IMP gave virtually no money for this purpose. The
French IMP's also gave substantial support for energy development and new technology
development (21 percent), and for the development of upland areas (22.3 percent). Developing
tourism was the only other significant target of support (12.1). The Greek IMPs, meanwhile, gave
more than half of its moneys to energy development (28.7 percent) and infrastructural investment
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(26.5 percent), and joined France in providing a sizable support program for tourism (10.9
percent) (CEC 1988a, Appendix 4; reproduced in Yannopoulos 1989, p.29). The Italian IMP,
finally, focused almost exclusively on the development of upland areas (62.9 percent) and on new
technology development (35 percent) (Ibid).
From the point of view of how the programs fulfilled their various purposes, the story
appears to have been mixed. As actual adjustment assistance designed to promote economic
development and adjustment out of non-competitive and into more competitive economic activity,
the programs had relatively disappointing results, with the minority of the programs forcing or
strongly encouraging changes or conversions out of one crop or agricultural activity into more
promising ones, or out of agriculture altogether (Yannopoulos 1989, p.294). Some of the
industrial investment, moreover, went toward developing textile and clothing industries, changes
that didn't have clear promise in the medium term. On the other hand, the tourist, rural upland
development, and high technology research did provide some long- and medium-term benefits that
diversified :vhat were hitherto almost completely agricultural regional economies.
On more political grounds, some IMP investment projects were motivated less by
adjustment imperatives that by "local party political anxieties" (Ibid, p.293). French regions to
receive aid, for instance, included the ddpartements of Drome and Ardiche, as well as those that
were more bona fide Mediterranean adjustment problems, and in Italy, the list included the
Appenines in the prosperous Emilia-Romagna (De Witte 1990, p.23?). But such a pattern of
investment simply continued what was the basic political origin of the whole IMP enterprise. And
by broad political calculations, the continued smooth and unwavering political support throughout
the E%., Ten for the Iberian Enlargement, and in Greece for its own continued involvement, is prima
facie evidence that this basic motivation was effective.
Broadly successful on these political and compensatory grounds, the IMPs also
foreshadowed more thorough-going reforms of all the structural funds. The IMPs were the first
testing ground for the move away from discrete project assistance with a narrow functional focus,
to more long-term, multi-project programs that integrated a variety of functions. In that respect,
they were part of a general reform process that kept the structural fund reform process on the
broader EC Commission policy-making agenda, ripe for continued focus as a subject for side
payments compensation at the next liberalization turn.
2. The Single European Act and Reform of the Structural Funds: Large-scale and Patient
Compensated Liberalization
The drawn-out completion of the Second Enlargement was just one of a series of major
compromises among the EC-Ten that helped inspire and make space for more grand political and
economic initiatives designed to "re-launch" the integration project. These proposals included the
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whole gamut of integration vehicles brewing since the founding of the ECSC, including increased
political integration, monetary union, and defense cooperation. But through conflict over how best
to promote integration demands and fears of the member states, the vehicle to emerge as the center-
piece of this re-launching entailed "a return to the origins" of the EC: trade liberalization toward a
single internal market (Delors 1988, quoted in Moravcsik 1991, p.24). Between 1984 and 1986 a
series of negotiations yielded a package of integration reforms, most prominently, EC political
reform and completion of the free trade area begun, but left unfinished, by EEC liberalization. The
SEA proposed to end all barriers to trade within the EC by 1992, and the principal mechanism for
doing so was mutual recognition of national regulatory practices rather than regulatory
harmonization. Such ambitious liberalization was to be overseen by the Commission and Council,
and in most areas to be decided by qualified majority rather than unanimity.
Such liberalization ended up being generous compensation liberalization, though it took a
couple of years to consummate the "compensated" side of the deal. Among the package of reforms
included in the SEA along-side this liberalization was the promise to substantially reform and
increase support for regional development of the Community's poorer areas through the various
structural funds, in the interest of fostering "economic and social cohesion." No money increases
were promised, and no particular plans outlined, but the general promise for reform was written
into the SEA Treaty provisions. The promise was made at the behest of the four delegations
representing the poorer members of the Community (Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain), who
had explicitly conditioned their support for the SEA trade liberalization on making and fulfilling
such promises. Such linkage made the cohesion policy promises side payment promises -- so the
SEA liberalization promised, but didn't provide, compensated liberalization.
Translating this promise into provision took another two years of budgetary wrangling. A
key part of that wrangling was whether, how, and how much to fulfill the general promises made
in SEA in 1986, and this was resolved in the 1988 acceptance of the Delors I package, where the
EC 12 agreed to double and restructure the structural funds by 1992. Explicitly demanded,
offered, and accepted to off-set the risks that the poorer countries faced in adopting the SEA
liberalization, this represented side payment compensation of unprecedented scale and patience.
Such compensation is remarkable in the contrasts it strikes. Like the previous cases of
internal market liberalization, this extended provision of such compensation contrasts with the
absence of such provision at the domestic level, and in general to the pattern of side payment
politics in the US. However, more than the other cases, in Europe as well as the US, it represents
a patient acceptance of a compensation promise in the face of temptation to renege by withholding
increased assistance as liberalization commences. Like the Second Enlargement, only more so, it
also contrasts with the relative decline in use of policy harmonization as a subject of side payment
compensation. Such harmonization, including social and environmental policy harmonization that
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would directly impact upon the distributional consequences of liberalization, was included in the
SEA package, but it was weak as the subject of liberalization, given emphasis on mutual
recognition, and it was not the subject of explicit linkage to the acceptance of the liberalization in
general. Finally, in stark contrast to the Second Enlargement, the SEA/Delors I Reform package
provided substantial benefits to the poorer members of the Community and less to the EC-Ten.
2.1. The SEA as Compensated Liberalization Promised
Like all the histories of compensated liberalization, this one begins with the basic fact of a
liberalization initiative. Unlike the calls for trade liberalization at the center of the ECSC and EEC
integration initiatives, the trade liberalization that was to become the centerpiece of the Single
European Act did not have clear authorship like the Schuman/Monnet and Beyen plans, and did not
become a principal focus of the integration project until very close to actual negotiation of the SEA.
To be sure, the SEA's liberalization did become associated with EC Commrssion President Jacques
Delors's plan for a single market by 1992, but that was late in the game. This proposal actually
grew out of a long lineage of failed or frustrated initiatives with many authors, and made it onto the
integration agenda amidst a slew of other vehicles for recharging the integration project.
For several years prior to the SEA negotiations, groups at all levels of political activity
surrounding European integration had been peddling proposals for trade liberalization to complete
the single market initiated under the ECSC and EEC customs unions. At the inter-governmental
level, the European Council had since its 1974 inception discussed and tasked commissions to
develop proposals for moving to complete the internal market. At that same level, the ill-fated
Genscher-Columbo initiative, tabled in 1981, called for a variety of initiatives to "re-launch
Europe," including internal market liberalization (Moravcsik 1991, p.33). Within the supra-
national EC institutions, likewise, the so-called "Kangaroo Group" of EC Parliamentarians,
founded in 1981, focused on the trade liberalization initiatives as the principal focus of integration
activity, and in 1983 "launched a public campaign in favor of a detailed EC timetLble for abolishing
administrative, technical, and fiscal barriers" (Ibid, p.22). These initiatives dove-tailed with a
number of other internal market liberalization pushes from groups outside international or national
government, most prominently those from individuals and groups in international business (Ibid.,
Sandholtz and Zysman 1989, p. 116-20). When such liberalization proposals were discussed, they
were usually packaged with a range of other proposed reforms designed to reinvigorate the
integration project, combining issues as diverse as political union and regional fund reform.
Before the mid-1980s, however, none of these packages had much of a fighting chance.
Through most of the 1970s and early 1980s a series of EC-agenda distractions and political
differences among the EC members made progress on any significant initiative or package of
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initiatives impossible. First, the EC were mired in a thicket of inter-twined controversies over the
Second Enlargement, CAP reform, and more general budgetary reform to remedy Britain's angry
net-contributor position. With these fights there was simply no room on the EC agenda for
anything significant and new.
Even if there were room on the EC "docket," the governments of the member countries had
such diverging political economic agendas that any new initiatives, especially involving thorough-
going liberalization, would be unworkable. Here, the most important snag was the deep divide
between the social democratic and nationalist agenda championed by the radical wing of France's
ruling Socialist Party, and the relatively more internationally open and macro-economically
conservative British and German ruling parties. The former was interested in stepped-up European
integration, but only towards a more interventionist, socialist or dirigiste EC, while the latter,
especially Britain's Conservatives, saw internal market liberalization as the sina qua non of any
integration activity. Cutting across this rift between France on one hand and Germany and the UK
on the other, was another rift over the general commitment to political union and other elements of
the integration project, with the UK generally much more hesitant than Germany and France to
accept any new EC competencies that might threaten national autonomy. These forces conspired to
frustrate the integration project, inspiring widespread "Euro-pessimism" and calls for multi-tiered
community initiatives that would seriously compromise the EC-twelve internal market liberalization
(c.f. Moravcsik 1991, passim; Sandholtz and Zysman).
It took a temporary trimming of the EC-agenda thicket and convergence in the political
economic orientations of ruling governments to clear the path for internal market liberalization and
other integration "vehicles." Political economic convergence happened first, with Frangois
Mitterand's decision to shift his Socialist Party's agenda away from the radical wing's brew of
nationalization, increased welfare expenditure, and dirigiste intervention, and tioward a more
internationally open and macro-economically austere path -- in other words, towards the German
and British path. I0 Part of that shift, moreover, was a renewed commitment to re-invigorating the
integration project, and that commitment helped shake loose a series of compromises that cleared
the EC agenda of some of its most long-standing and seemingly unresolvable blockages, including
the Iberian Enlargement and, more clearly rooted in French conciliation, resolution of the CAP-EC
budget reform complex. And roughly coinciding this shift, finally, was increased threat to move
forward on the integration project with or without Britain, a threat that inspired greater conciliation
from even the most sovereignty-squeamish Thatcherites (Ibid, passim).
10 As Moravcsik and others argue, this shift was motivated by a variety of conditions, including how threats of
further capital flight made austerity arguably inevitable and after the Communist party's decline allowed the President
to jettison his Party's radical wing (c.f. Moravcsik 1991, p.30, fn.28).
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These shifts came together and bore their first fruit in the June 1984 Fountainebleu summit.
The meeting finally resolved the budgetary wrangle by linking CAP reform, including ,ome
reduction in Guarantee rates, and more generous rebate scheme for the UK, to higher VAT rates to
raise EC revenue." This Mitterrand-led resolution cleared the way for the heads of gov e!nment to
agree on "a package of internal liberalization, coordinated stimulation, and collaborative research
and development" (Moravcsik 1991, p.38). Mitterrand also sought to coordinate new initiatives on
political reform, but received less support. Beyond these declarations, the Fountainebleu summit
also created two committees to investigate the various initiatives: the Adonnino Committee to
investigate customs formalities for individuals, harmonization of professional degrees, etc.; and
much more important for side payment politics, the Dooge Committee to consider institutional,
political and economic initiatives, including internal market liberalization and regional fund reform
(Urwin 1995, pp.225-27). As this was the re-launching of ambitious single market integration,
Fountainebleu was the SEA's Messina summit, and the Drooge its Spaak commission.
From this turning point, a rapid sequence of decisions lay the ground-work for a decision
to hold an intergovernmental conference to agree on a package of internal market liberalization and
other reforms. The Dooge deliberations and report made ii clear that the member countries could
agree more on the single market liberalization than on a number of major procedural reforms it was
tasked with considering, especially relaxing or ending the Luxembourg Compromise upholding the
practice of unanimity voting in favor of some kind of qualified majority scheme. Although it was
not a major subject of discussion, the Drooge participants also agreed o.- the need to improve and
restructure regional and adjustment policies in the structural funds. During Drooge deliberations,
Jacques Delors had taken on the EC Commission presidency and had announced in his first speech
to the EC Parliament the goal of completing the internal market by 1992. Partially based on the
Drooge report and at the Mitterrand-Delors initiative, the EC Council endorsed the 1992 single
market goal, and within a matter of weeks Internal Market Commissioner Lord Cockfield drafted
the White Paper laying out some 300-hundred details on how to reach that goal (CEC 1985b). At
the Milan summit in June 1985, member countries could agree on little beyond that White Paper,
but did commit themselves participate in an inter-governmental conference to reform the Treaty of
Rome to launch the internal market and other reforms (Urwin 1995, pp.226-8).' 2
1 Significant for the history of side payment politics, this package that linked at the international level three issues
-- CAP reform and UK rebate to increased VAT rates -- was facilitated by a second package of issue linkage, also
decided at the international level but focused more on particular domestic groups: the pain of reduced CAP Guarantee
subsidies to some farm groups was to be compensated for by the provision of some new adjustment and regional
fund assistance, mainly through the Guidance section of the EAGGF.
12 In fact, the UK, Denmark, and Greece were reluctant to commit themselves to such conference devoted to Treaty
revision. Wher a majority vote was called to decide whether to convene the conference, under EEC Article 236, the
three voted against, but acceded to the majoiity vote and agreed to attend. Their hesitancy lay mainly in
disagreements with the proposed procedural changes, like majority voting and European Parliamentary competency
(Urwin 1995, pp.227-8).
507
Burgoon
Chapter Seven
The conference was schedule for Octobcr 1985. At the center of the agenda was an
expected package including some detailed zomrnitnient to trade liberalization through the reduction
of the many non-tariff barriers laid out in the White Paper, combined with or even linked to a series
of political reforms, especially some move towards qualified majority voting, certainly on many
single market issues, but perhaps many others. But in addition to these center-pieces, the agenda
also included a variety of other reforms, including defense cooperation, social and environmental
policy coordination and harmonization, foreign policy competency, and structural fund reform. As
in a variety of areas, moreover, the structural fund reform process brewed outside of the inter-
governmental struggles for some time, through the Commission's development of various reforms
to improve integration of progiams, through a focus on longer-term programs rather than discrete
projects. Much of this activity was focused on the reform of the ERDF and implementation of the
new Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, set up in July 1985, after the Milan summit and before
the intergovernmental conference. Whether any and all of these reforms would be major subjects
of discussion at the conference, and what kinds of issue linkage would be demanded or accepted,
was shaped by the various country positions that constrained the negotiating delegatic ns.
2.2. Country Positions: The Rich not Against but also not With the Poor
The twelve member delegations and polities they represented approached the
intergovernmental conference with important differences over the whole gamut of issues to be
discussed. And on some of these issues, the main differences were among the large member
states. On the 1992 internal market liberalization and the side payment politics it provoked,
however, the important distinction was between the rich countries and the poor ones, for it was
along these lines that the member delegations were divided over what, if anything, to demand to
mitigate or off-set the expected costs of the liberalization. Although the richer and larger co untries
differed over plenty, especially over the degree and nature of procedural reform, they all tended to
see the single market project as a relatively un-problematic vehicle for or focus of integration. But
the poorer countries, or at least their governments, saw the zingle market as a more ambiguous and
complicated proposition.
Germany and the Benelux countries were the most compliant countries on the center-piece
issues to be decided at the conference. With EC-member countries consuming a full half or more
of their exports, all four had a very strong interest in retaining and expanding that market access
through the Single market liberalization. Since the signing of the EEC, in fact, Germany had
consistently been the most liberal of the member countries on issues of both internal market and
external market trade -- agricultural issues notwithstanding. And even Belgium's weak. sectors,
such as coal and steel, would not face significant market opening through the internal market
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liberalization, for they already had in EEC and ECSC. So within this group the only trepidation
lay in whether the liberalization would impact upon the CAP, and as the recent deliberations had
not brought the CAP into the 1992 internal market initiative, there wa, little worry for at least the
medium term. On the procedural issues discussed, moreover, the Germans and Benelux had been
willing for some time to go along with, indeed pushed, the French to soften the Luxembourg
Compromise and to increase the Commission's and Parliament's competencies.
Britain's position on these same two center-piece issues was more divided. Especially
under the Thatcherite wing of the Conservative Party, the British government and its delegation
was deenly suspicious of the procedural reforms, fearing that increased supra-national
competencies and extensive qualified majority voting would steam-roll Britain's sovereign
interests. But on the single market project, Thatcher especially was completely gung-ho, and in
fact this liberalization project was her governm,nt's prime interest in the whole integration project.
As a result, many proposals from the Conservative government, and by the Thatcher-appointed
Cockfield, made it into the White PR. er outlining the specifics of liberalization, especially in
financial services. The Party's interest in liberalization was so strong, in fact, that they recognized
the need to soften their position on qualified majority voting in order to facilitate the implementation
of the 1992 proposals. With such a position, there was little doubt that the delegation would accept
other, less threatening, trade-offs to achieve freer trade -- including linkage to various funding or
redistribution proposals.
France's position, and to some extent Italy's, was the basically the opposite of the British
one when it came to the basic trade-off between piocedural reform and trade libcralization, but for
the purposes of i:beralization side payment politics was perfectly compatible. Since Mitterand had
shifted his party away from its radical wing, the French government war interested in general
international openness, of which internal market liberalization was a vital part, but they were still
concern aboi t the potential adjustment costs associated with such liberalization. Instead, the 1992
liberalization's value lay mainly in its potential to leverage other countries, including most
prominently Britain, to re-charge the integration project in its many other political and social
dimensions. Procedural reform. then, was as high a priority for the Mitterrand's delegation as was
Delors's 1992. However, precisely because they recognized the costs of liberalization, more than
bezause they so wanted liberalization, the delegation was interested in a variety of other reforms
that might off-set liberalization's costs -- including social policy harmonization and expanded
structural fund reform, along the lines of tne IMP reforms that had so recently been beneficial.
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2.2.1. The "Poorer" Membery: Economic and Political Risks Were the Worry, Not the Costs
The poorer countries in the EC- 12 approached the intergovernmental conference with
general support for many of the single market and procedural reforms to be agreed upon -- and in
that sense, oddly most like the German government's stance, among the three dominant member
countrics. In details on many of the issues, moreover, the various poorer economies -- by various
measures, including per capita GDP and production val' added -- had less in common with
eachother than they did with one or another of other dominant countries. But the internal market
liberalization posed similar problems for all four, and in seeking some redress for these problems
the poor delegations found common cause. The problems which provoked this common cause,
however, lay less in anticipated economic costs of the lioeralization to various industrial or
agricultural groups than in anticipated political and economic risks for the polity.
At the time the elements of the internal market liberalization were first being discussed in
detail, in the context of the White Paper, the distributional implications across and within the
member states were amoiguous -- with plenty of reasons to expect that the liberalizatioi' would
disproportionately benefit, not harm, the poorer economies. A report released well after the
intergovernmental conference captured 'he general point that applied well to the situation in mid-
1985: "it is a matter of dispute at the moment among economists, including within the
Commission. as to whether economic and monetary unibn will be good for everybody or only
good for some. Some of these economic arguments miss the point. The point is that, first of all,
you cannot prove anything in advance with any certainty" (CEC 1991, p.3; quoted in McAleavey
1993, p.25-6).
Between the poor and the rich countries, moreover, recent trends in per-capita GDP growth
made the specific point that ihe 1992 liberalization might not be bad, and might actually be
beneficial. Throughout the period of their mem:bership in the EEC, the Iberian countries, Greece,
and Ireland remained the poorest members of the 12 -- together averaging less than 75 percent of
the EEC-12 average. But throughout the same period, during which the countries accepted
significant internal market trade liberalization, their relative poveitv didn't get vorse, and in fact
there was over a slightly longer period evidence that their growth in per capita income and
employment was greater than that for the "core" EC states (Keeble et al. 1988, pp. 104, 11; quoted
in Marks 1992, pp.2 0 1-2). Assessments by economists of the cross-country implications of the
single market, based on a variety of models of trade liberalization that focused on exploiting
comparativ- advantage and on exhausting scale economies, suggested that the peripheral poor
countries might have more to gain from the internal market liberalization than would the richer
countries (Neven 1990, p.46; quoted in Marks 1992, p.199).
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As for the distributional consequences within the poorer economies of the 1992
liberalization, the picture also looked reasonably good. The countries that had just completed their
accession negotiations -- Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in late 1984 -- the expected
distributional implications of the internal market were similar to what they had recently accepted to
endure, wi,5 their various transitions and safeguards. As the previous case history suggested,
such liberalization posed a variety of modest problems for agriculture and more serious ones for
industrial manufacturing, but in general the low-wage conditions of the new-comers suggested that
the liberalization would provide substantial, significantly greate,, benefits to existing induEt-ial and
agriculture sectors, as well as the usual benefits to consumers. This was also true through the
promise of foreign direct investment from investors outside of the EC 12 interested in getting or
keeping a foot-hold in the European Community market and able to take advantage of the relatively
lower-wage and cost conditions of the poorer members.
In Ireland the liberalization was even less troublesome in its distributional consequences.
In addition to the consumer benefits promised by a completed internal market, a nuilber of export
oriented industries that had hitherto had difficulty gaining access to EC markets, particularly on the
continent, stood to gain substantially from the 1992 removal of discriminatory procurement
practices, state aids, documentation, and other non-tariff barriers (McAleese and Matthews 1987,
pp.46-9). This was true, for instance, of food and drink producers, pharmaceutical and other
health-care providers, and sorlie electrcnics industries. The liberalization also promised indirect
benefits foreign direct investment, though it might not do as well in this regard as it had in the
recent past given the Second Enlargement.
The various expected costs of the liberalization, meanwhile, were nor expected to be very
strong for the producers traditionally dependent upon non-tariff b;.-rier relief. Some service
industries such as insurance might be threatened by the internal market, depending on what
happer.ed with off-shore and third country investments. Manufacturing industries in auto parts and
assembly, and other mrnufacturers, had trad;tionally and continued to receive state-aids that would
be outlawed by the prospective liberalization, but by 1985 these industries had already undergone
substantial structural adjustment that left them relatively viable and internationally exposed
(McAleese and Matth( , s 1987, pp. 5 1). For this or whatever other reason, there was "little
concein being expressed in industrial circles at the implications of [the internal market
liberalization] for Irish industry," unlike their opposition and concern expressed during the 1972
accession negotiations (Ibid).
The prospect of internal market liberalization may have had uncertain implications, even
promising some greater long term economic benefits through exploited comparative advantage and
scale econor.ies, but the transition to a single market also promised uncertainty and the risk of
economic recession, unforeseen dislocation for some sectors of the economy, and other economic
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problems. As Marks 1992 and others have observed in general terms, these economic risks were
much greater for the poorer than for the richer EC members, and these greater risks, in turn, posed
even greater risks for the governments in those poorer than richer countries (McAleavey 1993).
The greater economic risks were due to the lack of a social safety net or a cushion of
affluence in the poorer countries (Marks 1992, p.202-3). Poorer societies lacked general
econoric affluence of the richer states, with lower income levels implying that most citizens'
incomes paid for subsistence needs like food, clothing shelter, etc. Should the internal market
cause a down-turn or more concentrated dislocation, any lost income or unemployment would
generally be felt more strongly and bitterly than in richer societies. Moreover, the poorer
countries, especially Greece, Spain, and Portugal, had less developed and generous government
programs to guarantee income support, adjustment assistance, or other safety net services should
the economy suffer from the internal market liberalization (Ibid). So the economic risks of the
single market were greater.
The political risks involved in the transition to the internal market were also significantly
higher in the poorer countries (Marks 1992, 1993; McAleavey 1993). First all of the poorer EC
countries were relatively new members to the EEC, whose polities had not fell palpable benefits of
membership and were generally "unaccustomed to the idea of membership" (Marks 1992, p.).
Greece, Portugal, and Spain, moreover, were under-going significant ecclomic and political
transformation of which trade liberalization was only a part, with existing democratic government
having or at least sensing only fragile footing. With these characteristics, the governments in the
poorer countries faced greater risks that their polities would blame any economic down-turn or
dislocation, whether or not it was caused by transition to the internal market, on the single market
initiative, and since such an initiative was to be a clear inter-governmental choice, on the ruling
govemments (Ibid). The governments of the new democracies, of course, had more to fear in this
vein than did the Irish government.
With these greater political and economic risks. the government delegations were conscious
to -ff-set or mitigate the risks of single market liberalization, even if "distributional coalitions"
within their societies did not emerge against freer trade, and even if the expected economic
implications of the shift were, on the whole, favorable.'" The delegations could approach the
liberalization with an eye to ensuring that the internal market initiative provide safeguards and
escape clauses to deal with the risks. And since the inter-governmental conference was to consider
a wide range of policies and prcgrams along side the procedural and internal market liberalization
centerpieces, there were plenty of possibilities for off-setting those risks through side payment
compensation. Among the possibilities were social policy harmonization. But such
13 A later study showed public opihnion ia the four countries to more generally in favor of the 1992 program than
the "rich" country publics. EC Commission 1988d, p.20,
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harmonization, even if it entailed subsidized upward-leveling in social welfare and other conditions
relevant to mitigating or off-setting internal market risks, would likely be very expensive to the
other member countries and very complicated to negotiate.
Reform of the structural funds was a more obvious target. The countries involved in the
Second Enlargement had recently relied on such funds to off-set the costs and risks of EEC
liberalization, with Greece receiving substantially more than the Iberian entrants. Greece went into
the inter-governmental negotiations, therefore, with clear concern for the risks of the internal
market liberalization and a recent and strongly positive experience with using structural fund
expansion and reform to off-set such risks. Portugal and Spain, meanwhile, had received some
structural fund assistance as well for the costs and risks of their accession, but had seen the more
substantial fund assistance and reform go to the EC Ten. Ireland, finally, had recently undergone
general economic downturn, potentially linked to problems of the EEC liberalization, and also
faced the long-term prospect of reduced CAP Guarantee funding on which they had traditionally
benefited since accession. This drew attention to another set of budgetary programs that could take
up the slack as well as deal with the internal market's risks.
2.3. Negotiating the Promise of Compensated Liberalization in the Single European Act
The Inter-governmental Conference (IGC) got underway with its first Ministerial meeting
on September 9, 1985, and it took more than five months before agreement was reached with the
first signing on February 17, 1986.14 The deliberations were broken down into two broad
working groups, one focusing on the European Political Cooperation (EPC) proposals tabled
principally at the Milan Summit, and the other focusing on all the trade, monetary, cohesion, and
other issues pertaining to revision of the EEC. The latter working group, chaired by Luxembourg
representative Jean Dondelinger, set a dead-line for submission of p;oposals to be considered as
October 15th, and received over 30 proposals from the Commission and every member State
except the UK (Corbett 19, p.244). The working parties comprised country delegations, whose
members were drawn from a variety of ministers germane to the issues under consideration,
mainly Economics and Foreign Affairs ministries. These groups met almost weekly from the
beginning of September through December, and they reported to the Foreign Ministers, who met
14 My account of the inter-governmental negotiations draws on several secondary and primary sources. A few
historians have written relatively detailed accounts of the proceedings, especially Corbett 1986, Corbett 1987, Gazzo
1986, and Lodge 1986. The Corbett accounts are the most detailed. Gazzo 1986, however, provides an assemblage
of primary source documents from the negotiations, including Agence Europe bulletin reports, press releases, private
letters, formal policy proposals, as well as official Treaty and supporting documents. It, therefore, provides the best
source for information. My account draws on all of these sources, especially Gazzo's complication of documents,
supplemented by several EC Commission Bulletins that provide some day-to-day details on the side payment
politics.
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on six occasions before the Luxembourg summit in December 1985 and held an additional meeting
immediately prior to that summit. The Heads of government discussed the issues at the
Luxembourg summit, and when issues weren't resolved, the Foreign Ministers held a final
meeting on December 16th and 17th (Ibid).
The deliberations were as wide-ranging as had been planned. The center-piece issues,
internal market liberalization and procedural reform, dominated the sessions, but a variety of others
were brought into discussion, either in connection with the center-piece deliberations or as separate
agenda items. Thus, the working parties, the ministerial meetings, and the Heads of State also
discussed monetary capacity, the environment, research and development policies, social policy,
human rights, political cooperation, and cohesion (Corbett, Gazzo 1986, Lodge 1986, passim).
By all accounts, however, the widespread hopes of making significant progress on a
number of these issues during the IGC went unfulfilled. Making substantial progress on a variety
of the issues, especially the political cooperation, monetary policy, and procedural reform, has
been called by some the "maximalist program," in contrast to a "minimalist program" limited to
internal market liberalization and only those procedural and substantive issues pursuant to that
liberalization (Gazzo 1986, p.7-8; Moravcsik 1991, p.). If so, the IGC negotiations was basically
a story about the maximalist program getting "progressively sacrificed" in favor of the minimalist
one (Moravcsik 1991, p.; Gazzo 1986, pp.7-9). As a story about side payment politics, however,
such down-grading in the IGC agenda still involved clear and explicit side payment linkage and the
promise of compensated liberalization.
As for the internal market liberalization that dominated the discussions, the working groups
and ministerial meetings worked primarily from a Commission proposal that embellished the
Delors plan and the Cockfield White Paper. It called for creating by 1992 an internal market,
defined broadly as an area "il which persons, goods and capital shall move freely under conditions
identical to those obtaining within a Membei State" (CEC, quoted in Corbett 1987, p.245). The
mechanism by which the EC was to achieve this internal market was a combination of regulatory
harmonization where differences operated as non-tariff barriers, and of mutual recognition of such
differences, with the particular mix left for the Council of Ministers and the EC Commission to
decide. It also proposed, however, that those differences not harmonized by 1992 would be
automatically accepted through mutual recognition. The Council was to act toward liberalization
through qualified majority voting, except for the free movement of persons, and the Commission
was to implement Council directives with substantial autonomy (Corbett 1987, p.245).
Discussions focused on a variety of ,sues -- including the definition of the internal market,
the deadline for its achievement, the rules by which particular barrier reductions would be decided -
- most of which involved various members state delegations requesting changes that constituted
revision of the ambition of the internal market liberalization, or exemption from the reach of that
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liberalization. Much of the discussion, for instance, focused on delimiting majority voting relevant
to single market liberalization. Denmark and Greece preferred unanimity voting generally; the UK,
Germany, Netherlands and Ireland wanted to retain unanimity for taxation and fiscal differences;
and Ireland, concerned about the competitive position of its insurance and banking services,
supported majority voting except for these sectors (Corbett 1987, p.245). Other countries sought
to limit the range or direction of harmonization that might be the subject of internal market
liberalization. Thus, Denmark and Germany expressed worries that such harmonization could
require that they lower "their standards of environment and consumer protection" (Ibid).
Three of the poor countries -- Greece, Ireland, and Portugal -- also released unilateral
declarations on the need to mitigate costs on sensitive economic sectors (Corbett p.247). Greece
unilaterally stated "that measures taken pursuant to Arts.70 (1) and 84EEC," the harmonization and
mutual recognition directives, "must not harm sensitive sectors of Members' economies" (p. 2 1 2).
And at the Foreign Ministers' meeting, Ireland "added another unilateral declaration designed to
protect its sensitive insurance sector but confirming its agreement in principle to the qualified
majority voting on Art.57 (2)" (Lodge 1986, p.2 12). Such demands all constituted a combination
of delays, revision and exemption -- in short, rolled-back liberalization.' 5
The discussion of most of the various other issues on the IGC agenda, meanwhile, never
got explicitly linked to the internal market liberalization. For instance, discussion of monetary,
research and development, environmental, and social policy harmonization and EC policy, either
got discussed as actual subjects of internal market liberalization -- i.e. leveling differences that
might act as non-tariff barriers -- or was focused on achieving the policy improvements as
integration goals unto themselves. The secondary and primary accounts show no sign that any of
these issues involved groups linking their position to their support of particular market
liberalization reforms.
On only one issue did the IGC deliberations involve such explicit linkage: the cluster of
issues and policies under the mantle of "economic and social cohesion." During deliberations
focused on internal market reforms, and those focused on the cohesion policy issue as a separate
agenda item, the poorer countries, especially Ireland, Greece and Portugal explicitly conditioned
their support for internal market liberalization on adequate progress toward improved cohesion
policy. As Corbett 1986 recounts, during the internal market discussions the Greek, Irish and
Portuguese delegations, "fearing the centipetal [sic] effects of an integrated market, linked their
position to the outcome of negotiations on cohesion" (Corbett p.245).
The specific linkage demanded came out in the discussions over the economic and social
cohesion issue. Proposals on Community cohesion were tabled by the Commission, France,
15 Other issues included derrogations, the automaticity of mutual recognition once 1992 arrived, as well as the usual
requests for safeguards. See Corbett 1987, pp.245-6; Lodge 1986, pp.210-213; and Gazzo 1986, passim.
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Ireland and Greece, with much of the discussion and the final compromise based on revision of the
Commission proposal (Corbett 1987, p.248-9). That propeosal, tabled on September 30th,
focused on promoting cohesion by revising the Treaty of Rome to include five Articles on
cohesion. These focused on promoting the core objectives of cohesion,' 6 by appropriately
implementing "the internal market," by coordinating states' economic policies," by setting up new
policies, and by "rationalizing the operation" of existing ones (Lodge 1986, p.213). Principal
among the policy actions was "setting up one or more structural funds" focused on regional
development and adjustment, and setting up a new loan-granting mechanism (Commission, p.38;
in Gazzo p.38). The Commission also proposed reforming and restructuring the new and existing
structural funds and loan mechanisms, in order to coordinate and make more efficient the
achievement the core cohesion objectives. And most importantly, the Commission proposal
clarified that details of the expanded and reformed cohesion policy might not be worked out at the
IGC but that a specific commitment and plan to do so should be in the treaty (Gazzo 1986, p.38).
The Greek, Irish, and French proposals overlapped this Commission offering."
Deliberations over these various proposals focused both on the general goals and theme of
social and economic cohesion, and on the specific Community actions to promote such cohesion.
The various accounts concur in claiming that "there was a clear divergence between those countries
likely to benefit ," the poorer countries (Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Greece), "and some of those
likely to contribute" to the various re-distribution policies proposed. Principal among the latter
were Britain and Germany; France was more favorably disposed to the expanded structural funds
and other commitments. For instance, an Italian amendment supported by Ireland Greece, Spain
Portugal, and the Netherlands, was designed to ensure adequate funding for all the structural
funds, and elicited objections particularly from Germany and Britain (Lodge 1986, p.213). These
delegations were uneasy with structural fund expansion, and tended to "argue that cohesion could
best be obtained by providing the same economic conditions throughout the common market and
that emphasis should therefore be on convergence of economic policies" (Corbett 1987, p.248).
However uneasy, they never threatened to veto any major parts of the internal market or other
packaged agreements if the Commission or other proposals were adopted at the IGC.
The poorer country delegations, however, took a substantially stronger position, making
the outcome of the social and cohesion policy provision an explicit condition for their support of
16 These objectives were: "improving employment prospects in the Community and encouraging social
innovation, encouraging the modernization of agriculture...., contributing to the development of less favored regions
and the reconversion of regions experiencing crisis, and encouraging the adaptation of the European economy to
technological changes" (EC Commission, in Gazzo 1986, p.38).
17 Ireland's proposal sought specific provision in the EEC treaty for regional policy, as -'ell a for another provision
increasing the EC's cohesion "by improving citizens' living and working conditions" (Lodge 1986, p. 2 13). France's
alternatives to the Commission proposals highlighted the need for a public finance union.
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the internal market. The Progress Report by the Preparatory Group, setting the agenda for the
second session of the IGC on October 21st, officially chronicled this linkage:
Some delegations, without commenting on the Commission's specific proposals,
considered that appropriate practical provisions in this sector were a condition for
acceptance of the proposals on the Internal Market. They referred to the commitments
which had already been entered into along these lines on several occasions and the resultant
need for the Community to equip itself with the means, including financial means, to help
reduce the disparity in the economic development between the Member States and the
regions. (IGC Preparatory Group, in Gazzo, p.58; emphasis in original text).
Even though the cohesion policy provisions demanded and proposed make no explicit reference to
redressing the risks of internal market liberalization, as some of the ECSC and ESF adjustment
assistance did, this linkage constitutes a demand for side payment compensation.
And through the intervention of Delors, the various delegations were able to come to a
compromise on the cohesion issue, and hence to make a side payment promise (Corbett 1987,
p.248). The compromise involved dropping the demand for the new loan facility, omitting explicit
references to restructuring the ESF provisions (some delegation representatives thought this would
be redundant), and most importantly, accepting that the details on increased funding and
rationalization be left until later, but planned, EC action.
2.3. . The Single European Act as Promised Compensated Liberalization
Negotiation of the v-arious issues in the Inter-governmnental Conference consumed more
time and achieved much less than many had hoped, but a Single European Act encompassing
internal market liberalization, procedural reform and a variety of other issues was ready for
signature on February 17, 1986. On that day, only nine of the EC twelve actually signed the SEA,
with Denmark, Italy and Greece withholding their support pending a Danish referendum on the
SEA project. The day after 56 percent of the Danish public gave their government their go-ahead
to adopt the Luxembourg package, all three member states gave their signatures as well, on
February 28th in the Hague. When whittling away at the "maximalist position" was complete, the
minimalist result disappointed many pro-Europe supporters, especially those committed to more
EC supra-national competencies, but it was an ambitious program of compensated liberalization.
The compromise reached on the schedule, form, and decision-making process towards
internal market liberalization reflected a variety of the revisions of and exemptions from the original
Commission proposal demanded during the conference. But it was still a very ambition
liberalization. The 1992 deadline was adopted, but was not to trigger "automatic legal effects"
(Corbett 1986, p.245). The qualified majority voting rule was to apply to Council directives for
"the common customs tariff, banking, medical and pharmaceutical professions, services of
nationals of third countries, liberalization of exchange policies and movement of capital..., and air
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and sea transport" (Ibid, p.246). It would not apply, however, to those directives designed to
reduce NTBs through harmonization of fiscal policy or free movement of persons. The agreement
also called for a high level of harmonization on issues involving health, safety, consumer
protection and the environment. Where any harmonization is decided by qualified majority states
would through an application process "be free to apply national provisions on grounds of major
needs or relating to the protection of the environment or working conditions" (Ibid). In addition to
the exemption and revision implicit in these measures, the unilateral declarations in defense of
sensitive sectors held as limited exemption from the internal market liberalization. But these
provisions that "rolled-back" the liberalization did not prevent the SEA internal market from being
more far-reaching than any international trade liberalization in history.
With the various economic and social and economic cohesion provisions provided as the
conditions for the support of the internal market by several countries -- most explicitly Portugal,
Greece, and Ireland -- the SEA also promised side payment compensation. The SEA revised the
Treaty of Rome to include a variety of social and economic cohesion commitments, closely
paralleling but slightly watering-down the Commission cohesion proposal. The provisions were
encoded under "Title V: Economic and Social Cohesion," and were detailed in Article 130 (sub-
articles A through E). The article provisions emphasized reform and expansion of the various
structural funds (ERDF, ESF, and Guidance Section of the EAGGF) and other provisions (e.g.
EIB and the ECSC Re-adaptation Fund) (Article 130b). Implementing decisions were to be made
by qualified majority rather than unanimity, thus easing the ERDF implementation, which had
hitherto been constrained by unanimity (Article 130e).
The social and economic cohesion provisions, however, were only an ambiguous promise
of assistance, and were thus only an ambiguous promise of compensated liberalization. The
Article 130 provisions never mentioned any details about the level and direction of the reforms of
the structural funds. And, in fact, never promises to increase the level of funding or sweep of the
funds (Shackleton 1991, p.107). The member countries did, however, express a general
comm.tment at the SEA to increase structural fund finances, "by a declaration referring to the
conclusions of the European Council meeting of Brussels in 1984 that the funds would be
'significantly increased in real terms within the limits of financial possibilities"' (Corbett 1987,
p.249). And although details were left for future action, Article 130d set a schedule:
Once the Single European Act enters into force the Commission shall submit a
comprehensive proposal to the Council, the purpose of which will be to make such
amendments to the structure and operational rules of the existing structural Funds ....The
Council shall act unanimously on this proposal within a period of one year, after consulting
the European Parliament and the Economic Social Committee. EC Commission, in Gazzo
1986, pp.127-8).
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Thus, the cohesion provisions represented a promise for side payment compensation, a clear and
scheduled one, but a promise nonetheless. Whether this was a promise to be fulfilled or forgotten
was answered over the course of the next two years.
2.4. Negotiating the Provision of SEA-Structural Funds Compensated Liberalization
Although the Commission .'.filled its SEA mandate to propose reforms within a year of the
Treaty's passage, the proposed structural fund reforms, and hence the side payment promise,
became caught up in the tangle of budget issues that had been the integration project's traditional
road-blocks. The Commission's proposals for structural funds reform and expansion were
initially aired as part of the general Delors I package, named after the main initiator and champion
of the reforms Jacques Delors, and laid out in the February 17, 1987 report by the Commission
President, Making a Success of the Single Act: A New Frontier for Europe and embellished in a
later report (CEC 1987b; EC Commission 1987c). The Delors I Making a Success of the Single
Act package focused on changes in CAP, revenue, and the UK rebates, as well as structural funds
financing. As the title itself implies, the proposal reiterated the Commission's insistence "on the
intimate link between the establishment of the internal market and cohesion" (CEC 1987b; De Witte
1990, p.28). The Delors package "was presented as a necessary precondition for the successful
implementation of the internal market programme" (Tsoukalis 1993, p.243).
The actual details of the structural funds proposal, however, waited until Commission on
July 31, 1987 submitted its "comprehensive proposal pursuant to Article 130d" laid out in Title V
of the SEA Treaty (CEC 1987d).'" The first recommendation in this proposal was "that the
process of completion of the internal market should be accompanied by a parallel expansion of
budgetary credits for the structural funds, resulting in a doubling, in real terms, of the allocation to
those Funds by 1992" (quoted in De Witte 1990, p.29). This implied a planiied increase from 7 to
14 billion ECU, a rise in their percentage share of the overall budget from 9 percent in 1987 to 25
percent by 1993 (Shackleton 1991, p. 107; Allen 1996, p.2 15, 19). Although the proposal also
called for substantial and ambitious restructuring and coordination of the structural funds along the
lines laid out in the proposed ERDF Reforms and the IMP regulation in 1985, this budgetary
increase was the most dramatic element of the proposal.
Such an audacious request was justified, the report argued, by the insufficiency of previous
regional policy packages to narrow the large gap between the poorer and richer regions combined
with the likelihood that "completion of a genuine internal market was expected to widen even
further the 'natural' gap between dynamic and backward or declining regions" (De Witte 1990,
p.29). The proposed restructuring of the doubling of funds called for the largest portion (65%) to
18 An amended proposal was submitted on March 23, 1988 (EC Commission 1988c).
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be devoted to helping poorer regions with per capita income less than 75 percent of the EC average
(CEC 1987d; see also McAleavey 1993, p.23). Therein lay the idea that the reform would remedy
the gap between "dynamic" and "declining" regions.
The structural funds proposals were negotiated along with the other budgetary elements in
the Delors I package between roughly June 1987 and February 1988, mostly under the Danish
presidency of the Council in the latter half of 1987 (Laffan and Shackleton 1996, p.80). There
was intense controversy over the overall size of the budget and the need to discipline CAP
expenditure, but equally over the commitment of Structurai Fund resources to the poorer regions
(Tsoukalis 1993, pp.243-4). The restructuring provoked much less concern, mainly because its
immediate budgetary implications were very modest and were so overshadowed by the proposal to
double overall funding.
As with the negotiations over the SEA, "the major split was between the poorer states
fighting for a larger budget and the paymasters who sought to restrain the level of any such
increases" (Laffan and Shackleton 1996, p.8 0). Germany and Britain, mcre specifically, were the
reluctant paymasters, in contrast with France and Benelux countries, which would also be footing
the bill. Britain's delegation, however, was the most reluctant. As the negotiations over the
budget commenced, it became clear that Mrs.Thatcher assumed that Article 130 in the SEA
promising substantial structural fund reform was "merely symbolic" (Ibid).
On the other side of the aisle, representatives from the poorer states -- including those at the
highest level and this time including Spain as well as Ireland, Portugal and Greece --joined the
Commission in linking completion of the internal market to an increase in the structural funds.1 9
As one senior Commissioner was to later observe "without the Structural Funds five members
would have had severe doubts about signing up for the Single European Act" (Audit Commission
1991, p. 12; quoted in McAleavey 1993, p.23). In making these pleas, the Commission and the
poorer states were joined by the European Parliament and other groups commissioned to study the
implementation of the internal market (European Parliament 1988; Padua-Schioppa et.al. 1987).20
The attempt to resolve this and other disputes over the budget didn't succeed before or
during the Copenhagen European Council meeting in December 1987 as the Ministers and others
had hoped, so the Council agreed to set up a special meeting in Brussels in February 1988 under to
Germany presidency "in order to overcome the deadlock" (Laffan and Shackleton 1996, p.80). To
19 See, for instance, the Spanish Prime Minister Felipe GonzAlez's position outlined in L'Europe de la
Communautd des douze d I'Union Europdene: Objectif 1992, cited in De Witte 1990, p.2 8 .
The Padoa-Schioppa report, authored by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, previously a senior Commission official was
asked to investigate the "economic consequences of the decision taken in 1985 to enlarge the Community to include
Spain and Portugal and to create a market without internal frontiers by the year 1992" (Cutler et.al. 1989. p.77;
quoted in McAleavey 1993, p.22). The report claimed that as markets integrate there were tendencies promoting
both convergence and divergence in development and income, and said that "adequate accompanying measures are
required to speed adjustment in the structurally weak regions and countries, and counter tendencies towards
divergence" (p.4; cited in McAleavey 1993, p.22).
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"avoid a collapse in the Community's financial structure, Chancellor Kohl successfully brokered a
deal during the three days of that meeting, among other things overr'ding Thatcher's reluctance to
accept the doubling of the Structural Funds (Ibid). 2 ' As one observer noted, the agreement on
structural funds was possibly only because "Kohl wanted to secure agreement and was willing to
push for it, even though it meant a significant increase in Germany's contributions to the budget.
The German government wanted to maintain consensus on the internal-market programme" (Ibid,
italics mine). Thatcher and the British government, apparently, was caught by surprise "because it
had assumed that the Germans were in the austerity camp" (Ibid).
2.4.1. The Structural Funds Reform Fulfilling the SEA Promise
The structural funds reform, coming as it did within the deadline set by Article 130d of the
1986 Treaty revision, fulfilled the SEA's promise of compensated liberalization. Representing by
far the most dramatic development in the Community's regional policy history and getting
developed so quickly compared to the more drawn out ERDF and IMP experiences, the reiorm
came as a surprise to many, even "general astonishment" (Shackleton 1991, p. 107; De Witte 1990,
p.30). The quantitative part of the reform -- the doubling of the various structural funds -- was
enacted through a series of Council directives and by an Inter-institutional Agreement en Budgetary
Discipline and Improvement of Budgetary Procedure designed to ensure that the budget
commitments wouldn't be undone through Commission, European Parliament, and Council In-
fighting (Laffan and Shackleton 1996, p.80).
The qualitative part of the reform was more complicated, and involved no fewer than five
Council Regulations (De Witte 1990, p.30). The most earliest and most overarching was the
"framework Regulation" (2052/88) of June 24, 1988, laying out the functional and geographic
concentration of the various structural funds, and many of the relations between them (CEC
1988e).2 2 Article One of the Regulation laid out and related six Objectives, in particular. Objective
I legions were those least developed regions of the Community "with per capita GDP of less than
75 percent of the EC average" (Marks 1992, p.207). 23 The eligibility of regions was to be
determined by the Council of Ministers, and was expected to include "Northern Ireland, Corsica
and the French Overseas Department, ten Spanish regions, eight regions in the sought of Italy and
21 The other provisions included raising the ceiling of the financial resources available to the Community to 1.2
percent of GDP by 1992; extending the system of "own resources" to include a new fourth resource based on relative
wealth of the member states, as measured by per capita GNP; binding overall CAP spending to be no more than 74
percent of the growth in Community GNP; a continuation of the complex rebate system, set up at Fountainebleu,
for the UK's budget contributions (See Laffan and Shzckleton 1996, p.79-80)
The other Regulations were adopted on December 19, 1988, and included the following: Regulation 4253/88
(coordination between Funds); 4254/88 (Regional Fund); 4255/88 (Social Fund); and 4256/88 (Agricultural Fund).
See EC Commission Official Journal 1988e.
23 Some of the regions ruled eligible were slightly above that 75 percent threshold (Tsoukalis 1993, p.244).
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the whole of Greece, Ireland and Portugal," encompassing 21.5 percent of the EC population
(McAlea,,ey 1993, p.10; Marks 1992, p.207). This aid was allocated 65 percent of the increase
funds, by far the largest of the six objectives, and was to be funded principally out of the ERDF
(80 percent of this fund was to go to Objective 1 regions), but also by the ESF, the EAGGF, the
EIB and the ECSC Re-adaptation fund (Allen 1996, p.225).
The other funds were to receive substantially less of the expanded funding. Objective
Two was to convert regions seriously affected by industrial decline, where unemployment was
above the EC average, and applied to some sixty regions throughout the Community, comprising
almost 17 percent of the EC population. It was to receive around 1 1 percent of total structural fund
moneys. and ,-ass also to be covered by more than one of the funds, including the ERDF, the ESF,
the EIB and the ECSC (Ibid). Objective Three focused on combating long-term unemployment,
while Objective Four on facilitating occupational integration of young people, and were mainly the
preserve of the laboi adjustment assistance funds, ESF and the ECSC, though were also to receive
EIB money. Together they were to consume 11 percent of the total package (about 7.45 billion
ECU between 1989-93). Objective Fi"e focused on agricultural and foiestry assistance (5a) and at
the development of rural areas through diversification away from agriculture (5b), and was funded
to the tune of some 6 billion ECU (about 10 percent of total) by a combination of the Guidance
Section EAGGF, ERDF, ESF and EIB (Ibid). Objective Six, finally, was to deal with problems
particular to the thinly populated regions of Nordic countries (Allen 1996, p.225).
The structural fund refonns also called for a variety of changes in the interaction,
administration, and implementation of the structural ft-nd prcgrams. These included increasing
attention to coordinating expenditures across member states, and increasing the role for regional
authorities (Allen 1996, p.223-9). Some of the most important were changes in the emphasis from
projects to multi-annual, -task, and -regional programs (e.g. the Integrated Development Programs
(IDPs)), and improved coordination among the funds -- reforms already being implemented in the
new IMP provisions (De Witte 1990, p.). And although the principle of additionality applied, and
was actually formalized as a "principle' of the reforms, the cap on the EC's share of funding for
particular programs was to increase from 50 to 75 percent (ibid.; Marks 1992, p.2 10).
The nature and origins of these structural fund reforms and expansion represented a clear
fulfillment of the SEA side payment promise. The Irish, Portuguese, Greek, and, to a lesser
extent, Spanish delegations, all lobbied heavily for the funds, clearly conditioning their support for
the SEA trade liberalization on their reform and expansion. And after thc SEA, all four countries
continued to lobby for such reform and expansion with explicit ref-erence to the risks of completing
the internal market. The increase and reform, finally, was explicitly offered by the Commission
and the richer member states, especially Germany, as compensation to off-set the risks of internal
market liberalization. Although a number of regions in many of the member countries, the poorer
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countries were to receive the lion's shai.'. 24 For all these reasons, many EC historians and political
scientists have explicitly acknowledged the reform as a side payment to compensate for internal
marke' liberalization risks.25 There were other motivations to expand and reform the structural
funds, to be sure. But that doing so was explicitly and strongly demanded and offered as a
condition for acceptance of the SEA reforms, and for future internal market cooperation, makes the
liberalization side payment motivation significant.2 6 In historical context, however, we also can
see that the scale of the finding also makes it the most generous side payment compensation
provided in the history of European liberalization.
2.5. No Side Payment Politics at the National Level
Like thc previous cases, this supra-national side payment compensation contrasts with the
absence of any counterpart at the national level. Leading up to and during the Inte--governmental
Conference for the Single European Act, several parliaments adopted resolutions to influence the
deliberations. All of these resolutions were non-binding, the negotiations still not completed, and
focused mainly on the procedural reforms at the center of the "maximalist program" (Corbett 1987,
p.243). For instance, in mid-October, the Italian Senate Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously
urged the government "to keep the European Parliament's Draft Treaty at the centre of debate, to
confer legislative powers on the EP and to support the EP's proposals for associating itself with
the IGC" (Ibid). They were joined by similar gushings from the Italian Chamber c' Deputies, and
though less effusively, from the Irish, Dutch French, and Belgian parliaments (Ibid).
Actual ratification of the SEA, moreover, turned out to be pretty uneventful (Moravcsik
1991, p.4 4). Although all the governments had representatives expressing skepticism, none
24 Although before and after the reforms roughly 43 percent of the EC population was eligible for structural fund
assistance, the various Objective criteria "has resulted in a significant reduction in coverage in the north of the
Community in favour of the southern and western periphery..." (Liebman and Montalvo 1992, p.400).
25 Among the many equally explicit statements, Tsoukalis's is as concise and explicit as they come: "The creation
of new resources was the necessary side -payment for the political acceptance of the internal market programme and a
means of preparing weaker regions for the new cold winds of competition" (Tsoukalis 1993, p.243). For others, see:
A.len 1996, pp.214ff; McAleavey 1994, pp. 18-26; Marks 1992, passim; Marks 1993; Moravcsik 1991, p.43;
Shackleton 1991, p.107; Laffam and Shbzckleton, pp.79-80; Pelkmans and Winters 1988, p.76; and Ross 1995,
?640.
There were at least four related, or at least compatible, motivations for the Structural Funds expansion, if not
reform, other than as compensation for the trade liberalization: (1) they would directly buy off opposition to the
lowering of CAP by providing benefits, mainly under the EAGGF Guidance Section, to the same groups who were
hitherto receiving CAP Guarantee Section EAGGF benefits; (2) they would provide a strong financial incentive to
lower the CAP as a way of funding a new program, within a fixed budgetary pie, as a wav to build a stronger
coalition of supporters who have nothing to do with the CAP beneficiaries or losers behind CAP reduction, with the
idea that the structural funds can be more easily reduced politically than can the CAP; (3; the Fund expansion would
symbolically deflect criticism from various groups away from CAP reduction; and, of course, (4) they would remedy
the budget deficit by those who pay for the CAP disproportionately, and who need something in return, with the
structural funds being a way to provide such funds ( la ERDF origins).
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passed resolutions, binding or not, to revise or alter their governments' participation in the internal
market process. The letters of intent were goverrimental propositions, to be sure, but they were
tabled and consistent with the supra-national integration process. More seriously and genuinely at
the national-level and stage of liberalization was hesitation shown by the Danish, Itaiian and Irish
governments when the SEA was ready for signing. The Danish delay was the most serious. It's
Folketing on January 21st, 1986 had rejected the draft, with the opposition demanding re-
negotiation, and inspiring a referendum. But none of the governments, including Denmark's,
focused on the problems of trade liberalization, and focused much more on general problems of
sovereignty, and grand political and defense issues (Corbe@t 1986, p.266; Gazzo 1986, p. 113).27
2.6. Implementation of the SEA-Structural Funds
Understanding the generosity and future of the reforms as side payment compensation
requires a word on basic scale and direction of the implementation, and of the 1992 reforms. After
the 1988 structural fund reforms were enacted, the Conmmission was active establishing a list of
regions eligible for assistance under the various criteria, and then in encouraging and developing
actual programs. Of the programs developed as Integrated Development Programs, Community
Support Frameworks, and more discrete projects, the vast majority were initiated by national and
sub-national governments, rather Jhan by the Commission. Between 1989 and 1993. more than 60
billion ECU (in 1989 prices) were earmarked for actions in the various regions under CSFs (Hall
and van der Wee 1992, p.400). And at the end of 1990, another three billion Ecu were added to
assist ihe new German Lander (Tsoukaiis 1993, p.245).
The implementation of these programs has marked a shift away from infrastructural
investments and towards productive investment in industry and human resources. Before the 1988
reform, some 80 percent of the Fund expenditure, especially urder the ERDF, went to support
investment in transportation, telecommunications, energy and water infrastructure. This amount
has since been substantially reduced, in the period 1988 to 1991 to 55% in Objective I regions and
a mere 16% in Objective 2 regions (CEC 1991). During this latter period, a substantially greater
proportion of the resources -- 40% of Objective I and 80% of Objective 2 -- were used "to support
investment in industry and services, to improve the business environment and to develop human
resources" (Hall and van der Wee 1992, p.400). This orientation of the funding, of course, varies
project to project and country to country -- for instance, with Spain still disproportionately
spending its share of Funds on infrastructural investment -- but the overall shift is clear (IbFoid).
27 A letter exchange between the Danish writer and Euro-skeptic Ebbe Reich and his extreme opposite Spinelli
reveals the focus of concern. In it Reich outlines a variety of concerns as characteristic of the Danish skepticism,
none of which concef ns the trade liberalization. In fact, such liberalization, in Reich's view, is one of the few
features of the EC that could make integration palatable (see Gazzo 1986, pp. 113- 16).
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In macroeconomic terms the programs are modest, but as proportion of total national
investment they are significant. Between 1989 and 1993, the structural fund budgets amounted to
between 1.2% and 1.6% of the GDP in Objective 1 regions. Among the three weakest member
states, the numbers are slightly higher, but still modest: Ireland, 2.3%; Greece, 2.9%, and
Portugal, 3.5% (Tsoukalis 1993, F.24 5 ). As a percentage of total national investment -- both
public and private -- the structural fund programs ranged from 7% to 11%, and have grown since
1988 (Hall and van der Wee 1992, p.401). In 1993 the Community funds in total represented
11% of total investment, 7% in Ireland, and 8% in Portugal (Laffan and Shackleton 1996, p.74).
At the time of the 1988 reforms, the Council pledged to revisit the scale and direction of the
structural fund iefornms developed between 1991 and 1992. In the event, the structural funds
reform was caught up in a similar budget wrangle to the one through which they were doubled in
1988, with similar linkage to the continued deepening of the internal market. Although this linkage
is in itself of interest to the history and theory of compensated liberalization, to be discussed
shortly, what matters here are the substantive changes in the structural funds that retained its
increasing status and scale in the EC budget.
There, the member states agreed to increase the size of the funds from 18.6 billion Ecus in
1992 (reflecting more than dcubling of the funds as planned between 1988 and 1993) to 30 billion
Ecus in 1999 (at 1992 prices) (Shackleton 1993; Allen 1996, p.219). This implies an increase in
Table 7.1.
Structural Funds, 1994-1999:
Breakdown by Member State and Objectivc(in million Ecus at 1992 prices) (a)
Commty.
Country Object. l Object. 2 Ubjcts3&4 Object. 5a Object. 5b Initiatives Total (%)
Belgium 730 160 465 192 77 178 1,822 1.3
Denmark - 56 301 263 54 87 760 0.5
Germany 13,640 733 1,942 1,134 1,227 1,265 19,940 14.6
Greece 13,980 - - - - 990 14,970 10.9
Spain 26,300 1,130 1,843 432 664 2,242 32,610 23.9
France 2,190 1,765 3,203 1,913 2,238 1,232 12,541 9.1
Ireland 5,620 - - - - 374 5,994 4.3
Italy 14,860 684 1.715 799 901 1,505 20,464 15
Luxmbrg - 7 23 40 6 6 82
Netherlds 150 300 1,079 159 150 212 2,050 1.5
Portugal 13,980 - - - - 1,233 15,213 11.1
.X 2,360 2,142 3,377 439 817 814 9,949 7.2
Total 93,810 6,977 13,948 5,369 6,134 10,137 136395(c)
(%) 68.7 5.1 '0.2 3.9 4.5 7.4 (b)
(a) Objective 2 total and breakdown for 1994-6 only
(b) These figures are for the 9 Community initiatives agreed by July 1994
(c) The actual total for 1994-9 will be 141,471 million ecus. The difference is made up by the 1997-9 tranche
of Objective 2 funding, other Commar•ity initiatives and a small amoant to be spent on innovative measures.
Source:Aiien 1996,p.221.
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the proportion of the overall EC budget from 28 percent in 1992 (compared with the 9 percent in
1987 and the proposed increase to roughly 25 percent by 1993) to 35 percent in 1999. The
Maastricht Accord set up and the Edinburgh meeting implemented a new structural fund, the
Cohesion Fund, to finance large-scale trans-European transport networks and environmental
improvement projects in Member states with per-capita GNP below 90 percent of the EC average
(McAleavey 1994).
The reforms hove also called for more modest qualitative changes. These included
improvements in implementation and coordination across regions and between regions and
Community institutions. The basic orientation of the various Objectives has remained, however.
In addition to the new German Liinder, the Commission and Council since the reforms have given
Objective One status to regions in the richer states, including Hainault in Belgium, the Highlands
and Islands in the UK, and the Fievoland in the Netherlands) (Allen 1996, p.226; Hooghe and
Keating 1994). And the additionality principle still applied, with the structural funds to support no
more than 75 percent of total program budgets, and with 90 percent of the structural funds
expected to go towards nationally-initiated programs and 9 percent towards Cormmunity initiatives
in the 1994-1999 period (Allen 1996, p.223). The overall budget projections for the structural
funds is summarized in Table 7.1 below.
In short, the structural funds have been implemented in a way that not only consolidates,
but exceeds the reform and expansion begun in 1988 with the SEA fight. Leaving aside very
important issues of the funds' effectiveness, this continued expansion means that the funds are an
important part of EC economic life. They may or may not be effective in narrowing regional
disparities, in promoting development, and achieving its various other goals, issues that are
beyond the scope of this study., but they are programs that affect many people's lives and
conception of the EC -- and that enjoy substantial support.
And for the side payment politics, this support is the key to the implementation story.
Through their consolidation, the structural funds have generated support from a number of
constituencies to fight for their continuation and expansion -- both in the member states, in the
supra-national EC institutions, and among trans-national non-governmental organizations (Hooghe
and Keating 1994; Allen 1996, p.220; McAleavey and Mitchell 994, passim). As the Conclusion
will show, the interesting point is that such fightirng on behalf of the structural funds is still linked
to development of the internal market project -- through side payment politics as a legacy of the
SEA-Structural Funds liberalization episode. This legacy has more meaning, however, only in the
context of a clear explanation for the developments in the post-EEC liberalization episodes, and it is
to that which we now turn.
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3. Interpreting State Aids and Welfare: The Minimum of Side Payments at the Domestic Level
In all of the EU internal market liberalization episodes reviewed in this and the previous
Chapter, we have seen that struggles over the domestic and international negotiation of the
liberalization yielded plenty of supra-national side payments but little or no side payment
compensation at the domestic/national level. Yet we know from the literature on the relationship
between economic openness and the public economy that national governments, especially
continental European governments, provide plenty of assistance to cushion the blows of economic
openness. And we know, further, that in many cases natonal assistance of various forms goes up
as countries become more open over time and when we compare less with more open economies
(Blais 1986, Cameron 1978, Katzenstein 1985, Garrett and Mitchell 1996. Rodrik 1997). To
what extent do these links between openness and the public economy involve side payment
compensation, understood to mean assistance that is both intended to help victims of liberalization
and separate from the protections being reduced? Thus, to what extent is EC compensated
liberalization really a supra-national affair?
In the European setting, as in the US setting, the answer to these questions is that most
government expenditures that seem traceable to changes in openness do not reflect side payment
compensation, and hence EC side payment compensation tends to be supra-national -- even though
the overall package of public assistance to the victims of openness are both supra-national and
national. The reason changes in public subsidies, broader welfare assistance, and other public
expenditures generally do not constitute side payment compensation is because they either are not
targeted to help the victims of the EC internal market liberalization, or are not separate from the
core protectionist being reduced by that liberalization. To see this, consider the welfare and state
aid subsidization in turn.
Between the 1950s and the 1980s, EC member countries did, indeed, expand their income
transfers, health care policies, active and passive labor market policies, and the like. And there is
some, though limited, evidence that the countries that liberalized the most expanded such welfare
spending the most -- at least into the early 1980s.28 But these welfare expansions were generally
separate from the internal-market liberalization process and politics. During the domestic and
supra-national phases of the internal-market episodes, as we have seen, national and sub-national
28 The evidence is shaky, in that the longitudinal data looks at trade as a percentage of GDP, not at policy
liberalization, and in that the longitudinal studies that do exist are divided over whether increases in
openness/liberalization inspired expansions of public spending, particularly welfare. Garret 1995 and Garrett and
Mitchell 1996, for instance, claim the evidence generally suggests that changes to openness correlate with modest
welfare contractions -- except among the countries with strongest "Left-labor power." Rodrik 1997, however, claims
that greater openness caused greater public spending, particularly when looking at social welfare spending rather than
government spending generally (pp.49-59).
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Table 7.2
State Aids to Industry and Agriculture as a Percentage of GDP, 1960-94
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1981-6 1986-8 1988-90 1990-2 **1992-4
Belgium 1.9 2.3 2.9 3.9 4.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 2.9 2
Denmarkt 0.3 0.8 2.7 2.8 3.2 1.3 1 1.1 1 1
France 1.6 2.2 2 2.4 2.5 2.7 2 2.1 1.7 1.4
Germany 0.8 1.3 1.7 2 2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.6
Greece * * * * * 2.5 4.5 3.1 1.9 1.7
Irelandt 3.3 4 4.9 6.9 8.4 4 2.7 1.9 1.2 1.5
Italy 1.4 1.3 1.5 2.7 3 4 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.3
Luxembourg na na na na na 6 4 3.9 2.4 2.1
Netherlands 1.2 0.7 1.3 1.8 2.7 1.5 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.8
Portugal * * * * * * 1.5 2 1.5 1.2
Spain * * * * * * 2.7 1.8 1.3 1.2
UKt 1.9 1.6 1.7 3.5 2.4 1.8 1.1 1.2 0.5 0.4
EU 1.2 1.5 1.9 2.6 3.5 *2.8 2.2 2.1 1.8 1.7
*EEC 10 figure excludes Portugal and Spain, which were not yet members.
t 1960-70 figures included, but not incorporated into EC total, since Denmark, Ireland and UK
were not in EC until 1973
** Data for 1992-94 are underestimated. France, Greece Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain supplied no or incomplete data on aid to agriculture (EC 1997: 35)
Sources: Blais 1986; Dylla 1997, Appendix p.1; OECD Nat'l Accounts; CEC selected years.
groupings complained plenty about the liberalization process, but they did not ask for reforms or
expansion of national welfare schemes as part of the struggle over the EC agenda.
And if we look at the political struggles that did underlie expansion of those welfare
schemes, we see that they generally were episodic changes, temporally separate from the EC
project, and fueled by broader coalition struggles about how national governments can better deal
with all kinds of economic dislocations and inequality problems -- not the suffering from
liberalization per se -- and by partisan or personnel changes in leadership. For instance, the major
changes and expansion in German welfare provision, especially the major expansion in
employment policies in the 1969 Work Promotion Act represented a change in the composition in
government -- the electoral and government successes of the SPD.2 9
As for state aids, various forms of such assistance to industry and agriculture -- including
nationally-funded and -devised industrial and agricultural subsidies, tax breaks, "crisis
cartelization," etc. -- grew substantially over the first twenty years of the internal market
29 In this particular case, I have studied Bundestag documents on debate over the reform and expansion of the active
labor market components of the policy package. And in those deliberations I found no examples of partisans
demanding new employmtnt policies to deal with trade liberalization in the EU project past, present or future.
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liberalization. Table 7.2 below captures the bulk of this assistance, the state aids that include all
national subsidies outside EU structural fund auspices. As the Table shows, the average level of
state aids as a percentage of GDP nearly tripled between 1960 and the early 1980s, from 1.2 to
more 3.5 percent, before gradually declining in the latter half of the 1980s and early 1990s -- back
to an average of 1.7 percent between 1992 and 1994. This entire post-1959 period, of course,
encompasses the liberalization that has been the subject of the last two chapters. So already the
correlation is present in even the crudest form. More significantly, Blais 1986, Blais and Fels
1985, and others have shown that for countries including but going beyond the EU, tariff
reductions were statistically significantly correlated with increases in such state aids; Blais 1986
claimed that "everything else being equal, a reduction of 3 percentage points in tariffs leads to an
increase of I percentage point in public subsidies" (p.210).30 Given that such state aids are
targeted at the potential losers of trade liberalization, this supports the idea that domestic
subsidization might have entailed side payment compensation.
But several considerations suggest otherwise. First, for several reasons the increases in
state aids might have had benefited the losers of EC internal market liberalization, but were not
targeted and created to off-set such losers. Instead, they were more a reflection of broader
demands for government redress for broader problems plaguing non-trade as well as tradable
sectors -- Blais's own statistics shows a statistically much stronger correlation between
unemployment and subsidies thtn between tariff redu.tions and subsidies -- and for broader public
policy goals like social solidarity and equality.3" And in any event, the period also saw substantial
tariff and NTB liberalization vis ai vis non-EU countries, not just internal market liberalization. In
the content of the politics, moreover, the struggles over the EC internal-market episodes under
review here make no mention of subsidization as a way to off-set the costs of the internal market
liberalization -- except in so far as such subsidization is seen as an explicit exemption from the
reach of that liberalization. The domestic-political struggles over subsidization itself might reveal
important demanders or suppliers of subsidization linking their position on subsidies to past or
future internal market liberalization. I have not tested for such activity, so the conclusion that
proliferation of state aids is not targeted to redress internal-market liberalization is tentative.
In any event, many state aids were, in fact, exemptions from the reach of liberalization,
rather than compensation. Many national subsidization schemes grew and developed out of the
explicit phasing-in exemptions allowed by the ECSC and the EEC, and as discussed above. Many
30 Such results should be interpreted with caution, especially given the concern with side payment politics. The
Blais 1986 correlation is cruss-sectional across various European and other countries in a given year, thus lacking the
longitudinal dimension most relevant to our concerns with how countries respond to changes in levels of protection.
The only true longitudinal studies, to my knowledge, do not break out subsidies from otpf" expenditures, and focus
on trade as a percentage of GDP rather than trade liberalization.
31 No studies exist that look for correlations between such broader concerns -- as captured by, say, inequality levels -
- and subsidization.
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developed outside of these official mandates, a significant sub-component of which were not
separate from the NTBs the EEC explicitly sought to reduce. Many of these subsidy schemes, for
instance, violated Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty of Rome, though the Commission did not
effectively fulfil its mandate to monitor and control such subsidies. After 1986, with the passage
of the SEA, the overlap between state aids and the protections to be liberalized under the internal
market mandate was significantly greater. And after the SEA, the Commission acted more strongly
to liberalize such subsidies. by issuing more judgments on the use of aid, and demanding more
firms to repay illegitimate aid (Stuart 1995, Dylla 1997). 32 Whether a reflection of this
Commission activity in the post SEA period, or of a separate and more general trend away from
dirigisme, Table 7.2 captures the very significant decline in the use of such state aid as a percentage
of GDP in the post-1985 period.
State aid, therefore, appears to have provided assistance for those industries suffering from
EC liberalization, but the assistance was not likely side payment compensation -- especially in the
sense of entering into actual negotiations over the approval or disapproval over the water-shed
inter-governmental episodes that are the main stepping-s,ones to internal market liberalization.
This is most clearly true in the post-SEA period, but likely applies to the period between 1958 and
1986 as well. In short, taking into account broader welfare and state aid changes during the period
in which the internal market liberalization matured, we can see some expansion in the public
economy that helped humanize and facilitate that liberalization. But this expansion constitutes a
complement to rather than examples of side payment compensation. Hence, EC compensated
liberalization was essentially a supra-national affair.
4. Explaining Internal Market Compensated Liberalization, 1973-1988
As histories of compensated liberalization, the three internal market episodes discussed in
this chapter -- the Greek and Iberian Enlargements, and the SEA-Structural Funds Reform -- are as
noteworthy for the contrasts they reveal in the history of internal market liberalization as for the
continuity they share with the other cases in that history, the EEC and ECSC. Like founding
episodes in EC integration, the most recent series of negotiations yielded generous side payment
compensation for vulnerable groups fearing the costs or risks of freer trade, with the compensation
devised during the international deliberations, and involving policies funded and administered by
the EC's supra-national institutions. Also like the previous cases of compensated liberalization, the
32 As a 1978 Commission statement lamented, "granting of state assistance could cause a permanent drift towards
protectionism within the Community, both as between the Member States and in relations with the rest of the
world" (CEC 1978, p. 123). And more recently the Commission communications have often stated the commitment
to "controlling state aids with the objective of reducing overall levels of state aid and reliance by firms on public
support" (CEC 1996, p.20).
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accompanying deliberations that took place within national polities yielded no national policies that
would independently compensate or mitigate such fears. In fact, this pattern is clearer in the
structural funds cases than in the EEC and ECSC cases, both of which sparked more domestic
political action separate from the international level and phase, and generated more legislative riders
than the virtual domestic-legislative quiet in the structural funds cases. Thus, the Enlargements and
SEA-Structural Funds Reform deepen the pattern of generous and supra-nationally provided and
negotiated compensated -- in contrast with the US's less generous and nationally provided and
negotiated compensation.
But the contrasts within the history of internal market liberalization are just as important to
the theory and hope of compensated liberalization. The Enlargement and SEA-Structural Fund
histories reveal a trend in internal market politics towards a narrowing focus on the issues and
policies that become the subjects of side payment linkage. Whereas the EEC and ECSC cases
revealed a variety of such linkage, including not only supra-national adjustment assistance, but also
the packaging of grand issues such as the Euratom to the EEC, and the push for policy
harmonization to off-set the costs of tariff reductions (successful in the EEC, unsuccessful in the
ECSC). All the major internal market liberalization episodes since that time, however, have
converged upon creating, expanding, and reforming supra-national adjustment assistance and other
regional development budget programs -- clustered under the rubric "structural funds" -- as the
principal subject of side payment linkage, to the exclusion of harmonization or grand packaging.
The history of the "structural fund episodes" also revealed important differences not only
with the EEC and ECSC, but among themselves: increasing generosity and patience in structural
fund side payments. The Second Enlargement yielded substantially greater side payment
compensation than the first enlargement, and included the creation of a new structural fund
program, the IMPs: more money was involved, more people to be served, and more ambitious
intervention conceived. The SEA-Structural Fund reform, moreover, yielded still more generous
side payment compensation, a doubling in the funds, and concentrated the benefits on all poorer
regions of the EC Twelve rather than on the incumbent regions as the IMP compensation had done.
Finally, the SEA-Structural Funds Reform provided side payment compensation in two steps, a
promised commitment made in the SEA Treaty and fulfilled through the budget reform two years
later, making it compensation of unprecedented patience.
How can we explain this mix of contrasts and continuity? Luckily, the side payment
politics that characterize the creation and reform of the structural funds have been more widely-
recognized and analyzed than any of the previous cases of compensated liberalization -- in the US
or Europe. Historians and political scientists focusing on broad theoretical issues of issue linkage,
on the political economy of European integration, and most narrowly on the development of the
structural funds, have commonly and explicitly recognized that the creation and reform of the
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ERDF, the IMP, and then the subsequent expansion and reform of the whole package represented
side payments for the problems of integration, including in the latter two cases, the problems of
trade liberalization.
Most of these writings describe and explain these side payments as a predictable
consequence of the basic payoff structure of the internal market bargaining, with the nations
acknowledging liberalization's uneven distributional consequences and seeking pareto
improvement -- the nations expected to lose demanding and getting compensation from those
expected to win (McAleavey 1994; Marks 1992, 1993; Shackleton 1991, 1993, 1996). A few
more accurately see side payments as more complicated and difficult, and suggest a variety of
useful propositions, such as that side payments should be marginal, targeted at less central
bargainers, be provided late in negotiations, and be generally limited by big issue linkage tending
to spark strong domestic opposition (Moravcsik 1993; Weber and Wiesmuth 1987).
All of these treatments, especially the more nuanced contributions, provide leverage to
explain the patterns of continuity and change established by the structural fund episodes of internal
market liberalization. But there is much in these patterns that the ample attention provided to the
episodes still cannot explain, or explain well. The theory of compensated liberalization covers
some of the same ground as existing accounts, but it also offers many contrasting interpretations.
Through synthesis or disagreement with existing accounts, this theory draws attention to a number
of historical and institutional conditions that mediate protectionist power and transaction costs that,
in turn, better and more fully explain the patterns of continuity and change in SEA-Structural Fund
compensated liberalization. Such a focus better explains, in particular, the continued trend of
supra-nationality, the post EEC tuend towards structural fund compensation and away from
alternatives, and the increasing patience and generosity of the successive episodes of compensated
liberalization. Consider the explanation of each in turn.
4.1 Deepened Supra-nationality and Generosity in Contrast to National Politics
The basic supra-nationality and generosity of side payment compensation in the history of
internal market liberalization is what most distinguishes the European trade liberalization experience
from the US, and with the history of the internal market liberalization complete, we can consider a
more complete explanation of it than was possible in Chapter Six. EC internal market
liberalization's supra-nationality and generosity is left unexamined by the existing attention to
structural fund side payments. Indirectly, however, some of the more thoughtful contributions
suggest reasonable expectations, only they are the opposite expectation of the actual pattern. Some
of the most thoughtful work, for instance, has pointed out the way significant side payment
provision at the international level of EC bargaining will be constrained by the way such provision
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will inspire strong domestic opposition that, in turn, requires domestic side payments (Friman
1994, Moravcsik 1993). This, in turn, suggests that the realization of international side payments,
even if it entails supra-national policy provision, might rest on national provision of side payments.
This expectation that supra-national side payments may require national ones is important
and plausible, and such a pattern may have emerged in other settings, but it is inconsistent with
actual history of internal market liberalization, including the Enlargement and SEA liberalization
episodes.33 In fairness to this perspective, it might be argued that the reason no national-level
provision arose was because the supra-national provision and issue linkage was neither significant
nor divisive enough, as a budgetary item, to provoke strong domestic opposition. This may
explain partly why the side payment politics converged on budgetary items like the structural
funds, another of the perspective's expectations (Moravcsik 1993, Weber and Wiesmuth 1987).
But the perspective misses how generous budgetary items can be in redressing perceived risks of
liberalization, how such subjects of side payment linkage can be targeted at buying off opposition
from domestic interest groups, via their national delegations, 34 and in so doing can displace
demands for safeguards at the domestic level. In short, the focus on the EC side payment politics
without attention to its US counterparts makes it easy to overlook the significance, let alone the
origins, of the EC compensation's generosity and supra-nationality.
The theory of compensated liberalization offers a more complete explanation of this
deepened supra-nationality and generosity. As Chapter Six have already laid out, the theory of
compensated liberalization draws attention to how the integration project and its institutions exhibit
a number of features that allow bargaining at the international phase of the negotiations, and relying
on EC supra-national competencies, to overcome power and transaction cost barriers that
commonly stand in the way of side payment issue linkage. There are five principal advantages of
EC institutions, and the structural funds episodes reveal a maturation in those advantages beyond
the ECSC and EEC founding.
First, with liberalization being part of the integration project, the bargaining delegations
approached the trade policy bargaining along-side a dense thicket of other issues that got discussed
in detail and could be made subject of side payment linkage. This was true in the ECSC and even
more so in the EEC/Euratom discussions. But during the Second Enlargement and, especially
33 It may have emerged, for instance, in the multi-level struggle over CAP reform and the UK rebate, resolved
temporarily at the Fountainebleu summit. There, the international linkage, or side payment, between UK rebate and
CAP reductions on the one hand, and increased revenue sources on the other, was made possible by a second set or
side payments to off-set opposition from agricultural groups. These side payments included mainly EAGGF
Guidance funding, as mentioned above, but it also supposedly involved increased domestic policy provision -- in
other words, national-level side payment compensation.
34 Using the budgetary issue linkage as a method to buy-off domestic opposition contrasts with the implication of
the existing perspectives, which imply that the internationally-provided side payments or issue linkage are targeted at
different actors than are national-level side payments, when in fact all are generally targeted at domestic interest
groups as well as national delegations, through the two-level side payment politics discussed above.
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during the wide-ranging Inter-governmental Conference that created the SEA, the integration
project had matured to include a cluster of proposals for action on a wide range of issues, including
monetary union, political and defense cooperation, and social and environmental policy
harmonization. This constitutes a broad jurisdictional breadth in the parlance of the theory of
compensated liberalization developed in Chapter One.
Second, with liberalization tied into the integration project, the delegations were more and
increasingly conscious of "the shadow of the future," both in the current negotiation and in future
interactions. This had the effect of increasing concern for the happiness of bargaining partners,
and increasing concern for reputations. As the integration project came to encompass a denser set
of issues, and as it became more stab , in its future compared to the precariousness of the EEC and
ECSC episodes, groups at all levels of the polity became more aware of the EC's existence, and its
future promise.
Third, the EC's supra-national competencies improved monitoring capacities that, in turn,
made it easier to identify and understand all the various issues and affected groups, thereby making
it easier to identify linkages that would be pareto improving and impose minimal third party
externalities. Such capacities also made it easier to monitor compliance with EC agreements. As
the number of EC Commission competencies spread into new areas, and deepened within existing
ones, its ability to gather and disseminate information about possible and past linkages increased.
Fourth, the EC's budgetary and policy-providing competencies made it easier for the
beneficiaries of liberalization in one country to provide benefits to compensate the losers in another
country through linkages outside the liberalization focus. With the ECSC and EEC such
competency was in its infancy, and in fact doubts about its existence or independent funding
presumably diminished the possibility of using the supra-national budget and administration as
policies to be linked to liberalization concessions. With the maturation of the EC project, however,
these doubts faded, all the more so as the EC developed its independent revenue facilities, and as
the implementation of the structural funds communicated to the sub-national groups and their
national delegations that there was pork to be had.
Fifth and finally, the EC's unanimity voting rules increased the power of marginal
protectionist groups, providing they could get the attention of their national delegation, and thereby
increased the search for pareto-improving package-deals. After the Luxembourg Compromise, all
decisions, including those over trade liberalization, were subject to unanimity voting in the Council
of Ministers. The Single European Act, however, was important as much for :1e re-assertion of
qualified majority voting as for trade liberalization, and although the range of issues over which the
latter applied was limited, most aspects of trade reduction and harmonization towards the single
market were included. So the last internal market liberalization case saw a moderation rather than
intensification in this advantage for compensatory rather than rough-shod liberalization.
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With these five advantages, the national and international fights over internal market
liberalization was more likely to yield side payment compensation during the international
deliberations and to involve supra-national policy provision. With such increased likelihood of
supra-national provision, the theory of compensated liberalization suggests two final conditions
that made it increasingly unlikely that such side payment compensation would be accompanied by
anything else during national phases of the bargaining and by national governments. Here, the
development of the integration project after the EEC saw the deepening of one, and the diminution
of the other of these tendencies.
First, the existence or prospect of side payment provision at the supra-national level would
displace the need and interest in supplementary provisions nationally. Here the maturation of the
whole integration project's institutions and bargaining practices were key. In the ECSC, there was
no precedent of supra-national safeguard or compensation provision to assuage fears of domestic
groups that their interests would be compromised by the supra-nationally devised liberalization. In
the EEC, there was such a precedent, but it was a recent and relatively weak one -- for actual policy
benefits under the re-adaptation fund and the subsidization schemes in the transition period were
still being tried and revised. After that time, however, EC structural fund provision increased its
activities gradually and continually, disseminating within the polity the expectation that supra-
national institutions could be relied upon to provide benefits -- or, again, pork. Such a pattern
mirrors, and plausibly helps explain, the shifting focus of domestic-political ferment away from
national phases of negotiations and on demands for national-levc safeguards and compensation,
towards the supranational phase and level. The displacement effect, in short, grew stronger.
Second, the generosity of welfare provision at the national level, in contrast with the
relative underdevelopment of such welfare provision at the EC supra-national level, made side
payment provision accompanying liberalization an unnecessary, and even inappropriate,
supplement to general systems of welfare. Here, it is important to point out that the maturation of
the EC-level policy-making worked against an increased reliance on the most developed areas of
supra-national policy-making as subjects of side payment compensation: delegations and domestic
groups would increasingly believe that the preexistence of supra-national provision to compensate
for and safeguard against economic suffering from liberalization would obviate the need to provide
new assistance with successive liberalization episodes. The supra-national competencies, although
more and increasingly developed than during the ECSC and EEC episodes, were nonetheless a
pale comparison to their national counterparts. Thus, bargaining over the fears of dislocation due
to trade liberalization would still leave the international a more obvious target for redress than the
national system."
35 This is the flip-side of the coin of how the development of supranational structural fund provision, and the
dissemination of that development, favors displacement of national by supra-national compensation provision. The
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Chapter One emphasized two of the above institutional characteristics in trying to predict
the incidence of compensation during liberalization episodes: jurisdictional breadth, and welfare
generosity. And these two conditions figure prominently in the above explanation. The history
does not confirm that these two conditions matter more than the other institutional conditions
relevant to transaction costs and power. Nonetheless, the hypothesized interaction between
jurisdictional breadth and welfare generosity holds tone when we compare the EC with the US
institutional settings and the two continents' patterns of compensated liberalization. And we have
the historical support to summarize the hypothesized and actual differences between the US and EC
patterns of compensated liberalization.
Recall that US trade liberalization was conducted in domestic institutional settings that
combined reasonably broad jurisdiction breadth (House Ways and Means and Senate Finance have
broad authority) with a relatively modest array of welfare provision. The international phases of
US trade liberalization, meanwhile, took place in an institutional setting that combined narrow
jurisdictional breadth (e.g. GATT is single issue-oriented) with virtually non-existent welfare
provision. Such a combination predicts that bargaining at the supranational level will tend to
discourage groups from identifying and dema.ding secondary bargaining distinct from
liberalization under review, but will encourage such linkage domestically. Figure 7.1 captures this
contrast within the US cases, where P(a) and L(a) represent the average indifference curves of
protectionists and liberalizers, respectively, in national-level bargaining, and where (P(b) and L(b)
represent protectionists and liberalizers (in national delegations arid any mobilized sub-national
groups) in international settings. P(a) is relatively steep and L(a) relatively flat, compared to P(b)
and L(b), suggesting that the former pairing encourages substantially more linkage than the latter.
The EC compensated libecralization represents almost the mirror image of this institutional
pattern. EC supranational institutions through which internal market liberalization wa. negotiated -
- inter-governmental conferences and Council of Ministers -- inv3lved relatively broad
jurisdictional breadth as an artifact of the integration project. At the same institutional level,
welfare provision was, ever as late as the early 1970s, very modest. Such an aray of institutional
characteristics predict that liberalizers and protectionist:s in the supra-national phases of the
liberalization -will be strongly encouraged to link liberalization to side issues -- even more so than
US domestic bargaining. The relatively steep P(c) and flat L(c) in Figure 7.2 capture this result,
with the relatively large zone of possible agreement. Meanwhile, national level institutions
hrough which the respective EC member states ratified EC internal-market liberalization generally
combined broad jurisdictional breadth with generous welfare provision -- especially on the
Figure 7.1 Figure 7.2
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continental states leading the integration project, and especially labor market policies most relevant
to the dislocation of the internal market. Through displacement and through reluctancne to encroach
upon preexiscing welfare, the result is that liberalizer and protectionists operating in the domestic
phases will avoid secondary bargaining over side payment compensation -- hence the relatively flat
P(d) and steep (L(d) in Figure 7.2.
These bargaining tendencies, finally, predicts different patterns of side payments in the US
and EC. In the US the theory predicts and history broadly reveals relatively modest compensation
at the international level or by supranational institutions, but more frequent and generous
compensation at the national level. And in the EC the institutional characteristics predict generous
and frequent compensation at the supra-national level and relatively modest provision at the
national level. Figure 7°3 schematically captures the predicted and observed outcomes.
4.2. Narrowing Concentration On Structural Fund Compensation
To understand why the development of internal market liberalization saw a narrowing focus
on structural funds as the subject of side payment linkage, to the exclusion of other subjects like
social policy harmonization or more grand packages like the Euratom, scholarship on EC side
payments is substantially more helpful. Several scholars have pointed out that, in so far as EC
bargaining elicits issue linkage and side payments at the international level, it will tend to converge
upon budgetary issues like structural fund pork, because the preferences of domestic groups tend
to be less intense over such issues (Mor;vcsik 1993), and because its fungibility makes it easier to
Figure 7.3
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fashion packages of benefits that avoid alienating other national or domestic groups (Moravcsik
1993, p.505; Weber and Wiesmuth 1987, and McAleavey 1994, pp.3 1-2). Such an explanation
helps us understand why structural funds gradually displaced other subjects of linkage relied upon
in the ECSC and EEC negotiations. Linking some harmonization to off-set trade liberalization in
another area, or linking such liberalization into more grand package deals might be more possible
in the EC than in other institutional settings, but the likelihood that these deals will provoke more
opposition -- either third party externality opposition, or opposition from liberalizers -- make these
subjects of linkage less attractive than structural funds.
The theory of compensated liberalization overlaps this useful explanation, but in its focus
on transaction cost and power conditions underlying side payment issue linkage, it also points to a
couple of other explanations for the shift in emphasis. The overlap lies in the observation that
harmonization entails many more actors. compromises by entrenched policy administrators and
piactices. This makes harmonization more likely than stractural fund provision to make it difficult
to get ijiformation about and understand the distributional implications of such linkage, and to
provoke opposition from those third parties ambivalent or disinterested in liberalization but
opposed to the changes harmonization would bring. And these are precisely the effects that make
side payment linkage generally more costly in transaction cost terms than otl'er intra-issue links.
Structural fund provision, on the other hand, does not spark such high transaction costs. And
538
Burgoon
Chapter Seven
once the funds have been used more than once as such subjects, the costs of sticking with them as
side payment compensation are relatively much lower than looking for new side payment subjects
in subsequent liberalization episodes.
The added explanations for the focusing on structural fund linkage are, first, that the
structural fund reforms were already on the EC Commission's and the Council of Ministers'
agenda for policy development, certainly in a more detailed and developed way than harmonization
proposals or other possible policy subjects of linkage. This made it substantially easier to identify
and focus on such fund reforms as the prime mechanism for off-setting liberalization. We saw this
effect when Britain was first acceding to the EC, when the ERDF proposals already on the agenda
fell into everyone's lap just when they were searching for a way to compensate for the UK's CAP-
induced net-contributor status. The similar dynamic applied when the IMP proposals made IMP an
obvious subject of side payment linkage for Greece's continued acceptance of accession
liberalization and for Greece, France, and Italy to accept the Iberian Enlargement's agricultural
competition.
Finally, the theory of compensated liberalization reminds us that policies that were once the
subject of side payment compensation for some liberalization might later become, themselves, the
subject of liberalization -- and, hence, by definition no longer a side payment if traded off against
other elements of the liberalization. That is what happened with at least one of the alternative
subjects of linkage used in the EEC and ECSC liberalizations -- social and wage harmonization.
This doesn't explain anything for the First and Second Enlargement liberalizations, during which
EEC membership entailed principally tariff and quota liberalization. But it does explain why SEA
liberalization and the search for compensatory safeguards didn't focus on harmonization as
opposed to structural fund provision or reform: general policy harmonization was either the
subject of liberalization, as the alternative to mutual recognition, or was the target of other
integration goals like environmental cooperation.
4.3. Increasing Generosity of EC Side Payment Compensation
The second historical shift revealed by the sweep of EC internal market liberalization is the
increasing generosity of the structural fund provision. The EC .-ide payment literature,
unfortunately, is little help here. A corollary of the claim that budgetary issues will predominate
other subjects of side payment linkage is that they will tend to increase. But this claim is not
anywhere develcped, let alone stated. And in any eve t, such hypotheses would explain why
structural fund provision increased significantly in each episode of liberalization rather than
gradually.
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The theory of compensated liberalization's focuc on a few determinants of protectionist
power and transaction cost conditions provides a reasonable explanation for both increased
generosity and patience. The most obvious explanation for the increased generosity cf the
struciural fund provision from the First to the Second Enlargements, and from those Enlargements
to the SEA-Structural Fund Reform involves the increase and distribution of protectionist political
power over the three episodes. First, the Second Enlargement constituted substantially more
thorough-going and more dislocating trade liberalization than did the First Fnlargement. British
and Danish participation in EFTA, and Ireland's openness to most EC states and Britain, implied
that EEC accession entailed significantly less reduction in tariff and other barriers to meet EEC
standards than was true with the Greek and Iberian accession. More importantly, the liberalization
involved in the latter was substantially more dislc-ating due to particular industrial and, especially,
agricultural characteristics in the Iberian enlargement. Together these provoked stronger and more
uneven distributional consequences within and across the entrant and member states, in turn
fueling a much greater degree of opposition to the liberalization provisions implicit in
enlargement. 36
The SEA-Structural Fund Reform, moreover, constituted still more thorough-going and
potentially dislocating trade liberaliation than the Second Enlargement, and this provoked stronger
protector opposition within some delegations -- particularly the ones representing poorer states and
concerned about the risks rather than the costs of the SEA. At the same time, Spain and Portugal
had moved from countries seeking invitation and accession into the EC club, to full-fledged EC
members. At the time of the SEA, unanimity voting implied directly that these poorer countries,
especially in coaliticn with one another, could and did threaten to veto the liberalization if they
didn't receive substantial structural fund reform and expansion. Once that reform and expansion
was promised, these countries could then vote together and achieve qualified majorities to overturn
the implementation of the SEA liberalization if that promise wasn't kept.
In addition to these various shifts in the power position of the poorer, more protectionist
member states pushing for greater generosity, the theory of compensated liberalization also
generates the general expectation that successive episodes of bargaining over trade liberalization
will elicit continued upward-ratcheting in the level of adjustment assistance side payment
provision. The reasons for such upward-ratcheting are several-fold: that protectionists see the
structural funds as imperfect substitutes for protection while liberalizers do not see reductions in
the funs as imperfect substitutes for liberalization; that a constituency agitating for expansion of
programs created through side payment compensation will agitate for their expansion; and that the
transaction costs of working with old and established subjects of linkage makes it easier to stick
with such subjects.
36 The concerns w;th sovereignty, of course, were a completely different story.
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4.4. Increasing Patience of Structural Fund Compensation
This brings us to the final historical shift, the unprecedented patience of structural fund
compensation following the SEA liberalization. The EC side payment literature suggests two
possibilities. Most generally, the general perspective from which that literature draws is sensitive
to the general advantages of EC institutions, including lengthening of the shadow of the future and
issue density, that might make more patient side payment linkage possible. But this claim is, like
that on increasing generosity, neither stated nor developed. In any event, it doesn't explain why
the patience of the side payment linkage wasn't just better than other settings, but actually increased
within the existing EC institutional setting.
A few scholars who focus on the structural funds as side payments suggest a more detailed
and convincing explanation, one that basically focuses on the transaction costs of actually
negotiating structural fund reform as a side payment along-side the liberalization:
whilst the increase in the side of the structural funds played an important role in facilitating
the basic...decisions that led to the SEA...much of the haggling over distributive
implications was effectively left until later, because "the resolution of both types of decision
simultaneously would be practically impossible" (Allen 1996, p.220, quoting McAleavey
1994; Shackleton 1991).
Such an explanation is certainly on the right track, but again doesn't recognize the historical shift
that the separation entailed in the history of EC compensated liberalization, and begs the question
why such separation took place with the SEA and not before. The answer may be in the particular
complexity of the structural fund reform or in its level of expansion, but that is not stated, nor is it
necessarily accurate since all of the reforms had already been devised by existing EC Commission
studies on ERDF and IMP reform.
In any event, such an explanation doesn't acknowledge precisely the barrier to patient side
payment compensation that other contributors understand all too well: that promising to provide
compensation tomorrow for liberalization you agree to today introduced problems of opportunism
that make such an offer either politically unacceptable or unfulfilled (c.f. Weber and Wiesmuth
1991, p.255). It is certainly true that the SEA liberalization was to take several years to implement,
with a number of decision-points along the way that the protector coalition -- in this case, the
delegations representing the poorer states -- could band-together and veto. But most such points
required qualified majority voting and might be punished by the liberalizers in other ways. These
made it uncertain that any reneging on the promise to expand the structural funds reform , as
Margaret Thatcher and her UK delegation certainly wanted to do, would actually receive sanctions.
How is it, then, that the EC internal market bargaining allowed such patience to prevail in 1986-88
and not before?
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The theory of compensated liberalization suggests an explanation that overlaps the
literature's silently transaction cost focus on the complexity of negotiating details of structural fund
reform, but also focuses on how bargaining history can make the separation of promise and
fulfillment politically viable. Like the existing literature, the theory of compensated liberalization
reminds us that the costs of developing a detailed program along-side liberalization might be too
costly and lead to separation of promise and provision, and reminds us that such separation might
be more possible in the EC's integration project that lengthens the shadow of the future and issue
density that, in turn, increases concern for reputation.
But such conditions, as just noted, do not explain the historical shift in the patience as
such. Instead it is important to consider that the particular structural fund reform was, indeed,
unusually costly to negotiate in transaction cost terms, due to the complexity of re-structuring the
various structural fund mechanisms and in restructuring the budget so that significant expansion
could be paid for and agreed to. Likewise, it is also important to recognize that the shadow of the
future, generally lengthened by the EC integration project, was made darker and more looming in
the early post-SEA years as the member countries were turning their attention to further, and to
poorer countries even more dislocating and economically risky, monetary union as part of
completing the internal market. Finally, the theory of compensated liberalization also reminds us
that the history of past bargaining between protector and liberalizer coalitions, and in particular the
incidence of cooperation or reneging in that past bargaining, will influence reputations for
trustworthiness in the present. The recent history of the structural fund reforms in the Second
Enlargement, and in the successful and growing implementation of those reforms through the IMP
policies and the ECSC re-adaptation fund, improved the EC's and the paymasters' reputation (i.e.
Germany) for fulfilling promises,, including the promise to double Structural Fund funding.
5. Conclusion: The Future of Structural Fund Side Payments in European Integration
For the same reasons that the structural funds increasingly became the focus of side
payment politics during EC internal market liberalization, they have continued to be the focus of
such politics in subsequent EC integration activity and are likely to do so into the integration
project's indefinite future. Brief consideration of this claim by way of conclusion summarizes the
legacies of past and the direction of future EU internal market side payment politics, and sets up the
next chapter's discussion of the very different side payment politics in Europe's external market
and extra-EC trade liberalization.
After fulfillment of the SEA promise in the 1988 Structural Fund reform, the re-invigorated
EC integration project quickly moved forward to consolidate and expand the integration in a variety
of areas. Along-side the implementation of the Single European Act's liberalization, and the
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development of greater political and defense cooperation, the EC project turned its attention away
from internal market trade liberalization and towards even more ambitious monetary, fiscal, and
social policy union. In the run-up to the Maastricht summit that established the European Union
the centerpiece of this activity was monetary union. Although this was not trade liberalization, it
had equally acute and politically fractious distributional consequences, again pitting the poorer
member states against the richer ones.
With the structural funds firmly entrenched as the center-piece of side payment policies by
the time of the SEA, this conflict again inspired the provision of structural fund reform as
compensation for the risks of monetary union. The Commission, the Parliament, the weaker
member states, and their structural fund benefactors, all discussed any future reform or expansion
of the structural funds as necessary to consolidate and retain support for the internal market
program. British EC Commissioner Millan succinctly captured the spirit of this linkage in his
testimony to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities in 1991:
...what I think is happening at the moment is that some of the member states, led
principally by Spain but with tacit or explicit support from Greece, Portugal and Ireland are
saying, "Before we agree to the Treaty arrangements which are now proposed to be agreed
in Maastricht at the end of this year, we must have some assurance that our problems in the
context of EMU particularly but also more generally are properly taken care of, and that
means finance" (quote in McAleavey 1994, p.24)
In the event, the funds were expanded and reformed on that basis, again with a separation in the
promise and actual fulfillment of the reforms, the most recent and significant of which occurred at
the Edinburgh European Council meeting in December 1992 (Shackleton 1993; Laffan and
Shackleton 1996; Allen 1996; Marks 1992; McAleavey 1994; Tsoukalis 1993).
This repeat-performance that so resembled the SEA-Structural Fund Reform
simultaneously reflects the legacy of past internal market side payment politics, and foreshadows
their future. Were it not for the successful fulfillment of the promises to expand the structural
funds in the SEA episode, and for the reasonable implementation of the structural fund programs,
it is clear that the various groups, especially those in the poorer countries, not have accepted the
offer to further reform and expand those programs in 1991, and this in turn may have made it
substantially more difficult for those countries to have signed on to the project. Since the monetary
union project is continuing to divide the EC member states, along similar country lines (only with
some "rich" states finding common cause with the "poor") and out of similar fears, the structural
funds are likely to continue being the target of side payment linkage to compensate for rather than
roll-back internal market union.
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Conclusion
The ambition of this study has been to better understand the use of side payment
compensation during struggles over liberalization, on the premise that such compensation
represents one way countries can deal with the distributional conflict and policy dilemmas inherent
to increasing economic openness. To pursue this ambition, I began by recognizing the state of our
knowledge about the basic questions surrounding compensated liberalization: (1) when has
compensation emerged from struggles over liberalization?; (2) to what extent has compensation
fulfilled its promise to off-set social costs of and facilitate freer trade?; and (3) what can explain
why compensation gets provided at some times and places, and not others? The state of our
knowledge, I have tried to show, is pretty rudimentary. Existing political economy suggests
different answers to these questions, but lacks the theoretical or empirical development to
adjudicate those different answers, let alone to provide adequate ones.
To provide better answers, this study developed a strategy, theory and empirical program
to describe, evaluate and explain the incidence of side payment compensation. The strategy was a
set of measurement and assessment criteria to describe and evaluate the incidence of compensation.
The theory was an informal bargaining framework and a few measurable factors that can explain,
through that framework, variation in the incidence of compensation over time and space. And the
empirical program was a comparison of nearly two-dozen episodes of US trade liberalization since
1934, and of five episodes of European Community internal-market liberalization since 1951 that
provided the groundwork for describing, evaluating and explaining compensated liberalization.
This final chapter considers what we have learned from such a study. The first and most
important task is to step back from the details of the theory and case studies to summarize the
descriptive, normative, and explanatory findings. The goal, here, is to understand in light of the
previous seven chapters when and to whom compensation has emerged from the US and EC
liberalization experience; to what extent that compensation has actually off-set the social costs of
and facilitated freer trade; and perhaps most importantly, to understand what explains the incidence
of such compensation in the US and EC experience. On this last explanatory issue, the main
question is to what extent the history conformed with the expectations of the egoist theory of
compensated liberalization developed in Chapter One. Taking each set of findings in turn --
beginning with the description, moving to the evaluation, and then the explanation -- such an
overview involves summarizing: the problems in the literature which motivated this study; the
strategy or theory I developed to improve upon that literature; and the findings and limitations of
applying that strategy and theory to the US and EC history.
The rest of the chapter tries to make use of but look beyond these descriptive, normative,
and explanatory findings. In the fourth section I consider what the findings tells us about the
future of compensated liberalization, and especially about what liberalizers and protectionists can
do to better humanize and facilitate openness. Then, in a fifth section, in light of the limitations
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and promise of the existing findings, I outline some paths for further research to improve the
description, evaluation, and explanation of compensated liberalization, and to understand side
payment politics in different empirical settings and issues.
1. Compensated Liberalization Described
The most straight-forward task of this study has been to describe the incidence of side
payment compensation over a significant swath of time and space. The importance of this task lies
in disagreement and silence in existing political economy research. As I tried to show in Chapter
One, political economists are divided on whether such side payments are rare or common parts of
political life, "under-provided" or "over-provided" depending on one's attitude about the propriety
of such compensation. Yet, none of this literature investigates even the basic descriptive landscape
of compensation. Meanwhile, a number of political economists focused on how different countries
respond to the vagaries of openness have found some evidence that more open economies, and
possibly more liberalized economies, tended to have more extensive welfare spending, industrial
subsidization, and other kinds of spending in the public economy. Yet this literature says nothing
about the micro-politics that might connect openness and liberalization with increased government
spending. So, between disagreement over side payments per se, and ambiguity over whether and
to what extent side payments link openness with government spending, we need more substantial
description of the incidence of side payments.
As Chapter One explained, such description is not as easy at one might expect, and the
strategy I have used cannot capture thc full incidence of compensation. The difficulty, we have
seen, is that comensation is not necessarily observable by the content of policies provided, since
some compensation may or may not focus in substance on the victims of liberalization, but is
compensation if it is intended to help the victims of a given liberalization AND is separate from the
provisions being liberalized. My strategy has been to scour the bargaining history of liberalization
episodes to find all promises or policies that fulfilled both of these conditions. With this
measurement strategy, some side payments might go unnoticed, such as those devised behind
closed doors, while other provisions might appear to be side payments but are really something
else, such as policies with causal underpinnings in addition to being buy-offs for the losers of
liberalization. I chose the US and EC history partly out of the hope that the very good information
about the content of bargaining in these cases minimized both of these problems. And we have
seen that most, though certainly not all, of the cases I code as side payment compensation are
unambiguous. When they were ambiguous, however, I tried to qualify their description as such.
This measurement strategy and its limitations in mind, what did the US and EC histories of
liberalization reveal about the incidence of compensation? Chapters Two through Seven revealed
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that compensation varies widely in when and to whom it has been provided. In both the US and
the EC, compensated liberalization has been the exception to the rule from the point of view of all
the groups who stand to lose from liberalization. The rule for most groups in most episodes has
been some combination of no redress along-side liberalization or only pi ctectionist redress that
compromises the liberalization. And in both the US and EC histories, side payment compensation
generally did not take the form of promises or provision of the major expansions in the public
economy that correlate with greater levels of openness, meaning that side payments are not the
main mechanisms by which industrialized societies have traditionally cushioned themselves from
the vagaries of openness. Yet, the history offers dozens of instances of sizable side VFy'ment
compensation that loom large in the politics and the humanity of struggles over liberalization.
1.1. US Compensation: Inconsistent, Modest, and National -- with a Few Exceptions
The incidence of such compensation varies substantially across time and space in the US
and EC histories. Chapters Two through Five showed that the US trade liberalization was marked
by a pattern of compensation that was inconsistent in its incidence, modest in its scale and scope,
and national in the institutions through which it was been provided and negotiated. Table 8.1
summarizes this pattern. As Chapter Two showed, some eleven US liberalization episodes
between 1934 and 1962 proved to be episodes of compromised and uncompensated liberalization,
since not a single package of side payment compensation emerged from the struggles. Through
bargaining over the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, however, compensation was provided for the first
time, mainly in the form of trade adjustment assistance to workers and firms. In all subsequent
episodes of US liberalization, as we saw in Chapters Three through Five, negotiations yielded
some compensation offers, always including reform or expansion of the TAA but also including
other compensation subjects, such as tax breaks and the proposals to reform welfare provisions.
Most of this US compensation has been modest in the scale of benefits provided and the
number of groups helped. And the adjustment assistance program, in particular, has been the
object of retrenchment when trade liberalization initiatives are not under review. The NAFTA
liberalization, however, represents a partial exception to this pattern in that it yielded more
generous and diverse compensation, in the form of adjustment assistance, environmental cleanup,
tri-country commissions for monitoring labor and environmental standards, and a series of last-
minute benefits targeted more narrowly at ambivalent legislators.
Finally, most of this US compensation was negotiated during domestic phases of the
episode and provided by national governments, with very little compensatioii negotiated during
international phases of negotiations or provided by supra-national institutions. But the NAFTA
trilateral commissions were notable exceptions to this rule.
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Table 8.1
Incidence of Side payment Compensation in the US, 1934-93
Trade
Liberalization Episodes
I.-1 1.1934. 58 RTAA and
subsequent extensions
(1938 through 1958)
12.1962 Trade Expansion Act
(for GATT Kennedy Round)
13.1965 US-Canada Auto Pact
14.1968 Trade Expansion Act
15.1974 Trade Reform Act
(for GATT Tokyo Round)
16.1979 Wine-Gallon Dispute
.during Tokyo Round)
17.198S Ompibus Trade Act
18.1990-3 NAFTA
Side Payment Compensation
Kind of Compensation Level of Stage of
Promised or Provided Pre /ider Lib.•td.n,
No Side Payments
).Trade Adjustment Assistance
2.Limited Tax and Misc. Benefits
for Textiles and Lumber
TAA Reform and Expansion
Proposed TAA Expansion
1.Welfare and MNC Tax Reform
(proposed and rejected).
2. AA Expansion and Reform
Tax Rebates
TAA Reform and Expansion
I.NAFTA 1 rade Adjustment
Assistance
2.Promised Welfare Reform
3.Institutions to Monitor and
enforce Labor Rights.
4. Institutions and NADBank
to monitor, enforce, upgrade
environmeltal standards and
cleanup border areas.
5. Pork benefits to individual
legislators (e.g. C-17 aircraft,
agric.Jesearch center, school-
lunch purchase preferences)
Natl.Govt. Domestic
Natl.Govt. Domestic
Natl.C-ovt. Domestic
Natl.G,'"*. Domestic
Natl.Govt. Domestic
Natl.Govt. Domestic
Natl.Govt International
Natl.Govt. Domestic
Natl.Govt. Domestic
Natl.Govt.
Some supra-
national
Supra-
national
Domestic
International
International
Natl.Covt. Domestic
1.2. EC Compensation: More Consistent, Generous, and Supranational
Chapte:s Seven and Eight compared this US pattero to EC internal market liberalization
since 1951. In those chapters, I tried to show that compared to the inconsistent, modest, and
national compensated liberalization in the US, EC liberalization had nearly the opposite pattern of
compensated liberalization: more consistent in incidence, more generous in scale and scope, and
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more supra-national in the institutions through which it has been provided and negotiated. Table
8.2 summarizes this patter:n.
All five of the major episodes of EC internal-market liberalization yielded substantial side
payments to buy the support of national delegations explicitly conditioning their support for
liberalization upon provision of compensation packages. As we saw in Chapier Six, negotiations
over the ECSC yielded the ECSC Re-adaptation program to fund job retraining and relocation for
workers, and restructuring for firms, as part of the other transitional arrangements that included
temporary subsidization. Chapter Six also showed how the European Economic Community
(EEC) negotiations elicited not only a European Social Fund (ESF), a broader version of this Re-
adaptation program, but also explicit commitments to upwardly-harmonize equal-wage laws,
length of the standard work week, and vacation benefits -- all to off-set the pain from EEC
liberalization. Chapter Seven, meanwhile, chronicled how the Greek and Iberian enlargements
yielded new and expanded Structural Fund programs like the Integrated Mediterranean
Programmes (IMP) to compensate and promote adjustment among vulnerable agricultural
producers in incumbent countries. That Chapter also focused on how the Single European Act
yielded the commitment to expand and reform all Structural Funds programs to off-set the risks of
SEA liberalization, ultimately doubling the Funds budget to nearly $170 billion between 1994-99.
All the structural fund reforms and changes that I coded as side payment compensation had
motives distinct from the push to off-set the risks of internal market liberalization, but my claim has
been that the "compensation" motive was a necessary condition -- that without the internal-market
and the distributional consequences of that liberalization, the various provisions would inot have
been provided. And only those structural fund provisions separate from proscribed NTBs counted
as side payments -- leaving out, for instance, the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF.
In any event, these and other EC side payment provisions were provided by supra-national
institutions under EC Council of Ministers and EC Commission decisions and policies, and
negotiated during the international, inter-governmental stages of the episodes. During the domestic
stages of negotiating these episodes, very little side payment compensation was ever seriously
discussed, let alone enacted. And national governments appear to have provided very little side
payment compensation at any stage of the negotiations. There were a few exceptions to this rule,
su•T , as the commitment to build the Moselle Canal during the French National Assembly's
deliberations over the Treaty of Paris. And Chapter Seven also zonsidered ways in which some
welfare and state-aid expansion in Europe might be construed as side payment compensation. But
on the whole, whereas US compensated liberalization has been primarily national and domestic,
EC compensated liberalization has been primarily supra-national.
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Table 8.2
The Incidence of Side Payments
in EC Internal-market Liberalization, 1951-88
Trade
Liberalization Episode
1. 1951 ECSC
2. 1958 EEC
Side Payment Compensation
Kind of Compensation
Promised or Provided
ECSC Re--adaptation Fund
1.European Soci,! Fund (ESF)
2. Linked Social aidJ Wage
Heightening to Tariff Rdctns
3.Linked Tariff Reductions to
Euratom
Level of Stage of
Provider Librlztn.
Supra-natl. International
Supra-nad. International
Supra-natl. International
Supra-natl. International
3. 1972 First Enlargement
4. 1981 Greece Enlargement
5. 1985 Iberian Enlargement
ESF;GuidanceSctn.EAGGF;ERDF Supra-nati. International
Structural Funds and IMP
Structural Funds and IMP
6. 1986 Single European Act- Expanded and Reformed Structural
Structural Fund Reform Funds
Supra-natl. International
Supra-natl. International
Supra-natl. International
Finally, the EC internal market history revealed some important variation over time in the
pattern of side payments. Chapters Six and Seven revealed increasing generosity of the supra-
national side payments as measured by the people helped, the money spent, and the ambition of
programs provided. Chapter Seven revealed a narrowing in the range of policies relied upon as
subjects of side payment linkage, from a diversity of subjects including social and wage policy
harmonization to off-set tariff reductionrs, towards a concentration on the EC Structural Funds to
off-set risks. And Chapter Seven also reveaed the increasing "patience" of the EC side payments,
that is, the separation of the promise and actual provision of structural fund reform and expansion
as a side payment for liberalization.
2. Compensated Liberalization Evaluated
We should care about this variation in US and EC side payment compensation because
industrialized societies have a stake in whether compensation gets provided. As Chapter One
explained, however, political economists disagree about those stakes. On the one hand, scholars
who strongly differ in thei; view of the piopriety of free trade agree in suggesting that
compensation can simultaneously off-set the social costs of and thereby humanize freer trade, and
in the process defuse political opposition, promote economic adjustment and thereby facilitate
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openness. On the other hand some scholars have looked at the theory and record of such
compensation and concluded that compensation might fall well short of this promise, by providing
little real redress for the real victims of openness, inviting rent-seeking abuses, doing little to buy-
off opposition or promote adjustment. As Chapter One explained, however, this disagreement has
yet to be resolved or moved forward, for lack of empirical research into the real record of
compensation's accomplishments and pit-falls in any significant swath of history.
The second major goal of this study, then, was to look into that record in the US and EC
history, figure out when and to what extent compensation really did off-set the social costs of and
facilitate openness. As explained in Chapter One, I tried to evaluate the experience with
compensation according to criteria found in existing political economy literature, and my strategy
for measuring those criteria were self-consciously qualitative. In the six empirical chapters we
have seen that the quality of the information gathered varied from case to case, tending to be better
for the short term than for the long term indices of compensation's usefulness. But the measures
still generated some interesting and useful results.
The cases revealed substantial variation in the degree to which compensation off-set social
costs of and facilitated freer trade, but on the whole compensation can said to have fallen short of
its promise, and to contain some unintended and unexpected dangers for industrialized societies.
Yet, compensation can also be said to have provided real redress for the losers of openness and to
have bought and secured freer trade.
2.1. Compensation's Modest Redress and Uninte•lded Dangers
To assess how much compensation off-set social costs in all of the cases where
compensation was provided, the case studies measured (1) the scale and scope of compensation;
(2' the distribution of the compensation's benefits in comparison t,- -leged pain of liberalization's
"victims"; (3) the extent to which the scale of compensation went beyond actual or anticipated pain;
(4) the scale and distribution of financial and other costs of compensation; and (5) the effectiveness
of the compensation programs' implemeitation. In the process of assessing the experience with
side payment compensation across decades of hislory, however, the study also unearthed
information about whether compensation humanizes openness that went beyond these five
measures.
By all these measures, the story was mixed. Across the compensation provided in the US
and EC histories, we have seen that the generosity of the compensation provided varied a lot, case
to case. Some of the compensation packages were quite generous in terms of the moneys spent
and the level of redress providea in comparison to the perceived needs of the target group. As
Chapters Three through Five tried to show, this can be said of the adjustment assistance provided
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to auto workers in the 1965 Auto Pact and of the later adjustment assistance packages after the
1988 Omnibus Trade Act and the NAFTA bridge assistance, not to mention the generous
compensation to environmental groups under the NAFTA. And Chapters Six and Seven tried to
show how some of the supranational compensation coming out internal-market negotiations were
also quite generous, such as the later uses of the ECSC Readaptation program and the IMP
program for dislocated agricultural producers. On the other hand, many other compensation
packages fell far short of the perceived needs of the target group. Chapter Three argued as much
of tbc first TAA program, despite its promising design. Chapter Five, likewise, explained how the
various compensation packages provided organized labor during the NAFTA may have been
financially generous, but fell short of what Labor's perceived needs were.
More generally, the case studies showed that the distribution of compensation consistently
did not coincide with the distribution of perceived losses and risks from liberalization. Instead,
many groups who stood to lose the most from a given liberalization episode received nothing or
less compensation than those who stood to lose less. Chapter Two for instance, showed how
textile and lumber producers received significantly more compensation than did their more
vulnerable clay pot, leather shoe, and other import competing counterparts. Chapter Five's
discussion of the NAFTA case told a similar story, with the biggest losers being far from those
getting the most generous side payments: compare, for instance, the well compensated winter fruit
and vegetables producers with the uncompensated flat auto glass producers. Similarly, Chapter
Seven explained how the IMP program provided during the Iberian enlargement was targeted at
and dispensed benefits to the producers in iecumbent EC states such as Greece, France and Italy,
while the episode yielded little new side payment redress to the industrial and agricultural losers in
the applicant countries.
The US cases suggest an important conclusion, or at least a hypothesis, about the
distribution of the redress provided: side payment compensation provided in the corpus of last
minute legislative struggle involving protectionist and liberalizer legislators tends to provide
benefits that are further afield from the real interests of the victims of the liberalization under
review. The reason is pretty simple. In earlier proceedings, the actual groups expected to suffer
from liberalization have more voice and can focus side payment politics on their anticipated
suffering. In the later proceedings, however, the legislative "agents" of the societal "principals"
dominate side payment politics, and their incentives are tied to an entire constituency, making them
wil'ing to accept side payments that will cauterize the electoral pain of liberalization imposed on
free trade's victims, but not necessarily that will help the particular societal victims of liberalization.
Even if the distribution of benefits don't align well with the distribution of suffering, the
cases show very few cases of side payment recipients demanding or receiving compensation more
generous than the losses they expected to result from the liberalization. This is particularly true if
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we look at the losses and demands of protectionist groupings, such as the losses that organized
labor were expected to suffer from liberalization in the 1970s -- well above the TAA benefits they
demanded, and certainly above the benefits they received. If we look at individual recipients, this
is less true: early implementation of the TAA often went to temporarily laid-off auto workers who
would collect UI supplements while waiting to get re-hired -- even though such workers could find
temporary work in the interim. And there are even a few cases of recipient groups getting
compensation that outstripped their losses -- such as the over-generous package of side payment
benefits provided to the Florida fruit and vegetable producers for the ambiguous and negligible
NAFTA losses. Such might also be said of some structural fund side payments, such as EAGGF
funding and ERDF funding in Ireland. These cases, however, are the exception to the rule, with
the exceptions growing out of side payment politics involving legislative "agents" rather than
societal "principals." The rule remains compensation well within the realm of expected loss.
As for the scale and distribution of the costs of side payment packages, again the cases
revealed significant variation. Most of the adjustment assistance and other compensation provided
in the US history was paid for through general revenues -- meaning that the financial costs of the
side payments were distributed across the nation-wide tax base. Such a burden roughly coincides
with the demography of those most likely to benefit from the liberalization that compensation helps
to buy -- namely consumers. Some TAA and other benefits, however, were to be paid for by more
targeted revenue sources, such as employer taxes -- a burden slightly less fairly distributed given
that employers are not the main beneficiaries of libeiaiizaiton.
In the EC, most of the structural fund and other side payment benefits were similarly paid
for out of general EC coffers, with revenue increasingly coming from the EC-wide VAT -- again
with consumers bearing the burden and reaping the potential benefits of the compensated
liberalization. But the principle of additionality insured that many programs tied to such
compensation would be paid for by a variety of national revenue sources, and in any event some of
the EC budget came from national contributions that did not coincide well with the benefits of the
liberalization. Finally, the welfare and industrial subsidization costs of the compensation programs
in the EC and the US also constituted costs for some groups by virtue of violating laissezfaire
economic principles.
As for the longer-term redress, the story is more checkered. For instance, the various
programs created through US and EC side payment compensation have varied a great deal in how
much they promote economic up-grading for the individuals and firms involved -- as existing
implementation studies make clear. Beyond such a generality gleaned from a handful of secondary
sources, however, the study unearthed one important and unexpected finding about
compensation's long-term redress.
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Peppered throughout the US and EC histories were clues that side payment compensation
might have had an unintended cost for the broader policy arrangements that industrialized societies
have set up to mitigate the costs and risks of the market-place. Compensating the losers of trade
liberalization has done little to institutionalize or build support for, and may even have unwittingly
undermined, those broader arrangements. For instance, Chapters Three and Four chronicled US
labor's waning interest in and Congress' jealous support for a minimal TAA as a symbolic but
politically important gesture of compassion -- due in part to the initially tight eligibility
requirements and minimal benefits in the early TAA. The two chapters explained how this yielded
cycling fortunes for TAA -- weak, precarious but persistent use of trade adjustment assistance as a
cornerstone of US compensated liberalization. This cycling support and weak assistance has
provided fodder for the opponents of various labor market initiatives, such as public training
policies, on grounds that such policies are open to abuse and do not work. And it has, in any
event, played a small role in sapping energy behind efforts to develop more generalized and more
generous active labor market policies.
In Europe, providing targeted compensation during internal market liberalization may have
had a similar unintended cost, though through a different mechanism. The EC compensation, as
Chapters Six and Seven explained, tended to involve supra-national benefits, and tended to draw
attention away from domestic programs during the ratification and other domestic phases of
negotiations over the internal-market project. In so far as this displacement effect has occurred, the
EC side payments may have drawn some attention away from domestic programs that might be
more capable and promising solutions for mitigating liberalization's risks -- more promising than
those supranational benefits whose development and expansion suffer even greater collective action
problems and weaker administrative capacities.
Such longer-term risks and the various shortcomings in the scale and distribution of
compensation's more short term costs and benefits suggest that side payments in the US and EC
history have fallen well short of their promise to humanize openness. Having said this, one should
not lightly dismiss the real benefits that compensation has provided to some groups -- benefits that
go above and beyond preexisting arrangements, and benefits that the groups themselves
consistently ask to maintain and expand.
2.2. Buying Openness and the Occasional Lemon
To assess whether compensation actually facilitated freer trade, the case studies measured
(1) how much compensation lowered existing protectionist opposition; (2) how much it inspired
new opposition from groups opposed to compensation; (3) how much it sparked new opposition
from groups seeking to extort more generous compensation; and (4) how much compensation
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encouraged groups to exit the aggrieved sector of the economy. By these various measures, the
history again provided a mixed story, but this time on the whole painted a picture of compensation
conforming more strongly to its promise to facilitate openness.
The cases yielded the most information about the first of these criteria, whether a given
compensation package actually lowered opposition from the protectionist groups at whom it was
targeted. And here the cases varied widely. Several incidents of compensation appeared to have
fulfilled all political expectations by turning opponents into supporters or by garnering the support
of protecitonist groups who had made their support explicitly and credibly contingent upon
provision of compensation. The first provision of Trade Adjustment Assistance was a clear
example of the latter, in that ample correlational and documentary evidence suggests that AFL-CIO
and other member unions supported the TEA liberalization contingent upon such assistance, and
that this support was necessary to the passage of that liberalization. The 1965 adjustment
assistance to the UAW, and the NAFTA environmental compensation were similar stories, though
in the latter case some environmental groups were swayed while others grew more protectionist.
Athough their political effects are more difficult to separate out from other bargaining dynamics,
other examples of effective compensation include the ECSC Readaptation Fund, the harmonization
and ESF provisions, the IMP provisions during the Iberian enlargement, the SEA structural funds
expansion, and some of the last-minute NAFTA NADBank and several of the "pork" provisions.
Other incidents of compensation were politically less effective in that they failed to buy any
group's vocal support for liberalization, but at least moderated the level of group opposition. Such
can be said for the 1974 TAA package that moderated UAW opposition, and of NAFTA
compensation, which showed signs of moderating Richard Gephardt's protectionist zeal -- and his
handing-over the anti-NAFTA helm to David Bonior.
All of these examples of successful compensation focus on the initial passage of the
liberalization -- international negotiation and domestic authorization and ratification. The case
histories also showed a couple of examples of compensation successfully buying acquiescence
with or moderating opposition in the medium-term implementation and sustainability of
liberalization. The clearest example of this was the ECSC Readjustment assistance. Chapter Six
showed how the Italian delegation made its support for the ECSC conditional upon the ECSC
Readaptation funds. But it also showed how continued disbursement of these funds made it
politically possible for the High Authority to remove the temporary exemptions and subsidization
provisions that Belgium had demanded as transitional arrangements. Without the readaptation
assistance, member governments and their supra-national counterparts in the High Authority would
have had a harder time justifying an end to the subsidization or preventing protectionist back-lash.
As several of the case studies showed, however, not all of the compensation packages were
successful in defusing opposition of groups at whom they were targeted. The clearest failures
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were the Schultz MNC/welfare regulation that might have appeared to outsiders and in retrospect as
more generous compensation than the TAA Clternative, but was resolutely and universally rejected
by all protectionist groups at whom the package was directed. Similarly, the Kennedy
Administration's side payments provided within the seven point assistance package for the textile
industry -- a package that combined side payments with protectionist exemption -- was completely
unsuccessful in swaying textile labor and industry associations. Only the VER exemption in that
package had the desired effect of buying off textile opposition. Even where some of the packages
made a difference, several made less of a difference than had been hoped by their providers. The
best example of this has been the repeated and mostly vain attempt to expand TAA to moderate or
buy support of the AFL-CIO and laborite legislators. On a smaller scale, the NADBank assistance
during the NAFTA was also a disappointment, in that Clinton officials had hoped the assistance
would buy nearly a dozen votes in the Hispanic caucus, but probably turned out only a few.
In the short and medium term, the case studies showed that a number of side payments
discussed or provided during bargaining provoked opposition from groups otherwise supportive
of freer trade or disengaged from the trade. Such opposition, however, generally put limits on the
content of the compensation actually provided, but did not deepen as to off-set whatever opposition
the compensation defused.' For example, the Labor and environmental side agreements in the
NAFTA case mobilized very strong opposition among liberalizers (and even some protectionists)
to more ambitious versions of the international monitoring and harmonization supported by some
protectionist groups, especially organized labor. The result was scaled-back institutions. The
story was the same with the MNC/Welfare reform compensation in Chapter Four, and with the
TAA in Chapters Three and Four was similar -- though in the latter case, proposals to scale back
initial TAA offers often were drowned-out by proposals to expand.
And the case studies revealed very few examples of groups on either side of the free trade
aisle stepping-up their opposition to liberalization independent of anticipated problems with the
liberalization, as a way to get more compensation. Measuring such extortionate demands, of
course, was difficult in any event. But even by a general measure of such stepped-up opposition
the Chapters revealed only a couple of cases. The clearest grew out of the last minute pork
dispensed by the Clinton Administration during the NAFTA, where the record showed a few
legislators explicitly holding their support hostage to provision of some compensation, even when
these legislators had previously committed themselves to support the NAFTA. This example
suggests again that side payment politics involving legislative agents in last-minute bargaining may
have less desirable results than those involving interest group principals and taking place earlier.
Finally, SEA compensated liberalization involved the Irish delegation holding its support for the
single-market hostage to Structural Fund expansion, even though the country was expected to
The explanation section below will discuss such constraints in a moment.
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suffer relatively few distributional costs of such liberalization. This smacks of extortion, but it
may well have reflected a combination of fairness norms (support for EU cohesion) or genuine
perception of risk. Again, the examples of such abuses are very few and far between.
If the short- and medium-term political benefits of side payment compensation appear to
have been significant amidst the variation, the longer-term benefits are less impressive. First, in so
far as the case studies included review of implementation studies, the chapters offered some
information on the degree to which compensation provided incentives and assistance to upgrade or
exit non-competitive economic activity. Here the story was mixed, but generally showed that
various programs explicitly seeking such adjustment fell well short of their mark. This was
certainly true for the early implementations of the TAA program in the US and the ECSC
Readaptation program in the EU -- where groups tended to use mainly the income support elements
of the program, and much less so the training and relocation elements. In the TAA case,
implementation has been better in the last ten years, with the proportion of recipients engaged in
training and using relocation assistance going substantially up, and with the number of those
recipients using that assistance to exit the aggrieved sector also going up (Corson et.al. 1995).
Second, the cases suggest only impressions of how much compensation lends general
legitimacy to openness. Survey data in the US has shown that citizens tend to be much more
accepting of liberalization and more hostile to protectionist demands when adjustment assistance
programs are created along-side initiatives to off-set pain (Laudicina 1973). This suggests that
such compensation can generally consolidate support for openness. On the other hand, as we have
seen side payments might have done little to strengthen and may even have undermined the
viability of broader welfare arrangements for mitigating the pain of markets, thus off-setting the
gains implicit in the poll results.
In short, the evidence adds up to qualified support for the political effectiveness of side
payment compensation. In the US and EC experience, the study has shown that compensation
tended to fall short of its promise to buy-off discontent and facilitate openness in the short and
long-term. But amidst variation in its political effectiveness and pit-falls, the compensation
generally provided net benefits for liberalization.
3. Compensated Liberalization Explained
The description and evaluation of compensated liberalization -- showing marked variation
in but significant usefulness of compensation -- makes its explanation all the more urgent. And
such explanation has been the principal and most challenging task of this study. As Chapter One
sought to show, existing attention to the origins of compensation is thin and diffuse, but can be
roughly divided into "altruist" perspectives that essentially see side payment compensation
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provided to satisfy norms or social contract standards of fairness, and more "egoist" perspectives
that see compensation as an expedient of narrowly self-interested bargaining between protectionists
and liberalizers. This egoist bargaining perspective, in turn, can be roughly divided by the various
conditions thought to strongly influence bargaining: group or institutional conditions on both the
demand and supply sides of the trade and other policy-making.
As Chapter One also sought to show, this array of explanations suffers from both empirical
and theoretical shortcomings. The empirical problem was the same as for all writings about
compensation -- that they lack empirically grounded studies to test and adjudicate among the
various explanatory possibilities. The theoretical problems were that the various egoist and altruist
perspectives tended to be: (1) under-identified, failing to distinguish compensation from its
compromised or uncompensated liberalization alternatives; (2) under-developed, failing to explain
variation in incidence over significant swaths of time and space; and (3) under-specified, failing to
identify measurable and testable group, institutional or other characteristics that could underlie
egoist or altruistic provision of compensation.
In light of these problems, Chapter One developed a theory of incidence that strived to be
more identified, developed and specified. The theory consisted of a framework of egoistic
bargaining between liberalizers and protectionists, and of several group and institutional
characteristics operating within that framework. The framework built on the premise that
compensation will be provided when protectionists see some side payment as an imperfect
substitute for continued protection, and when liberalizers see providing such compensation as
necessary to secure passage of liberalization and as an acceptable alternative to protectionist
methods of securing such passage.
Working within this framework, I identified a pair of group and a pair of institutional
characteristics that I argued were measurable and likely to explain significant variation in the
incidence of compensation. First, I argued that compensation was more likely when and to
protectionist groups with more political resources to threaten or retaliate against the liberalization
initiative, and with broader, more multi-issue trade policy platforms that signal willingness to
accept and possible subjects of side payment linkage. Even though liberalizers could also set the
bargaining agenda and in any event set constraints on whether, what and how much compensation
could be provided, I argued that this coincidence of protectionist power and platforms could
explain significant variation over time and space. Second, I argued that compensation was more
likely when the institutional settings within which egoistic bargaining took place combined modest
welfare provision with broad jurisdiction, and less likely when those settings combined more
generous welfare and narrow jurisdiction.
The bulk of the US and EC histories in Chapters Two through Seven sought to illustrate
and test this theory of compensated liberalization. In general the hope was that the empirical
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comparisons would be consistent with the hypotheses deduced from the theory and framework.
But in the case I also tried to test the limits of the theory in two other ways. I tried to compare the
explanatory power of the egoistic bargaining theory I offer with more altruist interpretation of
when compensation ought to be provided. And I tried to reveal how much of the wealth of
variation in the incidence of compensation in the US and EC history the theory could explain.
How did the theory hold up to these three challenges?
3.1. The Theory Corroborated, but Weaknesses Revealed
As a general illustration and test, the history broadly supports my egoist bargaining theory.
In the US history, group and institutional variations across episodes, groups, and sectors predict
significant variation in the incidence of side payment compensation as distinct from uncompensated
and compromised liberalization. For instance, in the period between 1934 and 1962, Chapter Two
described how protectionist groups opposed to the RTA legislation and liberalization either lacked
the political resources to viably threaten the liberalization, or approached the episodes with narrow,
unconditionally protectionist platforms, predicting what the history revealed: uncompensated
liberalization for the weak; compromised liberalization for the strong and single-minded
protectionist. As Chapter Two also described, the shift in the platforms of textile groups to more
multi-issue protectionism, and of organized labor away from unconditional to conditional free trade
-- linking support for liberalization to the provision of trade adjustment assistance -- predicted the
advent of compensated liberalization in that year.
Chapters Three and Four showed how subsequent trade policy-making and implementation
of the TAA compensation fueled a split in organized labor's platform, with the UAW continuing
with the 1962 multi-issue conciliation and with the AFL-CIO closing-in on unconditional
protectionism. Here the history predicted continued and expanded side payment for the UAW in
the 1965 Auto Pact, but increasingly modest TAA and other compensation in subsequent domestic
struggles over the liberalization. The power-platform conditions also predicted how in the
Kennedy and Tokyo Round international phases of episodes, most protectionist groups lacked the
political resources to threaten the liberalization being devised. Combining this with the very
narrow jurisdiction of the supra-national institutions through which US liberalization got
negotiated, and the theory predicted a lack of compensation during such phases and the general
confinement of US compensated liberalization to the domestic realm.
Chapter Five, moreover, showed that the power-platform conditions also predict the
exceptions to these post-1965 rules of modest and national side payment compensation. During
the three-year struggle over the NAFTA liberalization, a protectionist coalition of unprecedented
breadth and power mobilized to fight against or to modify the agreement. And that coalition was
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dominated by a number of groups -- especially the highest echelons of the AFL-CIO and, more
resolutely, both the extremist and moderate wings of the environmental movement -- approaching
the bargaining with explicitly multi-issue platforms, and championing subjects of side payments
focused on new supra-national institutions and actions. Such power and platform conditions
broadly predict, again, what the history revealed: diverse and relatively generous side payments
including adjustment assistance, border cleanup funding, and compensation that included supra-
national labor and environmental institutions.
The EC and US comparisons in Chapters Six and Seven also bore out several predictions
of the theory, particularly those of the institutional conditions. The chapters showed that the EC
internal-market liberalization -- being part of a broader integration project -- took place through
international institutions with extraordinarily broad jurisdiction and yet offered minimal preexisting
welfare assistance. Meanwhile, the EC domestic institutional setting combined relatively broad
jurisdiction with much more generous preexisting welfare. Such an institutional array -- especially
in the context of many protectionist groups and delegations consistently sporting significant power
and multi-issuue platforms -- predicted what the history revealed: consistent side payment
compensation at the supranational level, and rare compensation at the domestic level. Chapter
Seven also emphasized how the welfare and jurisdiction in the EC's supra-national and national
institutional settings was roughly the mirror image of the US settings, which had modest welfare
and very narrow jurisdiction at the supra-national setting and modest welfare and broad jurisdiction
at the national setting. Thus, the US institutions predicted what the history revealed: more side
payments at the domestic than the supranational level. And the institutional differences between the
US and the EC also predicted that EC side payment compensation ought to be more generous than
the US compensation, since the integration project entailed a very broad jurisdiction of the
international institution and mandated groups to approach the liberalization episodes with even
broader platforms than was common for US protectionists in any bargaining arena.
The US and EC liberalization history, however, did not fit all of the theory's predictions.
First, the history includes several instances where the group and institutional conditions predict no
side payments -- that is, predict either uncompensated or compromised liberalization -- and yet we
see side payment compensation. In Chapter Two, for instance, the power-platform conditions
revealed how the softwood lumber industry had incidental power resources that allowed it and its
legislative champions to threaten passage of the TEA in the Senate, but the platforms of that
industry in a number of legislative hearings made scarce mention of several of the side payment
provisions ultimately provided with Kennedy's six point plan. This predicts compromised, not
compensated, liberalization; yet the result was the latter.
Similarly, Chapters Four revealed cases where compensation was offered or provided,
even though the groups at whom they were targeted were powerful but single-minded
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protectionist. One such instance was the package of MNC and welfare regulation side payments
that Schultz and other members of the Nixon Administration offered to soften the opposition of
organized labor and protectionist industries, even though these groups had basically eschewed
interest in any side payment compensation. 2 Also in Chapter Four, the wine gallon episode
revealed a case where the incidental power of the domestic distilling industry in the US was in a
privileged position to receive redress, but where its platform before and during the negoti itions
never made explicit reference to issues other than protectionist redress -- and yet were liberalizers
crafted and provided a side payment package. Finally, Chapter Five's discussion of the NAFTA
case revealed a number of examples of side payments, particularly the last minute "pork" packages
offered to the Florida winter fruits and vegetables and to other industrial groups, all of whom had
single-issue protectionist platforms. 3
These anomalies suggest that the group-institutional conditions on which my theory
focuses are unnecessary conditions to the provision of compensation. And they point to how
compensation may grow out of liberalizer initiatives regardless of protectionist disposition,
particularly when liberalizers are really desperate to clear political obstacles from liberalization and
where protectionist exemption or revision are for some reason ruled out as options.
Second, the history also includes a few anomalies suggesting that the group-institutional
conditions are insufficient conditions for the provision of compensation -- where the group and
institutional conditions predict provision of side payment compensation, and yet we see either
uncompensated or compromised liberalization. We saw an important example of this in Chapter
Three, where the AFL-CIO and a number of member unions approached the late- 1960s
liberalization episodes with a multi-issue platform, very skeptical of TAA compensation but still
clearly demanding extensive tax and regulatory changes on MNCs and outgoing foreign direct
investment. This positioning was a stepping-stone to a complete narrowing in the platform,
unconditional protectionism with explicit unwillingness to link trade protection with any side
assistance. But in the late 1960s and first couple years of the 1970s, the MNC multi-issue
platform predicted some compensation. Yet. as Chapters Three and Four showed, many
government and business liberalizers were very hostile to the idea of providing any MNC-related
cornpensa*4on, though they did offer TAA expansion in its stead. Such an anomaly suggests that
the theory's conditions are insufficient conditions for compensation. And it suggests that we must
pay attention to the constraints posed by the positioning of liberalizer groups on what power-
platform conditions will yield.
2 Thouen the MNC package partly reflects the interest of the AFL-CIO in MNC regulations designed to discourage
outgoing FDI.
' The continued provision of the TAA program in the early 1980s, even after the AFL-CIO and the UAW had gone
unconditionally protecti-mnist is a similar example of the theory predicting uncompensated or compromised
liberalization and the history revealing compensation.
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Although these various anomalies suggest that the group-institutional conditions on which I
focused might not be necessary or sufficient conditions for the provision of compensation, the
significant majority of the predictions derived from those condi ions were consistent with the
history. This suggests that ihe history provides ample illustration and some corroborating evidence
that those conditions are important forces in shaping side payment politics.
3.2. The Group-Institutional Theory Relative to Its Alternatives
Did giving pride of place to egoistic bargaining, to protectionist power and platforms, and
to jurisdiction and welfare of institutional setting, fit the US and EC history more closely than
altruistic forces, liberalizer conditions, and other institutional conditions? Here the history again
supports, though not without qualification, the relative explanatory power of the egoistic
bargaining framework on which I have focused, and of the particular group and institutional
conditions within that framework.
The ease studies showed plenty of instances where the egoist bargaining predictions fit the
history significantly better than the altruist perspective. In particular, both the US and EC
liberalization history included many examples of groups anticipating the greatest vulnerability or
losses getting significantly less or no compensation relative to other protectionist groups
anticipating lower vulnerability and losses. In the US, for instance, the 1962 TEA episode saw
significantly less compensation for clay pottery, watches, leather shoes than was provided to
textiles and sofLwood lumber. And the 1979 Tokyo Round saw compensation to distilled liquor
industry and not to other groups anticipating equal or greater losses as a result of the impending
GATT liberalization. In the EC, moreover, the Iberian enlargement elicited creation of the
Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (iMP), giving substantially more compensation to fruit and
vegetable producers in incumbent countries than was to be provided to more vulnerable industries
and agriculture in applicant countries. In most of the above cases, meanwhile, the power and
platforms of protectionist groups accurately predicted uncompensated liberalization for the weak,
and compensated liberalization for the powerful and multi-issue protectionist.
In some of the US and EC cases, however, the egoistic bargaining framework fared no
better than the altruist perspective. In a few cases, statements of liberalizers offering
compensation, and the intended targets of the compensation provided, were consistent with the
argument that norms or standards of fairness underlie compensated liberalization. This was true
for the offer and provision of trade adjustment assistance, where the Kennedy Administration
personnel and many of their liberalizer allies in business, were vocally in favor of adjustment
provisions that would not only defuse opposition but would off-set the particularistic suffering
necessary for the general gain of openness. Similarly, the Schuman plan and the Monnet
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precursors expressed dirigiste values of regulatory and trade policy that explicitly introduced
safeguards and other provisions to cushion the adjustment costs of ECSC liberalization -- thus
predicting Readaptation Assistance. And the SEA expansion of the Structural Funds grew partly
out of a German delega;ion and government expressing long-term commitments to cohesion and
equity of the internal market, as well as out of the more political motivations of their Thatcherite
counterparts. Even though these cases are consistent with the egoist bargaining theory as well,
they cannot out rule the altruist alternative,4
What about the pride of place my particular application of the egoist bargaining framework
gives to protectionist power and platformsr rather than liberalizer conditions, and to welfare and
jurisdiction rather than other institutional conditions? In many cases, the focus on protectionist
power and platforms as the main predictors of compensation seems to have had more explanatory
power than liberalizer conditions that might also set the bargaining agenda or pose constraints on
what is supplied. This is true for the advent of side payment compensation, for instance with the
AFL-CIO's positioning playing a key role in getting TAA compensation on the agenda and through
the ides of Cong;essiona, review, even after business supporters and Kennedy Administration
strategists were sanguine about its killing. It can also be said of the 1965 Auto Pact compensation,
of the NAFI A labor and environmental side agreements, where liberalizers certainly set constraints
but generally responded to protectionist demands in pursuing the assistance in the first place. The
same can be said of many EC structural fund provisions, especially the IMP and the SEA reforms.
There are .ome cases, however, where the liberalizer constraints and where institutional
conditions other than welfare and jurisdiction loomed as large or larger in the story than did the
protectionist power and platforms. This is certainly true in those cases where the liberalizers were
stronger in introducing compensation -- the lumber side payments in 1962, the continued use of the
TAA after Labor platforms moved towards unconditional protectionism, the wine-gallon
compensation in 1979, the Schultz compensation package in 1974, and the last minute "pork" side
payments in the NAFTA episodc." And when liberalizers vetoed some of organized labor's
stronger side payment demands in the 1960s (for MNC and outgoing FDI regulations) and in the
NAFTA episode (for stronger, better-funded labor monitoring and harmonization), the liberalizer
constraints played a crucial role in explaining the outcome of more modest compensation.
j There are even a couple of cases where the altruism perspective arguably fits the history somewhat better than the
egoistic bargaining perspective, such as the continued provision of the TAA program during liberalization episodes
after both the UAW, the AFL-CIO and a number of liberalizer groups lost interest. In these post-1980 cases, the
continued use of TAA s'ems to reflect some combination of its symbolic value in buy;ng off constituency
ambivalence and of its equity value in providing some relief for the victims of openness. In so far as it is the latter,
the altruist perspective gains some points over the egoist framework offered here.
5 In a few of these cases, liberalizers were the main agenda- and ccnstraint-setters on what happened with the
compensation, but it isn't clear whether the compensation was introduced for expediency (hence egoistic bargaining)
or equity (hence norms or standards of fairness) reasons.
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Finally, there are some cases where the welfare and jurisdictional conditions have to share
explanatory credit with other institutional conditions. For instance, the generosity and
supranationality of EC compensation has plenty to do with budgetary capacities, and with
information-gathering capacities of the EC Commission. And the last minute NAFTA
compensation has a lot to do with the institution of Fast Track negotiating authority that precluded
liberalizers from resorting to protectionist exemptions and revisions in order to buy support of the
agreement -- given that Congress was allo , .d only an "up or down" vote on the international
agreement, not any amendments.
In short, the egoist bargaining framework with its focus on protectionist power-platforms
and on the institutional setting's jurisdiction-welfare has to share explanatory space with their
alternatives. But the history still suggests that my approach can explain more of the variation than
the altruist perspective and/or liberalizer and other institutional constraints.
3.3. Explaining the Wealth of US-EC Compensated Liberalization
The final standard by which we can judge the theory of compensated liberalization is the
amount of variation in the US and EC comparisons that the theory can explain. I believe that the
theory does a pretty good job accounting for the broadest patterns of variation in the US and EC
cases: that US compensated liberalization tends to be inconsistent in incidence across time and
group, modest in scale and scope, and nafional/domnestic in the institutions through wlhich
compensation is bargained and provided, whereas EC compensated liberalization tends to be more
consistent, generous and s,,pra-national. And in some important details within and across episoces
-- like the advent of US side payments in 1962, or the exceptional scale and scope of NAFTA
compensation -- the theory provides a pretty strong account.
The history contains many other details, however, that the theory cannot adequately
explain. As we have already seen, this is true for the wine-gallon compensation in 1979, where
the theory does not predict any compensation given the liquor industry's single-issue platform.
And it is true for the differences between the compensation packages in the NAFTA, where the
theory predicts more parity in the generosity of the Labor and environmental tri-national institutions
and other side payment packages, but where liberalizer constraints appear to have yielded a less
generous Labor package.
Beyond the variation that cannot bt, explained because of anomalies, however, the history
also showed variation in compensation that was not in any event predictable ex ante by the theory.
For some cases like the Lumber compensation in 1962, and the wine-gallon compensation in 1979
the theory 1 develop makes at least partial sense of the compensation, since in both cases the
incidental power resources allowed the groups to threaten passage of the liberalization. But such
566
Burgeon
Conciasion
resources can only be measured ex post, when we can look back on the various incidental sources
of power. In this sense, the predictive power of the theory can be quite limited.
In any event, the cases also show variation outside the explanatory orbit of the theory
developed here. For instance, the history shows huge variation in the content or form of
compensation that also merit explanation, but which the egoist theory focused on protectionist
power-platforms and on institutional welfare/jurisdiction cannot explain. For instance, the EC
cases showed important narrowing in the focus of compensation from a diversity of subjects like
harmonization, to structural fund compensation. As we saw in the end of Chapter Seven, such a
shift can be understood in light of the egoist bargaining framework I propose, but not in light of
the particular group and institutional conditions on which I focus. Instead, liberalizer constraints
again entered the fray, as did other institutional conditions like budgetary capacities. Such a
shortcoming in the theory simply means that other conditions might need to be incerporated into
the framework to explain details as opposed to basic incidence of compensation.
4. The Future and the Possible: Using Compensation to Better Humanize and Facilitate Openness
With this (over-) abundance of findings about compensated liberalization in the past, what
can be said about the future? One thing we know is that the distributional conflict and policy
dilemmas of increasing economic openness are likely to be as acute in our future as in our past.
Close to home, we know that trade liberalization continues to be a central component of US foreign
economic policy, with continued expansion and deepening of the GATT/WTO multilateral trade
liberalization, with extension of the NAFTA to other Latin American countries, and with bilateral
and regional trade liberalization with Asia and Europe. And we know that such liberalization
continues to provoke intense distributional conflict -- most recently evidenced in the US by the
post-ponement of Fast Track negotiating authority for these various liberalization efforts, a delay
fueled by deep reservations about openness among labor and environmental groups and their
Coilgressional representatives. Such conflict on this, and a greater scale, brews throughout the
developed and developing world.
At the same time, political economic developments have also heightened the policy
dilemmas countries face in trying to deal with such conflict. As we saw in Chapters One and
Seven, one of the ways industrialized countries have traditionally dealt with distributional conflict
of openness has been to erect a variety of welfare and other broad policy arrangements to cushion
the pain and mitigate the risk of economic openness -- through a diffuse process that we have seen
was generally separate from side payment politics. Such embedding of liberalism, however, has in
recent years come under attack by deepening economic globalization. No longer do we see the
most open countries, or the countries that move toward greater openness, correlated with greater
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welfare and other government expenditures. As a number of scholars contend, the withering of
this correlation can be explained by fiscal constraints imposed on countries by more extensive
globalization of commercial and financial markets -- encouraging capital flight from higher
taxation, competition in regulatory laxity, etc. (Rodrik 1997; Ruggie 1995). Even if countries
retain some room for fiscal maneuver and for social democratic. exceptionalism (Garrett 1997), the
future seems likely to pose more rather than fewer constraints on this particular strategy for dealing
with the conflict and dilemmas of openness.
The result, of course, is that the strategy of uncompensated liberalization (humanized via
diffuse embedding of liberalism) is likely to become less viable and attractive in political life, while
compromised liberalization or protectionist closure is likely to become more tempting. Indeed,
these are precisely the developments that have inspired free-market liberals such as Rodrik and
Ruggie to sound the alarm of -- and more left-oriented progressives like Greider and Faux to sound
the battle cry of -- a protectionist back-lash against openness.
Although pundits and scholars in both of these camps don't recognize the point, it is
precisely this heightened dilemma of globalization that makes compeasation an increasingly
important method of controlling the distributional conflict and policy dilemmas posed by greater
economic openness. The last six empirical chapters have tried to show that such compensation,
despite falling short of its promise to humanize and facilitate freer trade, has at least sometimes
done both. And we have seen also that such compensation has not been, and need not be, a
significant fiscal burden -- even the EC Structural Funds can be said to be modest compared to
domestic welfare arrangements. If uncompensated liberalization with the possibility of sustained
or increased welfare arrangements is not viable, the provision of fiscally modest compensation
becomes one of the only alternatives to some kind of protectionism. Side payment compensation,
in other words, may turn out to be the only game in town.
4.1. What is to be Done?: A Few Recommendations for Liberalizers and Protectionists
While side payment compensation may increasingly be the most promising way countries
might realize the benefits while mitigating the social costs of econonmic openness, this dissertation
has taught us that compensation is not a panacea for what ails us, in that it hasn't always or
sufficiently off-set the social costs of and facilitated freer trade. It has also taught us that
compensation is, in any event, a relatively elusive creation of political str,.ggles over liberalization.
The question, then, is what can be done? What does our understanding of the political conditions
under which compensation has been provided, and of when and how compensation has fulfilled or
fallen short of its promise, tell us can be done to better humanize and facilitate openn-cs?
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First and most generally, the study tells us that side payments can be a useful tool for
mitigating the social costs of and facilitating trade liberalization -- a tool that could stand more use -
- if compensation packages are well-designed. Well-designed side payments, the study suggests,
need to strike a balance between the compensation's equity purpose (to off-set social costs) and its
efficiency purpose (to facilitate openness), and between its long-term and short-term benefits. In
general, fulfilling the equity purposes of compensation means designing benefits that off-set real
losses and risks of the victims of a particular liberalization, without inviting abuses or demands
from less affected groups and without imposing high third party costs. Fulfilling the efficiency
purposes requires both addressing the demands of powerful groups who can stand in the way of
the liberalization, and promoting economic adjustment out of less competitive sectors. Sometimes
there's a tension between these purposes, as when compensation seeks to help and buy off the
politically most well-placed protectionists who are far from the most aggrieved and who demand
side benefits that are costly but easy for legislatures to implement.
Balancing the long and short term benefits of compensation can also be tricky. On the one
hand, compensation should be designed to either steer fully clear of preexisting and more general
welfare arrangements, or should provide benefits through improvement in those arrangements.
This will safeguard compensation from competing with or undermining those broader
arrangements. On the other hand, to actually provide redress, compensation packages need to be
easily approved by domestic legislatures, and to provide quick and visible relief. This argues in
favor of more targeted compensation benefits. And when such compensation is targeted to help
dislocated workers, it will likely be institutionally separate from but overlap broader welfare
arrangements. Finally, compensation packages must also strike a balance between long and short-
term efficiency. On the one hand, they should promote adjustment out of non-competitive activity,
and minimize the financial cost of programs, especially costs to third parties. On the other, what
protectionists demand as buy-offs in exchange for liberalization may require less adjustment-
oriented benefits and/or benefits to those with more political influence than vulnerability.
What, then, can liberalizers and protectionists do to bring about such balanced
compensation? First, liberalizers can offer and accept compensation that strikes a balance between
long-and short-term benefits, and between efficiency and equity purposes of compensation. The
cases reveal examples of liberalizers doing just that, such as the most recent revisions of US trade
adjustment assiscance and the trilateral environmental monitoring institutions under the NAFTA.
Second, liberalizers need to design compensation packages mindful of the history of past
compensated liberalization. In particular, they need to remember that past compensation packages
may have been designed or implemented in a way that undermines the receptiveness of various
groups to any new compensation. For instance, the US cases revealed the disappointing
implementation of the early Trade Adjustment Assistance program made protectionist groups and
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their legislative champions wary of adjustment assistance and compensation generally. Any future
compensation needs to confront this wariness by being explicitly distinct from and better than the
previous compensation programs and administrative procedures that protectionists distrust. And
the compensation liberalizations consider should target particular needs and worries that
protectionists express.
For protectionists, the study suggests a simple recommendation: Approach trade initiatives
with more multi-issue trade platforms, rather than single-minded protectionism. This will likely
yield better outcomes, even measured by the narrow interests of some protectionists, and even if
the liberalization in question may be "killable." Rarely has the tension between doing what is
necessary to kill liberalization and what is necessary to get a more humane liberalization been so
great that groups were better off with unconditional protectionism. This means that not only is a
multi-issue stance better for aggregate welfare, it usually doesn't hurt and probably inspires better
results for vulnerable groups. And where compensation has been poorly provided in the past, it
may be better to fight for improved compensation than to "throw the baby out with the bath-water"
through unconditional protectionism.
These three recommendations apply to many contemporary struggles over economic
openness, and can be illustrated in reference to the recent struggle in the US over Congressional
approval of "Fast Track" negotiating authority for future trade liberalization. The Clinton
Administration tried to assemble a winning coalition behind the Fast Track by crafting a series of
compensation packages, including more funding and reform of worker and community adjustment
assistance, and a very modest and ill-specified push for labor rights through the International Labor
Organization. This failed to buy enough support from Democratic legislators sympathetic with the
concerns of organized labor and environmental groups. It failed in part because organized labor
and other protectionists, remembering past disappointments, have long since lost interest in
adjustment assistance as the substance of compensation. Labor and environmental groups do, in
fact, have multi-issue trade platforms, but the demands involve protections for labor rights and
environmental standards rather than adjustment assistance. Yet, given recent unconditional stances
of many protectionist groups, many liberalizers reasonably construe this new platform as an
attempt to exploit "fair trade" protection of standards as a vehicle to close down international trade.
The above recommendations suggest how both protectionist and liberalizers could do
better. Labor and environmental groups should clarify their platform to include the possibility of
genuine and ambitious labor and environmental action as a possible subject of side payment
linkage, separate from the negotiated trade liberalization -- even if they at the same time call for
inclusion of labor and environmental standards with main trade liberalization, with the threat of
trade sanctions against countries unwilling to protect agreed-upon standards. These same
protectionist groups should also consider ways in which adjustment assistance -- either as a stand-
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alone program or, better, as part of more comprehensive active labor market policy reform -- could
be a useful form of compensation in exchange tor moderated opposition or outright support.
Meanwhile, the Clinton Administration and their liberalizer allies should consider
compensation packages that give meaningful redress to a protectionist coalition with a different
platform than a decade ago, and a coalition skeptical of past compensation failures. Liberalizers
should again offer new and improved adjustment assistance, possibly connected to more general
labor market policy reform -- in any event in a stable form that will resist retrenchment in the
liberalization off-season. And more promising still, liberalizers could offer genuine policy reform,
action, and funding on international labor and environmental standards through bilateral and
multilateral initiatives separate from trade negotiations -- involving, say, the International Labor
Organization. Such compensation packages would off-set important social costs of liberalization
and would likely defuse a lot of protectionist opposition -- more so, certainly, than recent
compensation efforts. And precisely oecause such efforts would not compromise the liberalization
to be negotiated and would possibly buy necessary support for such liberalization, groups wary of
"polluting" trade policy with labor and environmental standards will not likely oppose the result.
5. Further Research to Improve and Extend Our Understanding of Compensatory Side Payments
Better advice on how to better humanize and facilitate freer trade will require better
information and research on compensated liberalization. And by way of conclusion, I want to
identify seve,:al avenues of further research that will improve and extend the research begun here.
In keeping with the three-way focus of the study, I consider such avenues for better describing,
evaluating and explaining compensated liberalization. And then I consider avenues for extending
the research into the use of side payments in other empirical settings and areas of political life.
5.1. Better Description and Evaluation
This study's description of compensated liberalization provided an account of the mix of
outcomes during struggle over liberalization -- compensated, compromised, and uncompensated
liberalization. The problems in such description were that the description may have missed back-
room exchanges, may have misinterpreted some buy-off motivations as necessary to the offer of
some policy that then gets registered here as side payments, and may have discounted the side
payment underpinnings of policies provided subsequent to the liberalization episode under review.
To better describe the incidence of compensated liberalization, then, further research could: (1)
look more closely at back-room deals, using more interviews than this study relied upon; (2) look
in more detail at the causal importance of the political buy-off motives surrounding some policies,
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such as the EC Structural Funds expansion, relative to other causes; and (3) consider in more detail
the micro-politics of policies that benefit the victims of some liberalization, but that are provided
subsequent to the liberalization -- policies such as state aids in Europe.
This study's evaluation of side payment compensation was more complicated and had more
blind- and rough-spots. I believe that the information gathered on the short- and medium-term
costs and benefits of compensation -- the scale and distribution of redress provided, of the scale
and distribution of the costs of that provision, and the defusion of existing political opposition --
was about as good as one can hope to gather. But information on possible rent-seeking and
extortionate abuse could use more focused study. More importantly, the longer-term consequences
of side payments in humanizing or facilitating openness needs further study. Not only do we need
better implementation studies focused on the scale of redress provided and of the economic
adjustment facilitated, but we also need some study into the unintended costs of side payments that
this study unearthed. This would entail some research into the politics of welfare and industrial
policy-making -- at the national and, in the case of the EU, supra-national levels -- with an eye to
the role that beliefs and political coalitions crafted over past compensation play in those politics.
5.2. Better Explanation: Refining the Egoist Theory of Compensated Liberalization
The case studies and this conclusion tried to show that my egoist theory of the incidence of
compensation (1) was broadly corroborated by the US and EC histories, (2) fit that history more
closely than its altruist or other alternatives, and (3) explained much of the variation in that history.
But we have seen that the egoist theory I have defended has problems with all three of these
challenges. In particular, the illustration and testing of the theory have revealed that, within the
egoistic framework I propose, giving pride of place to protectionist power and platforms, and to
institutional welfare and jurisdiction has its limits: These conditions prove to be both unnecessary
and insufficient to the provision of compensation, they do not always explain more than their
alternatives, and there are aspects of US and EC variation that they cannot explain. In light of
these weaknesses, consider three kinds of improvements to the theory of compensated
liberalization that further research could develop.
5.2.1. Taking Anomalies Seriously: First, further research needs to refine the egoist theory
to take better account of liberalizer agenda-setting and constraints that underlie specific anomalies to
my focus on protectionist power and platforms. We learned that the positioning of liberalizers
sometimes set the bargaining agenda in side payment politics, as much as did the coincidence of
protectionist power and platforms. And we learned that liberalizer positions sometimes set
important constraints on what compensation is actually supplied in response to protectionist
demands. Even though protectionist power and platforms explicitly encompass conditions on both
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the demand and supply sides of side payment politics, these anomalies suggest that the egoist
framework needs to be refined to take more explicit and developed account of liberalizer
positioning. As Chapter One showed, such conditions explicitly fit into the bargaining framework
I developed, expressed in the premise and Edgeworth Box representations of bargaining. But I
believed that protectionist power and platform conditions matter more and are more measurable
than the liberalizer positioning and constraints, and so assumed liberalizer constraints could
condition the incidence of side payment politics but could be abstracted from. Since this
assumption is only partly correct, future research should more explicitly consider and develop the
role liberalizer positions play in shaping and constraining the incidence of side payments. This
requires finding more measurable indices of liberalizer agenda-setting and constraints -- measures
that go beyond post-hoc observations I have made in applying my theory to the history.
5.2.2. Deducing New Hypotheses from the Egoist Bargaining Framework: Second,
further research should develop and test some of the hypotheses that can be deduced from the
egoist framework I proposed in Chapter One. That framework was premised on the idea that
compensation gets brought into bargaining when liberalizers see compensation as necessary and as
a desirable substitute for protection, and when protectionists see compensation as an imperfect
substitute for protection. Throughout the thesis I have used the heuristic of Edgeworth boxes to
capture this framework and particular applications of it to explain the US and EC history. The
focus on power and platforms, and on the welfare and jurisdiction of institutional settings grew out
of that framework, as can any refinements that look at liberalizer constraints. But Chapter One also
suggested that other propositions can be deduced from the framework.
By way of illustration, consider one such proposition. The framework suggests that the
amount of compensation likely to be exchanged for a given amount of liberalization (ratio or
compensation to liberalization) will vary depending on the preferences of liberalizers and
protectionists. All other things being equal, the more favorably liberalizers look upon
compensation as a substitute for protection, the lower the ratio of liberalization (change in
protection) to compensation -- meaning that egoistic bargaining will tend to yield less liberalization
bang for the compensation buck. And all other things equal, the more favorably protectionists look
upon compensation as a substitute for protection, the higherthe ratio of liberalization to
compensation -- meaning egoistic bargaining will tend to yield more liberalization bang for the
compensation buck. Such a hypothesis can refine our expectations and understanding of the mix
of liberalization and compensation to anticipate from bargaining over liberalization.
Figure 8.1 expresses this idea through the slopes of the respective indifference curves in
the Edgeworth space, with the resulting zones of possible agreement suggesting the likely
bargaining outcomes (some ratio of compensation to liberalization). For a given protectionist curve
P(a), a flatter liberalizer curve, L(b), yields a higher ratio of compensation to liberalization, x:a
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(more compensation for a given amount of liberalization), while a steeper liberalizer curve, L(a),
yields a lower compensation-to-liberalization ratio y:b (less compensation for a given amount of
liberalization). And for a given liberalizer curve L(a), a flatter protectionist curve P(a) yields a
higher compensation-to-liberalization ratio x:a (more compensation for a given amount of
liberalization), while a steeper protectionist curve P(b) yields a lower compensation-to-
liberalization ratio z:c (less compensation for a given amount of liberalization).6
Figure 8.1
Varying Willingness of Liberalizers and Protectionists to Exchange Protection
for Compensation Should Yield Predictably Different Mixes of Compensation and Liberalization
Trade
Protection
(a)
P(b)
L(a)
Compensation
Such a hypothesis, however, is difficult to apply empirically because of difficulties
operationalizing "protectionism" and "compensation" levels, not to mention liberalizer and
protectionist preferences over linking compensation to protection. To put this and other
6 The ratios of compensation to liberalization represent likely averages to result from the different protectionist and
liberalizer indifference curves, and the different zones of possible agreement they create. If information is perfect and
other bargaining transaction costs are low and power not an issue, then liberalizers and protectionists will reach
agreement somewhere on the contract curve at the pareto frontier. The positioning of these contract curves differ
depending on the pareto space created by the respective curves. The graph roughly suggests that the bargaining
outcome on the respective contract curves will entail the protectionists and liberalizers sharing the gains of exchange
equitably. But the theory predicts that agreement can be reached at any point on that curve. The point is that the
ratios created by any range of outcomes will, all other things being equal, yield predictable differences in the ratio of
liberalization and compensation -- consistent with the different ratios captured in Figure 8.1.
574
Burgoon
Conclusion
hypotheses to work, future research could find better measures of these variables, so as to support
more refined hypotheses about the likely mix of protectionism and compensation in bargaining
over liberalization.
5.2.3. Generating New Hypotheses Through Induction: Third and finally, further research
into the origins of side payment compensation should look to a number of factors that the case
studies inductively suggest can explain important patterns of compensation. One such factor is the
identity of the protectionist groups engaged in bargaining, that may affect the compensation likely
to be demanded: The cases showed different kinds of side payment politics when the protectionist
groups are interest groups appealing to legislatures or executive leaders for redress, and when the
protectionist demanders are legislative agents representing protectionist firms or workers as
members of their constituency. The legislative agents acting on behalf of protectionist members of
a constituency may well demand compensation that has little to with the real pain caused by
liberalization, and may have an easier time making extortionate or rent-seeking demands. Further
study could investigate this hypothesis.
The cases also suggested a number of institutional conditions other than welfare and
jurisdiction, an important one of which was whether legislative rules exist that limit the legality or
possibility of providing protectionist exemption or revision to some proposed liberalization. Such
rules should inspire, on the whole, more side payments than settings without such rules. The Fast
Track voting procedures guiding US liberalization ever since the 1974 Trade Reform Act is such an
institutional rule, where liberalizers are not allowed to change an internationally agreed-upon
liberalization initiative when considering ratification. This tempts liberalizers to resort to
compensation and other non-trade-related buy-offs to secure ratification.
5.3. Extending Research to New Empirical Settings and Policies
Whether or not further research can significantly improve upon the techniques for
describing, evaluating, and explaining compensated liberalization, it should consider the use of
side payments in other empirical settings and policy areas. Sticking close to this study's focus,
further study should consider compensation EC trade relations with "third" countries, in the
context of both multilateral and bilateral trade arrangements. The use of side payments in these
external relations can be expected to differ significantly from those in internal-market relations, in
that the integration project and institutions do not so clearly constrain bargaining dynamics when
the trade issue at hand is external market liberalization. Still in the realm of trade liberalization,
further research should consider the use of side payments by and among other industrialized
countries other than the US and EC members -- to include, especially Asian economies. Japan, for
instance, differs from the Western economies in how the polity responds to the distributional
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conflict arising from openness. Side payment compensation plays a significant role in that
response, though we currently don't know how such compensation differs in its origins and
usefulness compared to the use of compensation in the US and Europe. Finally, compensation has
a role to play in theory, if not in past experience, in developing countr)' trade liberalizalion.
Beyond trade liberalization, of course, countries spark distributional conflict in the other
ways in which they move from more to less regulated economic life. Liberalization on an
international scale includes financial markets as well as commercial exchange, and financial
deregulation sparks significant but different distributional conflict in which side payments might
again play a role. And industrialized, developing, and transitional economies have over the last
several decades experimented with and sought several kinds of domestic deregulation and
privatization of industries and services. Such privatization creates conflict and policy dilemmas as
acute as those sparked by trade liberalization, and the use of compensation and other forms of
redress has played an important role in those politics. Here, Carol Graham's work on transitional
and developing economies provides a number of useful insights with which the compensated
liberalization experience discussed in this study should be compared (Graham 1994, 1997).
Finally, exposing an economy to market forces is not the only issue in political life that
sparks distributional conflict over a change that benefits society as a whole but has costs for groups
within. Indeed, modern political life is crammed with such issues. For instance, they include a
host of global commons and environmental issues like control of greenhouse gasses, acid rain,
over-fishing, deforestation, and waste facility siting. The international and domestic politics over
these issues have been testing grounds for a variety of different kinds of side payment
compensation, with experiences that can be compared to the tale of compensated liberalization told
here. Mindful of the promise, pitfalls, and political complexity of compensation, further research
into all these areas can reveal better ways not only to humanize and facilitate economic openness,
but also to better reconcile the innumerable tensions between particularistic and general interests.
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